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
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
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Cythera
Rhodus
MYRTOUM

THE MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BY

WILLIAM L. SNYDER

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

BOSTON: RICHARD G. BADGER

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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

OUR knowledge of the Persian Wars is derived chiefly from Herodotus. Fortunately for posterity the writings of the first great historian have escaped the ravages of time. After the lapse of centuries, we may read his charming account of the manners, customs and traditions of the nations of antiquity, and also concerning the wars and conquests embraced in their military annals. The attempt of Asia, under the control of a single individual, to reduce to slavery the free cities of Hellas, presents one of the most fascinating stories in recorded history.

It is difficult to realize the extent of the power of Cyrus and Cambyses, of Darius and Xerxes, who ruled the eastern world, when we remember that without exception all within their vast dominions were abject slaves. At the request of Haman, Ahasuerus (Artaxerxes) issued a decree "to destroy, to kill, and to cause to perish all Jews, both young and old, little children and women in one day." At the request of Queen Esther the decree was reversed, and at the king's command, Haman and the entire race of Agag perished. It is now reasonably certain, that the Amestris of Herodotus was the Vashti of Esther.

The writings of Herodotus are the source from which, to a very large extent, modern historians derive the facts concerning the early history of the Hellenic people, and more especially with regard to the Persian Wars; as Thucydides is the principle source of our in-

formation concerning the Peloponnesian War and the causes which led to it.

The accuracy of the events recorded by Herodotus with regard to the Persian Wars is now generally conceded. His account of the forces of Xerxes which were reviewed at Doriskus, on the plains of Thrace in the valley of the Hebrus, has been questioned by some eminent scholars. Their criticism is confined chiefly to the numbers which Herodotus says the Persian monarch led on his expedition to enslave Hellas. Among his critics the ablest are Rawlinson, Grote and Heeran, all of them accomplished scholars and historians. One circumstance with regard to their criticism is difficult to explain. Professor Heeran, in his work entitled "Commerce of the Ancient World," [1] sustains the accuracy of the account of the forces of Xerxes. The author believes that there was a muster roll of these forces to which Herodotus had access. On the other hand, Mr. Grote contends that there never was any muster roll, while Canon Rawlinson assumes that there must have been a muster roll and Herodotus must have seen it. In this connection Mr. Grote, after referring to the numbers of the Persian hosts, observes: "So stands the prodigious estimate of his army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus. . . . To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near it, is obviously impossible, yet the disparaging remarks it has drawn upon Herodotus are no way merited." [2]

Canon Rawlinson on the other hand declares that it can scarcely be doubted that the numbers given are considerably beyond the truth. He then gives his estimate as to what he thinks Herodotus should have stated with regard to the strength of Xerxes' army. And yet

[1] Part 1, Sec. 1, pp. 162, 558, 3d Edition.
[2] Grote Hist. Greece, Vol. 5, p. 35.

Mr. Rawlinson is one of the fairest critics of the great historian, and says that the figures he gives are accurate; they contain no arithmetical errors, but he challenges the correctness of the results. Yet neither Mr. Grote nor Canon Rawlinson have advanced any facts, or produced any evidence whatever to sustain their conclusions.

Dogmatic denial, without more, amounts to nothing, except the personal views of the individual making the denial. When the historian presents facts in chronological sequence, and supports his narrative with abundant corroborative details, he has made a *prima facie* case. When the critic says I don't credit the story, his declaration proves nothing. It is a mere conclusion without evidence to support it. In order to discredit history, evidence must be produced to warrant the conclusion that the narrative is incorrect or without foundation. It is true that the writings of Herodotus are interspersed with legend and fable, and stories current in his time. But he is always careful to discriminate as to the facts of history, as distinguished from matters which deal with gossip and legend. For example, he tells a story of how Scyllias of Scyone, described as the best diver of his time, deserted the Persians and joined the Greeks at Artemisium. How he escaped, he says, he cannot certainly affirm, and wondered whether the account concerning it was true, because it was said "that having plunged into the sea at Aphetæ, he never rose until he reached Artemisium, having passed this distance through the sea, as near as can be, eighty stadia (more than seven miles). Many other things are related of this man that are very like falsehood, and some that are true. If, however, I may give my opinion of this matter, it is that he came to Artemisium in a boat." [1] Yet some

[1] Herod. viii, 8.

who delight to indulge in caustic criticism, do not give Herodotus credit for his frank avowal that he does not believe the story.

In reaching a just conclusion as to the accuracy of the strength of the army of Xerxes certain facts must be taken into consideration. In this connection we may ask what was the population of the vast domain over which Xerxes exercised absolute authority. His empire was the most extensive the world had ever seen. Over all the inhabitants within its borders his jurisdiction was supreme. His power extended to their property not only, but to their lives. Without exception, there was not a free man in his dominions. In one sense, they were not subjects, they were abject bondmen, chattels, slaves.

If we could estimate the total population of the Persian Empire in that age, we would be able more readily to appreciate the truth as to the number of fighting men, recruited from forty-six nations in Asia and Africa.

The population of these countries including Europe was calculated in 1890 by Wagner, a celebrated German geographer, as follows: Asia, 875,000,000; Africa, 170,000,000; Europe, 392,000,000. In all, 1,437,000,000.

According to the book of Esther, the kingdom of Ahasuerus embraced one hundred and twenty-seven provinces from India to Ethiopia. Herodotus does not give the number of provinces in the empire of Xerxes, but refers to the forces drawn from forty-six nations within his realm.[1]

The form of government of the Spartan oligarchy, as revealed in the rhetra of Lycurgus, the constitution of Solon and the modification of his laws by Clisthenes,

[1] For a discussion as to the numerical strength of the army of Xerxes, see Chapter XVII, page 274.

who established the ten Attic tribes, are interesting features and necessary to an understanding of the character of the Hellenic people. They derived their military ideals from the poems of Homer, whose works are discussed. Homer was endeared to the Greeks, as the poetical books of the Old Testament were to the Israelites. In this connection the chapter on Biblical and Homeric Literature will interest. From Homer, also, Alexander the Great, who believed himself to be a direct lineal descendant of Achilles, derived the inspiration which prompted him to conquer the world.

Sketches of the eminent men who contributed to make Athens the most interesting city of antiquity are necessary, also, to a study of the Military Annals of Greece.

Wm. L. Snyder.

New York, November, 1914.

MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT HELLAS AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES

EXTENDING from the southern rim of Europe three peninsulas project into the Mediterranean. The Iberian, the most westerly, embracing Spain and Portugal; the middle, Italy; and the most easterly and smallest of the three, Greece, known to the ancients as Hellas. One thing which impresses itself upon the mind of the student is the narrow limits embraced in the geographical outlines of this land, which has filled the world with its fame.

If the Hellenic peninsula, excluding Thessaly and Epirus, were projected on a horizontal plane, between parallel lines, without regard to its indented coast and crooked shore line, it would rest within almost a perfect square, which would measure one hundred and fifty-five miles across from east to west, and one hundred and eighty-five miles in length from north to south. In other words the territory embracing the confines of ancient Hellas could be placed within a parallelogram, one hundred and fifty-five miles in breadth, and one hundred and eighty-five miles in length on either side. Hellas, thus defined, includes the country south of Thessaly and Epirus, including the peninsula, south of

the gulf of Corinth, designated the Peloponnesus, divided geographically as Central and Southern Greece, lying between the thirty-ninth parallel and a line thirty-five minutes north of the thirty-sixth parallel, north latitude.

Central Greece is bounded on the south by the gulf of Corinth, the Corinthian isthmus, and the Saronic Gulf; by Epirus and Thessaly on the north; by the Ægean sea on the east, and the Ionian on the west. The states within this territory are Acarnania, Ætolia, Locris, Phocis and Bœotia, all forming the northern boundary of the gulf of Corinth; Malis, Locris, and Doris, the latter being the smallest of all, and the only state which does not border on the sea; Megara, which joins the isthmus of Corinth, and Attica which forms a peninsula jutting into the Ægean sea which washes the eastern shores and the Saronic gulf on the south and west. The island of Eubœa, also, separated from Locris, Bœotia, and Attica by the crooked channel of Eubœa, forms part of the territory of Central Greece.

The four principal cities in Eubœa are Histiæa on the north, Carystus on the south, and Eretria and Chalcis on the Euripus or narrow part of the channel in the centre. In Attica is Athens and the sacred town of Eleusis. In Bœotia is Thebes, Tanagra, Delium, Platæa, Chæronea (the birthplace of Plutarch), Coronea and Orchomenus (distinguished from a town of the same name in Arcadia). Delphi and Crissa are in Phocis; Naupactus is in Locris on the gulf of Corinth, as distinguished from Locris on the gulf of Malis. Heraclea, Stratus, Thyrrheum and Anactorium are in Acarnania, as is also the peninsula of Actium, memorable in Roman times as the locality of the naval engagement which sealed the fate of Antony and Cleopatra. Thermopylæ is in Locris on the gulf of Malis. Megara is on the isthmus in Megara.

Southern Greece, or the Peloponnesian peninsula, embraces six states. On the north are Achaia, Argolis and Elis; Arcadia is in the centre. The southern part of the peninsula embraces Laconia on the east and Messenia on the west. Patras is in Achaia. Olympia, Elis and Pylos are in Elis. Corinth, Sicyone, Argos, Mycene, Tiryns, Nauplia, Epidaurus and Troezen are in Argolis. Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenus and Megalopolis are in Arcadia. In Laconia is the lovely hollow Lacedæmon (Sparta), Amyclæ and Prasiæ. In Messene is the capital bearing the same name. Pheræ (the modern Calamata), Mount Ithome, and the Boar's Grave, famous in the Messenian Wars. On its western coast is the bay of Pylos (now the bay of Navarino) and the island of Sphacteria, on which Cleon captured the flower of the Spartan army in the first decade of the Peloponnesian War.

"Greece is all mountains, gulfs and bays." It is said that no place in Greece is more than forty miles from the sea. The island of Salamis, in the Saronic Gulf, is a chain of hills or low mountains. The Attic plain is surrounded by a chain of mountains called respectively Parnes, Pentellicus and Hymettus. The Citheron range forms its boundary with Bœotia. Mount Icarius and the Gerania Mountains cover Megara. The principal mountains in Laconia which form in part the valley of the Eurotas are the Taygetus and Parnon ranges, but the entire Peloponnesus is covered with mountains. It is said that Arcadia is perhaps the most mountainous of its six states. Central Greece also is all mountains. Delphi is on Mount Parnassus. Helicon, the seat of the muses, is in Bœotia; Mount Œta forms the wall on the gulf of Malis, at the foot of which, between its base and the sea, is the pass of Thermopylæ, where Leonidas perished. Eubœa is covered with mountains. The famed Olympus, Ossa and Pelion are in Thessaly. The notable rivers are the Eurotas

and the Alpheus in Peloponnesus, the Cephissus in Attica, the Achelous, which forms the boundary between Acarnania and Ætolia, the Euenus in the latter state, the Asopus in Bœotia, the Cephissus in Northern Locris and the Sperchius in Malis.

Greece has the most sinuous, irregular and crooked shore line of any country in the world, occasioned by the fact that its shores are everywhere indented with gulfs and bays innumerable. The peninsula is almost cut in two, by the gulf of Corinth on the west and the Saronic gulf on the east. Other indenting seas are the gulfs of Argolis, Laconia, Messenia, Cyparissius, Patras (Lepanto), Ambracicus, Malis, Pagasæus, and the channel of Eubœa. The width of the isthmus of Corinth at its narrow point is a little more than four miles. A canal has been cut across this neck, joining the gulf of Corinth with the Saronic gulf, and the Peloponnesus, since the construction of this waterway is no longer a peninsula, but an island.

The contiguous territory on the north, besides Epirus and Thessaly, is the peninsula of Magensia, which forms the eastern boundary of that state, and Dolopes, which in like manner forms part of the southern boundary of both Epirus and Thessaly.

In the latter state the river Peneus flows in a northeasterly direction across the country into the Thermaic gulf, or sea of Thrace. About fifteen miles from its mouth it enters the valley between the mountain ranges of Ossa and Olympus. This picturesque territory, known as the Vale of Tempe, has inspired poetic fancy on account of its varied scenery, which includes some of the most charming and beautiful landscapes in Northern Hellas.

The Vale of Tempe is the only opening into Thessaly through which an army can pass with its equipment and baggage. The walls of the mountains and the narrow defiles rendered it important from a military

standpoint. It is seventy-six miles north of the pass of Thermopylæ, which forms the gateway into Locris and Central Greece.

The contiguous territory on the north is Macedonia, from which projects into the Ægean or sea of Thrace the three-pronged Chalcidian peninsula. To the east stretches ancient Thrace, extending from the eastern borders of Macedonia to the Propontis (sea of Marmora) and the Euxine (Black sea). The Ægean separates Hellas from Asia Minor, in which are located the states of the Asiatic Greeks, namely, Æolis, Ionia and Caria. Among its principal cities were Halicarnassus, the birthplace of Herodotus, Miletus, Priene, Magnesia, Ephesus, Smyrna and Phocæa. South of the Hellespont and north of Lesbos was Troas, in which was Ilium, where Priam established his kingdom.

It may be observed that prior to the Balkan War Macedonia and Thrace were embraced in the Empire of Turkey as well as Asia Minor. Part of the territory known in antiquity as Epirus and Illyria are now in the states of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Servia. The states of Bulgaria, Roumania and Eastern Roumelia were earlier known as Thrace, and north of the Ister (Danube), the country was designated Scythia.

CHAPTER II

PRIMITIVE INHABITANTS OF PRE-HISTORIC HELLAS — ANTIQUITY OF MAN — TABLE OF EARLY CHRONOLOGY

WITH the possible exception of the Israelites, who trace their genealogy direct to Adam, the supposed father of the human race, what knowledge we have concerning the people who first inhabited the Grecian peninsula, like our knowledge with respect to the primitive inhabitants of every country on the globe, rests upon tradition, upon legend and fable.

The theory obtains, among modern scholars, that as early as B. C. 3000, which according to the Hebrew chronology would ante-date the flood, the date of which is presumed to be B. C. 2438, emigrants from Western Asia came into Europe, and overspread the Balkan peninsula. Part of this foreign population, it is said, centuries later, pushed southward, overran the Hellenic peninsula, and settled in Epirus, Thessaly, Central Greece and the Peloponnesus. For want of a better name, these newcomers are designated Pelasgians, whose genesis, and ethnological position is extremely uncertain. They are usually spoken of as a nomadic race, composed of shepherds and hunters. We are told that they dwelt in tents, or huts, from which the smoke escaped through a hole at the top, and were divided into tribes, and that from these tribes were descended the Hellenic race. The contribution of the Hellenes to art, poetry, and philosophy, which distinguished them from other nations of antiquity, and which has been

preserved to us, attest the learning, the culture and the genius of this remarkable people.

This theory with regard to the Pelasgians as progenitors of the Hellenes is full of difficulties. Whom did the Pelasgi find when they advanced through the passes of the Gerania mountains in Megara, crossed the isthmus of Corinth, and reached the plains of Argos, in the Peloponnesus. Who were the inhabitants that dwelt in the land when the Pelasgi entered it. There was a civilization in Argolis, which must have flourished long before the days of Agamemnon and the Trojan War, and long prior to the immigration of the barbarous hordes from the north. The remains of this early civilization can be seen to-day among ruined walls, crumbling arches and empty tombs, at Argos, Mycenæ and Orchomenus, to which we shall refer presently.

Can it be said that the Pelasgi were the first inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, and were driven out by the builders who erected the palaces, the arched galleries, casements, chambers, and the "bee-hive tombs" in Argolis and Arcadia? If so, these civilized people were post-Pelasgian. It is obvious that this theory cannot obtain, because the Pelasgi were barbarians, ignorant of the art of war, and unable to construct engines for purposes of assault necessary to dislodge an enemy entrenched behind fortifications and walls, which were, in some instances, more than fifty feet thick. The builders of Tiryns and Mycenæ brought their civilization perhaps from Mesopotamia, perhaps from Egypt. Others contend that the earliest civilization of mankind existed in Babylonia and Western Asia, not in Egypt. But this surmise is mere speculation. For want of a better name, the Greeks called the masonry in the plain of Argos, Cyclopean, the work of the Cyclops, a legendary race of giants, who, it was supposed, were the early inhabitants of the country.

The traveler who visits the plain of Argos, will wander through the ruins of the acropolis at Tiryns and then journey to Mycenæ. There is little left of ancient Argos, save the seats of the theatre on the hillside, near the modern railway station, which retains the name of the old city. At Tiryns, he will climb the eminence on which once stood a great palace, and note the walls of Cyclopean masonry, the remains of which still rise many feet above the base of the acropolis. This wall is constructed of tremendous blocks of rough stone, but from the appearance of the wall it is obvious that no cement or mortar was used in its construction. When he descends by the stone staircase from the ground floor of the palace, which once crowned the summit of the acropolis, to what must have been a sort of terrace or approach to the upper walls, he will enter a long hall, built of huge stones, constructed similar to the outer wall without mortar, the ceiling being of stones forming a sort of arched roof. The outer side of this stone hall is pierced by openings which lead into chambers, all perfectly constructed of blocks of unpolished stone.

At Mycenæ, he will find an acropolis or hill, somewhat higher than that of Tiryns, on the top of which stood the palace of Atreus, and his son Agamemnon. The entrance to the remains of the ruins is through the Lyons' Gate, which is centuries old. These lions are carved in stone, represented as standing on either side of a pillar over the entrance, placed on the lintel above the gateway, their forepaws resting against the base of the pillar or column. Here, too, as at Tiryns, can be seen the so-called Cyclopean masonry, the stone galleries, chambers and subterranean passages, believed by archæologists to have been constructed by a people who inhabited the region no one knows how long before the time of Agamemnon. Near the citadel of Mycenæ, the visitor will be shown what are known as the beehive

tombs, above referred to. These ancient repositories of the dead excite the wonder of the traveler because they were undoubtedly the work of a race whose origin is lost in remote antiquity. Some believe that this archaic people came from Western Asia, and employed burial customs similar to those practised in primitive Babylonia. These bee hive or dome-tombs vary in size. There is usually an entrance or vestibule from which you enter the enclosure. The principal tomb at Mycenæ is fifty feet in height from the floor to the apex of the dome. It is constructed of blocks of stone, laid in circles, each circle smaller than the one below on which it rests. All these circles gradually converge till the top is reached. You stand in the centre beneath a cone-shaped dome, rising symmetrically above your head. The style of architecture demonstrates that the people, whoever they were, who built these structures, were acquainted with the principle of the arch. The tomb referred to is believed by some to have been used as the treasury of Atreus, the father of Agamemnon. But doubtless it was built centuries before his time.

There are also in Argolis bridges of this massive Cyclopean masonry, spanning streams, running their tortuous course to the sea, over which roads are constructed. One of these bridges near Epidaurus is in a perfect state of preservation to-day. It is built in the form of an arch, constructed of huge rough blocks of stone laid together without mortar. As we stand and contemplate these perfect remains of remote antiquity, they seem to mock us with the inquiry, who constructed us; to what branch of the human family did our creators belong; in what age did they flourish and whence came they; who taught them to construct these stupendous walls and arches and domes? Were they Cyclopean or Pelasgian, or were they here long before either? These questions remain unanswered, nor have

the modern scholars and sages sufficient data with which to solve them.

We must, therefore, content ourselves with an inquiry as to the Pelasgi and the primitive tribes of Hellas.

In this connection it is interesting to note the observations of the learned Canon Rawlinson in regard to the Pelasgians. He argues that a single homogeneous people ethnically connected, was spread "at the earliest period to which history carries us back, over the whole or by far the greater part of the two peninsulas reaching from the shores of the Ægean to the borders of Liguria." He says it is even doubtful whether we ought not to class with them the Phrygians, the Carians and the Lydians. He is, however, unable to determine the exact position of the Pelasgians in this ethnic group. He says the Leleges, Curetes, Caucones, Dolopes, Dryopes, Bœotians and Thracians "are rather to be regarded as tribes parallel to the Pelasgic than a division of it." He argues further that the skill of the Pelasgi in fortifications was justly celebrated, and is inclined to the opinion that the Cyclopean masonry at Tiryns and Mycenæ are Pelasgian. In support of this theory he says that the unwarlike character of the Pelasgians led them "from the first to trust to walls for their defense against the enemies who assailed them on all sides." As to their destiny he believes they were absorbed in Asia Minor by the Carians, Lydians and Phrygians, while in Italy they were reduced by them to the condition of serfs, and in Hellas by the races more or less nearly akin to them.[1]

Of course all this is theory and speculation, but if Canon Rawlinson's argument is sound the Pelasgi were not nomads, eking out an existence as hunters and shepherds, but were a civilized people who built the

[1] Rawlinson's Herodotus, Appendix to Book VI, Essay II.

luxurious palaces which were erected in the early centuries at Tiryns and Mycenæ. To rank the Pelasgi as a civilized people, acquainted with art and luxury, seems to be entirely repugnant to all the accounts we have concerning them from the ancient writers.

It would seem also, if Canon Rawlinson is correct in his theory, that a homogeneous race, ethnically connected, spread over western Asia, and the Balkan and Italian peninsulas; that conditions existed there in prehistoric times similar to conditions which simultaneously existed on the continent of North America. On this western hemisphere in the territory extending from the Atlantic to the Allegheny Mountains and the Great Lakes, the early explorers found a homogeneous people, ethnically connected, divided into the great nations known as the Algonquin and the Iroquois. They must have lived from remote antiquity in the primitive and savage state, in which they were discovered by European navigators, a little more than four centuries ago. We speak of the Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas and Mohawks, as Iroquois; and of the Ottawas, Ojibways, Pequots, Pottawotomies, Sac and Fox Narragansetts, and many others north of the St. Lawrence, as Algonquins.

If the analogy is worth anything, then it would be safe to assume that the word Pelasgian was not the name of a tribe, but was a generic term, as Iroquois and Algonquin are generic terms intended to embrace people attached to many tribes. If this view is correct, the Leleges, Curetes, Dolopes, Dryopes, Bœotians and many others were tribes, belonging to the great Pelasgian Confederacy, and the Pelasgi were not a mere tribe or branch belonging to a separate ethnic group.

One plausible theory advanced is that the Hellenes and the Pelasgi were contemporaneous people. That the latter first came in collision with the former in

Thessaly. The Hellenes claimed their descent from Helen, son of Deucalion, who survived the deluge, just as the Israelites claim their descent from a branch of the family of Noah, who likewise survived the flood.

The progeny of Deucalion first made their appearance in Hellas, in Phocis, at the foot of Mount Parnassus, for as the ark of Noah, after the waters subsided, is said to have rested on the summit of Ararat, so the Greeks declare the ark of Deucalion rested on the summit of Parnassus. In the early history of every people, the tradition of a flood seems to be universal. The similarity between the account of the deluge recorded in Genesis, with that among the early people of Hellas is marked.

Noah, the son of Lamech, we are told, survived the human race, after its destruction, and was the second father of mankind. The Grecian legends confer upon Deucalion, King of Thessaly, son of Prometheus and Pandora, the distinction which the Hebrew records confer upon Noah. Zeus (who corresponds to the Jehovah of the Hebrews and the Jupiter of the Romans) covered the earth with a deluge, by way of punishment for the impiety of the human race. Deucalion constructed a ship, in which he saved himself and Pyrrha, his wife, who are the progenitors of the second race of men on the globe. The ark of Noah reposed, after the waters subsided on Mount Ararat in Armenia. The ship of Deucalion rested on the top of Mount Parnassus in Phocis, midway between the Gulf of Corinth and the gulf of Malis, from the summit of which, on a clear day may be seen the famous pass of Thermopylæ.

The story of Deucalion is also analogous to the Hebrew record as to his children, from whom the races of mankind descended. We are told in Genesis that the sons of Noah, who went forth from the ark (B. C. 2348), were Shem, Ham and Japheth. Ham is the

father of Canaan. These are the three sons of Noah, and of them was the whole earth overspread.

The Hellenic account is that Deucalion had three sons, Dorus, Xuthus and Æolus, and from these was the whole earth peopled. The descendants of Dorus are known as the Dorians, of Æolus as Æolians. No descendants from Xuthus bear his name, but are known by the names of his two sons, Ion and Achæus, and their descendants, who are known as Ionians and Achæans.



The Æolians went forth from Thessaly and migrated to the south of Greece, as far as the Gulf of Corinth. They crossed the Ægean also, and settled on the coasts of Asia Minor, and on the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos. The Dorians went forth from Macedonia into the Peloponnesus, and settled in Laconia, Argolis and Messenia. They also migrated among the Cyclades, and founded colonies on the island of Crete. The Ionians, known later as Athenians, the brightest and most enterprising of all the descendants of Deucalion, were mariners, and engaged in commerce and exploration. They peopled with their colonies the islands near the eastern shores of the Ægean, south of Tenedos, and north of Crete. The Achæans dwelt in Thessaly before they settled Achaia in the Peloponnesus. They were hunters, shepherds and warriors. Achilles, the most conspicuous hero of the Trojan War, was of Achæan blood, born in Phthiotis, in Thessaly.

No accuracy, however, attaches to this division of the Aryan family, who first occupied Greece and the islands of the Ægean Sea, because when the Dorians, Æolians and Ionians migrated to the south, they found the land already inhabited by the Pelasgians, who doubtless had inhabited it for centuries prior to the Hellenic migrations. And there seems to be no question but that the Pelasgians, wherever they came from, upon their advent into Greece, found the land peopled by tribes whom the Pelasgians must have subjugated or expelled. But as has already been shown, the builders of Mycenæ and Tiryns were a superior race, if indeed they were ante-Pelasgian, and their defeat or extermination by the Pelasgi seems wholly improbable. Indeed, the latest authorities on the subject of anthropology and archæology claim that tribes, of whose history and genesis we know nothing, inhabited the globe for ages prior to the existence of that people, whom we, for convenience, designate historic man.

Herodotus [1] was puzzled to account for the Pelasgi. From what he himself knew, concerning the language and habits of the remnants of the race which were still living in certain parts of Greece, in his day, he indulged in the conjecture that the original Pelasgians did not speak Greek, but used a barbarous language. He then concludes that if Greek was not the language of the Pelasgians, then the Attic race must have changed their language and used Greek, when they took the name of Hellenese, because in another part of his history, he affirms positively that the Attic race was Pelasgian. But he says also that this conclusion is based on speculation and conjecture. In another passage [2] he declares that when the Pelasgians possessed what is now called Greece, the Athenians were Pelas-

[1] Herod. i, 57. [2] Herod. viii, 44.

gians and went by the name of Cranai. During the reign of Cecrops, they were surnamed Cecropidæ, but when Erechtheus succeeded to the government, they changed their name for that of Athenians, and when Ion, son of Xuthus, became their leader, from him they were called Ionians. Herodotus declares also [1] that the Pelasgians drove those descendants of the Argonauts, who had settled on the island of Lemnos, from their homes, and took possession. They were not at that time living in harmony with the Ionians and Athenians, but were at war with the latter. To satisfy their vengeance, "they laid an ambuscade for the Athenian women," who were then engaged celebrating the festival of Diana, in Brauron," [2] seized them, and took them captives to Lemnos and there kept them as concubines. Nor did the Athenians get possession of the island of Lemnos till many years afterwards, when Miltiades, son of Cimon, was governor of the Thracian Chersonese, and took it from the Pelasgians. This Miltiades was the father of the hero of Marathon, and grandfather of the illustrious Cimon, one of the greatest of the naval commanders of Athens.

The Pelasgians, no doubt, inhabited the Grecian peninsula long prior to the Dorian migration. They were there in the Homeric age, a period so remote, that it is not possible for authentic history to penetrate. In the second book of the Iliad, in which is given a catalogue of the ships which conveyed the Greek mariners to the plains of Troy, and the cities and lands from whence they came, the Pelasgians were in the Peloponnese. After referring to Ajax, who led twelve ships from Salamis, and to Mycenæ, the well-built city, and wealthy Corinth, whose vessels were commanded by King Agamemnon, and to many others, the poet refers to the Pelasgians, who were then in the Peloponnese.

[1] Herod. iv, 145. [2] Herod. vi, 138.

"But now [O muse, recount] those, as many as inhabited Pelasgian Argos."

Herodotus, also, referring to the tribes and people who contributed to the vast army of Xerxes, speaking of those from that part of Asia Minor, and the islands along its coast settled by Ionians, part of whom he infers came from the Peloponnese, refers to their Pelasgian origin. Here is the passage. "The Ionians as long as they inhabited that part of the Peloponnesus which is now called Achaia, and before Danaus and Xuthus arrived in the Peloponnesus, as the Greeks say, were called Pelasgian Ægialees; but Ionians, from Ion, son of Xuthus."[1]

We have quoted from Herodotus because he is the earliest secular historian, and lived at a time when descendants of these ancient people were still dwelling in parts of Greece, which had been visited by Herodotus and with whom he came in contact. From his account, and by reason of the reference in Homer to "Pelasgian Argos," it might seem that the Pelasgians were aboriginal ante-Hellenic inhabitants of Greece, and were either driven out by the later migration of Dorians, Æolians and Ionians, or were intermarried and mingled with them in some localities. But this theory as to intermarriage and amalgamation is wholly improbable, for the reason that the remnant of the Pelasgi, who survived their ancestors, and lived in the days of Herodotus, did not speak Greek, but a barbarous tongue, in the language of their pre-historic ancestors, and were, in the fifth century B. C., distinguished from the artistic and polished Hellenes, by their rude dialect and barbarous manners.

With regard to the Pelasgi, Mr. Grote observes, that there is no sufficient historical evidence as to their genesis, or origin, their manners or customs which warrants their classification, except in the period of legend and tradition. We have no trustworthy information respecting them. "Where such is the case," says Mr. Grote, "we may, without impropriety, apply the remark of Herodotus, respecting one of the theories to explain the inundation of the Nile, that the man who carries up his history into the invisible world, passes out of the range of criticism."

[1] Herod. vii, 94.

Greece, however, so tradition tells us, did not remain isolated. Navigation and commerce brought immigrants to its shores. One of the earliest colonies came with Cecrops from Sais in Egypt. They settled in Attica. Danaus and his companions came from Egypt, also, and were received into Argos. A colony of Phœnicians was led by Cadmus. They made their way in Beotia and founded Thebes. From Mysia in Asia on the southern shores of the Black sea, came a colony led by Pelops. The influence of the immigrants was so great that the name of their leader became identified with the southern peninsula of Greece. He became the ancestor of a race of Kings, who ruled for years in the Peloponnesus. These migrations, however, are prehistoric, and their undertakings and activities, like those of the Pelasgi, belong to the period of tradition. They were not, however, barbarous people, but came from the most learned and refined nations of antiquity. This is especially true of Egypt and Phœnicia. From the latter the Greeks learned their letters and the use of the alphabet.

Herodotus, however, is not satisfied with the traditions and materials to which he had access to account for the Pelasgi, and Mr. Grote, as has been pointed out, observes that there is no sufficient historical evidence as to their genesis, or origin, except such as brings them within the pale of legend and tradition.

It is certain, however, that the Hellenes became the dominant race in the Greek peninsula, and were such

when authentic history begins. Whatever may be said as to the theories of the early ante-Hellenic people, it is clear that the Hellenese were of Dorian, Æolian and Ionian origin, and were the ingenious and intellectual race, which made historic Greece.

The Hebrew account of the dispersion of the races of mankind, however, is more authentic and satisfactory than anything which has come down to us, at least with regard to the distribution of the early races and subraces on the continent of Europe and part of the continents of Asia and Africa. But many difficulties remain. After the speech of all people had been confounded on the plains of Shinar, in the region about the tower of Babel, they separated B. C. 2234. Those speaking the same language formed themselves into a great body and sought out new lands. The descendants of Japheth embraced seven distinct families, sprung from the seven sons of this son of Noah. They are collectively denominated the Aryan or Indo-European race, among whom are the Hellenes, or Greeks. Their genealogy is given in the tenth chapter of Genesis. These are the seven sons: Gomer, Magog, Madai, Javan, Tubal, Meshech and Tiras. From Javan, the fourth son of Japheth, sprung the Hellenes. Professor Rawlinson says that the Jafones embraced the Ionians, who were Grecian people. The Israelites who traded on the eastern coast of what they termed the Sea of Tarshish (the Mediterranean) and along the southern shores of Asia Minor, the island of Kattim or Chittim (island of Cyprus) and also among the islands of the Ægean sea, traded with the Grecians.

The divisions of the family of Javan is also given presumably by Moses, and the contiguous territory into which they migrated and in which they dwelt. "The sons of Javan," says Moses,[1] "Elishah and Tar-

[1] Gen. x, 4.

shish, Kittim and Dodanim. By these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, everyone after his tongue, after their families, in their nations." The Isles of the Gentiles, here referred to, embraced not only islands but lands bordering on the sea, where ports were established and commerce flourished. It is even claimed that this comprehensive term embraced not only the coasts of the Mediterranean, but the Euxine and the Caspian also. This claim may be supported by a passage in Herodotus in which he refers to the Tabareni, and the Moschi,[1] descendants of Tubal, near the Caspian and Black Seas. Tiras and his descendants, it was believed, inhabited Thrace, and their progeny was a fierce and barbarous race.

Descendants of Elishah, son of Javan and grandson of Japheth, embraced the people known as Æolians, who inhabited certain islands in the Ægean sea, on the west coast of Asia Minor. The shell fish from which was obtained the famous purple dye — the Tyrian purple — were found on these island coasts, and are referred to in the Old Testament in the Lamentation of Ezekiel, over the doom pronounced by him, B. C. 586, against Tyre (Ezek. xxvii, 7 et seq.). See Fenton's translation post page 22.

Tarshish, with his descendants, it is believed, migrated to the west to Tartessus in Spain, and dwelt along the coasts of the Iberian peninsula. Kittim was supposed to have occupied Kittim, the island of Cyprus, and to have built Kitium, on the southeast coast, the city known as Citium, besieged by Cimon (B. C. 449) in his last campaign against the Persians and their allies. His people are said also to have dwelt in the islands of the Cyclades, in the Ægean Sea.

Dodanim's progeny are believed to be the Dardanians, who dwelt in Asia Minor, where Priam established

[1] Herod. iii, 94; vii, 78.

his empire and built Troy, immortalized by Homer, and to have dwelt also in the island of Rhodes. Javan and all his sons, therefore, were said to be progenitors of the Greeks.

In this connection we may refer to a mythical country, an island in the Atlantic Ocean, known as Plato's legendary continent of Atlantis, in which some claim were located the Elysian fields. This region of Greek legend, it is said, was some time in the remote past, inhabited by a powerful people who were finally conquered by the Athenians thousands of years before the time of Solon. No Greek writer makes any mention of this lost continent of Atlantis until the time of Plato. That distinguished pupil of Socrates and preceptor of Aristotle in his "Timaeus" and "Critias" is authority for the legend. He declares that an Egyptian priest disclosed to Solon, the lawgiver of Athens, the story of the valor of his countrymen who overthrew the inhabitants of the lost continent. This mythical land, Solon was told, was in the Western Sea, beyond Mount Atlas, over against the Pillars of Hercules. It was said that it was greater in extent than Libya and Asia Minor combined, was located in the ocean, and from it other islands and another continent could be reached, of which the Mediterranean or sea of Tarshish was but the harbor. It was further claimed that the hitherland within the Pillars of Hercules, embraced in the Empire of Atlantis, extended to Egypt and Tyrrhenia.

The military power of this vast continent was arrayed against Egypt and against Hellas, and all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, and threatened their existence. The armies of Atlantis invaded the territory on the shores of the Mediterranean. But when the soldiers of other nations failed, and even the Hellenes, with the single exception of the Athenians, gave way, the latter performed deeds of prodigious

valor that filled the world with their fame, and drove the invaders back into their own dominions beyond the Pillars and liberated the countries whose existence had been threatened.

The legend further declares that after this victory over the most powerful foe in the western world, there was an extensive earthquake, and the Hellenes were swallowed up and annihiliated and the great island of Atlantis disappeared and was swallowed up beneath the waves of the sea of Atlas, the western ocean beyond Mount Atlas, on the northern coast of Africa. Some writers give this in explanation of the shallows which are found off the west coast of Africa north of the equator.

After centuries of fruitless effort to establish the whereabouts of this mythical island of Atlantis, Leo Frobenius, a German explorer, in January, 1911, claimed to have discovered incontestable evidence that the lost continent of Atlantis was not an island but a region in Togo or Togoland, in Guinea, between Dahomy and Ashantee in Western Africa, close to the equator. His proof is based on the fact that he found in the locality indicated, the head of a man carved in bronze, of superior workmanship, on which was engraved the insignia of Poseidon, whom the Greeks worshipped as god of the sea, and whom the Romans called Neptune. The legend further associates the god Neptune with the founding of Atlantis. The head is not solid bronze, but hollow, indicating the superior skill of the workmen who produced it, and wholly unlike anything that the natives of Guinea or Dahomy or Ashantee could possibly have constructed. Frobenius further declares that the features are of "faultless mold, finely traced, and of slightly Mongolian type." As to what other and further proofs this enterprising explorer has to establish his claim to having discovered the mythical land of Atlantis, we are not informed. It

can scarcely be assumed, however, that the discovery in Guinea of a bronze head of Poseidon is sufficient without more, to establish the authenticity of a legend, which for centuries has been classed among the entertaining fables of the writers of antiquity.

The doom of Tyre pronounced by the prophet Ezekiel, above referred to, was uttered more than two and a half centuries after Homer's time, if we may adopt the chronology assigned by Herodotus, who declares that Homer flourished about four hundred years before his day. Herodotus flourished B. C. 450, having been born B. C. 484. He did not survive the Peloponnesian War, and died probably about B. C. 429. The language used by the prophet, however (Ezekiel, xxvii), is instructive in connection with the reference made to the geography of lands, countries and cities of which Tyre formed the commercial centre, and the nations and cities with whom it traded, and corroborates the theory as to the locality of some of the countries carrying on trade with the sons of Javan, who were identified with the Hellenes. Ezekiel foretells the doom of the great city of the Phœnicians, in the following poem,[1] which is given in part, as translated by Professor Farrar Fenton, from the Hebrew and Chaldee.

"You, who reside at the ports of the sea, —
Who trade with the Peoples of numerous isles,
Thus says the Almighty Jehovah to Tzur,
You boast — 'I am perfect in beauty!'
Your bounds are the heart of the ocean,
You builders have finished your charms!

"They built you with cypress from Senir,
For your decks they used Lebanon cedar,
And they took it to form your high masts, —
Bashan's oak trees supplied you with oars,
Your benches were ivory and box from Kithim,

[1] Ezek., Chap. xxvii.

Your gay flag was fine linen of Egypt,
Your sails were rich purple from Alishah's Isles!
. . . . . .

"You traded with Tharshish for all kinds of wealth,
For silver, for iron, for tin, and for lead;
They purchased your mercantile wares.
Javan, Thubal, and Meshek all traded with you,
Giving bodies of men, and bronze goods for your stores.
The House of Togramah with horses and chargers,
And mules have all purchased your goods.

"Sons of Dedan dealt with you, and many Isles traded,
Handing ebony, ivory, in change for your cash,
And Aram bought much of your factory products; —
With emeralds, and purple, and muslin, and lace,
And coral, and rubies, they paid for your wares.
Judah, and Israel's land were your dealers;
For fine wheat, and balms, and for honey and oil, —
And marbles, they purchased from you.

"Damask purchased much that you made,
With the rich wine of Helbon, and whitest of wool.
Dan and Javan bought cloth in your markets;
They sold you wrought iron, and cassia and spices;
Dedan sold you rich saddles for riding;
The Arabs and princes of Kedar dealt with you, —
Lambs, sheep, and fine goats were their goods.
The merchants of Sheba and Ramah were traders,
With the best of all spices, and all precious gems,
And gold which they paid for your wares.

"Haran, and Kanah, and Aden, with all Sheba's merchants,
And Ashur and Kilmad were trading,
They bought of you fine purple fabrics,
And laces, and braids of mixed hues,
And Cables well twisted, and cedars they purchased.

"Ships of Tarshish transported your trade,
And extended your power in the heart of the seas.
But your sailors have brought you to breakers;
The eastern wind wrecks in the midst of the sea;
Your bullion, your cargoes, your merchants, and seamen,
And captains, constructors, shipbuilders and brokers,
With all the bold warriors about you,
With all those collected within you will fall,
In the depth of the sea on the day when you fall!

"At the sound of the shriek of your pilots,
The breakers will tremble; —
All who handle the ropes will descend from their ships,
The sea-captains and sailors will stand on the land,
And will send up their cries and will bitterly shriek,
Cast dust on their heads, and will roll on the sand-hills,
And strip themselves for you, and clothe them in sacks,
And weep with soul-anguish and bitterly grieve,
And raising their wail, they will chant over you, —

"'Oh! Who was like Tzur in the midst of the waters?
Many nations were fed by your trade on the seas!
By your great wealth and traffic and kingdoms grew rich.
Now the breakers have wrecked in the trough of the sea!
Your cargo and crew sink with you to its bed!
All dwelling in islands are stupefied at you!
And their monarchs quivering have terrified looks!
The mercantile nations scream at you in terror, —
"You were," — but you never shall rise up again.'"

It may be profitable to inquire into the chronology of the events which transpired during the childhood of the race when the world was young. Historical events of a country should be studied, not from a standpoint of isolation, but in connection with contemporaneous history, which adds materially to human interest. The conduct of those who guided the movements of men and nations must be judged in view of all the facts which go to make up the historical setting, and in their proper perspective.

The question involving the antiquity of man, presents a problem which has not yet been entirely solved. History begins with an age of myth and fable. The observation is of universal application that oral tradition always precedes written history. There is no longer any question that man inhabited the globe thousands of years before the dawn of history. It was peopled for ages before the birth of civilization, that is before the advent of what we may term historic man, as distinguished from the men of the Stone Age, whose bodies were covered with hair; who used fire, made bows and

arrows, and weapons of stone and flint with which to protect themselves from wild beasts, and to carry on rude and desultory intestine wars.

Late in 1912 a skull was found in England by Charles Dawson, a geologist, at Plitdown common, about seven miles north of Folkestone. The anthropologists on examining it, became intensely interested, and after mature deliberation proclaimed their belief, that the Plitdown skull was that of an individual of the Pliocene age, who lived on this planet 500,000 years ago. This conclusion was based on the hypothesis as to the antiquity of the strata in which the skull was found. "Lime deposits," it was said, "in caves in which similar skulls and bones have been discovered, were under stalagmite, which forming at the present rate, would take at least 600,000 years to complete the formation. Flint tools have also been found in that formation, estimated to be from 20,000 to 500,000 years old." So stands the record.

In view of this verdict by men eminent in this branch of scientific investigation, the world is mute. The ordinary mortal has no means of refuting this dogmatic declaration, as to the archaic existence of prehistoric man. This Plitdown skull had one-half of the lower jaw and two teeth intact. It was restored by the head of the Geological Department of the South Kensington Museum. The work was done with plaster of paris casts, and teeth of a gorilla were placed in the lower jaw. But members of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain contend that the skull had not been properly restored. This assumption was based upon the theory that it was not the skull of a gorilla, but that of a man of low type. They contended that it had the prognathous, or square jaw of the gorilla, but that it also had the skull development to show that it was higher than the ape. The claim is, that a being in the line of human descent from half a million years

ago, would have teeth, resembling the human being of to-day, just as closely, and no more closely, than the anthropoid ape of that period, would have teeth resembling the ape of to-day. This late " find," it is now claimed, affords new and convincing proof of the relation of man to the anthropoid ape.

There has been no claim advanced, thus far, however, that this prehistoric man was endowed with an intellect, or with a soul, clothed with the heritage of immortality. The better opinion seems to prevail among a class of scientists, that what we term civilization was introduced by men who appeared as strangers among beings who had inhabited the world for ages. In other words, the analogy used by the Apostle Paul accords with the discoveries of modern science. He argues that in the order of things there is the natural man and the spiritual man, and declares that that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual. We are justified in applying this reasoning to the natural man, the untutored and unlettered savage, as distinguished from intellectual man. The declaration in Genesis is not repugnant to the theory that there were men in the world ages before Adam. The conclusion is justified that the account of the creation in Genesis indicates, in the Adam of the Scriptures, the advent of intellectual man into the world, as distinguished from the primitive inhabitants of the Pliocene age. Adam was endowed with intellect, with soul or spirit, when the Almighty breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. Then it was that man became " a living soul."

Thus the discoveries of science justify the conclusion that historic man is not coeval with the early geological periods of creation. His origin is assigned to what is termed the human period, which is comparatively recent. His presence on the globe is revealed by the rude implements and weapons of stone, metal or bone which he

used. These afford some proof of his antiquity. This proof, however, is not conclusive, but suggests some basis for the classification of the periods which reveal traces of man, designated as the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age. These periods indicate also the general order of succession in the formative ages of the world's creation, because the belief is general that man used stone long before he understood the use of metals.

Archbishop Usher, in his scheme of Biblical chronology, argues that Adam was created in Eden forty centuries before the birth of Christ. His views on this point cannot be sustained on the assumption that Adam was the first of the human species to inhabit the globe. The chronology of Usher, however, is useful in support of the contention of some modern theologians, that the Adam of Genesis relates to the advent of the historic or intellectual man as distinguished from the primitive man of the Stone Age.

For these reasons we may use the date given by Archbishop Usher as a starting-point in the following chronological table commencing with the advent of historic man. It has been compiled from authentic sources, the result of the prodigious labors of scholars and archæologists, covering years of research and especially biblical scholars, and students of the Old Testament. While we cannot expect such a table to be absolutely acurate it is doubtless approximately correct.

B. C. 4004. The date assigned by Archbishop Usher to indicate the creation of Adam. It may suggest the advent of historic man into the world as distinguished from a prehistoric people, covered with hair, who used fire and carved rude pictures on the rocks. See *supra*.
" 3074. Death of Adam.
" 2349. The Deluge and destruction of the human race, save only Noah and his family.
" 2500. } Pyramids constructed in Egypt.
" 2200. }
" 2247. Birth of Abraham, the father of the Israelitish race.

B. C. 1921. Abraham journeyed westward from Ur, of the Chaldees, into Canaan.
" 1920. Abraham driven by famine, journeyed into Egypt.
" 1898. Sodom and Gomorrah destroyed.
" 1898. Isaac born.
" 1857. Abraham died.
" 1837. Birth of the patriarch Jacob.
" 1732. Isaac died.
" 1729. Joseph sold as a slave by his brethren into Egypt.
" 1706. Joseph, a favorite in the Court of Pharaoh, at the height of his prosperity.
" 1689. Jacob died in Egypt.
" 1688. Approximate date of death of Joseph.
" 1635. Moses born in Egypt.
" 1500. Job dwelt in the land of Uz.
" 1491. Period of the ten plagues visited upon Pharaoh in Egypt.
" 1491. Moses, having slain an Egyptian taskmaster, flees from Egypt.
" 1491. Moses leads the children of Israel from the land of bondage, across the Red Sea, into the Wilderness.
" 1451. Moses died on Pisgah, in sight of Canaan.
" 1324. } Rameses II, greatest of the Pharaohs, reigns in
" 1253. } Egypt.
" 1184. End of the Trojan War, and destruction of Troy.
" 1095. Saul chosen King of Israel.
" 1056. David fights with the giant Goliath and slays him.
" 1056. Saul kills himself at the battle of Gilboa.
" 1056. David made King of Judah.
" 1015. Death of King David.
" 1015. Solomon succeeds to the throne of David, his father.
" 992. Queen of Sheba visits Solomon at Jerusalem.
" 975. Death of King Solomon.
" 975. } Rehoboam and
" 955. } Jeroboam reign in Israel.
" 955. Abijam reigns in Judah.
" 930. Nadab reigns in Israel.
" 925. Ahab reigns in Israel.
" 897. Ahab slain at Ramoth Gilead.
" 897. Jehoshaphat reigns.
" 895. Jehoram reigns in Israel.
" 884. Jehu reigns in Judah.
" 856. Jehoahaz reigns in Israel.
" 850. Homer flourishes. Homeric poems composed.
" 839. Amaziah reigns in Judah.
" 740. { Ahaz, Hezekiah and, Hoshea } reign in Israel.
" 740. Samaria taken by Sennacherib and the Jews carried into captivity.
" 723. Sennacherib besieges Jerusalem.

B. C. 710. Sennacherib's army of 185,000 men destroyed by a miracle before Jerusalem.
" 698. Manasseh and
" 641. Josiah } reign in Israel.
" 599. Nebuchadnezzar takes the city of Jerusalem and carries the Jews into captivity to Babylon.
" 538. Babylon taken by Cyrus the Great.
" 527. Cyrus died while on a military expedition near Chinese Tartary; succeeded by his son Cambyses.
" 525. Cambyses at the head of a vast army conquers Egypt.
" 522. Cambyses died on his return from Egypt.
" 522. Smerdis usurps the throne of Persia.
" 522. Smerdis slain. Darius, son of Hystaspes, ascends the throne of Persia.
" 512. Darius leads an expedition into Europe, crosses the Danube (the Ister), and invades Scythia. Retreats into Thrace, conquers Macedonia.
" 500. Sardis, the capital of Lydia, burned by the Ionians and Athenians. Ionian War continues.
" 492. Darius, in revenge for the burning of Sardis, sends an expedition to invade Greece. His fleet lost off Mount Athos.
" 490. Darius sets out a new expedition under Datis and Artaphernes to invade Greece. His army defeated at Marathon.
" 484. Herodotus born.
" 485. Darius died. His son Xerxes succeeds to the throne of Persia.
" 480. Xerxes with the greatest army ever assembled, invades Greece. His fleet defeated at Salamis.
" 480. Euripides born at Salamis the day the battle was fought.
" 479. Mardonius remains in Greece after the flight of Xerxes. His army defeated at Platæa.
" 479. The Persians defeated at Mycalé in Asia Minor.
" 431. Peloponnesian War begun by the surprise at Platæa.
" 404. Peloponnesian War ends.

CHAPTER III

HOMER

THE first military annals of Hellas were written in poetry and are contained in the Iliad. The Hellenic heroes portrayed by Homer contended on the plains of Troy, and the story of that memorable contest for the destruction of the kingdom of Priam is embalmed in the greatest epic ever written. In that struggle gods mingled with mortals, and enabled them to perform the wonderful feats of arms, which it was the ambition of their descendants to emulate. The Iliad and the Odyssey were the Bible of the Greeks, and from its pages they imbibed their inspiration.

It would be impossible to estimate the influence of the poems of Homer in connection with the martial achievements of the Greeks. Their military annals represent a series of the most remarkable campaigns in history. In emulation of the heroes, whose deeds of valor Homer paints in vivid colors, the armies and navies of Greece were inspired to contend with the armies of Persia, and beat back the myriads of Darius and Xerxes at Marathon and Salamis, at Platæa and Mycale, and to prosecute against the most formidable empire in the world, a war of expulsion, which drove the Persians from Europe and the Ægean and the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Miltiades and Themistocles, Leonidas and Cimon are names to conjure with. Alexander was stimulated in his ambition to conquer the world by the example of Achilles on the plains of Troy, from whom, through his mother, he claimed direct lin-

eage. The poems of Homer stand unrivalled in literature, and the example set by the heroes of the Iliad and the Odyssey, enabled Greece to secure her independence, to subdue the empire of Asia, and to establish for all mankind the lasting benefits derived from Greek letters, philosophy and art, as a noble heritage to posterity, the influence of which, on the destinies of the world, is inestimable.

The Greek poets of antiquity stand first in the order of intellectual superiority. In view of the grand imagery, the charm, the variety and wealth of color that abounds in the epics of Homer, it may be safely said that human genius has never soared higher on the wings of fancy. What can surpass the divine conception which prompted the early poets of Greece to write with the imperishable stars on the sable robes of night, the achievements of their heroes. What they have written in the sky is enduring as earth, stable as the heavens. As the stars are imperishable, the sublime conception of the Greek poets is likewise immortal. We look into the dome of heaven, and read there the names of the heroes who sailed with Jason to the confines of the world for the golden fleece, and who contended with the aid of the gods in feats of arms, Castor and Pollux and the ship Argo in which they sailed. Behold also as representing the gods, Arcturus and his sons, and Orion the mighty hunter.

Nobody knows who Homer was, or when or where he lived. All authentic information as to his identity or personality has perished beyond hope of recovery. Homer, then, as to his individuality, remains a riddle, which the genius of modern scholarship has been unable to solve. Professor Symonds, in his "Study of the Greek Poets," admirably expresses the idea as to the existence of Homer when he says: "Some Homer did exist. Some great single poet intervened beyond the lost chaos of legendary material and the cosmos of

artistic beauty which we now possess." As to the unity of Homer, Professor Symonds is equally clear. The theory that a body of editors called together by Pisistratus "gave its immortal outline to the colossus of the Iliad, and wove the magic web of the Odyssey," he considers as absolutely ridiculous, and absurd. His views in this regard are supported by modern scholars, who reject entirely the theory of many Homers, advanced late in the eighteenth century (1795) by Professor Wolf in his celebrated Prolegomena.

There was mythology long before Homer. Who taught the Greeks mythology? Who taught them that Zeus was supreme god of the universe; that in admiration of their brotherly love, he set Castor and Pollux in the sky as the constellation which the Romans called Gemini, or the morning and evening star? What is back of Homer? The Greeks spoke a wonderful language, the most musical, euphonious and expressive ever used among men. From what soil sprung the flowers of poetry which formed in poetic fancy the legends and ideals of the Greeks. These Hellenes, whoever they were, in the childhood of the race, before the existence of literature of which we have any knowledge, save the sublime religious poetry and literature of the Israelites, expressed themselves in poetry. Speech in song, seems to have been first in order, because poetry precedes philosophy and history. The universe, in their eyes, was a poem. On the subject of Greek myths, Professor Symonds says, that when mythology took form among the Greeks they spoke of the sun as a shepherd, and the clouds were his sheep; or an archer, and the sunbeams were his arrows. The sea was a husky voiced and turbulent old man, who shook the earth in his anger, and had the white-maned billows of the deep for horses. Spring was a youth, beloved like Hyacinthus, by the sun, or like Adonis, by the queen of beauty. Thus they conceived the world and nature,

and the tales they told about them has preserved the substance of their intellectual activity. Their thoughts were spoken in poetry, and invested with an imperishable form of art. Zeus was originally the open sky, Pallas the dawn, Phœbus and Artemis the sun and the moon. All was God, and their religion was expressed in pantheism and mythology. "Men thought in pictures and recorded their impression of the world in stories. The powers of nature were conceived as persons, and dignified with superhuman attributes."

The knowledge of the physical universe as Homer knew it, and all that was known concerning it in the Homeric age, was circumscribed within narrow limits. The Chaldeans diligently studied the heavens, and believed in the magic influence of the stars. They had marked out an imaginary path in the sky, in which they believed moved the sun, moon and certain particular stars and constellations. This path they divided into twelve signs, the signs of the Zodiac, to correspond with the appearance of the moon, which became full-orbed twelve times each year. These phenomena gave to the Chaldeans the idea of the divisions of time. Thus the Circle of the Zodiac and some of the constellations were known before Homer was born. The Pleiades and the Hyades and the great star figure of Orion were familiar to Homer, as they were to the early inhabitants of Mesopotamia, and to the Hebrews. Job, who dwelt in the land of Uz fifteen hundred years before the Christian era, was familiar with the astronomy of his day. In devout adoration he declares, concerning the power of Jehovah,

> "Which maketh Arcturus, Orion and Pleiades,
> And the chambers of the south."[1]

He listened to the challenge of the Almighty concerning his own weakness:

[1] Job ix, 9.

"Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades,
Or loose the bands of Orion?
Canst thou bring forth Mazzaroth in his season?
Or canst thou guide Arcturus with his sons?
Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven?
Canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth?" [1]

Of these constellations Homer sings when he describes Vulcan moulding the shield of Achilles:

"Thereon were figur'd earth, and sky, and sea,
The ever-circling sun, and full-orb'd moon,
And all the signs that crown the vault of Heav'n;
Pleiads and Hyads, and Orion's might,
And Arctos call'd the Wain, who wheels on high
His circling course, and on Orion waits;
Sole star that never bathes in th' ocean wave." [2]

The knowledge of the ancients, however, concerning the earth and the solar system, was comparatively nothing. They had no conception of the fact that the earth was a globe, or that it was one of eight planets held in their orbits by fixed laws of gravitation, and governed in their revolutions about the sun by what the scientists call the centrifugal and centripetal forces. In the days of Homer, the Greeks believed the earth to be a horizontal circular plane, about the outer edges of which flowed a copious river, never disturbed by storms or tides, a never failing source which supplied abundantly the seas and rivers of the earth. This steady flood around the confines of the world the ancients called the ocean, on the extreme outer edges of which was the entrance to the under-world, a land of gloom and shadow.

Over this great circular plane, with its seas and rivers, its mountains and valleys, and covering it like an immense dome of azure, was the sky, whose blue rim rested at every point on the outer circle of the ocean,

[1] Job xxxviii, 31, 32.
[2] The Iliad, by Earl of Derby, Book xviii, 545-551.

forming a vast concave of ether, the centre arch supported by Atlas. In this firmament dwelt the gods, over whose assemblies Zeus presided. He was the supreme deity who ruled the destinies of gods and men, and ordained the law of heaven and earth.

In the centre of the earth, the Greeks in their primitive geography located Mount Olympus, on whose many-peaked summit the gods convened in council; from whence they visited the earth, and took part in the affairs of mortals. On the side of Parnassus, at the foot of the twin peaks, not far from Helicon, was the temple of Delphi, in which the oracle or Pythia, the priestess of the temple, received communications directly from the gods.

The circular plane of the earth was indented with bays, and crossed by the sea (the Mediterranean) which extended to the Ægean and thence through the Hellespont and the Bosphorus to the Euxine, or Black Sea. Its inhabitants were Hellenes. Its remote confines was a *terra incognita*, a land of mystery and enchantment. To the mind of the Greek these remote parts of the earth presented an enigma and a riddle, which could only be solved with the help of the gods. These regions of mystery were filled with giants and monsters, serpents and dragons, and enchantresses; and beasts, part human, part animal; part bird or part reptile. These horrid monsters usually guarded fair maidens, rich treasures, or captive heroes. Other unknown parts were believed to be lands of perpetual summer and eternal bliss.

In the far north of Homer's world dwelt the Hyperboreans in a land of perpetual summer, which was separated from Thrace on the extreme north by a chain of lofty mountains, whose peaks were covered with snow. These rugged mountains were pierced with gloomy caverns, the home of the north winds, the severe blasts of winter. They issued from their dens and covered

the mountain peaks with snow, and congealed the rivers of the north. None could pierce the abode of the winds, and favored by the gods, they were exempt from disease and old age, and relieved from the toils of war. In the far south, beyond the confines of Ethiopia, dwelt the pigmies. On the coasts of Libya were the Lotos-eaters, in the dreamy atmosphere which seemed always afternoon, and "all around the coast the languid air did swoon." They were a happy people frequently visited by the gods, from Olympus, who shared their feasts and banquets. In the far west, were the Elysian plains, where dwelt the fair-haired Rhadamanthus. To these fields of enchantment, the fortunate mortals beloved of the gods were translated to enjoy an immortality of bliss. They were not permitted to taste of death or enter the gloomy shades of the under-world. Off these shores were the Fortunate Islands, or the Islands of the Blessed, where everlasting spring abides.

Between the land of the Lotos-eaters and the plains of Elysium, separated from them by broad plains and lofty mountains, dwelt the Cyclops, the giants and monsters of antiquity, whose deeds of violence and murder made all the coasts dangerous to the lost mariner. To the west of Elysium were the gardens of Hesperus, where father Hesper's lovely daughters guarded the golden apples — "Hesper, the dragon and sisters three" — the hallowed fruit given by Juno to Jupiter on their wedding day. Beyond these gardens, on the borders of an unknown sea, was the Island of Circe, by whose enchanted wand the sailors of Ulysses were turned to swine.

Across the world, Helios, the sun, in his flaming chariot with four milk-white steeds made his daily journey through the arch of heaven, coming up out of the ocean beyond Colchis, and the mountains of Caucasus, in the far east the chariot of the sun was driven, until at evening it disappeared behind the western sea, when

Night, with sable wing, began her rule, and the moon and stars shone forth.

Such was Homer's world. Such he depicts on the huge and massive shield which Vulcan divinely wrought for famed Achilles. On it, with cunning skill, he wrought a representation of the heavens crowned with its constellations, the Pleiades, the Hyades, Orion and the Great Bear. The moon also, and the stars about her like a swarm of golden bees. These were engraved in the boss or central circle. On the outer circle or circumference, was wrought in burnished silver the stream of the ocean, whose steady flow surrounds the earth, and keeps full its seas and rivers. The intermediate circle contained pictures of the social and material world, a varied panorama of the arts and pursuits of man, in war and in peace. In one compartment is shown a city in time of peace. In the streets processions sang nuptial songs to celebrate the wedding feasts. Flutes and lyres made music for the dancers, while women at their doors stood and admired. Then strife arose between two men contending for a fine, the price of one who had been slain. Then follows the trial, and both men were called for sentence, where the elders sat upon polished stones in a sacred circle. The pleaders were heard, and sentence voted. Two talents of gold, the amount of the fine and the subject of the litigation, lies on the ground before the judges.

Then is carved upon the shield a city in time of war, besieged by hostile armies, and Homer describes the scene as only Homer can; a bloody battle, an ambuscade at the watering place by the river's side, the dead and wounded, and the contest of each for the bodies of the slain.

Another scene represents agricultural life; a broad and fallow field in which are many ploughmen, to each of whom the master gave a goblet of rich wine, as

dark behind the plough, the ridges lay "like real furrows, though engraved in gold." The fields of wheat are shown, and the reapers with their sickles, and the binders tying fast the sheaves, and behind them the boys, the gleaners. The servants of the master are seen preparing a roasted ox beneath an oak, while the maids knead for the reapers the white meal.

Then is the scene of the vintage. The vineyard, the vines and clusters all in gold on rows of silver stakes, and the hedge round it. In the midst of those gathering the fruit in baskets, the peasant youth plays his lyre for the dancers.

Then is shown another pastoral scene. A herd of beeves coming lowing from their stalls to seek their pasture by the murmuring stream among the reeds. The herdsmen with their dogs follow. Two lions are seen who attack a bull among the foremost cattle. The shepherds, with their dogs, in vain seek to rescue the prey of the lions, who lap their crimson blood.

Another pastoral scene is engraved upon the shield, showing a broad pasture and pleasant glade, the white sheep, the shepherds and their huts in the meadows.

The final scene upon this wondrous shield represents the Pyrrhic dance, invented by Dædalus, in Gnossus, for fair-haired Ariadne. The young men with their swords of gold and belts of silver. The alluring virgins, holding the wrists of their companions, clad in linen robes adorned with perfumed garlands.

Such is the wonderful shield of Achilles, as described in the Iliad, embracing an epitome of the world of Homer. In his poems he celebrates the wealth of Egyptian Thebes, and the arts of Sidon, but says nothing of Susa, or Persepolis, of Ecbatana, or Babylon, of which he doubtless knew nothing. The eastern confines of Homer's world embraced lower Egypt, Phœnicia, Phrygia and the plains of Troy, at the foot of Mount Ida. The far East was doubtless an unknown

region in the Homeric age, which is prehistoric, an age of legend and fable, of poetry and romance.

The inquiry which presents itself, and which remains unanswered is, who was Homer, and when did he live. As to his identity, we have no authentic or reliable evidence. As to the physical existence of some Homer, however, there can be no possible doubt. It is certain that the individual who wrote the epics associated with the name of Homer, lived, and that he composed the Iliad, and almost certainly the Odyssey, although very learned scholars have labored ingeniously to rob him of the authorship of the latter.

As to the unity of Homer, there are some things that would seem to indicate beyond doubt that one individual produced the poems. The argument that the greatest productions of antiquity are the work of many authors, is based upon the hypothesis that at the remote period when the poems were written many literary men lived, and that they were all endowed with the highest possible intellectual attainments.

As has been observed, the individuality of Homer remains a riddle. No one knows who he was or where he lived. As to the authorship of the Homeric poems, or as it is termed, "the unity of Homer," a great controversy has arisen in recent years. It was not until the close of the eighteenth century (A. D. 1795) that Professor Wolf disturbed the literary world by the publication of his learned and elaborate argument, in which the great German scholar seeks to show that many authors contributed to the Iliad and the Odyssey, and thereby unsettled the belief of some as to the unity of Homer. Volumes have been written on the subject, which it would be impossible to analyze or review, within the limits of this chapter.

One of the arguments advanced by those who still deny the unity of Homer, is based upon the great length of the poems. The argument proceeds upon

the assumption that in the Homeric age, writing, as we understand the art, was unknown. There is no positive evidence to warrant the assumption. But the contention that, because of the extreme length of the poems, it would have been impossible to transmit them through the agency of human memory, if carried to its logical conclusion, would argue Homer and his poems out of existence. If they could be preserved only by means of human memory, and if they were too extensive for the memory to retain, it would seem to follow, that for the reason stated, they never were preserved, and hence that they do not exist. If such a poem as the Iliad, by reason of its great length, could not have been retained in the memory of the bard, or the rhapsodist, or of any individual, and if there was no means, then devised of reducing it to some intelligible written form, the poem must of necessity have perished, long before the days of Pisistratus, who, it is claimed, first caused the poems, associated with the name of Homer, to be collected, and reduced to writing. The fact that we have the poems would seem to furnish a complete answer to this argument. They are still in existence and are read daily in our schools and universities, and are admired by men and women of letters and refined tastes, just as they were by the men of learning in Athens in the days of Pisistratus.

The position of those controversialists who contend that writing was not discovered in Hellas in the Homeric age, seems untenable also, when we consider the elaborate and complex tissue of myth and fable embraced in the mythology which embodied the religious conception of the Greeks, with which we are made acquainted to some extent in the Homeric poems. If the contention is correct that the art of writing in some form, was unknown, when the Iliad was composed, it follows, as has been observed, that the only medium for the preservation of poetry and history was the human

memory. Then how was it possible to retain in the memory the elaborate system of theology, the voluminous and ingenious Hellenic theogony, which has been preserved to posterity and which the author of the Iliad had mastered. How could the complicated, extensive and harmonious account of the innumerable deities, the demigods and nymphs and satyrs contained in the Hellenic pantheism, have survived the centuries of remote antiquity in the absence of some process by which it could have been preserved without the aid of memory alone?

The argument of those who claim that writing was not discovered in Homer's day, and that the human mind had not then conceived a scheme or device, by which thoughts could be transferred to some physical substance, from which they could be read or reproduced at pleasure, is not strengthened by the theory that the poems were carried piecemeal in many memories. The advocates who deny the unity of Homer assume that there were professional bards or rhapsodists in those days, who respectively recited parts of the poems. This assumption, however, can rest upon no other theory than that some person had memorized the entire Iliad, and the Odyssey also, if you please, and doled it out in parts to traveling minstrels. As it is asserted that no one mind was capable of retaining so much, there could have been no general source to whom the rhapsodist could apply for part of the poem. The only other possible theory is the supposition which the advocates who deny unity have advanced, namely, independent authorship. In other words, they assert one mind did not conceive the poems. They were conceived by many minds. The assumption does violence to the beauty and harmony which prevails throughout the poems.

If we adopt the theory of divided authorship we must assume that in that remote age many literary men lived, and that they were all endowed with the highest possible

intellectual attainments. A bare statement of the proposition carries with it its own refutation.

Concededly the work of Homer is the work of a commanding genius. The Iliad embraces, it is said, twenty-seven rhapsodies, just as Byron's Don Juan embraces fifteen cantos, and his Childe Harold fourteen. These twenty-seven rhapsodies were collected and arranged, and fill out the Iliad, as we have it. To say that these rhapsodies are the work of as many different minds, is to assert that in the dawn of antiquity, there were many poets, and that every poet was a commanding genius, and that each was equally intellectually endowed. The achievements accomplished in the world of letters teaches us that such a proposition is not tenable. Genius such as inspired the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, was conferred upon but few mortals. Nothing in profane literature surpasses the great epic written not less than eight hundred years before the Christian era. No mind in all the intervening centuries has produced anything quite like the Greek poems. Homer stands alone, conspicuous in the ocean of time that links the prehistoric past with the present.

He had no model. He had no imitators. The only poetry of equal beauty and sublimity of which we have any knowledge is of an entirely different character. It embraces the sacred poetry of David and that of the author of the book of Job and of some other poetical books of the Old Testament. Of these, assuming that they were written before Homer's time, it is safe to say that the Greek poet had no knowledge. There is no archaic literature known to us, to which Homer seems to have had access, or from which he derived his inspiration, or which afforded suggestions which he could elaborate in his works.

To argue that twenty-seven such geniuses, as Homer admittedly was, existed contemporaneously, or even in the Homeric age, or within any reasonable propinquity,

seems contrary to all human experience. The world, it is true, has produced many great men of commanding genius, many great poets, orators and philosophers, wonderfully endowed, but all have their distinguishing characteristics, and no two are alike, although there are resemblances among them. To assert with positive deliberation that there were many Homers because the Iliad may be divided into parts, just as any poem may be divisible into parts, just as a book, for convenience, is divided into chapters, would, upon the same assumption, furnish the basis for an argument that there were twenty-seven Shakespeares because there were twenty-seven of his immortal plays, or as many Miltons as there are books in Paradise Lost. The idea is too remote from probability to be seriously entertained.

The subjects embraced in the Homeric poems relate to the Trojan War and the wanderings of Ulysses. Professor Wolf boldly declares, in substance, that these themes formed the subject of numerous epic ballads. He argues that the various productions on the same subject happened to fit into one another or to harmonize in such a way that it was a comparatively easy matter for the scholars assembled by Pisistratus to join them into the two great masterpieces known as the Iliad and the Odyssey. The idea had already been advanced by Dr. Bentley that Homer wrote a sequence of songs and rhapsodies to be sung by himself at festivals and public gatherings, and that he composed the Iliad for men and the Odyssey for women, and that these songs and ballads were collected and published 500 years after his death. It is clear that Dr. Bentley believed in the unity of Homer.

Professor Wolf, however, thinks that Bentley was incorrect in ascribing the authorship of the poems to Homer, and declares the authors were numerous. His argument assumes too much. The idea that many great poets may have written upon the same subject is pos-

sible. But to assert that all who wrote were great poets, and that there was such uniformity and similarity in the thought and expression which pervaded all these various productions that, when pieced together, they formed a harmonious whole of unsurpassed beauty and excellence, presents a coincidence so remarkable as to be wholly unworthy of credit. Homer sings of the wrath of Achilles. The struggle in the civil war which involved the supremacy of the American union involved the most stupendous struggle of modern times. That great contest also formed the subject of ballads and poems innumerable. Could any number of these be collected and woven into a great poem entitled, "The Wrath of the Southrons?" Could all the lays and ballads and hymns composed concerning the "Thirty Years' War" be collected so as to form an epic, entitled "The Wrath of the Dissenters," or "The Jealousy of the Papacy," or "The Wrath of Wallenstein?"

Nevertheless, enthusiastic supporters of the fallacy of professor Wolf have attempted to disintegrate the Iliad, in an attempt to discover the various independent poems of which they claim it is composed, thus subjecting the synthetical labors of the scholars convened by Pisistratus to an analytical process which fails absolutely to support their contention.

The weight of probability sustains the assumption that the scholars of Pisistratus eliminated to a great extent, from the Homeric poems whatever interpolations or spurious matter had been introduced from time to time, and restored the poems to their original form, and preserved them to posterity in their original harmony and beauty.

CHAPTER IV

HOMERIC AND BIBLICAL LITERATURE — WAS THE HELLENIC BARD IGNORANT OF THE SUBLIME POETRY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT?

THERE is one phase of the Homeric question which, so far as I have been able to discover, has not been discussed. The question which presents itself to the student who seeks to ascertain the genesis of letters and the authorship of the literature which first attracted the attention of mankind is, was Homer, the greatest literary figure of antiquity, ignorant of the sublime poetry contained in the sacred literature of the Israelites, which was composed centuries before he wrote his wonderful poems? A negative answer to this inquiry seems to be the only response warranted by the evidence.

Among the countless millions of people who inhabited the globe in the early period of its history, there were but two races, and only two, from whom sprung men of sufficiently exalted intellect, who were able to produce a literature destined to survive forever. These were the Israelites and the Hellenese or Greeks. It seems to be universally conceded that this Hebraic and Grecian literature is the best of its kind in the world of letters. It is also the oldest, so old in fact that although we may be reasonably certain of the age, we cannot with precision fix the exact century when it was written. When the book of Job was composed no one can tell. When the first chapter of Genesis or the Pentateuch were written no one can tell. When the Iliad or the Odyssey were written no one can tell. The

poetical books of ancient scripture, for grandeur, eloquence and sublimity stand unrivalled, and the poems depicting the wrath of Achilles and the wanderings of Ulysses, for rich imagery, wealth of simile and poetic beauty, have never been excelled.

Yet it seems clear, as will be shown presently, that the Greek author, for we do not subscribe to the doctrine of many Homers, remained all his life in ignorance of the existence of the literature of the early books of the Old Testament. He seems never to have heard of Moses, of David or of Solomon, though the latter died more than a century before Homer was born. If Moses wrote the Pentateuch (except the last chapter of Deuteronomy, giving an account of his death), that wonderful compilation of the history of the Israelites, which begins with a poetic account of the creation, had been already in existence at least six centuries before Homer's time, assuming that his birth occurred about the middle of the ninth century B. C. The most eminent biblical scholars fix the time of the death of Moses in the year 1451 B. C.

Why is it that a great intellect like that possessed by Homer, never knew of the existence or became familiar with the only literature in the world, which for beauty and excellence could alone compare with his own marvelous compositions? In seeking an answer to this inquiry it cannot be said that the Greeks and the Israelites never came in contact. There can be no doubt that many Greeks, not only men of letters, but merchants and mariners, traveled in Palestine, and were familiar, in a measure at least, with their laws and customs. .

Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, was said to have been contemporaneous with Homer. Indeed some writers claim that he was acquainted with the blind poet. It is recorded of Lycurgus, who was of royal lineage, that he traveled all over the known world, and spent

ten years in investigating the laws and customs of the various civilized people of that age, for the express purpose of gaining sufficient information and knowledge to enable him to prepare a proper code of laws for Sparta. He is said to have visited Crete, Ionia, Egypt, Iberia, Libya and India. Can there be any doubt but that he visited Babylonia and Syria, which embraces Phœnicia and Palestine. Greeks from Asia Minor, Herodotus tells us (i, 163), discovered the Adriatic, and Iberia (Spain), and Tartessus. This latter city is known also as Tarshish on the river Bœtis (now the Guadalquivir) near the site of the modern Cadiz. Tarshish, it is believed, was settled by Phœnicians. If this view is correct, it was a trading-port visited regularly by the ships of Solomon more than a century before Homer was born. Solomon made a treaty with Hiram, King of Tyre, one of the principal cities of Phœnicia, whereby he obtained from the latter cedar trees and fir trees, and gold and silver. Hiram also built the lavers, the shovels and the basins for Solomon's temple. Josephus says that Solomon also married one of the daughters of Hiram. He built also a navy which was manned by Phœnician sailors furnished by Hiram (1 Kings, ix, 27). The navy of Hiram and the navy of Solomon were accustomed to visit Tarshish once in three years. Tarshish was discovered long before the time of Solomon. It may have been settled by the sons of Gomer shortly after the flood. Among the latter, mentioned in the tenth chapter of Genesis, are Elishah and Tarshish, Kittim (who doubtless dwelt in Citium in the island of Cyprus) and Dodanim. David, in the forty-eighth Psalm, in describing the power of the Almighty declares " thou breakest the ships of Tarshish with an east wind." David also was on very friendly terms with Hiram (2 Sam. v, 11).

These references are given to show the close relations which existed between the Israelites or the Jews, and

the Phœnicians or Canaanites, more than a century before the time of Homer. The commercial dealings of the Phœnicians, Greeks and Israelites will be fully discussed presently. The richest stores of Hebrew literature were in existence when Rehoboam became King of Israel B. C. 975, after his father Solomon had reigned forty years. The latter contributed largely to the sacred writings of the Jews. He was the author of the book of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon. These writings had become part of the sacred Hebrew literature at least one hundred and twenty-five years (B. C. 975, given as the time when Solomon died) before Homer flourished.

There can be no doubt that the Tartessus of Herodotus was the Tarshish of Ezekiel; that it was in the Atlantic beyond the Pillars of Hercules, in Iberia, now Spain, on the Bœtis, now the Guadalquivir. The Greek historian, speaking of Tartessus, says (i, 163), that "the Phocæans were the first of the Greeks who performed long voyages, and it was they who made the Greeks acquainted with the Adriatic, and with Tyrrhenia, with Iberia, and the city of Tartessus." In speaking of the expedition of Aryandes against Libya, shortly after the Scythian expedition of Darius, Herodotus says (iv, 152) that a Samian vessel, on its way to Egypt, was carried out of its course by a terrific gale from the east and was driven past the Pillars of Hercules, "and at last by some special guiding providence reached Tartessus." It seems equally clear that this Tartessus was the Tarshish of Ezekiel, who was contemporaneous with Solon, because the products of the country mentioned by the prophet answer the description of the products of Spain. In his lament over Tyre, written early in the sixth century (B. C. 588), the prophet refers to the wealth and commercial importance of the greatest city in Phœnicia. He says (xxvii, 12), "Tarshish was thy merchant by reason of

the multitude of all kind of riches; with silver, iron, tin and lead, they traded in thy fairs."

The Tarshish referred to in the book of Kings, in connection with the navy of Hiram, in the reign of King Solomon, does not correspond with the Tarshish referred to by the prophet Ezekiel, if we are to judge by the nature of the cargo brought to Tyre and Jerusalem by these Israelites and Phœnician merchantmen. With regard to the ships of Solomon the record declares (1 Kings, x, 22), "For the king had at sea a navy of Tarshish, with the navy of Hiram; once in three years came the navy of Tarshish bringing gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks." The record further declares that gold for the temple of Solomon was brought by the Phœnician ships of Hiram from Ophir. The ships brought also precious stones and Almug trees, from which exude medicinal gums, very precious and very fragrant. The queen of Sheba in Ethiopia (now Abyssinia) contributed to Solomon, for the decoration of his costly and magnificent temple, one hundred and twenty talents of gold, and vast stores of spices and precious stones.

It seems very clear, from what is said of the character of the cargo brought by these merchantmen, by the navy of Tarshish, namely, gold, ivory, apes and peacocks, that they brought these things not from Spain, but from Arabian, Indian and African ports. The navy of Tarshish, from the language used, seems to indicate in this connection the character of the ships in the navy, not necessarily the particular port which the ships visited. In other words the navy was said to consist of Tarshish ships, that is, ships built especially for long voyages. The ships, in which Phœnicians traded with the distant port of Tarshish in Spain, were necessarily constructed, as to size, strength and durability, in such a manner as to be able to make a voyage of five thousand miles, being about the distance from Tyre to

Tarshish, including the return trip. Hence Tarshish ships, as the words are used in the first book of Kings (x, 22), mean ships constructed after the strongest and most durable model, fit to make a voyage to Tarshish. The passage might, therefore, be rendered, "For the king (Solomon) had at sea, a navy of Tarshish ships, with the navy of Hiram."

But the record discloses the further fact that while these Tarshish ships brought gold from Ophir, gums and spices from Arabia, and peacocks from India, they went also to Tarshish. The journey to that distant port, it will be observed, consumed three years. In the second book of Chronicles, is this declaration:

"For the king's ships went to Tarshish with the servants of Huram; every three years once came the ships of Tarshish, bringing gold, and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks." (2 Chron. ix, 21.)

This appears also from what is said concerning Jehoshaphat, King of Judah, who reigned about B. C. 896, and his dealings with Ahaziah, King of Israel. "And he (Jehoshaphat) joined himself with him (Ahaziah) to make ships to go to Tarshish, and they made the ships at Ezion-gaber." (2 Chron. xx, 36.) The record shows also that "Jehoshaphat made ships of Tarshish to go to Ophir for gold, but they went not, for the ships were broken (lost in a storm) at Ezion-geber." (1 Kings, xxii, 48.) The Mediterranean, also, through which the ships sailed on their voyages to and from Tarshish, was called the sea of Tarshish.

From these accounts in the Hebrew Scriptures it is clear that the rendezvous of the ships and navies of the Israelites was not anywhere on the east coast of the Mediterranean. Jerusalem, the capital of David and Solomon, was nearly forty miles inland, in the valley of Cedron, in Judea, or the ancient Kingdom of Judah, the land of Canaan. Its nearest neighbors on the south were Edomites and Moabites. Its nearest seaport to

the south was Ezion-geber, in the land of Edom, on the most northern extremity of the gulf of Akaba, an arm of the Red Sea, extending north, and forming the eastern boundary of the Sinaitic peninsula, the western boundary being the gulf of Suez, also an arm of the Red Sea. Between these two gulfs or horns of the Red Sea is the peninsula of Sinai, and the wilderness of Paran, through which the children of Israel wandered, after their escape from Egypt under the intrepid leadership of Moses. The distance from Jerusalem to Ezion-geber was about one hundred and fifty miles almost due south.

From these accounts we must assume that merchantmen in Solomon's time and in Jehoshaphat's time brought cargoes from all parts of the then known world. They brought merchandise from ports in Arabia, and from ports in Malabar, along the west coast of India. They brought gold from Ophir. Where was Ophir? Some scholars locate it in Arabia, near the present Aden, on the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, on the Red Sea, others assert that the Ophir of Solomon's time was on the east coast of Africa, on what is now known as Mozambique channel, in the neighborhood of the modern district of Sofala. Some contend that this land of Ophir, though remote from what we now designate Abyssinia, may have formed part of the dominions of the queen of Sheba. However this may be, it is highly probable that these ships of Tarshish not only sailed as far south as Mozambique channel, from which they brought ivory and gold, but that they sailed the entire length of the African continent, the ancient Libya, doubled its southern cape, now known as the Cape of Good Hope, sailed north in the Atlantic, along its west coast, to Tarshish in Spain, and thence east to Tyre, or Ezion-geber, a voyage which consumed a period of three years. This view is supported by certain statements by Herodotus, to which we shall

refer presently, corresponding, as to time and distance, with the biblical account.

The objection to this theory, that the ancients doubled the cape of Good Hope, and reached Tarshish, sailing north along the west coast of Africa, is obvious. How could the navy of Hiram and the navy of Solomon and of Jehoshaphat possibly have sailed from Ezion-geber at the extremity of the gulf of Akaba, an arm of the Red Sea, to Tarshish in Spain. Their vessels might sail southeast through the Red Sea through what are now known as the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb into the Gulf of Aden, and thence into the sea of Erythræum, now known as the Indian Ocean, to Malabar, on the west coast of India, and along the east coast of Africa to Ophir. But they ask how could these ships sail into the Mediterranean, or into the Atlantic.

The objection rests upon the assumption, first, that all land south of Ethiopia was a *terra incognita;* that the Phœnicians in the time of David and Solomon never ventured far south, and consequently knew nothing of the Cape at the extremity of the continent, now known as the Cape of Good Hope; and second, that there was no canal extending across the isthmus of Suez from the Gulf of Suez to the eastern waters of the Nile Delta, and thence through the Nile, to a port on the Mediterranean, as there is to-day. In the light of modern investigation, it seems that both of these assumptions are erroneous. There is abundant evidence of the fact that there was a canal across the isthmus of Suez, nearly three centuries before the time of David. Archæologists assert positively that this canal was constructed by the Kings of Egypt, Seti I and Rameses II, about B. C. 1350-1300, extending from the Pelusiac branch of the Nile Delta to lake Timsah, and thence to the gulf of Suez or the Red Sea. The mouth of this most easterly tributary of the Nile is not far from the site of the present Port Said, on the Mediterranean. If these

archæologists and engineers are correct, and they claim there is abundant evidence disclosed by modern French surveys to sustain their contention, then the ships of Solomon and Jehoshaphat could have sailed directly from Ezion-geber through the Red Sea and the ancient Suez canal, into the Mediterranean, and thence west through the gates of Hercules into the Atlantic, to Tarshish, on the southern coast of Spain, and thence back again through the Mediterranean. They could also have sailed round the Cape of Good Hope, assuming that the statements of Herodotus in that regard are correct, and north past the gates of Hercules, or straits of Gibraltar, to Tarshish, in the south of Spain, and thence east through these straits, through the Mediterranean, directly to Tyre, or down the eastern branch of the Nile Delta through the canal across the isthmus of Suez, constructed by Seti I and Rameses II, into the Red Sea and thence through the Gulf of Akaba to Ezion-geber in the land of Edom. According to the biblical record, and the account of Herodotus, the journey either way would consume a period of three years.

With regard to the circumnavigation of the African continent, the ancient Libya in remote antiquity, Herodotus observes (iv, 42), that it was well known in his day that Libya was washed on all sides by the sea, except so much of it as borders on or is connected with Asia. This was proved by Neco, King of Egypt, who, when he had ceased digging the canal leading from the Nile to the Arabian Gulf, sent " a number of ships manned by Phœnicians with orders to make for the Pillars of Hercules, and return to Egypt, through them, and by the Mediterranean. The Phœnicians took their departure from Egypt, by way of the Erythræan Sea (the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Indian Ocean) and so sailed into the southern ocean. . . . Two whole years went by, and it was not until the

third year that they doubled the Pillars of Hercules, and made good their voyage home."

The Carthaginians mentioned by Herodotus were not the only navigators who doubled the Cape of Good Hope at a very early period. Pliny declares that Hanno, a Carthaginian, long before the time of Neco, went round it, sailing through the Pillars of Hercules, touching on the southern coast of Spain (doubtless at Tarshish), navigated along the west coast of Africa around the Cape, and returned through the Arabian Gulf (Red Sea).

Referring to the ancient canal across the isthmus of Suez, Herodotus (ii, 158) observes that Neco, King of Egypt, was the first to attempt the construction of the canal to the Red Sea. The Neco here referred to, was the son of Psammetichus, who reigned about two centuries before the time of Herodotus. Modern scholars declare, upon undoubted testimony, that the canal was originally constructed by Seti I and his grandson, Rameses II, the greatest of the Pharaohs, who reigned a century after the death of Moses, whose achievements are engraved in the temples of Karnak and Luxor. The work of Neco, it is believed, was directed to cleaning out and repairing the ancient canal of Rameses, which had become partly choked up and obstructed by the drifting sands during the intervening centuries. Herodotus says that this work begun by Neco was afterward completed by Darius Hystaspes, father of Xerxes. The latter, it will be remembered, was defeated by Themistocles in the straits of Salamis. He says the length of the canal was " four days' journey, and the width such as to admit of two triremes being rowed along it abreast. The water in the canal was supplied from the Nile, the eastern tributary of which the canal leaves a little above the city of Bubastis, near Patumus, the Arabian town, being continued thence until it joins the Red Sea. At first it is carried along

the Arabian side of the Egyptian plain, as far as the chain of hills opposite Memphis, whereby the plain is bounded, and in which lie the great stone quarries. Here it skirts the base of the hills, running in a direction from west to east; after which it turns and enters a narrow pass, trending southward from this point until it enters the Arabian Gulf. From the northern sea (Mediterranean) to that which is called the Southern or Erythræan, the shortest and quickest passage, which is from Mount Casius, the boundary between Egypt and Syria to the Gulf of Arabia is a distance of exactly one thousand furlongs."[1] The work, as conducted, occasioned appalling mortality, which indicates the cruelty of the Egyptian taskmasters of that age. Herodotus declares that of the laborers who did the excavating one hundred and twenty thousand perished during the period occupied in the work.

This convincing testimony justifies the conclusion, that the countries of the ancient world, bordering on the Mediterranean and the Euxine, on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as on the Atlantic, where it washes the shoulders of the continents of Europe and Africa, known by the archaic designations, Mauretania and Lusitania, and their contiguous territory, were not locked countries. These seas and oceans were open seas. The people of antiquity were merchants and traders, navigators and explorers, and carried on their commerce and established their colonies on the remote frontiers of the then known world.

These authorities are sufficient to establish the proposition that the people of Hellas, of Egypt and of Syria, which embraces both Phœnicia and Palestine, came in contact with each other as merchants and traders. It is evident that in the time of Homer, Lycurgus visited

[1] 1,000 stades is about 114 English miles, at 600 Greek feet to the stadium.

all these countries in pursuit of knowledge. What was open to Lycurgus was open to Homer. We will show presently that four centuries later, this intercourse among the nations of antiquity continued. Practically all the countries of the then known world were visited by Herodotus, who has given us vivid descriptions of what he saw and heard in his day and generation.

We now proceed to a discussion of the second branch, namely, the literature of the ancient world, as it existed in Homer's day. First, let us consider their alphabet, and means of communication among these early people.

The Phœnicians, as has been observed, were among the most conspicuous merchants and mariners of antiquity. They sustained very close relations with the Israelites, and established treaty relations with David and Solomon. Beyond question these treaties were in writing. The Greek alphabet, the same which doubtless Homer used in composing his great productions, was of Phœnician origin. The earliest forms of the letters of this alphabet (*αλφα, βητα*) bear a very close resemblance to those used in the commercial code of Phœnicia. Philologists declare that Greek names, in numerous instances, are derived from the Semitic. They point out also the interesting fact that the various alphabets in use in the time of Homer, and long prior thereto, namely the Hebrew, Phœnician, Aramaic, and their branches are all of common origin. This important statement is sustained and corroborated by a recent discovery. In 1868 at Diban, in the land of Moab, a stone was found, containing an inscription of thirty-four lines, known as the Moabite stone, the fragments of which have been carefully fitted together, and are preserved in the Louvre. The inscription is written in Moabite characters and has been deciphered by modern scholars. These learned men say that the characters used are identical with those on Phœnician monuments. It is claimed further that the language in

which the inscription is written, is so closely allied to the Hebrew that the conclusion is justified "which makes Hebrew and Moabitish practically identical." The inscription relates to the achievements of the King of Moab, presumably Mesha, who was a contemporary of King Ahab, whose reign is referred to in the Second Book of Kings (iii, 4), who flourished about B. C. 895. After the death of Ahab, Mesha rebelled against the King of Israel. The archæologists assume that the inscription on this Moabite stone was written in the neighborhood of 870 or 860 B. C., a period contemporaneous with Homer, if those scholars are correct (and among them Herodotus) who assert that the poet flourished about the middle of the ninth century B. C.

This bit of evidence, discovered so recently, sustains the theory that the literature of David and Solomon must have been known to the neighboring nations, not only on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, but probably in Egypt also, as both Phœnicians and Israelites, as has been shown, sustained close commercial relations with that country. In the light of this testimony, we continue to wonder why it was that the earlier poets of Greece had no knowledge whatever, and were entirely unfamiliar with the writings of the Hebrew poets, whose sacred songs and religious chants stand unrivalled in the world of letters.

Two early systems of writing have recently been discovered also on the island of Crete, a country with which Homer was familiar and to which he refers in writing of the Dorian race. One of these systems, specimens of which were found on vases and pottery, taken from ancient tombs, seems to have been of Egyptian origin, by reason of the pictures or hieroglyphics used. The other system, however, is based on a linear alphabet, and employs a number of letters or signs resembling the Phœnician and early Greek characters, which letters, it is pointed out, had been borrowed by

the Greeks from the Phœnicians, and which, it is believed, were in use among the Greeks before Homer's time, as early at least as the time of David.

The evidence furnished by the inscription on the Moabite stone, establishes almost conclusively the assertion of Assyriologists, that the early inhabitants of Palestine, the land of the Israelites, were Asiatic, not Egyptian, and that their earlier culture was derived from Babylonia. Professor Naville of the Institute of France, declares that the ancient books of the Hebrews, and particularly the Pentateuch, must to a great extent have been written in Babylonian or Assyrian, and in cuneiform characters.[1] He argues that Moses must have written the Ten Commandments in Babylonian cuneiform, and that written Hebrew does not seem to have been used prior to the time of Solomon. Might not this theory be explained on the assumption that Moses may have used cuneiform characters to write Hebrew words? He is careful to say, however, in this connection, that the absence of Hebrew documents does not necessarily imply the non-existence of that language as a literary medium.[2]

The inquiry at once presents itself what is meant by the "Hebrew language." What language did Abraham speak? What language did Lot speak? We may assume that they spoke the language which prevailed in

[1] Discovery of the Book of the Law, under King Josiah, page 40.

[2] Dr. A. S. Yahuda, of Berlin, referring to the progress made in excavations in Assyria, Babylonia, Asia Minor and Egypt, in 1911, speaks of one hundred clay tablets which had been dug up in Samaria, written in old Hebrew, the same as the inscription on the Moabite Stone. These inscriptions, Dr. Yahuda says, were not cut in clay, but were written in deep black Egyptian ink, which has preserved to us, in excellent condition, writings from the first and second millennium B. C. on papyri, on wooden coffins and clay tablets, in Crete and Egypt. On one of these tablets is said to have been found a letter from an Assyrian king to Ahab, King of Israel, about B. C. 900-854, the period corresponding with the age of Homer.

the land of their birth. Abraham was born in Ur in Chaldea. Lot's father was likewise born there for he was Abraham's brother. Whatever language was spoken in Chaldea and Babylonia, was the mother tongue of Abraham. It was doubtless designated as the Chaldean or Babylonian language. Dr. Briggs, an eminent theologian and Hebrew scholar, says that "the ancient Assyrian and Babylonian are nearer to the Hebrew and Phœnician than they are to the other Semitic families." This language which is called Hebrew, Dr. Briggs says, "was the language of the ancient inhabitants of Canaan." This accords fully with the Biblical account. The Assyrian or Babylonian language, which was used also in Chaldea, was doubtless the language which Abraham spoke, and which his nephew, Lot, spoke.

In this connection, it will be profitable to note the origin of the word Hebrew. It was not used originally to designate a particular language, but was employed by the Canaanites, who applied the term to Abraham. They called him "Abram the Hebrew" (Gen. xiv, 13), to distinguish him as one who had crossed the Euphrates, and had come out from Ur, of the Chaldees, and journeyed westward into the land of Canaan. The original word, we are told, is *'eber*, which indicates "beyond, on the other side." The tribesmen of Abraham, having migrated to the west, went to Haran, thence south across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia to Aram or Syria, and thence south into Canaan, were designated Hebrews, having migrated to the west, to distinguish them from those who dwelt in the east. Did Abraham acquire the vernacular of the Canaanites, which is usually designated as Hebrew, or was that the form of speech in Canaan, as well as in Chaldea. On this point the opinion of Dr. Briggs, the eminent Hebraic scholar, would seem to indicate that the Hebrew and Chaldean languages were very sim-

ilar. He says, in this connection, "Whether Abraham adopted the language of the Canaanites or brought the Hebrew with him from the east is unimportant, for the ancient Assyrian and Babylonian are nearer to the Hebrew and Phœnician, than they are to the other Semitic families." [1]

Lot dwelt in the land of Moab, which was peopled by his incestuous descendants. Their language in the time of King Ahab is revealed to us by the inscription on the Moabite stone above referred to, which the archæologists says is so closely allied to the Hebrew as to make the Hebrew and Moabitish practically identical. Tyre and Sidon were in Canaan, afterwards designated Phœnicia.

The merchants of Tyre long before the time of David and Solomon were princes, and her traffickers were the honorable of the earth. But the prophet Joel denounced the merchants of Tyre and Sidon because they trafficked in Hebrew slaves and sold them to the Greeks. "The children also of Judah and the children of Jerusalem have ye sold unto the Grecians, that ye might remove them far from their border." (Joel, iii, 6.)

This testimony illustrates the close commercial relations which existed not only between the Greeks and Phœnicians or Canaanites, who dwelt in Palestine, in Syria, immediately on the borders of Judah, but which existed also between the Phœnicians and the Israelites. Not only were these nations commercial allies, but Solomon married a Canaanite, the daughter of Hiram, King of Tyre, and thus established bonds of affinity and consanguinity between them. Solomon also married the daughter of Pharaoh, presumably Sheshonk I (Shishank), who was the first Egyptian monarch of the Twenty-second Dynasty. This Pharaoh aided Solomon in his war with the Canaanites. He sent an army into Palestine, we are told in the first book of Kings, took the City of Gezer, destroyed the Canaanites, who defended it, and "gave it for a present unto his daughter, Solomon's wife." (1 Kings, ix, 16.)

[1] General Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, p. 52.

These exogamous marriages must have taken place when Solomon was at the summit of his fame, and had given to the world the book of Proverbs containing more profound maxims and more wisdom than any book written before or since.

We shall now consider the literature of the Israelites as it must have existed in Solomon's time, and from archaic times long prior. In this connection also we refer to the poems of Homer, in order to show from internal evidence contained in his writings, that he knew nothing of the literature of the Israelites.

The Phœnicians, from whom the Greeks, as has been observed, learned their letters, were in a sense an educated people, and had been for centuries. They taught the Greeks at all events their letters. Their pupils proved apt, having created a literature that will live forever.

It has been said that Homer had no model. He speaks of the gods and their relations with men. He speaks of the physical universe, and gives an elaborate description of it, in which he refers to the stars and constellations, and the occupations of those who dwell in the land of shadows. It seems clear from his observations on these topics that Homer was ignorant of Hebrew literature contained in the Old Testament, which bears internal evidence of having been written centuries before the age usually attributed to Homer.

Job refers to the same constellations to which Homer refers, Arcturus, Orion and the Pleiades. He asks some questions, which, had Homer heard them, would doubtless have manifested themselves in his writings and would have colored the expressions in his poems.

If a man die, shall he live again? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened, or, who laid the corner stone thereof? Hath the rain a father? Who hath begotten the drops of dew? Job refers always to Jehovah, the only god known to the Hebrews. He describes his power as Homer describes the power of Zeus (Jupiter), whom the Hellenes declared to be the supreme ruler of the universe. But the description of the sovereignty and omnipotence of the Jehovah or Elohim of the Hebrews, as depicted in the Old Testament, far surpasses in beauty and in strength and sublimity of thought, the work of the master poet of Hellas. In the Eighth Book of the Iliad, Homer, speaking of the power and authority of the father of the gods, declares:

"Now morn in saffron robes had spread her light
O'er all the earth, when Jove, the Thunderer,
Summoned the gods to council on the heights
Of many-peaked Olympus. He addressed
The Assembly, and all listened as he spoke.
. . . . . .
Whosoever, stealing from the rest, shall seek
To aid the Grecian cause, or that of Troy,
Back to Olympus, scourged and in disgrace,
Shall he be brought, or I will seize and hurl
The offender down to rayless Tartarus;
Deep, deep in the great gulf below the earth,
With iron gates, and threshold forged of brass, —
As far beneath the shades, as earth from heaven.
Then shall he learn how greatly I surpass
All other gods in power. Try, if ye will,
Ye gods, that all may know: suspend from heaven
A golden chain; let all the immortal host
Cling to it from below; ye could not draw,
Strive as ye might, the all-disposing Jove,
From heaven to earth. And yet, if I should choose
To draw it upward to me, I should lift,
With it and you, the earth itself and sea
Together, and I then would bind the chain,
Around the summit of the Olympian mount,
And they should hang aloft. So far my power
Surpasses all the power of gods and men."

How does this picture of the strength and power of Zeus, compare with the majesty and sublimity of thought in the Hebrew poems, when speaking of the god of Israel? Thus Job: "The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his reproof. He divideth the sea with power, and by his understanding he smiteth through the proud. By his Spirit he has garnished the heavens; his hand has formed the crooked serpent. . . . He overturneth the mountains by the roots. He cutteth out rivers among the rocks; and his eye seeth every precious thing. He looketh to the ends of the earth and seeth under the whole heaven; to make the weight for the winds; and weigheth the waters by measure."

Equally beautiful is the description of Jehovah's power in the Psalms of David, who was brought up as a shepherd boy among the hills of Judea, and who subsequently became the greatest of Israel's kings. "O Lord my God, thou art very great, thou art clothed with honor and majesty. Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment; who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain; who layest the beams of his chambers in the waters; who maketh the clouds his chairot; who walketh upon the wings of the wind. . . . He watereth the hills from his chambers. . . . He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth; he touches the hills, and they smoke." [1]

Solomon, also, who lived more than a century before Homer, made some remarkable declarations. He declares that all things are of dust, and turn to dust again; that when man dies his dust shall return to the earth as it was, but "the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." [2] Solomon also says that wisdom was coeval with Jehovah: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way. . . . I was set up from

[1] Psalms, civ. [2] Eccles. xii, 7.

everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths I was brought forth. . . . Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth; while as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens I was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth. When he established the clouds above, when he strengthened the fountains of the deep; when he gave to the sea his decree; that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth. Then I was by him, as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight." [1]

Homer's ideals of divine power and majesty, as described in the opening of the Eighth Book of the Iliad, and his conception of the universe as described in the eighteenth, indicate clearly that he was wholly unfamiliar with the writings of the Hebrews, and knew nothing of the power and majesty of the Jehovah of the Israelites as set forth in the first chapter of Genesis, in the book of Job, in the Psalms of David or in the works of Solomon. What influence these writings of the Hebrews would have had upon the intellect of a poet, endowed with the genius revealed in the Iliad and the Odyssey, it is impossible to conjecture. But when the Greek and Hebrew writings are compared, it is obvious that the Hellenic bard was ignorant of the sublime poetry contained in the literature of the Israelites, which was extant in his time, portions of which were composed more than eight hundred years before the middle of the ninth century B. C., the period when Homer was supposed to have flourished. Modern scholars have established the chronology of these authors approximately as follows: The time of Job is placed about 1520 B. C.; the death of Moses about

[1] Proverbs viii, 22-30.

1451; of David about 1015; the death of Solomon, 975. Homer according to the weight of authority flourished about 850 B. C.

What writer thus far has given any satisfactory reason for the fact, that the literary men of Hellas had no knowledge of the literature of the Hebrews; the nation that produced the authors of the Old Testament, whose sacred poetry has never been surpassed. It has survived the ages, and will live forever, although some of it is so old that its origin and its authorship are lost in the twilight of antiquity.

If we can credit Josephus, Solomon was the most voluminous writer and the most eminent man of letters that ever lived. He excelled all his contemporaries in wisdom and learning. "He composed books of odes and songs one thousand and five," says Josephus, "of parables and similitudes three thousand; for he spake a parable upon every sort of tree, from the hyssop to the cedar, and in like manner also about beasts, about all sorts of living creatures, whether upon the earth or in the seas, or in the air, for he was not unacquainted with any of their natures, nor omitted inquiries about them, but described them all like a philosopher, and demonstrated his exquisite knowledge of their several properties."

This testimony seems to establish beyond question two important facts, first, that the Israelites from the earliest times were a literary people, and loved the arts, as well as the sciences; and second, that the Hellenese, in the age of Homer also excelled in literature. The evidence is conclusive also that the Hellenese mingled freely with the Israelites, Phœnicians and Egyptians, and traded with them. In Homer's time, it seems that a slave trade was carried on between the Phœnicians and the Greeks, and that the subject of their traffic was Hebrew maidens and Israelitish women, and that the principal slave marts were established at Tyre and

Sidon. Notwithstanding, these people were not isolated, but traded with each other continually, yet the wealth of Hebrew literature, somehow, seems never to have come to the knowledge of the literary men of Hellas.

In this connection it will be interesting to note the condition of learning among the early Israelites while they yet dwelt in Chaldea. If we may credit Josephus, it would seem that Abraham was driven out of Chaldea for opinion's sake. The old patriarch was the first to declare the doctrine of monotheism. This sublime truth, we are told, was revealed to Abraham through his observations of the phenomena of the heavens, and the earth, the changes in the physical world, on land and sea; the spectacle of the sun and its apparent motion, the phases of the moon and the variations in the seasons, of the constellations, and the glittering hosts in the starry heavens. The old patriarch of Israel was a man of attainments, and skilled in the learning of the Chaldeans, with whom he dwelt in Ur. The science of astronomy and learning as to the heavenly bodies, was cultivated among them. As the motions of stars and planets were irregular, Abraham argued that their movements were not produced by any inherent power in the bodies themselves, but that they were of necessity subservient to the power of Jehovah, by whom all things were created.

Because Abraham entertained these views with respect to theology, we are told, the Chaldean priesthood, who were the first astronomers of whom we have any knowledge, and the priests of Mesopotamia, raised a tumult against Abraham. Thus in the tenth generation after the flood, more than nineteen hundred years before the beginning of the Christian era, Abraham was persecuted for opinion's sake. For this cause he went out from Ur of the Chaldees and journeyed to Haran. When he quitted Haran, he settled in the strip of country between the mountains of Lebanon and the Mediterranean which they called the land of Canaan. Now Canaan was the fourth son of Ham. The Biblical account tells us that Abraham reigned at Damascus. Other branches of the Semitic race journeyed to and dwelt in the land of Canaan and built there the cities of Tyre and Sidon, long before the advent of Abraham. These early races, or sub races were referred to by the Hellenic mariners and merchants as Phœnicians, who sold Hebrew slaves. Abraham, after he came into Canaan, suffered by reason of a famine which visited the land, and journeyed thence into Egypt, and it is said that he was the first to introduce the study of astronomy among the Egyptians. It seems to be well established also that Greek colonists migrated to Egypt and dwelt there, even before Abraham visited the land of the Nile.

We know also that the Egyptians excelled in mathematics. Of this we are reminded constantly by the Pyramids, by the ancient temples at Karnak and Luxor, at Thebes and Memphis, which attest, after more than three thousand years, that the men who built them were proficient in the higher branches of mathematics.

These observations show that the people of the ancient world excelled in certain branches of the arts and sciences; that their countries were not isolated, but, on the contrary, that extensive commercial relations existed among the people of the several nations about the shores of the Mediterranean, the Ægean and the Euxine. It seems clear, also, that a knowledge of the literature of the Israelites never extended to the Greeks or to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, until after the time of Alexander the Great.

CHAPTER V

SPARTA — LYCURGUS — THE ACHAEAN AND DORIAN SUPREMACY IN THE PELOPONNESUS

SPARTA, the ancient capital of Laconia, is situated on the plain, on the right bank of the Eurotas, where it is joined by its confluent, the Œnus. The valley of the Eurotas lies between the mountain ranges of Taygetus, on the west, which forms the boundary between Laconia and Messenia, and Mount Parnon on the east. Rising from the perimeter of this stretch of country, the slopes of the surrounding mountains and hills form a great bowl or basin at the bottom of which is the plain and valley of the Eurotas. Homer describes it, as if looking into the valley from the mountain tops, as the "lovely hollow Lacedamon."

The locality is historic. In Argolis, forty miles to the northeast, is Argos, in the plain of Argos. In the immediate vicinity is the ancient Tiryns and the City of Mycenæ, said to have been founded by the Phrygian Pelops, the famed capital of Agamemnon. Mycenæ is twenty miles northeast of Argos, and is almost midway between Argos and Corinth.

When Agamemnon reigned in Mycenæ, his brother Menelaus was King of Sparta, and Diomedes King of Argos. Homer, referring to the Hellenes in the Peloponnesus, calls them Achæans, Argives and Danaans. These names are sometimes used in the Iliad as synonymous terms, and in a generic sense, to indicate the branch of the Hellenic race, which in the heroic age,

had acquired the ascendency over the greater part of the Peloponnesus.

Inquiry as to the lineage of Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, and the epoch in which he lived, involves a discussion of the return of the Heraclidæ, the Dorian invasion, and the succession of the Dorian over the Achæan supremacy in the Peloponnese, one of the unsolved problems of prehistoric Hellas, which will be discussed presently.

The age of Lycurgus belongs probably to the first half of the ninth century B. C. If this conjecture is correct, Lycurgus flourished nearly a century before the first recorded Olympiad, B. C. 776, from which event is traced some isolated fragments of authentic history. The age of Lycurgus, therefore, lies beyond the domain of historic time, and belongs to the age of tradition. It was presumably the age in which Homer lived, and some authorities declare that the great legislator of Sparta, in his extensive travels, met and conversed with the poet, with whom it is alleged he was a contemporary. For the purpose of fixing the chronology of contemporaneous events, it may be observed that during this period, the prophet Elisha performed his wonderful miracles among the children of Israel, having healed Naaman of his leprosy, and breathed life into the dead son of the Shunamite woman.

Although the greatest literary monument of all time was composed and perhaps written in the age of Lycurgus, that epoch was long prior to the historic age of Hellas. It was still the age of poetry and fable, of legend and romance, and four centuries passed before the sun of Herodotus rose above the literary horizon. Indeed, our information concerning the individuality of Lycurgus is so vague, that some authorities have denied his existence, and have assumed that such a personage never lived. Nevertheless, some modern scholars, and among them Mr. Grote, upon a review of all the

evidence attainable, have reached the conclusion that Lycurgus lived sometime in the first half of the ninth century B. C., and that he secured the enactment of the laws and ordinances which bear his name, under which the Lacedamonian military republic flourished.

Nevertheless the ancient authors who wrote four centuries and more after his death, were obliged to indulge in speculation concerning him. They did not have sufficient reliable data as to his birth and lineage, or the age in which he lived, to enable them to write a satisfactory biography, and were unable to agree as to whether he was an actual or mythical personage. Plutarch has contributed the fullest details that have come down to us, in his interesting sketch of his life. He thus reveals his embarrassment in the opening sentences of his biography:

"There is so much uncertainty in the accounts which historians have left us of Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, that scarcely anything is asserted by one of them, which is not called in question or contradicted by the rest. Their sentiments are quite different as to the family he came of, the voyages he undertook, the place and manner of his death, but most of all when they speak of the laws he made, and the commonwealth which he founded. They cannot by any means be brought to an agreement as to the very age in which he lived; for some of them say he flourished in the time of Iphitus, and that they two jointly contrived the ordinance for the cessation of arms during the solemnity of the Olympian games."

This latter estimate, cited by Plutarch, places the time of Lycurgus nearly half a century later than is consistent with the more reliable authorities. The Olympian games were of great antiquity and were celebrated long before the time of Iphitus, King of Elis. In the reign of the latter, however, the games were celebrated at Olympia, his capital, and the year 776 B. C. is fixed as the date of the first recorded Olympiad, from which is derived the chronology of the early Hellenes.

Lycurgus was a lineal descendant of Hercules. In the age of fable, Lacedamon ruled the city on the banks of the Eurotas, and gave to it the name of his wife Sparta, daughter of Eurotas, King of the Leleges. He introduced the worship of the Graces, and built a temple in their honor. Since his time, the city was designated interchangeably Lacedamon and Sparta.

King Lacedamon was of Achæan blood. His line became extinct on the death of Castor and Pollux, sons of Tyndarus, whose daughter Helen was the cause of the war with Troy. Under Agamemnon, Argos and Mycenæ were joined in a confederacy with Sparta, which also included Tiryns and Corinth. Heracles (designated by the Romans, Hercules), according to the legend, was a King of Sparta, and was lawful heir to the throne of Argos. His descendants, the Heraclidæ, subsequently, about 1080 B. C., conquered their Achæan kinsmen on their return to the Peloponnesus, in the reign of Tisamenes, son of Orestes, and grandson of Agamemnon. About this time was established in Sparta, the diarchy, or dual kingship, which prevailed in the time of Lycurgus. The diarchy was supposed to have arisen from the fact that the queen of King Aristodemus gave birth to twins, and neither the queen mother, nor the oracle at Delphi, deemed it prudent to decide which of the children was born first.

The descendants of Hercules settled in the Peloponnesus, and after the death of their great ancestor, were driven out by Eurystheus, and sought shelter in Attica. As they inhabited the Peloponnesus in the heroic age, we must assume that the Heraclidæ were of Achæan blood. The ancient authors, except Simonides (who was a contemporary of Pisistratus), assert that Lycurgus was the son of Eunomus, and a younger brother of

Polydectus. He was sixth in the line of descent from Patrocles, and the eleventh from Hercules.

The ancestral line of Heracleid Kings is involved in confusion and obscurity. The following table shows the genealogy of Lycurgus, according to Herodotus (viii, 131), as eighth from Hercules.



It will be observed, therefore, in order to make Lycurgus eleventh in the line from the common ancestor, it will be necessary to interpolate Euristhenes, brother of Procles, and his two sons, Soüs and Agis, as having occupied the throne of Sparta.

The last Kings of Sparta were Heraclidæ. Plutarch declares that Soüs, the great-grandfather of Lycurgus, was the most renowned of all his ancestors. During his reign the Spartans made slaves of the Helots, and added a part of Arcadia to their dominions.

It will be interesting to trace the royal Achæan line, and examine the legends concerning Hercules, their progenitor. By reason of the wrath and jealousy of Hera (Juno), Hercules became a wanderer, subject to the commands of his kinsman Eurysthenes, usurper of the

throne of Argos, at whose direction he performed the Twelve Labors. Hera was Queen of Heaven, and was the wife and the sister of Zeus (Jupiter), the supreme ruler of the universe. Zeus became enamoured of Alcmena, wife of the King of Argos, who had been banished from his dominions. The King of Heaven assumed the form of the absent husband and visited Alcmena, who afterwards in Thebes, Beotia, gave birth to Hercules. Hera, in a fit of jealous rage at the thought that her husband should love a mortal, sent serpents to destroy the child; but the infant, by reason of the superhuman strength bestowed through the agency of Zeus, destroyed the serpents in his cradle. But the Queen of Heaven pursued him, and caused him to become subject to Eurysthenes, King of Mycenæ, who commanded him to perform the prodigies which made him the most conspicuous of the heroes of antiquity, the superhuman feats known as the Twelve Labors of Hercules. He also slew the Centaurs, destroyed the swallows which drained Lake Copias in Beotia, and rent the rock of Gibraltar, causing the Mediterranean to flow into the ocean through the Pillars of Hercules. Upon his death his mortal parts were burned and purged of the earthy, and he was admitted to the circle of the gods, and Hera, having become reconciled, gave him in marriage her daughter Hebe, goddess of Youth and Springtime.

Hercules, on his mortal side, was Achæan, his mother was an Argive, wife of Argos' banished King. His descendants, the Heraclidæ, were of the royal family of Argos and became fugitives by reason of the persecution of Eurysthenes. They took refuge in Attica and in Beotia. Eurysthenes, on his death, was succeeded by the Pelopidæ, descendants of the archaic Pelops, from whom the peninsula derived its name. These were Phrygian Achæans, and doubtless kin to the constituents of Priam, king of Troy. Hyllus was the

eldest son of Hercules. While a fugitive and an exile, he gave military assistance to Ægimius, a Dorian chief, by whom he was afterwards adopted, and the Heraclidæ, through this alliance of their ancestor, became nominally Dorian.

On the death of Ægimius, Hyllus succeeded to his throne, notwithstanding the fact that Ægimius left two sons, Pamphylas and Dymas. After Hyllus became Dorian, the names of the three Dorian tribes were designated Hylleans, Pamphylians and Dymanatæ, derived from Hyllus, and the two sons of Ægimius. Thus the Dorian rule passed to Hyllus and to his descendants the Heraclidæ, and the Achæan line became nominally Dorian.

Hyllus and his Dorian associates planned an invasion of the Peloponnesus, to redeem his birthright. He led an army across the isthmus of Corinth. It was agreed by the opposing forces to decide the contest by single combat between Hyllus and Echemus of Tegea. In the encounter Hyllus was slain. The Heraclidæ then under the compact agreed, in case their leader was defeated, to renounce their attempts to invade the Peloponnesus for a hundred years. This period having expired, Temeus, Cresphontes and Aristodemus, great-grandsons of Hyllus, three generations later, renewed the enterprise to regain their supremacy in the southern peninsula of Hellas. They were, however, warned by the Pythian priestess of Delphi not to attempt to lead their armies across the isthmus of Corinth, but across the mouth of the Corinthian gulf at Naupactus, the modern Lepanto. The invaders were joined by Ætolians and Locrians, who participated, with the Achæan-Dorians, in this final attempt to secure supremacy in the Peloponnesus. Oxylus, an Ætolian, acted as guide, and piloted the expedition.

The invaders were opposed by the Peloponnesian Achæans, under Tisamenes, son of Orestes. The latter

was defeated. The invaders established themselves again in the land of their fathers, and the death of Hyllus was avenged. This campaign was the successful movement known in history as the Dorian Invasion and the "Return of the Heraclidæ."

It will be observed that the retaking of the territory in the southern peninsula of Greece restored Achæans as well as Dorians. The conquerors were now divided into three tribes, according to the Doric number three; namely, Hylleans, Pamphyleans and Dymanatæ. They divided the Achæan territory into three parts, Argos, Sparta and Messenia, for which they cast lots.

The new possessions fell to the children and grandchildren of Aristodemus, who was a grandson of Hyllus, as follows: Argos fell to Temenus, eldest son of Aristomachus; Sparta fell to Eurysthenes and Procles, children of Aristodemus, son of Aristomachus; Messina fell to Cresphontes, third son of Aristomachus.

Thus the Heraclidæ reclaimed, but did not at once acquire possession of their ancient inheritance. Their lineage and the territory they endeavored to conquer is shown by the following table:



To Oxylus, who acted as guide, and piloted the expedition, was assigned the territory of Elis. Thus

Achæans, allied with Dorians and Ætolians, conquered Achæans, many of whom refused to submit to the yoke of the invaders, and migrated north, to the southern shores of the gulf of Corinth, then known as Ionia, drove the Ionians into Attica, and settled in the country which thereafter was called Achæa.

The difficulty in fixing the probable date of the "Return of the Heraclidæ" and the Dorian invasion arises from our inability to fix the date of the Trojan War. Thucydides says that the Beotians were driven out of Arne, in Thessaly, in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy and that the Dorians in the eightieth year thereafter "took possession of the Peloponnese with the Heraclidæ." Allowing three generations to a century, Canon Rawlinson estimates seventeen generations, or 566 years from the time of Aristodemus, fourth in the line of descent from Hercules to the time of Leonidas and Leotychides, who reigned in Sparta when Xerxes invaded Greece B. C. 480. The calculation is based on the genealogy of these Spartan kings as given by Herodotus (vii, 204, viii, 131). Aristodemus, it will be observed, was the great-grandson of Hyllus, son of Hercules, and if this theory is correct, he led the Dorians and Heraclidæ into the Peloponnesus 566 years before the invasion of Xerxes, B. C. 480. The approximate date of the Dorian invasion, therefore, he places about B. C. 1046. If this invasion was, as Thucydides says, eighty years after the fall of Troy, that event happened according to the calculation of Canon Rawlinson about 1126 B. C.

Eratosthenes, on the other hand, a grammarian of Alexandria, assigns 407 years before the first recorded Olympiad which is fixed at B. C. 776, or about B. C. 1184, as the most probable date of the fall of Troy.

It must not be assumed, however, that the success of the invaders in gaining a foothold in the Peloponnese gave them dominion of the peninsula. It took centuries

for the Heracleid-Achæan and Dorian invaders to conquer Laconia and Messenia, as will be shown presently.

We find strong corroborative evidence to justify the conclusion that there were no Dorians in the Peloponnesus until they came into the peninsula in force with the Heraclidæ, at the period known as the Dorian invasion or the "Return of the Heraclidæ," in the fact that the Iliad makes no reference at all to Dorians in the Peloponnesus. In the Odyssey (xx, 210-220) they are mentioned but once in connection with the numerous tribes on the island of Crete.

> "Crete is a region lying in the midst
> Of the black deep, a fair and fruitful land,
> Girt by the waters. Many are the men,
> Nay numberless, who make it their abode;
> And ninety are its cities. Different tongues
> Are spoken by dwellers of the isle.
> In part they are Achæans, and in part
> Are Cretans of the soil, a gallant stock;
> There dwell Cydonians, Dorians of three tribes;
> And proud Pelasgians."

As has been observed, Lycurgus, according to some of the authorities cited by Plutarch, was contemporaneous with Homer, who makes mention of Dorians only in Crete. From this we may infer that before the expulsion or voluntary exile of the Heraclidæ, the inhabitants of the peninsula were Achæan, and that the Heraclidæ themselves were Achæan. Lycurgus, who was a lineal descendant of Hercules, if we can place any reliance at all on the ancient tradition, was not Dorian, but Achæan, in the sense that he was of the Heracleid line.

The descendants of the archaic Greeks regarded the account of the deeds of their ancestors as recorded in the Iliad and the Odyssey as the canon of the highest possible distinction. These poems were indeed the Hellenic Bible, revered by the Greeks as no other book. Homer, as has been observed, does not refer to the Dorians at all in the Iliad, but the Achæans are con-

spicuous in the poem, and renowned for their deeds of martial valor, the word Achæan being sometimes used as a generic term for the Hellenese. The plain of Argos and "the hollow Lacedamon" are fully described, and their heroes, Agamemnon, Menelaus, Diomedes and Achilles, the Thessalian Achæan, are among the most conspicuous characters.

Some authorities assert that the Hellenes were subdivided into four great branches, deriving their names from the immediate posterity of Deucalion, namely, Æolians, Ionians, Dorians and Achæans, as will more readily appear from the following table:



It seems clear, however, that the Achæans were not a distinct Hellenic race in the sense that the Ionians and the Dorians were, nor in the sense that the Æolians, Phocians and Ætolians were. We find nowhere a distinctive Achæan language, Achæan art, or Achæan religion. We may safely assert that they were not a distinct tribe or branch, but that Heracleids and Achæans were powerful families in the royal line closely allied to the Ionians, and descended both from Perseus and Hercules. In their veins ran the blood of Perseus, the Attic hero, and of Hercules, rightful ruler of Sparta, in the sense that the houses of York and Lancaster represented powerful families in the Plantagenet line of English sovereigns. These branches of the Anglo-Norman race contended for supremacy and waged intestine war. Their emblem was the rose, the white being the symbol of the house of York; the red of the house of Lancaster. On this account the wars they waged are known as the "Wars of the Roses." These powerful families were finally merged in the house of Tudor, in the person of the Earl of Richmond, who after the death of Richard III, on the field of Bosworth, ascended the throne as Henry VII, the first of the Tudor line. From thence the Plantagenets disappear from history, and we find the new emblem, the double rose, known as the Tudor Rose. So the old couplet runs:

"In this Seventh Henry, the roses unite,
His own was the red, and his wife's was the white."

In like manner the Achæans, Argives, Danaans and Heracleids, are known as Ionians and Dorians, the latter being distinct tribes, with their distinct dialects and tribal characteristics.

Achilles came from Phthiotis in Thessaly. Professor Curtius observes that Achilles "preferred a short life, full of great deeds, to a long life full of comfort, but devoid of glory," and characterizes him as "an imperishable monument of the chivalrous heroism, of the idealism and poetic genius of the Achæans." The founder of Mycenæ was said to have been Perseus, the hero of Attica, a son of Zeus, conceived in a shower of gold; while Heracles, rightful king of Sparta, was of Achæan blood, through his mother, the wife of the banished king of Argos. These cities, with Tiryns, Sicyon and Corinth, were united by Agamemnon, who was also Achæan, and formed a confederacy with Sparta, which was ruled by the descendants of Hercules. Thus the ancient sovereigns of the Peloponnesus were Hellenes, whose royal houses and ruling families were Achæan and Heraclean.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Achæans and the Heraclidæ do not denote distinct branches of the Hel-

lenic race, but powerful families, tracing their ancestry from both Perseus and Hercules, and the eponyms, in that sense were used to denote descent and lineage.

In the veins of Lycurgus ran the blood of Hercules. The great lawgiver, therefore, though born long after the Dorian invasion, was Achæan and not Dorian. This conclusion seems justified by the weight of authority, though seemingly inconsistent with the fact that after the Dorian invasion, known as the "Return of the Heraclidæ," the Peloponnesus gradually became Dorian. Upon this theory may be reconciled the early conflicting myths involved in the "Return of the Heraclidæ," and the Dorian supremacy in the Corinthian peninsula, whose early rulers were Achæan and Heracleid sovereigns of Ionian origin.

The early inhabitants of Laconia and Messenia, which comprise the southern half of the Corinthian peninsula, were known as Achæans and Pylians. Their language differed little from the Dorian dialect. During the Peloponnesian war, the Messenians who were allied with the Athenians spoke the same dialect as the Helots. Mr. Grote says, however, that the Doric dialect was not peculiar to the Dorians. It seems to have been the dialect of the Phocians, Delphians, Locrians, Ætolians and of the ancient Achæans, who dwelt in Phthiotis, in Thessaly, and also among the Achæans in the Peloponnesus, on the south coast of the Corinthian gulf. If any presumption arises from the speech and language of these people, it would seem to justify the conclusion that the Dorian invaders of the Peloponnesus found there a dialect differing but slightly from their own.

As late as the seventh century B. C. the conquerors, who founded a dynasty in Sicyon, west of the Corinthian isthmus, entertained hostility toward the Argives, who boasted of their descent from the constituents of Agamemnon. We may cite one instance of this.

The names of the three Dorian tribes were Hylleis, Pamphyli and Dymanes. But Clisthenes of Sicyon, grandfather of the Athenian Clisthenes, who founded the democracy of Attica, made war against Argos, whose ancestors prided themselves on their Achæan blood. It may be said that one cause of the hostility of Clisthenes to the Argives was jealousy, and envy of their noble ancestry, and their reverence for the poems of Homer, in which the Achæans were honored and exalted for their feats of valor. On this account Clisthenes suppressed the minstrels and rhâpsodists in Sicyon, who were accustomed to chant the verses of the Iliad, in contending for public prizes. In these exercises, which were performed for the edification of the multitude, the heroic deeds of the Argives and the glories of Argos were extolled continually. For that reason the Homeric poems were forbidden at Sicyon in the time of Clisthenes.

His hostility to the Argives also caused Clisthenes to make a decree changing the ancient and venerable names of the three Dorian tribes, to wit, the Hylleans, Pamphylians and Dymanatæ, and, in order to degrade them, gave the tribes new names derived from words indicating the sow, the ass and the pig. The reason which Herodotus assigns for this stupid act was in order that the Sicyonians and Argives might not have the same names. In the time of his grandson, Clisthenes the Athenian (about 595 B. C.), the Argives had become amalgamated with the Dorian tribes, and almost the entire Peloponnesus had become Dorian.

In all Dorian cities, there were distinguished Heracleid families. The tribe of Hyllus, for example, claimed lineal descent from Hyllus, the eldest son of Heracles. The royal families of Sparta were Heracleids of the tribe of Hyllus. This view is supported by Herodotus. In this connection Mr. Grote observes:

"The chiefs of the Heracleids were the special

grantees of the soil of Sparta from the gods — the occupation of the Dorians being only sanctified and blest by Zeus for the purpose of establishing the children of Heracles, in the valley of the Eurotas." Referring to the succession of Cleomenes to the throne of Sparta, Herodotus (v, 39) observes: "Anaxandrides, son of Leon, no longer survived and reigned over Sparta, but was already dead; Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides, held the soverignty, not having acquired it by his virtues, but by his birth."

This ancestral pride and glory in Achæan blood is further illustrated in the account given by Herodotus (v, 72) of Cleomenes, the Spartan king, who reigned jointly with Demaratus, when he sought shelter with Isagoras, in the temple of Athene on the Acropolis. The incident occurred when the followers of Clisthenes refused to dissolve the Senate, even at the behest of Isagoras, supported by Cleomenes, with a contingent of Spartan soldiers. The Lacedamonian sovereign approached the sanctuary of the goddess to consult her, but the priestess, rising from her seat before he had passed the door said: "Lacedamonian stranger, retire, nor enter within this precinct, for it is not lawful for Dorians to enter here." He answered, "Woman, I am not a Dorian, but an Achæan."

This incident justifies the presumption that there were two houses representing the royal families in Sparta, the sovereigns ruling jointly, representing both the Achæan and Dorian line of succession. This explanation of the diarchy is most plausible, and is based upon the fact that the invasion of the Peloponnesus was accomplished by the united efforts of Achæans and Dorians, who were accompanied by Ætolians also. In the division of power, therefore, both were represented, and for centuries shared jointly the honors of royalty.

The conquest of the Peloponnesus, after the first impact of the Dorian invasion, covered a period of centuries. The fact that the Heraclidæ and their Dorian associates won a substantial victory, after they had crossed the gulf of Corinth from Naupactus, possibly in Elis, on the west coast, and then cast lots for the territory which they had invaded, does not justify the conclusion that this initial victory gave them control of the peninsula, or any part of it. The route taken by the invaders is wholly a subject of conjecture. The opinion entertained by Canon Rawlinson is that they came south through Elis to the banks of the Alpheus, which flows northwest through Arcadia and Elis into the Ionian Sea, and thence proceeded eastward through the valley of the Alpheus into Messenia, and thence east through the mountain passes into Laconia and the valley of the Eurotas. They then fought for the possession of the cluster of villages in Laconia, called Sparta. The struggle was long and tedious. It was a struggle by Achæan aided by Dorian against Achæan. In view of the character of the combatants, it is not strange that the contest lasted for centuries. After Sparta was occupied, the Achæan city of Amyclæ, two miles south, renowned in the Iliad, retained its independence against the invaders for nearly three hundred years, having held out till about B. C. 826, within 50 years of the first recorded Olympiad, B. C. 776. The struggle then continued against the Messenians and Helots for centuries.

Thus, when Lycurgus was born, his countrymen were in a state of perpetual war, seeking to establish themselves and complete the conquest of Messenia and Laconia, which embraced the southern half of the peninsula. These intestine and bloody struggles continued until long after the death of the great Spartan lawgiver, and justifies the statement of Plutarch that when Lycurgus planned a cure for the evils which disturbed the peace and tranquillity of his country, "anarchy and confusion had long prevailed in Sparta," and sedition

and misgovernment disturbed the repose and quiet of the neighboring states and bordering nations "to whom they were as near related in blood as situation."

Such was the environment in which Lycurgus found himself and the conditions which prevailed when he established the Rhretra, or code of laws and ordinances, which, in a measure restored order and harmony among the Lacedamonians, and converted Sparta into a military oligarchy and disciplined camp.

CHAPTER VI

SPARTA — LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS — THE RHRETRA OF LYCURGUS

THE best modern definition of law is that given by Sir William Blackstone, the eminent English commentator. He defines it as a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in the state. The Israelites, the only early monotheistic race, and the most archaic civilized people of whom we have any record, who became a nation after their flight from Egypt, more than three centuries before the Trojan War, and prior to the heroic age of Greece, regarded law as the commands given by Jehovah, the invisible ruler of the universe, the only living and true God, directly to the people, through the mouth of his prophet and priest, ordained as such, to be the medium through which the divine will should be revealed to man. Among the Hellenes who were polytheists, or rather pantheists, the idea of law was similar to that entertained by the Israelites, in that they believed that all law for the government of the state should bear the sanction and approval of the gods, as revealed through the medium of the Pythian priestess of the temple of Apollo, at Delphi.[1] Lycurgus consulted the Oracle to secure the divine sanction and approval to the Code of Laws which he afterwards established for Sparta.

Thus the devout Israelite, and the intellectual Greek,

[1] Prophecies were also delivered in the temple at Dodona, in Epirus.

each according to his best light and understanding, regarded law as of divine origin, and recognized the ruler or rulers of the universe as the source and fountain of justice.

Lord Bacon speaks of law as streams proceeding from the fountain of justice, "but as streams and like as waters do take tincture and taste from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountain." Laws for the government of society are designed to be of universal application, because the public and private conduct of every member of the state is supposed to be governed by law. Without law society cannot exist. Law is the antithesis of anarchy. It springs from necessity and is coeval with man. The law of nature has no direct application to human conduct. Where men are reduced to a state of nature, without government or law of any sort, they are swayed by their whims and passions, uncontrolled in the exercise of their tastes and inclinations, and do not respect their obligations to society, or the moral or political rights of their neighbors. In a state of nature, which is a state of anarchy, the weak are ruled and oppressed by the strong, and where moral obligations are not recognized, life is not sacred, no one in the community is safe, and instead of law, liberty and order, rapine, lust and murder prevail. Writers of distinction sometimes speak of the law of nature and nations. This must be for the sake of the alliteration. The expression is incorrect, because the law of nature governs the physical universe, and the complete and delicate organism of the human body. These obey the law of their being, prescribed by their creator. Municipal law governs the conduct of men in their social and political relations. Constitutional law defines the power of the state, as exercised by its co-ordinate branches of government. The moral

law governs the conscience, and the conduct of man toward his creator and the author of his being, and relates to the moral obligation man owes to his fellowmen, although in civilized society, human conduct with respect to moral duties and obligations, in some respects is governed by the municipal law.

In order to understand the encomiums which the philosophers of antiquity have bestowed upon the laws of Lycurgus, we must seek to divine his object in establishing them, the social and political conditions of the people for whose benefit they were established, and the views Lycurgus entertained in that archaic age concerning the powers and limitation of government. It is necessary to remember, as has been shown, that Sparta, in the age of Lycurgus, was an armed camp. The Spartans constituted an army of occupation, surrounded by a people engaged in a continuous struggle for political liberty and independence. Sparta was an inland city, in the valley of the Eurotas, practically cut off from communication with the commercial world, and with those busy marts and trading ports, then being established on the shores of the Ægean and the Mediterranean. The Spartans or Lacedamonians were strangers to commerce, and diligently excluded all foreigners and forbade them to dwell among them. They were at all times exposed to inroads of the Arcadians and Messenians, whom they were seeking to subdue and conquer, and whose states bordered immediately upon their territory and with whom they were constantly at war. The inhabitants of Laconia whom they partially subdued were doubtless Achæans or partly of Achæan blood. These unfortunate people, when finally forced to yield, were obliged to till the soil, or work at rustic trades, that the invaders, who formed the dominant class, might subsist on the fruits of their labor. The subject population were divided into what were known as the Helots and the Perioeci. The condition of the

Helots was inferior. They were reduced to a base form of slavery and were attached to the land, and formed part of the estate, like the cattle that grazed in the fields. Their condition, however, was somewhat ameliorated, in that they were allowed to keep and retain a percentage of the crops and produce which they raised. They bore much the same relation to the ruling class, that the villains in England did to their Saxon and Norman lords, but were required to perform military service at all times. Villainage, in medieval times, was of two sorts: villains regardant, who were annexed to the manor; and villains in gross, or at large, that is annexed to the person of the lord, and transferable by deed from one owner to another.

The Perioeci, who lived in the villages, though not slaves, in the sense that they were deprived of their liberty, were denied all civil and political rights, were not allowed to vote or hold office, and had no voice in the government. They were permitted to rent and occupy lands and tenements for which they paid the Spartan owner a fixed tribute. They engaged in barter and carried on trades, and whatever primitive manufactures were customary in that age, and produced all household articles and utensils for daily use, as the Spartans deemed it beneath their dignity to engage in manual labor of any kind. They looked upon war and military training as their only honorable pursuit. The Perioeci were also required to render military service at all times, and fought with the hoplites or heavy armed troops.

It will be observed that under the system of political economy which prevailed in Lacedamon in the age of Lycurgus, the principal resources of the commonwealth were derived from slave labor, which furnished the ruling class their means of subsistence. The latter despised labor, and devoted themselves exclusively to athletic exercises and military training and discipline.

As has been observed, the Spartans, in the time of Lycurgus, had no commerce. Consequently no revenues were derived from that source. They dwelt inland, and although the western and southern boundaries of Laconia, the state in which they settled, had an extensive sea coast, the Lacedamonian commonwealth in that early day, was established in the valley of the Eurotas, "the lovely hollow Lacedamon," in the heart of Laconia. Consequently they had no ships and no navy, and their military operations were conducted exclusively by the army.

In view of the fact that the Spartans were not a commercial people, and were without means of securing a public revenue with which to pay for the services of its soldiers, public policy required that every man should become a soldier trained to that end, and that they should dwell together, as in a camp, eating daily at a common table, or public mess. Their entire time was spent in training for war, in their public exercises, and religious games. Consequently, every citizen was a powerful athlete, expert and dexterous in the use of arms, the bow and arrow, the sword and the spear which constituted the principal weapons employed in that remote age. Consequently, they excelled in physical strength. Their battles were an aggregation of duels, in which the advantage was with the man who possessed the maximum of physical endurance, and skill and dexterity in the use of arms.

Such was the environment and state of society in Lacedamon in the age of Lycurgus. They sought peace with the sword, and retained their liberties and independence by reason of their success in war.

While the sword, in that turbulent age, was the only arbiter and afforded the only method whereby to secure peace and domestic tranquillity, it was doubtless true that Lycurgus did not advocate foreign conquests, and his laws and ordinances seem to preclude the notion that

he believed in encroaching on the territories of neighboring states, for the sole purpose of enlarging the boundaries of his own dominions, unless it became absolutely necessary for the defense of the state. In order to prevent campaigns for selfish aggrandizement, and to destroy every incentive to military ambition for purposes of conquest, Lycurgus sought to abolish the use of money. He doubtless believed that the love of money, and the desire for riches, was the root from which springs military ambition, and wars of conquest, which may be doubtless considered the root of all evil. This presumption is justified by the fact, that just as soon as the cupidity of the Spartans was aroused by the spoils of war, and the loot of foreign conquest, the laws of Lycurgus lost their force. Lysander, as the result of his conquests and successful alliances, acquired Persian gold. The gold and silver and the spoils of war which he brought home to Sparta fired the ambition of his countrymen and taught them to esteem wealth and luxury, and to advocate war, for war's sake; not merely to protect the state from invasion, but to advocate wars to invade other states for the sake of plunder, and to undertake foreign conquests, in order that, as a people, they might become rich, and feared as a military power.

But the laws and institutions which Lycurgus framed for the Lacedamonians were born of their necessities and peculiar environment. The conquered people among whom they dwelt were their kinsmen, possessed of almost equal courage and military training. The conditions which existed when the Achæan-Dorian invaders established themselves in the Peloponnesus, known as the "Return of the Heraclidæ," rendered it necessary for them to live constantly with arms in their hands. The Heraclidæ considered themselves a superior branch of the Hellenic race, and were not content to permit the inhabitants of the country they had practically conquered, to share with them civil and political rights.

Under these conditions many proud families of Hellenic blood, unable to endure the disgrace and humiliation incident upon their displacement, fled from the place of their nativity, and took up their abodes elsewhere. Many claiming to be Achæan settled, as has been shown, on the southern shores of the Corinthian gulf, drove out the Ionians, and held the country called Achaia, which name it has retained for centuries.

The conquest of the people in the valley of the Eurotas, however, was gradual and the Helots were not finally reduced to slavery till the reign of Soüs, grandfather of Aristodemus, and great-grandfather of Lycurgus. Even after they lost their independence, they continued to revolt and were not subjugated till the end of the third Messenian war, 455 B. C.

In the days of Lycurgus, before his laws were established, constant strife and turbulence still continued to prevail in Sparta, to a degree bordering on anarchy, and murders and assassinations were frequent in the streets of Lacedamon and adjacent villages. The Spartan kings indulged in tyranny and oppression, as overlords of the territory in which they ruled, and thereby engendered increased malignity and hatred against the ruling classes. Plutarch says, in this connection, that anarchy and confusion long prevailed causing among other calamities the death of Eunomus, the father of Lycurgus, who was stabbed with a butcher knife in an attempt to quell a riot in the streets of Sparta.

Polydectus, the elder brother of Lycurgus, then became king. Upon his death, Lycurgus, being in the direct line of succession, ruled until the birth of a posthumous son of Polydectus. Then, with commendable respect and reverence for law, Lycurgus placed his infant nephew on the throne and called him Charilaus, the name indicating the joy or dearly beloved of the

people. His love of justice, in performing this act, is further shown by the fact that the queen dowager, mother of Charilaus, or Leobotus, according to Herodotus, made overtures to Lycurgus, and besought him to marry her, and share the throne, promising to destroy her posthumous son, if he would consent to her proposal. He promised to do as she wished, but fearing that she would promptly carry out her threat, he assured her that he himself would undertake to remove the infant. But when the babe was brought to him, he gathered the people in the Agora, and with great solemnity he there presented his infant nephew, and declared him to be lawful sovereign of Sparta, after which he acted as regent. Fierce disputes and dissensions having arisen as to the line of succession, Lycurgus, in order to fit himself to rule over his turbulent subjects, went into voluntary exile and entered upon his extensive travels about the world, to study the laws and institutions of the countries he visited, that he might be able to devise a code for the government of Sparta, under which peace might be established and harmony and concord restored to his distracted country. It is said that during his travels, which extended over a period of ten years, Lycurgus visited all the countries of the known world, including Asia Minor, Crete, Egypt, India, Africa and Spain. While sojourning in Asia Minor, it is said, he became familiar with the works of Homer.

On his return to Sparta he was made welcome by the people, who looked to him not only as their lawful sovereign but as their political saviour, fitted by study and experience to frame wise and humane laws and restore peace and prosperity to the commonwealth. Conditions were desperate, indeed, and anarchy and political ruin was imminent.

Plutarch says that Lycurgus determined to institute radical political reforms and to change the whole face of the commonwealth, " for what," he observes, " could

a few particular laws, and a partial alteration avail. He must act as wise physicians do in the case of one who labors under a complication of diseases, by force of medicines reduce and exhaust him, change his whole temperament, and then set him upon a totally new regime of diet."

The form of government which obtained in Sparta prior to the time of Lycurgus seems to have been based on the primitive institutions which prevailed among the Greeks in the heroic age and which are referred to in Homer. Under these institutions the commonwealth included a king, a council of elders or chiefs, who acted as his advisers, and the people. The latter, when called upon to participate in the affairs of State, were assembled in the agora, or the market place in the city or village, and were permitted to vote on whatever proposition the king and council of elders or chiefs chose to submit to them. They were not, as a rule, allowed to debate or discuss the measure under advisement. All deliberations concerning such matters were conducted by the king and his elders or advisers. The political authority exercised by the citizens gathered in the agora was confined to the simple right to vote, yea or nay, on the proposition which the king and his council of elders saw fit to submit.

Under the laws devised by Lycurgus we are taught that the sovereignty of the state was divided between the kings — this office in Sparta being represented by dual sovereigns — the council of elders, and the assembly, or body of citizens who composed the state. This council of elders was designated in the time of Lycurgus as the Senate, though some authorities claim that the Senate was not devised till after the time of Lycurgus. The Senate consisted of thirty members, one from each of the thirty tribes, and no person was eligible until he attained the age of sixty years. The senators were elected by the people and held office for life. The

two Spartan kings were members of the Senate, so that as matter of fact, there were twenty-eight senators, and two kings, each having an equal vote. The Senate was a sort of cabinet or advisory body to the kings; they also originated all legislation which it was designed to submit to the assembly for approval or disapproval. Prior to the establishment of the Ephori, or body of five Ephors, the Senate seems to have exercised judicial functions from whose decision, in certain cases, an appeal lay to the assembly. When the office of Ephor was established, that body exercised judicial as well as administrative functions.

The assembly, also known as the Appella, consisted of free citizens, who had attained the age of thirty years. The Perioeci and the Helots were not eligible to citizenship. The assembly, by a majority vote, filled all vacancies in the Senate, except the kings, who ruled by hereditary right. They met once a month, or oftener if necessity required.

The Court of Ephors, which came into existence perhaps half a century after the time of Lycurgus, exercised in reality the chief powers of government. They were a popular body, elected annually by the people. It is believed that the kings and Senate usurped powers which the popular assembly sought to exercise. To cure this evil, the Ephors were chosen by the people, with authority to check these encroachments. In time the Ephors became a sort of executive committee to carry out the will of the people in all things, and in fact ruled Sparta at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

The chief fame of Lycurgus, however, arose from the arduous discipline and military training to which every member of the state was subjected under his ordinances; and so strict was this discipline and so severe the training, as Mr. Grote observes, that Lycurgus was "the founder of a warlike brotherhood rather than the lawgiver of a political community."

But the circumstances in which the Spartans were placed, and the plight in which they found themselves, as a band of invaders, in the midst of a hostile, half-conquered, half-civilized people of their blood and lineage, and possessed of courage equal to their own, required that they should live as an armed brotherhood in order to retain their sovereignty in the valley of the Eurotas, and the regions they had conquered or were seeking to conquer, and reduce to subjection.

Perhaps one reason why we do not know more with regard to the details of the Rhetra of Lycurgus, arises from the fact that he expressly forbade that his ordinances should be reduced to writing, and a law was passed to that effect. As to the details of the discipline to which his people were subject, and their training in the art of war, he preferred that it should be instilled in the memory by constant practice, and that none should communicate his ordinances and teachings in that regard, to their enemies. For this reason, Plutarch says, a law was passed that their campaigns with the same enemy should be as short and infrequent as possible, lest by constant observation, their adversaries might be instructed in their methods of warfare, and adopt them in their own defense. This idea, however, is not justified by the facts as shown by the three long and arduous Messenian wars, the last of which was not brought to a close till B. C. 455. This war became so formidable that Sparta, at one time, through the influence of the great admiral, Cimon, sought the assistance of their rivals, the Athenians. However, we are told that Agesilaus was much blamed for a violation of this ordinance, on account of his continual incursions into Bœotia, by which, it was argued, he made the Thebans a match for the Lacedamonians. When Agesilaus was wounded in one of these campaigns, he was reminded by Antalcides that "he was very well paid for taking

such pains to make the Thebans good soldiers, whether they would or no."

It was the law, also, that the Spartan must never turn his back to the enemy. If he was unable to conquer, he must die, but must never quit the field. The brief maxim of the soldier was "conquer or die." Those who thus died, they believed, were glorified. In obedience to this sacred rhetra, Leonidas at Thermopylæ cheerfully yielded his life, although he knew that victory was absolutely impossible. With his three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians, assailed by an enemy, numbering more than two millions, in force at both ends of the pass, victory for the Spartan king was impossible. The law said, if he could not conquer, he must die, and in obedience to that law he gave his life. Posterity may still read the epitaph to the Spartans at Thermopylæ:

"Tell the Spartans, at their bidding,
Stranger, here in death we lie."

The conspicuous exception to this rule of discipline occurred fifty-five years after Thermopylæ, in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war (B. C. 425), when the flower of the Spartan army surrendered themselves to the Athenians, on the island of Sphacteria, in the Bay of Pylos, now Navarino.

In the time of Lycurgus, however, foreign conquests were not contemplated and military operations seemed to be confined to holding the country, the Lacedamonians, or the Achæan-Dorians, had conquered. We are also informed that when a Spartan army took the field, their severe training was, in a measure, relaxed, their commissary arrangements gave them better food, and their discipline was in many ways less strict. In this connection Lycurgus observes that they were the only people in the world to whom war gave repose.

Before engaging in battle, the king offered sacrifices

to the Muses. The men were permitted to curl and adorn their long hair, in which they took great pride. They were allowed also to have costly arms and fine clothes. A goat was usually sacrificed. Then the soldiers placed garlands on their heads. The pipers, on their flutes, played the hymn sacred to Castor. The king, with a chosen body guard of one hundred, accompanied by the Spartan, if there was one who had been crowned victor at the Olympic games, sang the sacred pæan, in which the troops joined, and marching to the music of their flutes, precipitated themselves upon the enemy. They were taught that nothing could be more honorable than war, or more sacred than victory, and that death on the field of battle meant an immediate entrance into glory. They might indeed sup with Pluto and enter Tartarus, but as they fell in battle their deeds were glorified.

Some authorities claim that Lycurgus was a military man, as well as a legislator, and an experienced cavalry officer, and that he first designed the division of the horse, in troops of fifty, in a square body. This, however, is denied. Others assert that the armistice or cessation of hostilities in all intestine wars throughout Hellas, during the period of the Olympic games, was suggested and adopted by Lycurgus, but this assumption rests wholly in conjecture.

The ideal state, as conceived by Lycurgus, and the commonwealth he sought to establish, was one in which there should be absolute equality among all citizens, not only as to their political rights, but as to their social position, their wealth and earthly possessions. Home influences and home comforts there were none. Ease and luxury were forbidden, because Lycurgus believed that relaxation made men effeminate and unfit to engage in military exercises and the pursuits of war. The community ate in public, at mess tables. Private banquets and feasts were discouraged, as far as possible,

because such indulgences, it was believed, had a tendency to render men physically unfit to discharge their duties to the state.

The law of marriage among the Lacedamonians was unique, as well as their regulations as to the birth, training and education of children. Lycurgus taught that the children belonged not to the parents, but to the state. While all licentious disorders were forbidden, it was nevertheless considered honorable for men, in the language of Plutarch, "to give the use of their wives to those whom they should think fit, that they might have children by them; ridiculing those in whose opinion such favors are so unfit for participation, as to fight and shed blood, and go to war about it. Lycurgus allowed a man who was advanced in years, and had a young wife, to recommend some virtuous young man that she might have a child by him, who might inherit the good qualities of the father, and be a son to himself. On the other hand, an honest man who had love for a married woman upon account of her modesty, and the well-favoredness of her children, might, without formality, beg her company of her husband, that he might raise, as it were, from this plot of good ground, worthy and well-allied children for himself." The children being assets of the state, Lycurgus was of opinion that they should not be begotten by the first comers, but by the best men that could be found. He regarded as absurd and inconsistent the laws of other countries, where people were so solicitous for their dogs and horses, as to exert interest and pay money to procure fine breeding, and yet kept their wives shut up, to be made mothers only by themselves, who might have become foolish, infirm or diseased; as if it were not apparent that children of a bad breed would prove their bad qualities, first upon those who kept and were rearing them, and well-born children in like manner, their good qualities.

To the end that the female population might become strong and vigorous like the men, they were obliged to engage in similar exercises, that they might become mothers of healthy well-developed children, and the better able to endure the pains of childbirth. In order to encourage marriage, we are told by Plutarch, that the maidens performed their athletic contests in a nude state, and appeared naked also in the dances and public processions. It was further decreed that any youth who, after he attained a certain age, remained a bachelor, was in a measure disfranchised, in that he was forbidden to attend the dances and public processions which were conducted by naked youth and maidens.

Under these regulations the family was merged in the state. The children, as has been observed, did not belong to their parents, but to the commonwealth. A body of citizens chosen to perform that duty were authorized to inspect all children, while tender infants, to ascertain their physical condition. The father was obliged, when the child reached a certain age, to bring it before these inspectors. If the child was perfectly formed and was apparently sound and healthy, it was permitted to be reared and trained in public after it reached the age of seven years. Infants, which were apparently sickly or deformed or physically weak, were not allowed to grow up, as the idea prevailed that they would never be able to perform military service, or become useful to the state. After they had attained the age of seven, they were classified and numbered in companies, and became subject to such training and discipline, as was deemed necessary to make them fit for war, superior in physical excellence and able to suffer every hardship, and to endure pain without a murmur. The tests they were put to sometimes taxed them to the very verge of existence. They were publicly whipped, and made to submit to bloody flagellations, and passed the ordeal successfully, only when they suffered the

pain in absolute silence. So severe were these beatings and scourgings that instances are given where death ensued, the victim choosing to die, rather than utter a cry of pain. Those unable to endure the severe course of training were adjudged unfit for citizenship. They were made to suffer hunger and thirst also, that they might be the better able to undergo such hardships and experiences which are incidental to the life of the soldier in the field.

The moral teachings in the Spartan Commonwealth were also tinctured with the overweening desire to make men expert in war and masters of strategy. Therefore, if theft was committed, the thief was never punished, unless he conducted himself so carelessly and unskillfully that his crime was detected. Then severe punishment was inflicted upon the culprit, not as a penalty for the crime of larceny, but on account of the stupid and slovenly manner in which the larceny had been accomplished, because, in the eye of the law, one who was not skillful enough to successfully conceal crime, it was believed, would not be able to deceive the enemy in war, or to circumvent his movements by means of strategy.

In order to abolish, in the state, as far as possible rank and station, based on the possession of wealth or property, Lycurgus tried to abolish the use of money. To that end the precious metals were not coined, but money was made of iron, so heavy and unwieldly as to render it practically unfit for use as a circulating medium. He also caused the citizens to be numbered, and then divided the lands within the commonwealth, as nearly as possible into as many lots or parcels as there were citizens, and to each was alloted his aliquot part. The number of citizens in Sparta, at that time, we are told, amounted in the aggregate to nine thousand persons, entitled to full political and civil rights, and accordingly, in order to insure equality, the lands

were divided into nine thousand parcels and distributed among them, share and share alike. It was believed that such equal distribution of wealth would produce tranquillity and contentment in the state, and practically abolish envy and jealousy, which might arise in a community in which there were both rich and poor. Lycurgus designed a commonwealth in which the citizens should be neither rich nor poor, and in which all might stand on a plane of political and social equality. This was his dream. The distribution of lands equally among all citizens has been denied by some authorities, who claim that no such distribution was made in the time of Lycurgus. It seems to be universally conceded, however, that the objective point which Lycurgus sought to attain was to make every citizen equal before the law, and as far as possible, equal as to his possessions and property qualifications. In this view, the motto, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," adopted during the French revolution, would have been fitting and appropriate in the commonwealth of Sparta in the middle of the ninth century, B. C.

A state in which absolute equality and perfect uniformity in all things exists, is a utopian dream, impossible of realization in this imperfect world. While it may be true, in one sense, that all men are born politically equal, it is true also that absolute equality as to intelligence, temperament, mental endowment and ability, does not exist; never did, and never can exist. It has pleased the supreme governor of the universe to bestow upon his creatures, widely different dispositions, inclinations, temperaments and abilities. There is as much diversity in the measure of intelligence among mankind as there are colors in the landscape, or tints in the clouds in a mountain sunset. It is manifest that an all wise creator never intended that a rule of uniformity should exist among men, as to their respective abilities and endowments. Diversity, not uniformity,

is the law of nature, and prevails in every department of the physical and the intellectual world. Men were not made mentally and physically equal, because diversity and variety is the rule of life and the law of creation. This principle is embodied in the argument of St. Paul, when he says: "There are also celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial. . . . There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory." There is no uniformity in the landscape, in the climate, the sea; in the firmament or in the mountains and valleys of this beautiful planet we inhabit, but a delightful and charming variety always interesting and pleasing to man, for whose enjoyment all things were created.

It is true that the government and institutions established by Lycurgus remained intact for nearly five centuries, but this continuity and political integrity of the Commonwealth of Sparta, was not due to the effort to establish political and social equality among its citizens, but to the environment of the Lacedamonians, and their position in the Peloponnese, which made it necessary for them to continue constantly on a war footing to maintain their supremacy among hostile neighbors in Messenia, in Arcadia, in Argos, in Elis, in Argolis, and elsewhere in the peninsula, and to subdue revolts, which occasioned the first, second and third Messenian wars. The latter continued till 455 B. C. Sparta, however, was engaged in war almost continuously or lending aid to its allies, till the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, B. C. 431, which struggle occupied Sparta and her allies for a period of twenty-seven years.

The military brotherhood established by Lycurgus owed its prolonged existence mainly to the necessities occasioned by its situation among warring neighbors, rather than to any idea of social or political equality, although it may be conceded that many of the rules and

ordinances introduced by Lycurgus were admirably adapted, under the circumstances, to the maintenance and unity of the military brotherhood, known also as the Spartan Commonwealth.

CHAPTER VII

THE AMPHICTYONIC COUNCIL — ITS INFLUENCE AMONG THE HELLENESE — LACK OF POLITICAL UNITY THE CAUSE OF THE DOWNFALL OF GREECE — THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS, THEIR GAMES AND FESTIVALS

THE cause of the failure of the Hellenese to acquire universal supremacy, was the absence among them of political unity. The bond which preserved and distinguished their national character rested on sentiment alone. This bond existed by reason of kinship and propinquity of blood, community of religion and patriotic pride, derived from exclusive participation in their national games and religious festivals, from which all were excluded except those of Hellenic blood. But these sentimental considerations were wholly insufficient, as the sequel shows, to secure that political unity, which is absolutely essential to establish and preserve a nation. Greece was exhausted by intestine wars and civil commotions, resulting from envy and jealousy, and history affords no more striking example of the truth of the maxim frequently exemplified, "united we stand, divided we fall," which is also forcibly expressed by the divine teacher when he said, "a house divided against itself cannot stand."

The Amphictyonic Council was of great antiquity, and was the only national assemblage or Congress, of a permanent character known to the Greeks. It was supposed to have been founded by Amphictyon, the son of Deucalion, and brother of Hellen, the common ancestor

of the race. It exercised no political functions or powers. Its duties were confined to the execution of all decrees agreed upon among the states, or the Hellenic tribes, and the care of the temples, where the gods were worshipped and the oracles consulted, and supervision over the national religious games and festivals of the Hellenese. It succeeded the many religious associations or congregations, which had previously existed for the same purpose, who were accustomed to meet at fixed times to offer sacrifices to the god of some common temple. When the first Amphictyonic Council was chosen, the Hellenese were divided into twelve tribes, which comprised the independent cities and states of Greece, including the Thessalians, Beotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnesians, Locrians, Ænianians, Achæans of Phthiotis in Thessaly, Malians, Phocians and Dolopians. The council was composed of twenty-four deputies, two sent by each state or tribe. It met regularly twice a year, in the spring at Delphi in Phocis, in the temple of Apollo; in the autumn at the village of Athela, near Pylæ, or Thermopylæ, in the temple of Demeter (known to the Romans as Ceres). There was a temple also dedicated to Apollo on the island of Delos, the religious metropolis of the Cyclades, where sacred rites were also celebrated.

Every member of the council, when elected, was obliged to take what was known as the Amphictyonic oath by which he became obligated as a member, as follows: "We will not destroy any Amphictyonic town, nor cut it off from running water, in war or in peace; if any one shall do so, we will march against him and destroy his city. If any one shall plunder the property of the god, or shall be cognizant thereof, or shall take treacherous counsel against the things of his temple at Delphi, we will punish him with foot and hand and voice and by every means in our power."

The Amphictyonic Council conducted the first Sacred

War against the city of Cirrha on the Corinthian gulf, the port town of Crissa, on the plain at the foot of Mount Parnassus, on which stood the temple of Delphi. The Cirrhæans were guilty of the crime of levying extortion against those who came to worship and consult the oracle at Delphi. The struggle was tedious and protracted, and covered a period of ten years. The war was finally concluded under the leadership of Solon who, it is said, poisoned the waters of the river Plistus, which flowed through the city into the gulf. The Amphictyonic Council dedicated the spoils taken at Cirrha, in founding the sacred Pythian games, which were periodically celebrated on the plain, at the foot of Parnassus, and acquired celebrity in the odes of Pindar. The Phocians were involved in the Second Sacred War, which afforded an opportunity to Philip of Macedon, to interfere in the affairs of Greece. He claimed to be a Greek, and became a member of the Amphictyonic League, which he subsequently made instrumental in destroying the liberties of Greece.

Plutarch, in his life of Cimon, mentions an instance of the interference of the Amphictyonic Council in the affairs of the Dolopians, one of the tribes having representation in that body, and who at that time were established in the island of Scyros. The Dolopians were pirates. But in that early age, Thucydides says the inhabitants on the coast and islands of the Ægean seas had recourse to piracy. These pirates, he says, were commanded by powerful chiefs, who took this means of increasing their wealth, and providing for their poorer followers, for in that age, piracy was regarded as an honorable occupation, and was not then considered disgraceful. These Dolopians descended on a party of merchants from Thessaly who landed on the island, and not only despoiled them of their goods, but also confined them in prison. Imprisonment, it seems, was not customary. The Thessalians escaped, and appealed for redress to the Amphictyonic Council. After hearing the evidence, a decree was issued by this ecclesiastical court against the inhabitants of Scyros. These people held the decree to be unjust, because it was directed generally against the Dolopians on the island, and not against the piratical band who had perpetrated the outrage. They, however, tried to force the pirates to restore to the Thessalians what they had taken, and failing in this, besought Cimon, the great Athenian admiral, to succor them from the penalties of the decree obtained against them by the Thessalians. The Athenian took the town which the pirates had occupied, expelled the pirates, and afterwards reduced the island to possession.

On what theory the Amphictyonic Council entertained jurisdiction in this case it is difficult to understand, unless we assume that as both the Thessalians and Dolopians were represented in the Council, the taking of the goods of the former was construed as equivalent to destroying "an Amphictyonic town." In that case the Council was justified in making its decree against the Dolopian pirates, but not against the Dolopians.

There is another theory, however, which would seem to strengthen the belief of those authorities who claim that the Dolopians were not members of the Amphictyonic League. As the Thessalians were members, the League could make war on the Dolopians for seizing the property of Thessalians. This conclusion, however, would follow whether the Dolopians were or were not represented in the League.

The purpose of the Amphictyonic League, however, was not to secure a political union which bound the tribes into a nation, in the sense that the independent states of the American union are bound together politically into an indestructible union of indestructible states, by the adoption of its written constitution,

under which all the states are represented in a national Congress, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. If such political unity had been devised for the protection of united Greece, the history of the world would have presented an entirely different story. But Greece was never united, except for military purposes, in order to beat back the Persian invaders, which threatened to reduce the Hellenese to slavery.

The Amphictyonic Council was intended essentially to uphold and preserve the temples and public worship, and to conduct the religious games and festivals among the Greeks. This observation leads to the inquiry as to what was the religion of this remarkable people.

With the exception, perhaps, of Hellas, the religions of antiquity sprang from fear, and were enshrouded in mystery. Primitive man, and civilized man, in the early ages, based his conclusions as to his origin and destiny, on what he saw and heard in the physical world around him. These manifestations revealed to his mind only some hidden power, some supernatural force, which he was unable in the slightest degree to understand, or comprehend. In the presence of the earthquake, accompanied by destruction and death, man understood his weakness. He was powerless to prevent such violent convulsions of nature, and knew not what invisible power controlled. He heard the peals of thunder and saw the flash and fire of the lightning. He stood amazed at the power of the winds, which caused the destructive billows of the deep to swallow up the frail vessels, which man had devised to creep along the edge of the winding shores of the ocean. He was constantly amazed and mystified at the spectacle of death, and the mysteries surrounding his own birth. What force was back of the power which presided over the affairs of men? What power caused them to be born, and suddenly caused their existence to cease? Who controlled the winds and the waves? Who filled the sea with great

monsters, and the waste places of the earth with wild beasts and horrid reptiles? Who established seed time and harvest and caused the herb and the tree to yield their fruits in season? Who caused the sun to rule by day and the moon and stars to rule by night? To primitive man all was mysterious and awe-inspiring. He understood only his own weakness and helplessness. The supernatural powers which manifested themselves in the works of nature were regarded by man as the deity; as God. The only divine attribute which man perceived, as revealed to him by the phenomena of nature, was force, or power. When the storm and earthquake threatened destruction, when plague disease or famine threatened annihilation, it was natural for man to conclude that the deity was angry, and that he manifested his anger in the havoc wrought by the various agencies, which threatened man with destruction.

It was natural, therefore, to seek to avert these calamities, by propitiating the divine wrath and to seek to placate the deity. To accomplish this, sacrifices were offered, often human sacrifices, presenting religious spectacles of the most cruel and revolting character.

These manifestations of nature, inspired in the human breast that awe and fear, the desire to avert which, is termed religion. Unless accompanied by revelation of some sort, this fear is designated natural religion, as distinguished from revealed religion. Thus the inquiring mind sought revelation, concerning the occult mysteries of nature. Revelation as to human destiny must of necessity come from the deity. It must come only through inspired human agency because it is impossible to establish direct physical intercourse between God and man.

This agency, or human intermediary, is described as a priest or a prophet, a seer or soothsayer, a magician or spirit raiser, supposed to be endowed by some divine agency. The object of divination has been, in all ages,

to solve the mysteries of creation, the riddle of the universe, and the destiny of man.

These observations apply to all ancient religions. The Israelites, after their flight from Egypt, received their laws direct from Jehovah, through their prophet and lawgiver Moses, the supposed author of the immortal pentateuch, who was commanded to speak to the people, and declare to them the divine will, as it was revealed to him directly by Jehovah, the invisible and ever living God.

But the usual mode of revelation or communication by God to man was through the agency of dreams and visions, or portents and strange voices from the spirit world.

Thus was established among men the institution of the priesthood. Monotheism was taught among the Israelites and by the Magi of Persia. The other tribes and nations of the world were taught polytheism. The religion of the Greeks was polytheism. But the idea of sacrifice was common to all religions. In many instances these offerings included human sacrifices. Even Abraham was willing to offer his son Isaac on the altar of sacrifice to propitiate an offended god. This idea of sacrifice was due to a sort of general belief, that conceived somehow that the deity was a cruel and revengeful spirit, whose anger when manifested by some dreadful calamity must be appeased. The basic principle of the ancient religions, therefore, seemed to be fear. Men worshipped rather to avert evil than procure good.

The Greeks, however, were the most intellectual people of antiquity. It is true they sought divine guidance, through oracles, and through portents and auguries revealed by the flight of birds, or the smoking entrails of animals slain by the priest or soothsayer, or by the commander of an army before engaging in battle. The pantheism or theogony of the Greeks was

conceived in poetry. The divine attributes, according to their ideas, seemed to be physical strength and skill in arms, to enable man to overcome his enemies and win renown in martial deeds, rather than the qualities of the heart evidenced by mercy and love and peace. But how could there be love and peace in an age when war was the normal condition and state of society. All the refinements of art, sculpture, painting, poetry and music were employed to celebrate the power and majesty of their many deities. To the Greek mind, as has been aptly said, the gods were immortal men, and men were mortal gods. The ideal of the Greek was to be a hero, endowed with all the qualities with which their favorite gods were endowed. The spirit of their religious teaching was not so much a desire to humanize the gods, as to deify men. The celestial deities were the friends of mortals. They participated in their joys and sorrows, and took part in their wars and conflicts. They were endowed with human loves and human passions, and the religious games and festivals among them were celebrated in honor of their deities, with manly feats, with dances, with music and poetry and a display of the fine arts, because the Greeks believed that what was pleasing and delightful to man, was pleasing also to the gods. To fight for their temples was the highest exercise of patriotism. Impiety, therefore, was treason, and acts of sacrilege were visited with the most severe punishment.

The poetic imagination of the Greek taught him of an existence after death in a world of shadow or sunshine, and it cannot be said that they failed to comprehend the grand doctrine of immortality. The idea of a happy existence beyond this mortal state is sung by Pindar (522-443 B. C.) in a poem which has survived the wreck of time. Professor John A. Symonds has rendered in elegant English the lines of the poet in which he breathes the thought of a blessed immortality,

which Professor Symonds says "sounds like a trumpet blast for immortality, and, trampling under feet the glories of this world, reveals the gladness of the souls who have attained Elysium." Here are Pindar's lines on the blissful state of departed mortals:

"For them the night all through,
In that broad realm below,
The splendor of the sun spreads endless light;
'Mid rosy meadows bright,
Their City of the tombs with incense-trees,
And golden chalices
Of flowers, and fruitage fair,
Scenting the breezy air,
Is laden. There with horses and with play,
With games and lyres, they while the hours away.

"On every side around
Pure happiness is found,
With all the blooming beauty of the world;
There fragrant smoke, upcurled
From altars where the blazing fire is dense
With perfumed frankincense,
Burned unto gods in heaven,
Through all the land is driven,
Making its pleasant places odorous
With scented gales and sweet airs amorous."

It may be observed in this connection, that up to the time of Pindar no clear and positive revelation as to the doctrine of immortality had been revealed to man, aside from the doctrine of metempsychosis taught by Pythagoras, relating to the transmigration of souls. The conception of eternal life, in his day, was a dream vague and unstable as the shadows. Four centuries after Pindar's bones were dust, the Messiah, born in Bethlehem of Judea, first proclaimed that doctrine in the ears of a listening world. Nowhere in ancient philosophy or literature, or in the philosophy or literature of any age, do we find a sentiment so grand, so imposing, so sublime, as the declaration made by the saviour of mankind and the redeemer of the world. "I

am the resurrection and the life. . . . Whosoever believeth in me shall never die."

The most ancient religious national festival among the Greeks, the Olympian games, was celebrated on the plain of Olympia, at the sacred precincts of Olympus, on the banks of the Alpheus, in the State of Elis in the Peloponnesus, in honor of Zeus (Jupiter), the king of heaven, the sovereign of gods and men and supreme ruler of the universe. Jupiter was supposed to dwell among the clouds, upon the summit of many peaked Olympus, a mountain chain, in the northeastern Thessaly, separated from Ossa and Pelion by the river Peneus, which flowed into the Thermaic gulf, through the enchanting and sacred Vale of Tempe, from whence was brought the laurel, to crown the victor at the Pythian games. Upon the mountain tops in Thessaly, Zeus was accustomed to convene the Counsel of the gods, and there he presided over their deliberations.

On this plain of Olympia in the valley of the Alpheus stood from time immemorial the temple of the Olympian Zeus, where the games were celebrated before the age of Hercules, who, in his time, revived them. They were finally established periodically by Iphitus, who ordained that they should be celebrated every fifth year. The festivities took place at the time of the first full moon after the summer solstice, a period corresponding in our calendar with the latter part of June, or early July. This was the most important event in the life of the Hellenes, by which, also, chronology was established among the Greeks. The period of four years, which intervened between these celebrations, was called an Olympiad. The first recorded Olympiad dated from B. C. 776, when Coroebus was crowned victor, having won the foot race, a dash of 210 yards, which constituted the stadium at that time. Later the stadium was fixed at various lengths. This mode of chrono-

logical computation continued among the Greeks for a period of more than eleven hundred years, to the 292d recorded Olympiad from B. C. 776 to A. D. 394, when it was abolished by the Emperor Theodosius. At first the festival was confined to a single day and the exercises consisted of a match of runners on the stadium. From time to time other contests were introduced until the time occupied extended over a period of five days. The gymnastic contests embraced feats of skill in running and leaping, hurling the quoit and javelin, archery, armor races, wrestling bouts and boxing bouts. About B. C. 680, equestrian contests were introduced, including the hippodrome, or the four-horse chariot race, and later, as in other religious festivals, intellectual exercises were performed, including contests between musicians, artists, poets, philosophers and historians. These latter exercises formed the most conspicuous part of the Pythian games, which will be referred to presently.

The Olympian games became the most celebrated and renowned contests of antiquity, and all the world did homage to the physical and intellectual skill and superiority displayed at these national festivals. Although none but Greeks were permitted to participate, visitors from everywhere were welcomed, and thousands came to witness the wonderful feats in which the most skilled athletes and the most renowned men in the department of art and letters contended for the palm and the wreath, esteemed among the Greeks as the highest mark of distinction possible of attainment.

The Olympian games were regarded as the most important of events, more important even than war. During the month in which they were celebrated, all hostilities throughout Greece were suspended, and a general armistice prevailed. The territory of Elis during this period was even regarded as hallowed ground, and hostile bands who dared to enter it during

that particular period, were deemed to have incurred the crime of sacrilege, which might be visited by drastic penalties by the Amphictyonic Council.

The only prize awarded the victor was a palm branch and on the last day of the feast, the judge presiding at the games, placed upon his brow, the simple crown of wild olive, from the tree sacred to Hercules. But his fame was established, and he became for the time the most distinguished man in Greece. Athens was accustomed to bestow upon its citizens, who were crowned at the religious festivals, a pension for life.

Besides the Olympian games, three other great religious festivals were celebrated periodically in Hellas. These were known respectively as the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian games. The Pythian festival was held in honor of Apollo, who was born on the island of Delos, the gem of the Cyclades, son of Zeus, by Leto. Apollo was the god of light and the enemy of darkness. He was god of the sun, and twin brother of Artemis (Diana), goddess of hunting and of the moon, although each new moon was sacred also to her brother Apollo. One of his ancient sanctuaries was at Delphi on the southern slopes of Mount Parnassus, in Phocis, overlooking the bay of Crissa, in the gulf of Corinth.

The site where the temple of Delphi was built was originally known as Pytho, by reason of the fact that an immense Python, having wings like a dragon, dwelt there, polluting the air with its foul and poisonous breath. This monstrous serpent belonged to the powers of darkness. It assumed to guard the oracle, and was slain by Apollo, and in memory of his battle with the dragon, and his triumph over the powers of evil, and the broods of darkness, the Pythian games were instituted. Note the resemblance to the modern legend of St. George and the dragon. They were celebrated triennially, in the third year of each Olympiad, at or near

Delphi. After the first Sacred War, in which Crissa was overthrown, the Amphictyonic Council dedicated the plain of Crissa, on which to commemorate the Pythian games, and the spoils of the war were devoted to that purpose. As Apollo was the god of the sun, the god of light and of summer, these games were celebrated at a time of the year which corresponds to our month of August.

Poetry and music at first were the principal features of the Pythian games. The music, it seems, was a sort of primitive opera, composed for the flute, and arranged to represent the idea of the battle of Apollo, with the serpent, with expressions of exquisite harmony and beauty, interspersed with choruses for the virgins, and hymns and chants. Rhythmic dances for those engaged in the contests were also introduced. But gradually athletic sports, which constituted the features of the Olympian festivals, were included in the festivities. The poetical and musical, as well as the athletic contests, and the arrangement and details of the festival, were placed by the Amphictyons under the direction of the priests attached to the temple of Delphi. In the Pythian games, men and boys, youths and maidens, might enter the lists. The foot races, wrestling and boxing bouts, and also the equestrian contests were classified and arranged for men and boys.

The prize awarded the victor was a laurel chaplet. The bows from which the wreaths were made were required to be brought by boys, both of whose parents were living, from the sacred Vale of Tempe. When the greens were brought to the plain of Crissa, they were borne in procession, accompanied by flute players. The palm branch was also awarded the victor, and he was accorded the distinguished honor of having his statue erected in the sacred grove on the plain of Crissa.

Pindar, the great lyric poet of antiquity, one of whose poems on immortality has been quoted above, celebrated the victories at the national Hellenic games in lyric verse, known as the Olympian, Pythian and Isthmian Odes, some of which have come down to us. Pindar, it has been said, was beloved of the gods, and Apollo, we are told, sent to the sleeping infant in his cradle a swarm of bees, who bathed his lips with honey, so that he became one of the sweetest singers of the Hellenic race.

The Nemean games were instituted in honor of Zeus, in commemoration of the feat of Hercules, in his contest with the lion which infested the forests in the valley of Nemea, in Argolis, in the Peloponnesus. In this valley was a temple of Zeus in a sacred grove near Cleonæ, about midway between Nemea and Corinth. The skin of the Nemean lion was impenetrable; no arrow from the bow of mortal could pierce it. Hercules fought the beast with his club. The weapon failed. He then strangled it with his hands, exercising the superhuman strength displayed by Samson under like circumstances, when he tore asunder the jaws of the lion that roared against him in the vineyards of Timnath.

This festival was also supposed to have originated in the funeral games celebrated in memory of the infant Archemonus, who was stung by a serpent in the Nemean valley. The fatal accident occurred during the absence of the child's nurse, who left the babe to show the thirsty warrior chiefs and their followers the location of a spring, while they were marching through the valley on their way to destroy Thebes. This expedition of the Argives was immortalized by Æschylus (B. C. 525-456) in his poem, entitled "The Seven against Thebes."

The contests embraced musical, gymnastic and equestrian exercises, the long race and the armor race. Only males could enter the lists in the Olympian games, but in the Nemean, young maidens were allowed to

contend for the prize, which consisted of a wreath of olive sprays, and later a garland or wreath of green parsley.

The Isthmian games were celebrated biennially, on the isthmus of Corinth, in a pine grove sacred to Poseidon (Neptune). There is some question as to the time of year when these festivals took place. One account says that they were held in the spring of the first and fourth year of each Olympiad. Another account declares that they were celebrated in midsummer, probably July, in the first, and in winter in the fourth year of each Olympiad.

The origin of these games is lost in the twilight of antiquity, which gives rise to a different account of their history. Some legends declare that they were established by Theseus, the national hero of Attica, in honor of Poseidon, in commemoration of his exploits in which he slew the robbers and monsters, which infested the isthmus, and sought his life, when he journeyed from Troezen, in Argolis and across the isthmus on his way to Athens.

Another legend declares that the Isthmian ceremonies originated in the funeral games established by Poseidon in memory of Melicertes, the son of Ino, who was pursued by her husband, Athamas. Rather than fall into the hands of her pursuer, Ino, when she reached the isthmus of Corinth, threw herself into the sea with her infant son in her arms. The dolphins sent by Poseidon carried their bodies to the shore, and through the agency of the god of the sea, they became marine deities, who watched over the misfortunes and lent aid to shipwrecked mariners. A shrine was erected to Melicertes, in the grove of Poseidon.

In view of the legend which associated the Isthmian games with the deeds of Theseus, the Athenians were always conspicuous at the festivals, and were awarded

seats of honor at the contests. Solon, it is said, prepared the law, which awarded 100 drachmae to any Athenian who attained the crown of victory on the isthmus. The prize awarded the victor was a palm branch and a wreath of wild parsley.

There is some authority for the assumption that the Isthmian games were the only festivals in Hellas, which were not pan-Hellenic, because it is said that the Elians alone of all the Greeks, were excluded from participation in them. It would seem that a rule which would exclude the inhabitants of Elis from such a contest might prove disastrous, if the latter chose to retaliate and exclude the Athenians from the Olympian games, the first and greatest national festival celebrated in Hellas, which always took place on the plain on the banks of the Alpheus in Elis. There is, perhaps, some explanation about this exclusion of the Elians, from the isthmus, which has not been made clear by any of the ancient authors. If there is any truth in the declaration that the Elians were ever forbidden to contend in the Isthmian games, it must have been at some remote period, when the ceremonies were conducted merely as a local festival, and was abandoned later, when the contest became national in its character.

The most exciting of all the contests in these national games in time came to be the four-horse chariot race, subsequently adopted by the Romans, as one of the conspicuous features of the Circus Maximus. The chariot race, as described by General Lew Wallace in Ben Hur, has taken its place as a classic. It is a prose poem which will render the name of the author familiar to remote posterity.

While the contests in these national games were open to any person of Hellenic blood, the horse races and chariot races were the favorite sport of the wealthy, who were permitted to employ trained athletes as riders or drivers. The exciting scenes of the hippodrome fur-

nished the theme for the sculptor, the painter and poet in every age. Pindar, in the Second Olympian Ode, sings of Theron, King of Agrigentum, who won the chariot race. In Bishop Heber's translation, the ode begins:

> "Alone in famed Olympia's sand,
> The victor's chaplet Theron wore."

Such were the religious ideas of the Greeks in the beginning of the Fifth Century B. C. It is not to be wondered at that their views of the destiny of man were vague and shadowy. Even the religion of the Israelites, which taught the existence of an eternal ever-living God, gave no clear conception of the immortality of the soul. The only hint of man's future state, expressed in the Old Testament, is the declaration of Solomon that man's dust shall "return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it." This declaration as to the ultimate destiny of the soul was made more than five hundred years before the birth of Socrates, who, by his teachings, sought to dispel ancient prejudices and fallacies. From the language used by Plato, in the Apology, we may infer that the idea of immortality had been taught long before the time of Socrates. The work of the latter was carried on by Plato, his illustrious pupil, who taught even more clearly than Socrates the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Did either of them ever read the books of Solomon, or any part of the Old Testament scriptures, or did they read from the book of Job the profound inquiry, "if a man die, shall he live again?" Did either conceive the great doctrine of immortality, from the hint given by Solomon, that after death the spirit of man should return to the divine source from which it sprang; to God who gave it. If not, then the sublime idea must have been inspired in the Greek philosophers, who succeeded the Greek poets.

They taught that from a divine source sprang not only the souls of men, but that the physical universe, and all created things, was the work of an eternal self-existent cause, the divine origin and genesis of all physical and material existence.

It has been observed that all ancient religions were founded on fear. This seems to be the theory also of the priesthood of Israel. But the religion of the New Testament, promulgated in the first century of our era, is founded on love. It is founded on the divine atonement for the redemption of the world. The suffering on Calvary of our redeemer, once a babe on his mother's knee, is depicted in Mr. Welsh's beautiful hymn:

> "Oh Babe, the shadows deeper grow,
> What deepening sorrow grieves Thee so?
> Now I see a leafless tree,
> On a height called Calvary.
> And its bitter fruit, God saith,
> Ripens for my hour of death;
> Yet within that awful hour
> Life immortal breaks its flower."

CHAPTER VIII

ATHENIAN JURISPRUDENCE—LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF SOLON

THE principal military operations in which the Greeks were engaged, aside from intestine disturbances and revolutions, intermediate the period of the Scythian expedition (B. C. 513) and the battle of Marathon (B. C. 490) were the Ionian Wars, which arose from the efforts of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to establish the independence which they enjoyed, before they became tribute allies of Crœsus, and finally subjects of Cyrus the Great, after the defeat of the Lydian Monarch on the plain before Sardis. The Ionian Wars include the burning of Sardis, the battle of Lade, and the siege of Miletus.

In order to understand the political and social condition of the Hellenes during this period and the period of the Persian Wars, which followed, it will be important to examine the laws instituted by Solon and later modified by Clisthenes. Also the laws established for the government of the Lacedamonians, as embraced in the rhetra of Lycurgus, which are discussed in Chapter VI *supra*.

Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, referring to the battle of Marathon, says that the flower of the Persian army made a prolonged assault on the enemies' centre, held by the tribes of Leontis and Antiochis. He relates also how Callimachus, third Archon or Archon Polemarch of Athens, decided the question as to whether the Greeks would fight. The strategi, or ten generals,

were equally divided, five voting in favor and five against the proposal to engage. The Polemarch who commanded the right wing had the casting vote, by which it was decided to give battle.

These passages are not entirely intelligible, unless the legal status of the tribes, the strategi and the archonship, are understood. Athens, B. C. 490, was governed by the Constitution of Clisthenes, under which the tribes referred to by Plutarch were established. The office of strategus was also created by that instrument. The archonship, aside from the judicial functions attached to the office, remained much the same as it had been under the Constitution of Solon, except as to the third archon who, prior to the time of Clisthenes, was clothed with supreme command of the military forces of the State. It will be profitable, therefore, to examine briefly, both the Constitution of Solon and the Constitution of Clisthenes. In order to understand the latter, it will be necessary also to become familiar with the former.

The Senate, or Council of Areopagus, which convened on the Hill of Ares (Ἄρειος Παγος), designated by the Romans, Mars' Hill, immediately west and within bow-shot of the Acropolis, was the most ancient tribunal known to the Hellenes. That body, in primitive times, exercised all the functions of the State, apparently, and administered all law, civil and criminal. We have no knowledge that any written records of its decisions have been preserved. The jurisprudence of this ancient people seems never to have assumed the form of a written code, until the laws, or rather a digest of the decisions of the Areopagus, were codified by Draco (B. C. 624) and became standard authority. The unusual cruelty and severity of this code is proverbial. It is universally declared that Draco's laws were written in blood for the reason that under his code, about every crime constituted a capital

offense, punishable with death. In explanation of these drastic provisions, it is said that Draco held that small offenses deserved death and he could find no more severe penalty for the greater crimes. In this connection Plutarch, in his life of Solon, observes, " the man who was convicted of idleness, or who stole a cabbage, or an apple, was liable to death, no less than the robber of temples, or the murderer." The Athenian penal code, if this theory is correct, must have been a dreary affair, consisting principally of a catalogue of the various crimes known to the law. Perhaps the statute, by way of variety, and to break the doleful monotony, must have varied the mode in which the death penalty was inflicted. But why malign Draco? Under the enlightened Commonwealth of England, until the reign of George IV, grand larceny was a capital offence, just as murder was a capital offence. This seems all the more horrible, when we recall that grand larceny embraced every theft where the value of the article purloined was of the value of more than twelvepence. The life of the prisoner at the bar, therefore, who was indicted for grand larceny, frequently turned on the question of value. For example, where the charge against the prisoner was the theft of a spoon, the question on which the life of the accused depended was whether the metal in the spoon was silver or pewter.

In ancient times, the mode of inflicting the death penalty presented methods in infinite variety, ranging from crucifixion and drinking poison to ordinary beheading, hanging or sword thrust in the vitals. Some idea of the varieties of torture which were practised may be inferred from the choice penalty inflicted by the Roman law for the crime of parricide, which Sir William Blackstone tells us, was punished in a much severer manner than any other kind of homicide. " After being scourged," says Blackstone (iv, 202), " the delinquents were sewed up in a leathern sack with a live dog, a cock, a viper and an ape, and so cast into the sea." The illustrious commentator adds, " Solon, it is true, in his laws, made none against parricide, apprehending it impossible that any one should be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity."

The legislation of Draco, however, presents one redeeming feature which certainly reflects credit upon its author. It is said that through his influence was established the Ephetæ, a court consisting of fifty-one members having jurisdiction in homicide cases. This tribunal embraced four divisions: (1) having jurisdiction of cases of justifiable homicide; (2) cases of accidental homicide; (3) cases where the homicide was committed abroad, while the offender was in exile; (4) cases where a chattel belonging to defendant was the immediate occasion of death, as where one is killed by a fall from a horse, a cart or the like, not being in motion. Under the law of England in such cases the chattel connected with the offense is called a deodand, which is forfeited, to the State. The table of laws established by Draco remained in force until they were abolished by Solon. He retained, however, the court designated, the Ephetæ, above referred to.

Solon lived to be old. It is said he was born on the island of Salamis about 638 B. C., and died about B. C. 559. He was a direct lineal descendant of Codrus, the last King of Athens. He was one of the seven wise men of Greece, and to him was attributed the political maxim that " an injury to one was the concern of all;" that harm done to the meanest subject was an insult and injury to the entire community. The beginning of the popularity of this great lawgiver of antiquity arose from his successful efforts to retain for Athens his native island, after it had been taken and retaken by the State of Megara. Plutarch observes that the Athenians grew tired of the long and tedious war, waged for the possession of Salamis, and enacted a law,

making it a crime punishable with death for any man, either by writing or speaking, to assert that Athens should seek to recover the island. Solon, like many others, whose numbers were constantly increasing, considered this law a disgrace and an abomination, but none cared to risk his life by advocating a renewal of the war for its recovery. Finally, he conceived the idea that he might successfully evade the Statute, by feigning insanity, and the rumor spread about the city that he was mad. His plan was, while apparently insane, to make a strong plea to the people as the frantic appeal of a lunatic, relying, in case of failure, upon his feigned insanity to excuse him from incurring the penalty of the law. He composed a stirring patriotic poem, which he committed to memory, and when the opportunity presented itself, rushed frantically into the market-place and, mounting the heralds' stand, sang his verses, entitled Salamis, beginning with the lines,

> "I am a herald come from Salamis the fair,
> My news from thence my verses shall declare."

The plan succeeded. The poem was everywhere commended, and under the leadership of Pisistratus, one of Solon's kinsmen, the obnoxious law was repealed, and as a result Athens recovered Salamis (about B. C. 600) and Solon became popular with all classes.

Social and political conditions in Attica were reflected by the contour of the landscape, and the topography of the country, diversified by hills, plains and the shores of the sea. The Hill-men were shepherds and herdsmen; those who dwelt in the level country were agriculturalists who owned the land and tilled the soil; while those who dwelt along the shore were fishermen and traders, who forced their living from the sea. These inhabitants were divided into three classes, grouped in accordance with their occupations. The

Hill-men were among the poorest. They, like the mountaineers in every age, loved liberty and hated tyranny. They strove constantly to overthrow oligarchy and establish democracy. They were known as the Daicrii. The aristocrats embraced the money lenders and conservative agriculturalists, who tilled the land, or held mortgages upon it, and were known as Pedieis. These wealthy members of society, as a class, were designated the Eupatridæ, or the nobility among whom the high office of Archon was, in earlier times, hereditary. The merchants and dwellers along the coast, many of whom were well-to-do, were a mixed population, known as the Parali, who held a position politically which prevented the Hill-men and the Eupatridæ from securing the kind of a government each strove to establish.

The condition of the masses, under such circumstances, was miserable indeed, owing to the extreme poverty which prevailed among them. The poor constantly grew poorer, and the severe laws governing the relation of debtor and creditor rendered their condition desperate.

Aristotle[1] refers briefly to these deplorable conditions. The form of government was an oligarchy, and the poorer classes, men, women and children, were the serfs of the rich. They were obliged to cultivate the lands of the nobility, and received as compensation one-sixth of what they produced. The entire country was in the hands of a few persons. If for any reason a tenant failed to pay his rent, the landlord might resort to the most drastic remedies, and was empowered to sell not only the serf, who toiled for him, but his children also, as slaves. If necessity required any to procure a loan, the money was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's person, as well as on his lands, if he had

[1] Constitution of Athens, 2.

any. These conditions prevailed until Solon came forward as the leader of the masses, was elected Archon, instituted his reforms, and established the constitution, or code of laws, which bears his name.

Severe as these laws were, it is said that the law of the Twelve Tables, enacted prior to the abolition of the Tarquins in Rome, was even worse. Under its provisions creditors were permitted to slay the delinquent debtor, cut his body in pieces, and distribute his flesh among themselves.

One method of preserving a record of mortgages in Attica, at this period, was to erect upon the mortgaged land a stone or marble post, on which was inscribed the date of the mortgage, the name of the mortgagor, and the amount of principal due thereon. The result of the system increased the wretchedness and misery among the masses of the poor, to such an extent that their condition became too grievous to be borne. Existing laws could no longer be enforced. Fields, homesteads and garden spots all over the country were dotted with the stone pillars on which their debts were recorded, and which it became impossible to pay. Many freeborn citizens had been sold by their creditors into slavery. Their families, as a consequence, were broken and scattered. Many, as slaves of their creditors, were compelled to cultivate for their masters the lands which they had themselves owned. Many were sold to foreigners and were obliged to toil as exiles in bondage. A crisis was at hand, revolution threatened, and something had to be done to bring relief from conditions which had become intolerable. The revolt instituted by Cylon had failed, but the masses could not be held longer in restraint.

Such was the state of affairs existing in Attica when, by unanimous consent of rich and poor alike, Solon was elected Archon (B. C. 594), and was given power to frame remedial legislation. He was looked upon as

was Moses by the Israelites, as the sage and philosopher, who could lead his countrymen out of the wilderness of political chaos, which threatened the ruin of the State. The position in which Solon was placed was extremely delicate, confronted as he was by diverse warring and conflicting interests, the demands of the wealthy, who had so long enjoyed power and privilege on the one hand; and on the other, the cry of the masses for political equality, a share in the government, and immediate relief from their debts. It was obvious, that no matter what reforms Solon might grant, everybody could not be satisfied, and nobody could be expected to be altogether satisfied. The legislation of Solon, therefore, was of necessity a compromise. Had he chosen to take advantage of the crisis and the position in which he was placed to seize the reins of power, he might have championed the cause of the masses against the tyranny and oppression of the ruling families, assumed leadership in the State, and anticipated the work of Clisthenes and Pericles in establishing a democracy. The country was passing through a bloodless revolution, but Solon, mindful of the trust reposed in him, and prompted by the purest and loftiest ideas of patriotism, strove to discharge with courage and fidelity the important task assigned to him.

As the intolerable condition of the debtor class was the immediate cause of the elevation of Solon to the archonship, his first measure of relief was in their behalf. To that end he framed the great remedial statute entitled the Seisachtheia [1] (Σεισάχθεια). This piece of legislation might with propriety have been entitled, "An Act for the relief of the debtor class, to extinguish mortgages, emancipate all citizens held by their creditors as slaves, or sold into foreign bondage, and to abolish imprisonment for debt." These were

[1] Law for "removing burdens."

the objects which the law accomplished. The statute required that all mortgages, and the bonds or obligation they were given to secure, should be cancelled, and the mortgages extinguished. The effect was to free all landed property from existing incumbrances. Solon, in one of his poems, thus refers to this sweeping enactment:

> "The mortgage-stones that covered her, by me
> Removed — the land, that was a slave, is free."

Under the statute, all slaves were made free. Provision was also made for redeeming from bondage those citizens who had been sold to foreign masters. In order to prevent syndicates and monopolies from securing control of the land, and from creating a landed aristocracy, a maximum limit was set to individual ownership. Thus Solon, by this ancient bankruptcy law, abolished commercial slavery in Attica. The remedy was drastic indeed, partaking of the nature of confiscation, but Solon deemed it necessary to restore peace and order in the State. Was it, however, any more drastic than the remedy provided by our modern bankruptcy laws, whereby the debtor class are relieved from their obligations, and given a fresh start in life? Does not a bankruptcy law, in effect, operate to confiscate the property of the creditor? Yet bankruptcy laws are now held in popular esteem and are deemed to be a wise and beneficent exercise of legislative power.

While the law of Solon extinguished all mortgages and incumbrances which burdened the land, and relieved debtors of their obligations, the statute related only to existing obligations. It is not to be inferred that loans were not thereafter made, secured by mortgages on land. But the iniquitous usury laws were abrogated, and all debtors were made free men and given a new start in life. The statute further made it unlawful for a man to pledge his body to his creditor,

and forbade the creditor to sell the delinquent debtor or his family into slavery. It also abolished imprisonment for debt, a reform which was not accomplished in modern times, even in our own republic, till very late in the nineteenth century.

In order to enable the creditor in a measure to recoup part of his losses, under the relief law, provision was made to increase the purchasing power of money. Mr. Grote calculates that the value of the silver drachma was depreciated at least 27 per cent., so that a debt of 100 drachmas could be discharged by the payment of 73 drachmas under the new law.

This important law for the relief of the debtor class and affecting the relation of debtor and creditor abolishing commercial slavery, forbidding imprisonment for debt, limiting the ownership of land and reforming the currency laws, was the result of Solon's first term as Archon. He was unanimously reelected, and during his second term, framed a new constitution, popularly known as the Constitution of Solon.

The state of Attica, at the time, was ruled by nine Archons and the Senate or Council of the Areopagus. These tribunals were vested with all legislative and executive authority, not vested in the Ephatæ. The archonship was hereditary, and the Areopagus was composed of persons who had formerly held the office of Archon. Before Solon's time, however, the archonship had ceased to be hereditary, and those chosen to that high office held it for a period of ten years. The Archons were chosen from their own number by the Eupatridæ, who constituted the wealthy class or the nobility of Attica. It was claimed that Theseus divided the people into three divisions: (1) the nobility or gentry denominated the Eupatridæ; (2) the husbandmen or Geomori; and (3) the artisans, designated the Demiurgi. The Archons were divided into four classes: (1) The Archon, or Archon Eponymus, who was presi-

dent of the entire body of magistrates. His duties were similar to those administered by the modern Surrogate, or Orphan's Court. He had jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to widows and orphans, and all disputes concerning the family, and domestic relations; (2) The Archon Basileus, or the king, whose functions pertained to religious matters, and who was substituted for the king as high priest of the people. His jurisdiction extended also to homicide cases. If this is correct, the Areopagus must in such cases have constituted the Appellate Court. (3) The Archon Polemarch, or third Archon, was commander-in-chief of all military forces in the State. His civil jurisdiction extended to all controversies between citizens and aliens. (4) The remaining six Archons were the ordinary magistrates with judicial powers, and exercised jurisdiction in all matters not within the province of the other Archons. They were designated the Thesmothetæ.

It will be interesting to examine, for a moment, the question as to the jurisdiction of the Archon Eponymus, or chief Archon, while exercising his functions as to estates of decedents, which are performed under our laws by the Surrogate or Orphan's Court. From the earliest times, the law recognized, in some form, the rights of the heirs of an individual, to succeed to property which belonged to the ancestor. The right to own property, in a civilized community, is not a natural, but a civil right. The right to keep and retain dominion of property can be exercised only by the living, for when a man dies and ceases to exist, he ceases to have dominion. Under the civil law, the object was to prevent a vacancy or cessation of ownership. To this end father and son were, in the eye of the law, but one person, so that upon the death of either, the estate strictly speaking did not descend, but continued in the possession of the survivor. "From remote antiquity," says Sir William Blackstone, "on failure of children

or heirs, a man's servants, born under his roof, were allowed to be his heirs; being immediately on the spot when he died." He cites, in support of this proposition, from the book of Genesis (xv, 3), where the patriarch Abram in his old age declared "to me thou hast given no seed: and lo, one born in my house is mine heir." It is obvious that the right of inheritance has been recognized among mankind since remote antiquity. But the right of the ancestor to dispose of his property by will has been established at various periods among civilized nations. In England no one could dispose of his lands by a last will and testament till the reign of Henry VIII, when a statute was passed authorizing the making of wills, and gave the right to a testator to devise part of his realty, though not then held in free and common sockage. But after the Restoration, in the reign of Charles II, the right of devising real property became universal. Under the ancient law of the Athenians the estate of the ancestor was vested in his lineal descendants, and in the absence of lineals, then in collaterals. Under the Constitution of Solon, the ancestor was permitted to dispose of his property by a last will and testament, but only in a case where there were no lineal descendants, "showing," observes Plutarch, "that Solon esteemed friendship a stronger tie than kindred, and affection than necessity; and made every man's estate truly his own." To this rule of descent and distribution, or inheritance by devise or bequest in a last will and testament, there was this qualification, which required that whoever succeeded to the estate, took it, *cum onere*, that is, burdened with the debts of the ancestor or testator. It is indeed an equitable rule that a man must be just before he is generous, and it is only right that the debts of the ancestor must be first discharged, before the residue can be paid over to the heirs, devisees or legatees. But the laws of Athens, in this regard, under the Constitu-

tion of Clisthenes, and presumably under the Constitution of Solon, went much farther than attaching the debts of the decedent to the property he left. The heir was obliged to discharge the debts of the ancestor in any event, and if the property of the decedent was insufficient, the heir became personally liable for the deficiency; or for the entire indebtedness, if the debtor left no property. Not only this, but the obligation of the ancestor operated to disfranchise the heir, until the obligations of the ancestor were paid and discharged.

A conspicuous example of this harsh and unjust law is illustrated in the case of Cimon, son of Miltiades. It will be borne in mind that the hero of Marathon was fined fifty talents (more than $50,000), by reason of the losses sustained by the Commonwealth in fitting out the expedition he asked for, with which he sailed to the island of Paros. Miltiades was blamed, because he did not disclose the purpose for which he wished to use the fleet. He, being unable to discharge the debt, died in prison shortly after his trial. His son, the illustrious Cimon, under the unjust laws of his country, became personally liable for this debt of his father, and was disfranchised by operation of law, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But for the generosity of Callias, one of the wealthiest men in Athens, who fell in love with Elpinice, the sister of Cimon, and who discharged this unjust debt inherited by his brother-in-law, the Athenians would have lost the distinguished services of this great admiral, who, with the sole exception of Themistocles, was the most illustrious commander after his father's death among the Hellenese.

The Areopagus, on the Hill of Ares (Mars' Hill), within bow-shot of the Acropolis, was the ancient Senate or Council having jurisdiction in criminal cases, including certain cases of homicide, and in all matters pertaining to religion and morals. This branch of authority it still possessed in the days of the Apostle

Paul, who was taken before the Council of the Areopagus, with the admonition that he explain to that body the "new doctrine" which he preached in Athens. Before that august tribunal, Paul, looking up at the Acropolis near by, covered with temples and statues of gods and goddesses, delivered his address beginning, "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are very religious."

The people of Attica from the earliest times were divided politically into four tribes, said to have been descended from the four sons of the ancient patriarch, Ion: Geleon, Ægicores, Argades and Hoples. In the days of Solon, these tribes were still so designated. They mingled in the discharge of their religious duties and social obligations, and for mutual improvement and intercourse. In the exercise of religious functions each tribe had a patriarch, or head, denominated the King, who offered the sacrifices on behalf of his people.

Under the Constitution of Solon, the four Ionian tribes remained, as they had been, but the entire body of citizens were divided for political purposes into four classes, based on a standard of wealth instead of a standard of birth. The new classification made wealth, not blood, the canon of privilege. Of the four classes, three were graded by property qualifications, and the fourth, by far the most numerous, consisting of the great mass of citizens, included those who possessed practically no property or stated income. In the first class were grouped all persons having landed estates yielding an income, measured by the equivalent of at least five hundred medimini or measures of grain, or its equivalent in wine and oil. The second class of landed proprietors included those whose estates yielded between 300 and 500 medimini. These were the Hippies, or horsemen, who furnished a horse, and served in the cavalry in time of war. The third class comprised the small farmers, included those whose land yielded

from 300 to 200 medimini, designated the Zeugitæ, "owners of a yoke" of oxen for the plough. The fourth estate included all whose property yielded less than 200 medimini, or who owned no land at all. This, by far the most numerous class, included artisans, laborers, shopkeepers, clerks, fishermen and sailors.

Thus Solon, though actuated by the highest and purest motives, made merchandise of privilege (for, as we shall see, the landed proprietors exercised exclusively the political power) and measured it, as the merchant measures his grain, and wine, and oil, to be sold in the market. These political powers were classified as follows: Those of the first or wealthiest privileged class were alone eligible to the archonship, to membership in the Senate or Court of the Areopagus; to the higher offices, and to military and naval commands. The other two privileged classes were eligible only to minor offices, and to membership in the Council of the Four Hundred with members of the first class. With regard to military service, those in the second class served in the cavalry; those in the third class, as hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry; those in the fourth class were not eligible to any office, nor were they liable to any direct tax. They served in the army as light armed troops and as sailors in the fleet. The only political power which they seemed to exercise was the right of franchise, or privilege of voting for rulers nominated by others.

The cavalry and heavy armed troops were required to furnish their own arms, except a shield and spear. These weapons were supplied by the State which gave to every citizen when he attained his majority, a spear and shield, and bade him defend the Commonwealth. He was obliged to bear arms in defense of his country, and render military service when called upon, without pay.

Although the government founded by Solon was an

oligarchy, it was his intention to give the masses a voice in public affairs. To this end every citizen was clothed with the franchise, and entitled to vote in the Public Assembly, afterwards designated the Ecclesia, which met annually, and elected the Archons and all other public officers. This great popular body, which constituted the entire electorate, was clothed also with judicial functions, and sat as an Appellate Court to review appeals taken from the decisions of the Archons. This power was granted to give the people a check on the latter, who were chosen only from the wealthiest class. It was the popular branch of the government, and in the exercise of its legislative functions, passed the laws of the Commonwealth, but was without power to originate legislation, which function was committed to the Council of the Four Hundred, which will be considered presently. The Popular Assembly had power to call on all magistrates to give an account publicly, at the close of their term of office, of the manner in which they had administered the respective trusts confided to them.

Solon, who was a student of checks and balances in government, thought it wise to establish a countercheck on the power of the people, sitting in the Public Assembly, and to that end devised the Council of the Four Hundred, consisting of one hundred from each of the four tribes. But members of this Council were chosen from the three wealthy classes, and were elected annually by the Popular Assembly. It was an advisory body, merely, with exclusive authority to originate all legislation. It could frame laws, but could not enact them. Its powers ceased when the measures they framed were submitted to the Public Assembly, which alone had authority to ratify or reject all proposed legislation. As the Public Assembly was both a legislative and judicial body, every member had a right to take part in debate, and to express his views upon all

questions brought before it. Thus Solon accorded to all the right of free speech.

Such was the Constitution of Solon, not perfect by any means, nor could perfection be expected, since nothing is ever perfect. But the government framed by him was far from a democracy. It was a sort of republican oligarchy, perhaps the best, that was possible at that critical period in the history of Attica. Its principal democratic features, consisted in the right of universal suffrage conferred upon the electorate. But that right did not permit the people either to originate legislation, or to choose their magistrates and rulers. The latter were chosen for them by the privileged classes, whose members were alone eligible to office. The people, however, were permitted to go through the idle form of casting the ballots, which ratified the choice of the oligarchy for the officers who were to exercise the powers of government. True, the people had exclusive power to enact all laws, but they could vote only for or against such laws as were framed for them by the Council of the Four Hundred, who were chosen only from the privileged classes.

The work of Solon has made his name immortal. The task he accomplished was a long stride towards popular government, the political ideal for which mankind has been striving through the ages. The Council of the Four Hundred whose members were aristocrats, taken from the privileged classes, and the dignified and conservative Council of the Areopagus, also an aristocratic body, were the institutions which Solon regarded as the sheet anchors of the Constitution, and which he deemed amply sufficient to steady the ship of State, and enable it to ride safely through the stress and storm of intestine commotion, and political revolution. Solon's conception of the delicate task he undertook to perform, may be gathered from his own words. Here is his comment on his work: "I gave the people,"

he said, "as much strength as is enough, without taking away from their due share, or adding thereto. But as for those who had power, and the splendor of riches, to them also I gave counsel, even that they should not uphold violence. And I stood with my strong shield spread over both and suffered neither to prevail by wrong."

The Constitution of Solon remained in force till the time of Clisthenes, a period of over seventy years. But though it brought temporary relief from commercial bondage and conferred free speech and universal suffrage, it did not entirely allay the discontent which existed, and the old dissentions among the dwellers of the Plain, the Shore and the Mountain became active. Revolutions followed and Pisistratus finally succeeded in securing the reins of government permanently, and by his wise and humane administration in which he professed reverence for the Constitution of Solon, he so managed affairs as to retain his power, until his death, B. C. 527. His sons, Hipparchus and Hippias, known as the Pisistratidæ, succeeded their father in the government. Hipparchus was assassinated B. C. 514, and Hippias was driven into exile B. C. 510. Amid the intestine commotions resulting from the efforts of Hippias to secure his restoration to power, Clisthenes became the popular leader in Athens. The secret of his success was his outspoken sympathy with the political reforms sought by the people, and his promise to advocate their cause and give them the sort of government they asked. He kept his promise, and introduced a new constitution based upon democratic principles. His reforms entitle him to rank as the founder of democracy and of the Attic Commonwealth. These reforms, and the military disturbances under which they arose, will be considered in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IX

USURPATION OF THE PISISTRATIDÆ — THE CONSTITUTION OF CLISTHENES

WARS and revolutions occasioned by the usurpation of Pisistratus and his two sons, Hipparchus and Hippias, which extended over a period of more than half a century, embrace the principal historical features of Hellas, intermediate the adoption of the Constitution of Solon, about B. C. 594, and the establishment of the political reforms, known as the Constitution of Clisthenes, about B. C. 510-9.

While the reforms of Solon furnished his countrymen temporary relief, they went too far to suit the ambitious aristocrats and not far enough to suit the discontented Hill-men or mountaineers, who possessed practically no property and constantly sought to bring about the complete overthrow of the privileged classes. This discontent furnished an opportunity for the work of demagogues and selfish politicians, who were seeking political power. Factions arose, revolutions were planned, and the men of the plain, the shore and the mountain, were involved in continual strife. Conspicuous among the political leaders of the time was Pisistratus, second cousin of Solon, who had also been his comrade in the wars between Athens and Megara. During the absence of the great lawgiver on his extended travels, through the world, Pisistratus seized the Acropolis and became the ruler of Attica (B. C. 560). In the strife which ensued he was twice driven from

power, but as the leader of the mountaineers or Hill-men, and being a strong advocate of democracy and popular government, he succeeded in retaining the supreme power in the State until his death, 527 B. C., thirty-three years after his first usurpation. He adhered to the Constitution of Solon, and enacted many wise and beneficent laws for the promotion of good order and morality. He was a man of refined tastes, and as a patron of literature and art, was surpassed only by the illustrious Pericles. From his tongue dropped honey, and he sought to conciliate the masses by making their political yoke easy and their burdens light. He beautified and adorned Athens, and to him posterity is indebted for the preservation of the Iliad and the Odyssey. The poems were collected and edited by a body of literary men, under his direction, and published in the form in which we now have them.

Landor paints his character in fair colors. In a supposititious letter, written by Pericles to Aspasia, the Athenian statesman is made to eulogize the most benevolent despot who, in that age, had ever attempted to seize the reins of power. "Pisistratus," writes Pericles, "was affectionate; the rest of his character you know as well as I do. You know that he was eloquent, that he was humane, that he was contemplative, that he was learned; that he not only was profuse to men of genius, but cordial, and that it was only with such men he was familiar and intimate. You know that he was the greatest, the wisest, the most virtuous, excepting Solon and Lycurgus, that ever ruled any portion of the human race. Is it not happy and glorious for mortals, when, instead of being led by the ears under the clumsy and violent hand of vulgar and clamorous adventurers, a Pisistratus leaves the volumes of Homer and the conversation of Solon for them."

Upon the death of Pisistratus, his son, Hipparchus,

with whom was associated his brother Hippias (the brothers being designated the Pisistratidæ), continued the mild rule of their father which alone prevented political uprisings, and made the people measurably contented. Hipparchus was also a man of letters and a liberal patron of learning and art. The most distinguished men of the age visited him and attended his feasts and banquets. Among them was Simonides, the poet, and Anacreon, whose elegant ballads and convivial lyrics still continue to charm and captivate. The Pisistratidæ, by reason of their wealth and position, dwelt in luxury, and indulged in dissolute habits. Their dissipation finally resulted in their downfall. Hipparchus, at a public festival, grossly insulted the sister of Harmodius, a young Athenian of noble family. The latter, in company with his friend Aristogiton, attacked and slew Hipparchus (B. C. 514). Hippias continued in control of the government, but the violent death of his brother made him suspicious and morose, and instead of the elegant gentleman of leisure, and the professed friend of the people, and supporter of the Constitution of Solon, he became an oppressor, an offensive tyrant and despot.

The conspicuous figures which the historian throws upon the canvas in bold outline during this period include Hippias, the ambitious usurper, seeking to retain his power; Isagoras and Clisthenes, the heads of the powerful families who were seeking to depose him, and the joint rulers and kings of Sparta, Cleomenes and Demaratus. Clisthenes was of the family of the Alcmæonidæ, and was their political leader. He was a grandson of Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon. His family, the Alcmæonidæ, were the political rivals of the house of Isagoras, but in view of the fact that both families desired the expulsion of Hippias, they, for the time being, subordinated their dissensions and united their efforts for the attainment of their common object.

The Alcmæonidæ, also, through their influence with priests of the temple of Delphi, were enabled to enlist in their behalf the influence of Sparta. Though the Spartans were most friendly to Hippias they were, through superstition or reverence for the Delphic oracle, obliged reluctantly to lend a willing ear to the overtures made to them by Clisthenes. The latter's family secured their influence with the aid of a venal and corrupt priesthood by the liberality they displayed in executing their contract to rebuild the Delphian temple, which was by accident destroyed by fire B. C. 548. This edifice, sacred to Apollo, was under the protecting care of the Amphictyonic Council, composed of representatives from all parts of Hellas. Through the religious zeal of the people the Council succeeded in securing for the rebuilding of the sacred edifice, a sum equivalent to more than half a million dollars. The contract was awarded to the Alcmæonidæ, who had been in exile since the third and final usurpation of Pisistratus. In order to win favor with the religious orders, they constructed the front of the temple of the choicest Parian marble, though the contract specified only plain limestone. They expended also large sums in beautifying and adorning the edifice, and contributed liberally to the support of the priesthood. By their munificence and liberality, the temple was finished about B. C. 512, about two years after the death of Hipparchus. Through intimate associations, incident to the execution of their contract in rebuilding the sacred edifice, the Alcmæonidæ gained great favor at Delphi, and influence with the Pythia or priestess of the temple, who espoused their cause openly, against Hippias. In this way the Kings of Sparta were restrained from granting aid to Hippias who persistently sought their support to enable them to defeat the designs of Clisthenes and Isagoras, and sufficient pressure from Delphi was brought to bear upon the Lacedamonians to induce

them to take sides openly with the Alcmæonidæ and the house of Isagoras, in the efforts of the latter to depose the usurper.

As a result of priestly influence Sparta was induced to send an army into Attica, under Cleomenes to dislodge Hippias. During this campaign, Hippias endeavored to send away his children secretly, that they might find an asylum in Asia Minor. Fortunately, for the Athenians, the offspring of Hippias fell into the hands of their enemies. In order to save them Hippias abdicated his power and sought refuge in the Troad (B. C. 508). As a voluntary exile he visited the Court of Artaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, at Sardis, to invoke his aid in his cause against the liberties of his people.

The abdication of Hippias left the affairs of Attica to the rival factions headed by Isagoras and Clisthenes, with a Lacedamonian army as a factor in the political problem. Although Clisthenes had been instrumental in securing the assistance of Sparta to enable him to depose Hippias, his following had no intention of allowing the Peloponnesians to gain a foothold in Attica. On the other hand, Isagoras, who represented the party of the plain, was desirous of reestablishing an oligarchy, as it had existed before the time of Solon. In this enterprise the Spartans were in accord, and secretly aided the plans of Isagoras. The latter sought to unite the conservative party of the Plain-men, in their efforts to defeat the party of Clisthenes. The latter instituted a vigorous campaign at the head of the mountaineers or Hill-men, who sought to enlarge the liberties secured to them under the Constitution of Solon, and to establish in Attica, an absolute democracy. The old Shore-party, which had almost disintegrated, was as far as possible united by Clisthenes in his vigorous efforts to defeat his rival. He infused new life into these old factions and put himself at the

head of the party of progress. His slogan was substantially that of the leaders of the modern French Revolution who adopted the motto, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Though at heart an aristocrat, yet to gain power Clisthenes promised the masses that he would abolish privilege, and inaugurate a political system designed to make all men equal before the law. His efforts created intense enthusiasm, and amid the rejoicings of the masses at being liberated from the yoke of Hippias, Clisthenes became the man of the hour and the democratic leader of the Attic people.

Isagoras, as champion of the aristocracy, found himself at the head of a minority party, as the leader of a forlorn hope. His chance of success lay in the support of a Spartan army. He was the personal friend of Cleomenes, and found no difficulty in enlisting the support of his troops, in his efforts to defeat the popular party, and the reforms promised by his rival Clisthenes, and with the aid of the Spartan king, sought to usurp the supreme power in the State. At the request of Isagoras, Cleomenes, whom it is claimed shared the favors of the beautiful wife of Isagoras, the Spartan Ephors, sent a herald to Athens and demanded the expulsion of the Alcmæonidæ. Clisthenes was not strong enough to resist a Spartan army, acting in combination with adherents of Isagoras, and went into exile to await the developments of the Isagoras-Cleomenes conspiracy, anticipating when the period of reaction came, to return to Athens, as the liberator of Attica and the saviour of his country.

The secret aim of Cleomenes undoubtedly was to put Isagoras, who was his creature, in power, undermine his authority, and ultimately make Attica a Peloponnesian state.

After the departure of Clisthenes, Isagoras, under the protection of Spartan troops, was elected Archon. In furtherance of the designs of the conspirators,

Isagoras, upon assuming power, sent the Alcmæonidæ and their sympathizers among the wealthy classes, into exile, including about seven hundred families, whom he regarded as hostile to his designs, and in sympathy with the party of progress. The new Archon and his party began to tear down what Solon and Clisthenes had built up. Our knowledge as to the precise time when the Constitution of Clisthenes became operative is not accurate, but the best authorities indicate that the reforms of Clisthenes were made immediately after the expulsion of Hippias, and before Isagoras was raised to power with the aid of Spartan arms.

When Isagoras assumed the archonship, he sought to abolish the Council of the Four Hundred, established by Solon, which had been increased by Clisthenes to Five Hundred, and inaugurated a new Council of Three Hundred, based on the Doric number three, instead of the Ionic number four. This new body was composed exclusively of those in sympathy with the establishment of an oligarchy. The policy of Isagoras opened the eyes of the people. His design, with the military aid of Sparta, to overthrow the Constitution of Solon and the reforms of Clisthenes, and to destroy the liberties of Greece, became apparent.

Public opinion became aroused. Isagoras was everywhere hated and detested. Inflamed by the fear that a despotism more onerous than that of Hippias was about to be established, the masses broke out into open rebellion and armed resistance. The Council of Five Hundred refused to be dissolved at the behest of the new Archon. The revolution was exceedingly popular. The movement suddenly gained a momentum that nothing could resist. Isagoras, in fear of his life, retreated into the citadel on the Acropolis for safety. Cleomenes did not have the approval of the Delphic oracle, in his support of Isagoras, against the Alcmæonidæ, and finding his army short of provisions, and wholly inadequate, he quit Attica, temporarily leaving Isagoras to his fate.

The withdrawal of Spartan troops and the deposition of Isagoras was followed by the recall of the Alcmæonidæ, and Clisthenes again became the leader of the party of progress.

The final struggle for the liberties of Attica now assumed formidable proportions. Cleomenes secured the support of the Ephors, in furtherance of his schemes, and through his influence, the Lacedamonians were induced to declare war against Athens. He assembled a large army, augmented by the Peloponnesian allies, including troops from Corinth and Ægina, and prepared to enter Attica. The exiled Hippias now became active. Cleomenes sought aid also of the cities on the northern frontier of Attica, to act in conjunction with his own forces from the Peloponnese on the south, and endeavored to establish a confederacy in furtherance of his scheme to ruin Athens. To this end he intrigued to secure the co-operation of Thebes, northern Beotia, and the Chalcidians, the nearest neighbors of Beotia on the east, who occupied the territory at the Euripus on the island of Eubea, which, at Chalcis, is separated from the mainland by the narrowest part of the Eubean channel.

Cleomenes was careful, however, when he collected his Peloponnesian forces, not to disclose his ultimate design to establish Isagoras as tyrant of Athens. He marched to the territory of Eleusis, on the Saronic gulf on the southern frontier of Attica, about twelve miles northwest of Athens. At Eleusis dissensions arose in his army. It came to the knowledge of the allies that the real purpose of Cleomenes was to put Isagoras, his own creature, in power at Athens. Selfish interests, dictated by commercial rivalry, caused the Corinthians to withdraw from the enterprise. They feared not only the advantage that might accrue to

Ægina, their commercial rivals, but also the power that would inure to the benefit of the Peloponnesians. They refused to advance and returned to Corinth. By a strange coincidence, Demaratus, King of Sparta, who reigned jointly with Cleomenes, and who subsequently piloted the hosts of Xerxes into Greece, was instrumental on this occasion in saving Athens. A quarter of a century later this same Demaratus then an exile in the Persian Court, accompanied the army of Xerxes in his campaign to destroy Athens and subjugate Hellas. He quarrelled openly with his colleague Cleomenes on the plain of Eleusis, refused further to participate in the undertaking and returned to Sparta. The remaining allies, when they observed that their commanders had disagreed, and that the Corinthians had returned to their homes, abandoned the enterprise. Cleomenes found his campaign at an end, and in the face of these dissensions, the Dorian invasion of Attica failed utterly.

The Athenians, being no longer in danger of invasion from the south, determined to take revenge on their enemies in the north. Before the Bœotians could make a junction and unite with the Chalcidians, they planned to attack them separately and destroy them in detail. They moved rapidly upon the Bœotians, whom they defeated with great slaughter, and took seven hundred prisoners. On the same day they fell upon the Chalcidians, whom they also defeated, confiscated their territory and apportioned it among Athenians, four thousand of whom settled on their lands in Eubea.

The victorious Athenians returned with their prisoners in chains, on whom they set a ransom of two minæ for each prisoner. With part of the ransom money they constructed a brazen chariot with four horses which Herodotus says, "stands on the left hand as you first enter the portico in the Acropolis." He says the chains with which the Beotians were bound were

hung up in the Acropolis where they were still to be seen in his day. On the brazen chariot was engraved the following inscription: "The sons of the Athenians, having conquered the nations of the Bœotians and Chalcidians in feats of war, quelled their insolence in a dark iron dungeon, and with a tithe of the spoils dedicated these steeds to Pallas."

At a critical juncture, when the Peloponnesian anti-Athenian alliance was formed, shortly after the return of Clisthenes from exile, ambassadors were sent to Sardis to solicit the aid of Artaphernes, and bring a Persian army to Athens to defeat the combined forces of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Some modern historians, we believe unjustly, declare that this embassy was sent through the influence of Clisthenes to subserve his own ends. The ambassadors were told by the Persian satrap, that the Athenians, in order to receive aid from Darius, must become his subjects. When the proposed treaty with Artaphernes was submitted to the people, it was scornfully rejected by the Ecclesia, composed of the ten tribes under the new constitution of Clisthenes, assembled on the hill Pnyx. The Athenians who had long striven against tyranny in their efforts to establish a democracy, refused to purchase respite from destruction and political annihilation at such a price. They preferred to perish in war waged by Greeks against Greeks, contending for the establishment of free institutions, than abide under the shadow of a Persian despot.

Whether the attempt to enlist Persian aid was brought about by Clisthenes, as part of a design to restore the family of the Alcmæonidæ to power, establish an oligarchy, and thereby defeat the plans of Hippias, who was seeking the aid of Darius to regain his supremacy in Athens; or whether it was an attempt in good faith to save Athens from impending ruin, at the hands of its combined enemies, must remain the subject

of conjecture. However this may be, the Attic commonwealth which had now become a democracy, rejected the proposal of Persian aid as an insult, and administered a stinging rebuke to the ambassadors, who were responsible for it. The attempt only served to stimulate their patriotism and devotion to the cause of free government.

If we may judge Clisthenes by the work he accomplished in organizing the ten tribes, and establishing in Attica a democratic commonwealth, the imputation that he deliberately sought an alliance with Persia to establish an oligarchy for his own aggrandizement, is a slander upon the fair name of this popular leader, who was indeed the political Moses of the Athenians. The assumption that Clisthenes, while building up a democracy, was all the while planning to tear it down, and establish an oligarchy on its ruins, is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which the scanty records of the history of that time afford. We are not informed as to what public services Clisthenes rendered in the closing years of his life. After the proposed alliance with Persia was rejected by the Athenians, his name disappears from the page of history.

The work of Clisthenes and the main features of his constitution remain to be considered. It will be observed that his measures were thorough. His principal reforms were radical, and far reaching, and established the foundations of a genuine democracy, broadened somewhat by Aristides and finally assuming all the elements of a pure democracy under the guiding hand of Pericles.

If the aim of Solon was to make all men politically equal, he failed entirely to accomplish that result. Under his reforms the political power remained with the Eupatridæ, who alone were eligible to the Archonship, the Senate of the Four Hundred and the Council of the Areopagus. Universal suffrage, which was bestowed by

the Constitution of Solon, was not a weapon sufficient in itself to control to any great extent the power of the wealthy classes. Their political strength lay in their exclusive right to administer every important office, and draft every law which was submitted to the Public Assembly. So long as they alone had power to name all candidates for the important offices, it became immaterial, so far as they were concerned, who cast the ballots to elect them.

The most radical reform of Clisthenes was the abolition of the four Ionic tribes, based on the Ionic number four, which remained unchanged under the Solonian constitution, and the substitution of new tribes and new political divisions based on the decimal system. Clisthenes established ten tribes, and divided Attica into one hundred townships called demes. The unit of the tribe was the deme. The tribe was the unit of the State. The entire commonwealth comprised ten tribes, and the membership of each tribe embraced ten demes. Ten demes constituted a tribe, and ten tribes constituted the State.

No person who was not a member of one of the four Ionic tribes, under the Constitution of Solon, could exercise the rights of citizenship. Under the system of the ten tribes, established by Clisthenes, resident aliens were permitted to enroll in some deme, become citizens of the Commonwealth, and exercise the right to vote. Thus the citizenship was enlarged so as to include traders, merchants and others engaged in commercial pursuits, who came to Athens to reside, and carry on their various enterprises. Even slaves, in some instances, according to Aristotle, might become citizens. Thus Athens presently became a prosperous cosmopolitan, commercial centre.

The new tribal arrangement, in view of the object sought to be accomplished, was ingenious. The design of Clisthenes was to break up cliques and factions, pre-

vent as far as possible separate tribal interests, and the ascendancy of one tribe over another. To this end it was provided that the territory of demes, belonging to the same tribe, should not be contiguous. In order, as far as possible, to break up the old division of parties which included the Hill-men, the men of the plain and the men of the shore, Clisthenes sought to mould the citizens of the Attic commonwealth into a homogeneous electorate, so arranged that mountain demes, shore demes, and plain demes, should be found in the same tribe. No tribe, therefore, was made up exclusively of contiguous demes. To stimulate patriotic devotion, and inspire Hellenic pride, each tribe was named for some god or hero of antiquity, the memory of whose achievements in war was embalmed in the poems of Homer. These were the names selected for the ten tribes: Erechtheis, Ægeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Œneis, Æantis, Antiochis, Cecropis, and Hippothoöntis. These are the ten heroes, for whom the respective tribes were named: Erechtheus, Ægeus, Pandion, Leos, Acamas, Œneus, Cecrops, Hippothoön, Ajax and Antiochus. We read in subsequent history that Themistocles belonged to the tribe of Leontis, Aristides to the tribe of Antiochis and Pericles to the tribe of Acamantis. The names given to the demes were derived from plants and flowers.

Patriarchal usages were abolished. Every citizen was entitled to civic rights without regard to birth or descent, and, so far as the suffrage was concerned, without regard to property qualifications. Every citizen was required to be enrolled in his deme. The Mayor, or official head of every deme, was designated the demarch, whose duty it was to keep the register of all those under his jurisdiction, who were entitled to the franchise. No matter where an Attic citizen might reside, he continued to be a member of the deme in which he was originally enrolled. The actual locality

of his residence was not material, in view of the fact that the tribe met only in Athens on the Pnyx, a hill west of the Acropolis, where all the tribes assembled in the open air ten times a year, in the great Public Assembly, known also as the Ecclesia, where all legislature functions were exercised. When thus assembled they constituted the demos, or Commonwealth of Attica, and the entire electorate of the State. Every member of the commonwealth was personally represented, because, theoretically at least, every member was supposed to attend the Ecclesia not through the proxy of a chosen representative, but in person.

Under the Constitution of Solon, the elective franchise was confined exclusively to the members of the four Ionic tribes, which embraced for religious purposes, groups and societies termed gentes and fratres. The bond of the former was founded on kinship, propinquity in blood and family ties. The latter, known as fratres, consisted of congregations or religious societies, who, except when the entire nation periodically celebrated their religious games and festivals, worshipped together in the celebration of their particular customs, rites and festivals. The gentes and fratres, however, under the Constitution of Clisthenes, possessed no political significance.

The archonship remained elective as it had been under the Constitution of Solon. Nine archons were chosen annually, but their jurisdiction and powers were materially abridged. Under the new law the military office of Strategus was created. The strategi consisted of ten generals, one from each tribe, including also two hipparchs, who were assigned to the command of the cavalry. Under the Constitution of Solon, the supreme command of the army was vested in the third archon, known as the archon polemarch. Under the new law, however, the third archon was *ex officio* a member of the council of the Strategi, and in all matters,

if the council was equally divided by a vote, the polemarch was entitled to the casting vote. This power was exercised by the polemarch Callimachus, at the battle of Marathon, where the strategi were equally divided. The vote of Callimachus on that occasion decided the destiny of Athens. The third archon was accorded also the distinguished honor of commanding the right wing in battle. The command of the army was given to the strategi severally, in rotation, each strategus exercising the command for one day.

The powers of the archons were abridged further by a new jury system, designated the Heliæa, in whom was vested all judicial power, except such as remained in the Court of the Areopagus, which was confined chiefly to certain cases of homicide, and matters of religion and morals. The powers of the Heliæa will be considered presently.

The Senate or Council of the Four Hundred was retained, but its membership was thrown open to all citizens. Under the constitution of Solon only citizens belonging to the first property class were eligible to membership in that body. Under the new law, the Senate increased to five hundred, including fifty members from each of the ten tribes, who were chosen annually by the Ecclesia. A body of fifty senators including ten from each tribe, presided daily over the deliberation of the Senate and the Ecclesia, ten being chosen to preside each day. Of these ten presiding officers one was chosen by lot each day to act as chairman, both in the Senate and in the Ecclesia. While so acting, this chairman was entrusted for the day with the keys of the Acropolis and the treasury located in the temple of Erechtheus and was also given the custody of the public seal of the Commonwealth.

The Ecclesia met ten times a year, or once every month, as the Attic year consisted of ten months. The month was called a "prytany." Mr. Grote observes

that the year consisted of twelve lunar months or 354 days. Under Clisthenes, the decimal system governed the division of time, and of the ten months or prytanies, six contained 35, and four 36 days each. The prytany or month was divided into five weeks, of seven days each. "In the intercalated years of thirteen months," says Mr. Grote, "the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively.

The ten senators whose chairman was chosen by lot daily presided over the Ecclesia for a week. There being five weeks in a prytany of the fifty senators chosen to preside for the month, five senators from each tribe acted in the presiding body during the prytany. Ten of these senators presided during each of the five weeks respectively.

This Senate or Council of Five Hundred was the executive Committee of the Ecclesia, whose duty it was to preside over its deliberations, in the manner indicated prepare legislation to be brought before it for action and summon that body to assemble.

The new jury system instituted by Clisthenes was termed the Heliæa. From the entire electorate 6,000 citizens were annually chosen by lot to perform jury duty, 600 being chosen from each of the ten tribes. These jurymen were called dikasts. No citizen under thirty years of age was eligible to the dikastry. The dikasts were divided into five panels called decuries, each decury consisting of 500 jurymen. The remaining 1,000 dikasts not assigned to a specific decury were kept in reserve to fill vacancies in the decuries caused by death, disability or absence. When assigned to duty and sworn in, the dikast was given a tablet or ticket on which was engraved his name, the deme in which he was enrolled, and the letter designating the particular panel or decury to which he had been assigned; as for example D designating the decury; Diodors, name of the dikast; Phrearrios, designating

his deme. This is a transcript taken from a decury ticket which was dug up in Athens in recent years. (Boesckh-Corp. Inscrip.)

The dikasts had jurisdiction of all important cases, and by their verdict in any given case disposed of all questions of law and fact, thus exercising judicial functions, as well as ministerial duties. Under our modern system of jurisprudence, the functions of the jury are confined solely to deciding questions of fact. The presiding justice, a member of the judiciary, is given exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions of law, except in cases of libel, where the jury may consider both questions of law and fact. The verdict of dikasts in any given case was conclusive, and it seems that from it there was no appeal.

When court assembled and defendant was called upon to answer, he was represented by a lawyer, an advocate or counsellor, who was entitled to address the dikasts, on behalf of his client. This same right was accorded also to the public prosecutor or counsel for the plaintiff in a civil action. One of the six inferior archons, presided at the trial. As the archon could not pass upon questions of law or fact, his duties were presumably confined to maintaining order, regulating details of procedure, and preserving the dignity which is an essential accompaniment to a solemn adjudication involving the life, liberty or property of the citizen.

In order that no member of the panel might know beforehand in what case he was to sit, or which of the archons would preside over his decury, it was provided that the six archons should select by lot which of ten decuries or how many panels should sit, and which of the archons should preside over a given decury. Such was the jury system in the times of Clisthenes.

To Clisthenes is attributed also the law of ostracism, under which any citizen, by a majority vote, provided at least 6,000 ballots were cast, might be ex-

patriated for a period not exceeding ten years. This peculiar statute was born of fear of tyranny, which of all political conditions the Hellenes dreaded most. The ostracism was a vote of confidence or lack of confidence, which was given or withheld by a fickle electorate. If less than 6,000 ballots were cast, the election was void, and there could be no ostracism. In other words no citizen could be banished unless at least 6,000 citizens participated in the election. The ostracism was not devised as a punishment for crime, but as a preventive remedy to destroy the political ambition of an individual leader, or public spirited citizen, whose influence it was feared might become dangerous to the State. Fear that undue popularity might enable an unscrupulous and ambitious man to usurp power and establish a tyranny on the ruins of democracy and thereby become a tyrant. The word " tyrant " used at this period among the Hellenes did not denote individual acts of cruelty or measures of oppression, or despotic conduct displayed by a particular ruler. A " tyrant " was one who presided in a government designated a tyranny or oligarchy, as distinguished from a democracy or a republican form of government under which all citizens enjoyed civil and political liberty. Banishment was supposed to furnish the remedy for this sort of political danger.

In order to ostracise a citizen, an election was held for that purpose. The voter was given a ballot consisting of a shell or tile, on which he was required to write the name of the objectionable citizen, whom he wished to send into exile. The ballots thus prepared were deposited in urns. If 6,000 ballots or more were cast, the name written on a majority of the ballots, authorized a decree of ostracism.

The ostracism was in effect a sort of political lynch law under which the career of any public man, however amiable or patriotic, might, through the machinations

of his enemies, be brought to a sudden close, and the victim forced perhaps to end his days in exile. The statute might with propriety have been entitled "An Act to permit selfish political office seekers to conspire to save themselves from outlawry by combining to exile an innocent citizen." It turned out that the ostracism was frequently invoked by a dangerous group of politicians, who feared defeat at the hands of a political rival, or one whose wealth or influence exposed them to the envy and jealousy of those less fortunate in life. It did not hinder political factions from combining against an independent leader, who refused to be governed or controlled by the designs of selfish men, seeking only their personal advancement. This was the result in the case of Aristides, a man preëminently just, and possessing the highest patriotism. Aristides was banished by his political foes, led by the great admiral and democrat Themistocles. The outlawry, however, was revoked and the exile recalled when the army of Xerxes was approaching threatening Athens. Aristides returned in time to coöperate with Themistocles, in the defeat of Xerxes at Salamis.

The unsatisfactory results of the statute was later illustrated in the case of Hyperbolus. Alcibiades and Nicias were political rivals. Both began to be feared by the people; the latter by reason of his great wealth, the former on account of his brilliant talents, unscrupulous and reckless conduct and dissipated habits. Public opinion became aroused, and it was evident that one of them would be ostracised. Both men at the critical juncture used their influence with their followers and adherents for mutual advantage, and so contrived as to work upon the prejudices of the voters, so as to involve Hyperbolus. When the ballots were counted Hyperbolus was the victim who suffered banishment and became an outlaw. This result clearly demonstrated that the law worked more harm than good, and led to its repeal.

Under the Constitution of Clisthenes, the collection of taxes and revenues which flowed into the public exchequer was entrusted to a body of ten magistrates known as the Apodektæ. They were clothed with power not only to receive, but also to disburse the public funds. It seems that all public revenues were derived from a graduated income tax imposed in accordance with financial ability of the citizen, who were still grouped in four classes, as they had been under the Constitution of Solon, supplemented possibly by a graduated land and commodity tax. Although the Athenians were an enterprising commercial people, and subsequently masters of the sea, to such an extent as to cause the Ægean to become practically a *mare clausum*, and although their colonies were scattered throughout the frontiers of the commercial world, they seem to have been free traders. We have no authentic data from which to infer that the idea of a protective tariff imposed as duties upon imports or exports or a tariff for revenue only was ever conceived by the Greeks. Their political economy and commercial relations with other countries, in that age, did not seem to require any such mode of taxation, either to build up home manufactures, protect "infant industries," or secure protection from pauper labor. The pauper labor was slave labor and the Athenians owned the slaves. There were no custom houses, so far as we are informed in any Athenian port, anywhere, and the government, prior to the time of Pericles, seems to have been supported solely by revenues derived presumably by direct taxation. After the Persian Wars, the revenues of the Delian Confederacy were appropriated by the Athenians, to build up their empire, and to beautify and adorn their imperial city.

The Apodektæ were therefore simply the tax gath-

erers and disbursing agents of the Attic Commonwealth. In view of the fact that prior to the age of Pericles, the army was obliged to serve without pay, as were some other officers of the State, including the dikasts, the amount of revenue to support the government must have been comparatively small.

Such was the earliest democracy established in Greece, and the form of Constitutional government framed in the first instance by Solon, and enlarged and strengthened by Clisthenes, the first democratic leader of the Attic people. Among the supporters of Clisthenes and his reforms, was the youthful Aristides, who later fought with his distinguished contemporary Themistocles at Marathon and Salamis, and led the Athenians to victory at Platæa.

CHAPTER X

PERSIANS UNDER DARIUS—HIS AFFAIRS IN ASIA —SCYTHIA AND THE SCYTHS

THE Scythian expedition under Darius, though a Persian undertaking, properly belongs to the military annals of Greece. The Greek colonies along the northern shores of the Euxine had been established for more than a century before the time of Darius. These trading posts, located on the frontiers of Scythia, afforded Greek sailors and merchants abundant opportunity to become acquainted with the Scythians, and familiar with their language, and enabled them to obtain much information as to the unexplored regions of the interior and some knowledge of its resources.

This information Darius sought from his Greek subjects in Asia Minor, by whom many of these colonies had been established, and under whom they flourished. He relied upon the Greek cities of Asia Minor to furnish the navy which was essential to the success of his expedition, and depended entirely upon the skill and scientific knowledge of his Greek subjects to construct bridges over the Bosphorus and the Danube, for use in transporting his armies.

Before discussing the details of the expedition some preliminary observations may be profitable. First as to the motives which induced Darius to undertake this, his first European campaign, which he purposed to lead in person, and which, considering the numerical strength of his armament comprising more than three-quarters of a million fighting men, was the most formi-

dable military undertaking of which, up to that time, we have any knowledge. It was surpassed only by the expedition, which a generation later his son Xerxes led into Greece; through the pass of Thermopylæ, accompanied by a formidable fleet which suffered humiliating defeat in the straits of Salamis. A knowledge of the political state of Asia and the growth and condition of the Persian empire, in the time of Darius, is essential also to a correct understanding of the events, which followed his occupation of the throne of Cyrus, and the circumstances under which he attempted to extend his dominions to the Adriatic and the Gates of Hercules. Who were the European Scyths, whose country Darius sought to explore and conquer? A brief sketch of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and the colonies planted by them, in the west, and on the Scythian frontiers, is proper also in this connection.

Herodotus declares that the Scythian expedition took place after the second conquest of Babylon, by Darius, which transpired about B. C. 515. He assigns as the motive of Darius in undertaking the expedition, revenge upon the Scythians, because of their invasion and temporary conquest of Media, during the reign of Cyaxares, more than half a century before. If revenge was the only motive Darius had, in undertaking the conquest of Scythia, the immediate cause might with some propriety have been attributed to the circumstances attending the death of Cyrus the Great, father-in-law of Darius himself, who, after a reign of twenty-nine years. according to Herodotus, perished in battle, with the Massagetæ, who resembled the Scythians in their dress and mode of living.[1] These wild and barbarous tribes inhabited the remote regions on the north-

[1] This account of the death of Cyrus is not in harmony with the account in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, who declares that the great monarch died peacefully in his bed.

eastern confines of the Persian empire, and were ruled by queen Tomyris, a prototype of the famous British queen, Boadicea. Cyrus led his last expedition across the Araxes (obviously, not the river of the same name, which flows northeast through Armenia into the Caspian), and perished in battle, B. C. 529. The queen sought for his body among the slain, and mutilated the remains in revenge for the death of her son, who took his own life while a prisoner in the camp of Cyrus.

The Scythians, however, prior to the time of Cyrus the Great, and about sixty-three years before Darius ascended the throne of Persia, invaded Asia. They first broke through the Persian frontier, when Cyaxares, the Mede, was conducting a siege against the City of Nineveh, after he had defeated the Assyrian King in battle. There is some doubt as to whether this incursion by the Scythians was in the reign of Cyaxares or Astyages. The war then being waged between Cyaxares, King of Media and Alyattes, King of Lydia, which had been carried on for six years, was brought to a close at the nocturnal battle of the Halys. At noonday, while the troops were fighting, darkness suddenly ensued. This mysterious spectacle was occasioned by an almost total eclipse of the sun. Filled with alarm, and superstitious terror, the combatants suspended hostilities and concluded a treaty of peace. Modern scholars have made astronomical calculations to ascertain when this eclipse took place, in order to fix the date of this battle. Mr. Grote says that no less than eight different dates have been assigned by different chronologists, the most ancient 625 B. C., the most recent 583 B. C., and concludes that the most trustworthy calculations fix the time of the eclipse as occurring on September 30, 610 B. C. On the other hand, Curtius inclines to the opinion that the most accurate calculations point to that which occurred on May 28, 585 B. C., which in the land of the Halys changed the

dawn of day into night. If this date fixes the time, it was Astyages and not Cyaxares who ruled the Kingdom of Media. Labynetus, the King of Babylon, who acted with Cyennesis, the Silician, as one of the mediators in the peace negotiations was believed to be the Nebuchadnezzar of the scriptures. At all events, Mr. Grote concludes that it was after this peace, concluded by reason of the superstitious fear occasioned by the eclipse of the sun, which interrupted the battle of the Halys, which river afterwards became the boundary which divided the kingdoms of the Medes and the Lydians, that Cyaxares (or Astyages) collected all his forces and laid siege to Nineveh, but was obliged to desist by the unexpected inroad of the Scythians.

On this occasion, the Medes were defeated and the Scythians became masters of all Asia, where they established themselves for nearly a generation, and remained for a period of twenty-eight years. This was at a time when war was beginning to be practised more skillfully and scientifically, and not by projecting masses of men indiscriminately upon opposing masses. We are told that Cyaxares was the first to divide his army into cohorts and separate the spearmen, the archers, and the cavalry, into distinct bodies. We are thus given to infer that before the time of Cyaxares, armies fought in a confused mass, the spearmen, the cavalry, the archers and slingers being indiscriminately intermingled.

If, therefore, vengeance was the impulse which prompted Darius to lead an army to the Danube to invade Scythia, he had abundant cause. But when we come to study the character of Darius, his wise statesmanship, large experience and the wealth, resources and extent of his dominions embracing an empire, the richest and most magnificent which the world has ever seen, the pride and ambition not only of Darius, but of Atossa, his wife, the proud daughter of Cyrus the

Great, the father and founder of the Persian empire, we are justified in the conclusion that the real motives which induced Darius to undertake the Scythian invasion sprang from his desire to outstrip the achievements of Cyrus and Cambyses, and extend his dominions across the frontiers of Europe, to the Adriatic, to subdue and conquer unknown lands, and explore the remotest confines of the world. Had he succeeded, he would have anticipated Alexander the Great, as a world conqueror.

The empire established by Cyrus the Great to which Darius succeeded, with the exception of Egypt, embraced the confines of the eastern world. Cyrus was the son of Cambyses, King of Persia. His mother was Mandane, daughter of Astyages, King of Media. When Cyrus came to the throne, Media was, with the exception of Babylonia, the most powerful kingdom in the east. The Medes had been successful in their wars with the Assyrians. They took the city of Nineveh, fortified Larissa and Mespila on the Tigris, and conducted military operations against the Lydians. Cyrus revolted and made war against Astyages, took Ecbatana, his capital, and overthrew the kingdom of Media, about B. C. 559. He then advanced westward, conquered Lydia, and reduced the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the states of Caria and Lycia. Turning his armies to the east Cyrus besieged and took Babylon, the most important city in Asia about B. C. 538. The Babylonians had conquered Syria which was subject to their jurisdiction, when Babylon was taken by the Persians. With the fall of Babylon, therefore, Syria also fell; and Tyre and Sidon, Phœnicia and Palestine became an integral part of the dominions of Cyrus. He then sought the conquest of the turbulent and barbarous nations on the northern and eastern frontiers of his dominions on the borders of Scythia. He advanced against the Sacæ and neighboring countries, and Bac-

tria, Sogdiana, Chorasmia, and part of the territory of the Massagetæ, all of which, by the success of his arms, were embraced within boundaries of his empire.

Cambyses, who succeeded Cyrus to the throne of Persia, augmented the dominions which he inherited, by the conquest of Egypt. When Darius came to the throne shortly after the death of Cambyses, B. C. 522, his dominions embraced practically the confines of the civilized world, with the exception of Hellas. It extended in the east to the Indus and the western borders of Chinese Tartary; on the south to the Erythrean Sea (now the Sea of Arabia), the Indian Ocean, the confines of Ethiopia (Abyssinia), Egypt and Libya on the north coast of Africa, and on the north it included the frontiers of those vast unexplored regions which the ancients designated under the general designation of Scythia, extending to the remote regions on the shores of the Caspian, and the Oxus or Sea of Aral, to the Caucasus mountains; on the west its boundary was the Ægean Sea.

This vast kingdom was graphically described by Cyrus the younger to his Greek auxiliaries shortly before the battle of Cunaxa. Xenophon, who was present and heard them, has preserved the words of Cyrus in this connection. "We have before us, my friends," said the younger Cyrus, addressing his ten thousand Greeks on that occasion, "the empire that was my father's; extending on the south to the parts where men cannot live for heat; and on the north to the parts where they cannot live for cold; and over all that lies between these extremes, the friends of my brother are now satraps."

To satisfy the ambition of Darius, as conqueror of the world, it was necessary for him to extend his dominions in the west to the gates of Hercules, or straits of Gibraltar; reduce Hellas, Italy and Spain, and as much of the trackless wilds and steppe country

north of the Danube, the Euxine and the Caspian as he might be able to penetrate with armies.

Before he could carry out these designs, however, it became necessary for him to restore order in Asia, where several revolts had broken out, including formidable uprisings in Media and Babylonia. These he suppressed, and B. C. 515, took from his rebellious subjects, the City of Babylon, which his father-in-law had taken from Belshazzar more than twenty years previously. Darius utterly demolished its walls and defenses. He then organized his kingdom into twenty-one satrapsies from which he derived an annual income of more than the equivalent of $21,000,000 annually. He removed the capital of the empire from Persepolis, and built magnificent parks, palaces and fountains at Susa, the new capital of his empire, during the winter months. In the summer he usually repaired to the cooler regions of Ecbatana, the ancient capital of Media.

At the time of the Scythian expedition, therefore, Darius was the wealthiest and most powerful monarch the world had ever seen. Yet, in his expedition to the Danube he failed utterly, notwithstanding his wisdom and experience, and the unlimited resources at his command.

Who were these Scythians who defied the power of Darius and baffled his efforts to reduce them to slavery?

Some confusion arises as to this inquiry from the fact that the words Scythia and Scythians were used as a generic term in connection with the numerous mongrel races who inhabited the wild and inaccessible country north of the Euxine, the Caspian, and the Danube.

Among these Herodotus mentions the Tauri, the mountaineers of the Tauric Chersonese, now the Crimea, who live by rapine and war; the Agathyrsi, fond of gold ornaments, who live in promiscuous intercourse with women, deeming themselves all brethren; the

Neuri, a nation or tribe of magicians and soothsayers; the Androphagi, a nomadic race of cannibals; the Melanchlaeni, who habitually wear black garments; the Budini, who paint their bodies blue and red, a race of nomads who eat vermin; whose country abounds with lakes and forests, and the Sauromatæ, who claim to have descended from the Amazons. Such were the wretched and miserable inhabitants who, in the sixth century B. C., dwelt as neighbors among the Scythians, and roved over the steppe-lands, and on the borders of stretches of deserts, the forests and trackless wilds of what is now Roumania, and southern Russia. Ethnological problems are involved also, which will be discussed presently. Herodotus declares that the Scythians had driven the Cimmerians out of Europe, pursued them into Asia, and by that means entered the territory of the Medes, about the time of the nocturnal battle of the Halys, before referred to, where they established themselves, and remained dominant for twenty-eight years.

These Cimmerians were a barbarous race, and doubtless became extinct after the Scythians secured the ascendancy. They are referred to in the Odyssey, where Homer describes the visit of Ulysses to the land of the Dead, an expedition projected by the fair haired enchantress Circe. When the paths of the great sea were darkened, and the ship of Ulysses reached the distant confines of the world, on the furthermost limit of the ocean stream and beyond the influence of the life giving sun, in this region of the dead, they reached the land of the Cimmerians.

"There lies the land, and there the people dwell
Of the Cimmerians, in eternal cloud
And darkness. Never does the glorious sun
Look on them with his rays, when he goes up
Into the starry sky, nor when again
He sinks from heaven to earth. Unwholesome night
O'erhangs the wretched race."

The Scythians were expert archers and excelled in horsemanship. They overran not only Media, Persia and other parts of Asia Minor, but invaded Palestine. They were the scourge of God sent to punish the Israelites. It is believed that Jeremiah (v. 15) refers in his prophecy to the Scythians. He wrote approximately about B. C. 612. The prophet declares:

"Lo, I will bring a nation upon you from far, O house of Israel, saith the Lord. It is a mighty nation; it is an ancient nation; a nation whose language thou knowest not neither understand what they say.

"Their quiver is as an open sepulchre; they are all mighty men. And they shall eat up thy harvest and thy bread, which thy sons and thy daughters should eat; they shall eat up thy flocks and thine herds; they shall eat up thy vines and thy fig trees; they shall impoverish thy fenced cities, wherein thou trustedst with the sword."

The facts seem to be established beyond question that late in the seventh century B. C. or early in the sixth, the Scythians became masters of all Asia. They came with their armies into Syria, conquered Tyre and Sidon, overran Phœnicia and Palestine, and were about to extend their inroads into Egypt. The Egyptian King, however, anticipating their approach, journeyed into Palestine and by the use of immense bribes, succeeded in persuading these savage nomads to desist and spare Egypt. Thus the land of the Pharaohs escaped the hand of the spoiler. The Scythians, however, pillaged and desecrated the temple of the celestial Venus at Ascalon. Divine retribution followed. In revenge for his impiety, the Goddess, we are told, inflicted on the Scythians an hereditary female disease which infected them and their posterity. In the middle of the fifth century B. C. the ravages of this disease was prevalent. Herodotus, referring to this plague, declares that one who visits Scythia may see in what a state they are, in

consequence of this scourge. There can be no doubt that by reason of their neglect and licentiousness these wretched people gradually became extinct. Ethnologists affirm in corroboration of this view that the race is now extinct and that not a trace of them can be found.

They were expert with the bow, and fought always on horseback. They were barbarous and bloodthirsty. A Scythian was accustomed to drink the blood of the first man he slew in battle, in the belief that the courage of the vanquished foe passed with his blood and augmented the prowess of the victor. Only the warrior who brought with him the heads of an enemy was entitled to share in the spoils. An instance of their extreme cruelty is evidenced by the fact that it was the custom to put out the eyes of their slaves and captives upon the theory that being devoid of sight, they could not successfully steal from their masters.

As to the ethnological problem regarding the Scythians, it may be said that Canon Rawlinson, the English historian, orientalist and theologian, and one of the most accomplished of modern scholars, concludes that the Scythians were Aryans. That they belonged to the Indo-European race, not to the Mongol or Tartar family. That they were entirely distinct from the Slavs, Celts, Pelasgians, and Teutons, and that they are now extinct. "Like the Mexican Aztecs," says Mr. Rawlinson, "whom they resembled in some degree, they have been swept away by the current of immigration, and except for the mounds which cover their land, in the pages of the historian or ethnologist, not a trace remains to tell of their past existence." Their places have been taken by Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Turks, Mongols, Tartars, Calmucks and Thibetians, who, in subsequent centuries have made inroads and incursions as did the Cimmerians and Scythians in the age of Cyaxares. Such were the Scythians in the sixth

century B. C., whose territories the Persian monarch sought to invade, and bring within the confines of his vast dominions.

Darius, in his first attempt to extend his empire in the west beyond the shores of the Ægean, like Cyrus the younger more than a century later, depended for the success of his expedition upon his Hellenic auxiliaries. He relied upon his Greek subjects in Asia Minor to furnish a fleet with which to ascend the Danube; to bridge the Bosphorus, and the Ister and to pilot his land forces through the unexplored regions of Thrace.

CHAPTER XI

PERSIANS IN EUROPE UNDER DARIUS — THE SCYTHIAN EXPEDITION ON THE DANUBE, B. C. 513

HAVING restored order in his own dominions, as related in the last chapter, Darius began to make preparations for his campaign against the Scythians. From his palace in Susa, he dispatched messengers, some to collect the land forces, others to convene the fleet. Mandrocles of Samos was ordered to build a bridge of boats across the Thracian Bosphorus, to enable the army of Darius to march from Asia into Europe.

This army Darius collected from all parts of his dominions. When he reached the Bosphorus it comprised 700,000 men, including the cavalry. His naval force consisted of six hundred ships manned by Ionians, Æolians and Hellespontines. At the mouth of the Bosphorus, on the Euxine, are the Cyanean islands, which the legend says were at one time enchanted floating islands. On the largest of these was erected a magnificent temple, overlooking the broad expanse of the Euxine. When Darius arrived at the Bosphorus, the bridge which he had ordered to be thrown across the strait had been completed. Before crossing from Asia he tarried a short time, to view the Straits and the Euxine. He went on board a ship, and sailed in this land of enchantment to the temple on the Cyanean islands. There, seated beneath its broad arches, he gazed out upon the waters of the Euxine, which of

all seas, is by nature the most wonderful, doubtless anticipating a complete conquest of the countries on its coasts, as a result of his expedition into Scythia. Having traversed the shores of the Bosphorus, which extends about eighteen miles from the Propontis to the Euxine, Darius erected two columns of white marble, upon which were inscribed the names of all the nations from which his armament was gathered, which included some from every country in his vast empire. These inscriptions were in Greek and Assyrian that all the world might read. Darius was highly gratified and pleased with the bridge of boats which the skillful Mandrocles, the Samian, had constructed. He rewarded him with gifts befitting the generosity of the richest monarch in the world. Mandrocles, elated by his success and good fortune, procured an artist to paint a grand picture, portraying in vivid colors, the structure with its termini in Europe and Asia. Conspicuous in the painting was shown Darius in the seat of honor reviewing his army, as it passed over the bridge. The picture was taken to the temple of Here (Juno), at Samos, to whom it was dedicated, and bore the following inscription:[1] "Mandrocles, having thrown a bridge across the fishy Bosphorus, dedicated to Here a memorial of the raft; laying up for himself a crown, and for the Samians glory, having completed it to the satisfaction of Darius."

When all things were in readiness Darius gave orders to his fleet to sail along the western shore of the Euxine to the southern mouth of the Ister (the Danube), where the city of Istria was located, advanced thence up the stream to the apex of its delta, two days' sail from the sea, where the river forks and discharges

[1] The fish-fraught Bosphorus, bridged to Here's fame,
Did Mandrocles, this proud memorial bring;
When for himself a crown he'd skill to gain,
For Samos praise; contenting the Great King.

itself through several mouths into the Euxine. At this point his engineers were instructed to build a bridge across the river, and await the arrival of Darius with the land forces.

In all probability the route taken by Darius, after leaving the Bosphorus, was inland, a short distance to Perinthus on the north shore of the Propontis (sea of Marmora), the modern Erekli; thence almost due north through Thrace, across the Hæmus mountains, a spur of the Balkans, into the land of the Getæ, who at that time doubtless dwelt on both sides of the Danube whom the invader subdued, and proceeded thence north to where its channels separate, where the bridge was constructed to enable him to cross with his army into Scythia.

The distance from Perinthus to the delta of the Danube, in a direct line, is about 300 miles. The trail followed by Darius, in view of the fact that he was obliged to cross the Balkans, and allowing for deviations in his route, owing to physical conditions of the country through which he passed, was perhaps in the neighborhood of 350 miles. The sources of the Tearus, in Thrace, are about sixty miles north of Perinthus. It is one of the purest and clearest rivers in Europe, and was noted in that day for the wonderful healing properties of its waters. Its sources are thirty-eight springs or fountains flowing from contiguous rocks, some of which are cold, others hot. It flows southwest through Thrace into the Hebrus, which empties into the Ægean. When Darius reached the springs of the Tearus, he encamped three days, and recorded his satisfaction and delight by erecting a column with this inscription:

"FROM THE SPRINGS OF THE TEARUS FLOW THE CLEAREST AND PUREST OF WATERS. TO THEM CAME DARIUS, SON OF HYSTASPES, THE SUPERIOR OF ALL MEN, KING OF THE PERSIANS, AND OF THE WHOLE CONTINENT, LEADING AN ARMY AGAINST THE SCYTHIANS."

Naaman, the Syrian general, when directed by the prophet Elisha to bathe seven times in the Jordan, as a cure for his leprosy, passed a like encomium upon the waters of his own country. "Are not Abana and Pharpar," he said, "rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel?" This declaration, however, was made nearly four centuries before Darius visited the springs of the Tearus.

In corroboration of this part of the narrative of Herodotus, concerning the Scythian expedition, which some modern critics have assumed never took place, it will be interesting to observe the account given by General Jochmus, who visited the headwaters of Tearus in 1847. In an article in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (Vol. xxiv, pp. 44, 45), he declares that a fragment of the inscription, written at the command of Darius, in letters described as resembling nails, was extant in that locality, a few years before his visit. He says he conversed with persons who claimed to have seen the ancient inscription, which cannot now be found. He observes further that the thirty-eight sources of the Tearus mentioned by Herodotus may easily be made out in the town of Bunarhissar, and in the village of Yene one hour due north. He corroborates Herodotus as to the locality and declares that Bunarhissar "is at an equal distance from Heræum (Heræopolis), a short distance west of Perinthus (the modern Erekli), and from Apollonia, on the Euxine (the present Sizeboli), being distant two days from both." Jochmus is of opinion that Darius, after crossing the Bosphorus "encamped successively at the sources of the Tearus (Bunarhissar) on the banks of the Teke, or Artiscus (at Doletagach), and following the direction of Burghas and Akhioli, and receiving the submission of the sea towns, he afterwards passed the Balkans by the defiles parallel to the sea-coast from Misevria, to Yovan-Dervish, moving thus from south

to north by the same roads which were chosen by Generals Roth and Rudiger, and Marshall Diebitch himself from north to south in 1829." The Russians, also, in 1828, like Darius about 2,300 years before, crossed the Danube at that part of the river where it branched off, that is near the modern Isaltcha."

Modern surveys made by the Danube Navigation Commission, under the direction of Charles A. Hartley, its chief engineer, affords us accurate information as to the present location of the channels forming the delta of that great stream. Isaltcha, referred to by General Jochmus, is in Bulgaria, fifteen miles beyond Ismail, which is at the head of the delta. The Danube divides at present near Isaltcha, between Braila and Ismail. It is forty miles below Ibrail, and thirty miles below Galatz, in Moldavia, on the left bank of the Danube, between the mouths of the rivers Sereth and the Pruth, distant 76 miles from the sea following the course of the most northerly, or the Kilia branch; 78 miles following the central or Sulina branch, and 90 miles by the most southerly, or the St. George branch. It is 58 miles from the sea, measuring in a straight line.

Mr. Hartley describes the delta of the Danube as bounded north by the Kilia branch, south by the Toulcha and the St. George branch, and on the east by the Black sea. Its area is 1,000 square miles. Of this triangle the Ismail fork is the western apex, and the seacoast from the mouths of the St. George and the Kilia, is the base. Including the island of Dranova, south of the St. George, as part of the delta it contains 1,300 square miles.

During extraordinary high floods the delta is almost entirely submerged. It is not fitted for cultivation, with the exception of a few patches. "Reeds of large growth cover a greater portion of its surface, and vast swamps and fresh water lakes are found in every direction. On the islands of St. George and Leti, in the

delta, are deep forests of oaks, many of which are three feet in diameter, and belts of willow and alder trees clothe the convex shore of the St. George, at every bend of its course." In corroboration of Herodotus, it may be observed that modern surveys show five principal mouths or channels. At Galatz, at the present day, the Danube is 2,000 feet wide. It is located 85 miles from the Sulnia, or middle mouth. It is probable that its site is approximately the locality where the bridge was constructed over which the army of Darius entered Scythia.

In view of the fact that the St. George channel is located too far north to correspond with the location of Istria, which it is said was at the southern mouth of the Danube, Canon Rawlinson observes that it is possible that at the time of the expedition of Darius, B. C. 513, there may have been "some other line by which a stream may have passed considerably to the south of all the present mouths. It seems clear that a navigable branch must once have reached the sea, at or near Istria, which was certainly as far south as Karaglak."

Herodotus visited the Ister, and spent some time at Olbia on the Hypanis (now the Bug). He was not only the first great historical writer but the most distinguished traveler of his age, having visited almost every part of the known world, then open to commerce. He describes the Ister as the largest of rivers, flowing from the country of the Celts through all Europe, which discharges itself through five mouths into the Euxine. He mentions a number of its confluents, and observes that the Nile surpasses it only in quantity, or volume, because the latter had no tributaries.

When Darius arrived at the delta of the Danube, the bridge had been constructed, and was in readiness. Darius then led his forces into Scythia, and "commanded the Ionians to loose the bridge and follow him

on the continent with the forces from the ships." When preparations were being made to execute this order, Coes, an officer from Mitylene, ventured to suggest to Darius that it might perhaps be prudent to allow the bridge to remain. He reminded him that he was about to penetrate an unknown and unexplored region, and could not foresee what difficulties might possibly render it essential for his safe return. If the Scythians were conquered, the way would be open; but if the enemy should evade pursuit in the wilderness, it would be convenient to return by the bridge. Darius not only received the suggestion kindly, but commended Coes for his foresight. He convened the Ionians, and commanded them to remain on the Ister, and guard the bridge for a period of sixty days after his departure, and in case he did not return within that time gave them permission to return to Asia.

He improvised a rude calendar to mark the passing days by using a thong in which he tied sixty knots and directed that each day one knot should be loosed, until all were untied, and if by that time he had not returned, the Ionians might depart to their homes.

In explanation of this sixty day time limit, some writers have suggested that Darius intended to march his army north and east inland through the country bordering on the shores of the Euxine; thence across Caucasia, and south through the defiles of the Caucasus range of mountains, into the region inhabited by the Saspires, in modern Armenia, thence across the Phasis, and southerly into his own dominions. If this plan had succeeded, Darius would have had no further use for the bridge on the Danube. However this may be, he instructed the Ionians that if he returned not within the days numbered by the knots, they need not expect him, and that the Greeks might sail home.

The only source from which we learn what took place during the sojourn of Darius in Scythia is the account given by Herodotus, which is rather indefinite. The substance of the narrative is that Darius found himself in a trackless wilderness, inhabited by nomads, without permanent cities or villages; a country destitute of roads or proper means for transporting an army. That the Scythians having failed to induce their neighbors to unite and fight in open battle with the invader, determined not to fight at all, but to hector and annoy the enemy, by falling on their rear and flanks, at unexpected times and places, and then suddenly disappear successfully evading pursuit. They obstructed the passes, filled up the springs and wells, run off the cattle and herds, but gave no opportunity to the Persian to attack them, in the open. They constantly eluded the vigilance of the enemy, intending to wear out the Persians and reduce them to starvation if possible. It will be observed that the tactics pursued by the leaders of these half civilized nomads to thwart the aims of Darius were very similar to those adopted later by the Roman Fabius, in his efforts to defeat the strategy of Hannibal. What could Darius accomplish against an invisible foe and in the face of such tactics? He could not take their cities or pillage their villages, for being nomads, he found neither cities nor villages worthy of the name. He could not destroy them in battle, because he was afforded no opportunity to fight a battle. He could not surprise or capture the enemy, because he was in a strange, hostile country, a practical wilderness, and was himself surprised and harried by an invisible foe. The Scythians were expert horsemen, and showed great intelligence in their efforts to secure knowledge of all the movements of Darius. They visited the Greeks, who were guarding the bridge on the Danube, and learned that Darius purposed to return in sixty days. Doubtless among these Scythians there were many who had come in contact with the Greek fur traders, corn merchants and settlers in the frontier

towns along the northern shores of the Euxine and were able to understand enough Greek to communicate intelligently with the Ionians. They endeavored to foment a conspiracy among the Greek auxiliaries at the bridge after the sixty days had passed, and they used every means to persuade them to destroy the bridge, and leave Darius to his fate amid the trackless wilds and steppe country of Scythia. They declared to the Ionians that by so doing they would gain freedom from a despotic tyrant, for which they could thank the Gods and the Scythians.

It may seem incredible that negotiations under the circumstances could be successfully carried on, on the banks of the Danube, looking to the coöperation of these half civilized and barbarous nomads, with the Greek subjects of the Persian ruler, having for its object the ruin of Darius and the destruction of his army by keeping them, in a sense, prisoners in the trackless wilds of Scythia, where they must eventually perish for want of subsistence. And yet the scheme was entertained by the Ionians, and would have succeeded if the views of Miltiades, governor of the Thracian Chersonese, who with other Greeks were forced to join the expedition, could have prevailed. This Miltiades was a nephew of the Athenian exile of the same name, who had been banished from Athens, with others of the oligarchical party of the Pisistratidæ. The nephew entertained no sympathy for the Persians, whom he regarded as hostile to his government in the peninsula west of the Hellespont. Nearly a quarter of a century later, this Miltiades achieved immortality by his victory over the army of Darius at Marathon. On the occasion at the bridge on the Danube, however, Histiæus of Miletus, came to the rescue of his sovereign. He argued that by compassing the destruction of Darius they would defeat their own authority as military governors. He pointed out that they retained

their respective offices by the grace of Darius. If his sovereignty were to end by reason of his death, his possible successor might not look with favor upon the Ionians. In any event, Histiæus contended that the liberty loving Greeks in Asia Minor would rise in revolt, and seek to establish a democracy on the ruins of the oligarchy which Darius permitted to exist, when he allowed his Greek subjects to administer the government among their people, within the limitations prescribed by the Great King. He contended that the failure of Darius to return to Asia would result in a bloody revolution, and civil war, which would be disastrous to them, no matter what the ultimate result of the struggle might be. The argument advanced by Histiæus finally prevailed, and it was resolved to remain with the fleet, and await the return of Darius or tidings of his whereabouts. The Greeks, however, deemed it prudent to deceive and mislead the Scythians by declaring that they believed their counsel wise, and that they would act accordingly. Their real object was to prevent the Scythians from attempting to cross the bridge, and to persuade them to return to harrass, and if possible, prevent Darius from reaching the Danube. Histiæus was commissioned to say these things to the Scythians. He told them they intended to act on their advice and dismantle the bridge. He added also this admonition: "While we are breaking up the bridge," he said, "it is fitting you should seek the Persians and having found them avenge us and yourselves on them, as they deserve." In order to emphasize the delusion, the Greeks began to remove some parts of the bridge, on the left or northern bank of the stream, purposely retarding their work, until the Scythians had departed.

In furtherance of their scheme of coöperation with the Ionians on the river, the Scythians sought to lure the Persians as far as possible from the stream. They

permitted them occasionally to capture detached herds, and appeared as if to give battle and then retreated with the design of having the enemy follow them, hoping thus to detain Darius until the plan for the destruction of the bridge had been accomplished. The plot, however, failed, owing to the influence of Histiæus, who undoubtedly was instrumental in saving the Persian army and the life of his sovereign. Darius succeeded in reaching the Danube, crossed it, and continued his march south through Thrace, and at Sestus crossed the Hellespont into Asia.

How far the army of Darius succeeded in penetrating into Scythia no historian has been able to state with any degree of accuracy. It seems incredible that he could have advanced as far as the Tanais (the Don), the Hypanis (the Bug) or even across the Tyras (the Dniester). This is obvious because neither of these rivers are fordable near their mouths, and Darius could not cross them with an army of 700,000 without the aid of a bridge such as was constructed across the Danube. There is no pretense by anybody that he had under his control in Scythia boats, or material necessary to bridge these great rivers of southern Russia. Ctesias, who derived his information from Persian sources, declares that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian country and there met the King of Scythia and exchanged bows with him. Strabo indicates that the wanderings of the Great King were confined to the territory between the Danube and the Tyras (the Dniester), which includes Moldavia and Bessarabia. If he remained absent from the Danube more than sixty days his march may have been north along the west bank of the Dniester. If he crossed that river and penetrated as far as the Bug, it must have been at a point where it was possible to ford it. But the fact that we have no certain information as to how far Darius penetrated Scythia, is no reason why

we should discredit the narrative of Herodotus, and claim that the Scythian expedition never took place. No one who has sought to challenge the narrative in this regard has been able to assign any plausible argument for the assumption that the account of the expedition is a mere fiction. Mr. Grote entertains no doubt that Darius marched into Scythia, and declares that "the adventures which took place at the passage of the Danube, both on the out march, and the home march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history." Canon Rawlinson, after a thorough and exhaustive examination of all the authorities, declares that the fact that Darius led such an expedition, crossed the Bosphorus at Constantinople, ascended the Danube and crossed it into Scythia, and that Miltiades was present at the passage of the Bosphorus, and later at the Danube, must be taken to be facts "as assured as the battle of Marathon itself," and that Darius penetrated some distance into what is now Wallachia and Moldavia and returned without attaining any success, or without any overwhelming loss, is also certain.

If the object of Darius, in leading his expedition to the Danube, was to conquer Scythia, it was an absolute failure. But the design of the Great King embraced the idea of subduing Thrace, making the Danube the northern frontier of his dominions in Europe, to be supplemented ultimately by the reduction of Hellas, and the extension of his empire to the extreme western borders of the continent. In order to attain this end he detached Magabazus with an army of 80,000, directing him to remain in Europe to complete the conquest of Thrace. That energetic commander, subdued Perinthus on the Propontis (sea of Marmora), extended his dominions westward beyond the Hebrus to the Strymmon and finally secured the allegiance of the Macedonians, who became tribute allies of Darius. He es-

tablished forts and store-houses on the Hebrus, the Strymon and other parts of Thrace, which were utilized by Xerxes, on his memorable march through that country to invade Greece. The existence of these forts and bases of supplies, years before the time of Xerxes, is regarded as one of the strongest proofs that the Scythian expedition took place, substanially as narrated by Herodotus.

CHAPTER XII

IONIAN WARS — BURNING OF SARDIS — MILITARY OPERATIONS ON COASTS OF ASIA MINOR — BATTLE OF LADE

THE strip of sea-coast which forms the eastern boundary of Asia Minor was colonized very early by Greeks, attracted by the grateful climate and commercial advantages of these trans-Ægean regions. Hellenic colonies inhabited the states of Æolis, Ionia and Doris, which form the fringe of coast-line immediately adjoining the kingdoms of Lydia and Caria. What are known as the Ionian Wars derived the name from Ionia, above referred to, in which was situated the important cities of Miletus, which is built on the mainland adjacent to the island of Lade, Priene, Magnesia, Ephesus, Smyrna and Phocea. The islands of Chios and Samos belong to Ionia; Lesbos to Æolis; and Rhodes to Doris.

Before Cyrus conquered the Medes and absorbed their empire, Crœsus, King of Lydia, had extended his jurisdiction over the Ionians. He did not attempt to wholly subjugate the Greeks, but established an alliance with them, whereby they agreed to contribute to the revenues of the Lydian monarch, and to acknowledge him as their nominal sovereign, in return for which Crœsus permitted them to enjoy their political autonomy and lent them military aid and support in their wars. In other words, the Greek cities of Asia Minor for a long time were merely tribute allies of Crœsus.

After Cyrus destroyed the empire of the Medes, Crœsus became alarmed. He consulted the oracle at

Delphi and led an army across the Halys into the dominions of Cyrus. He was defeated by the Persian monarch and retreated to Sardis, his ancient capital. Cyrus defeated the Lydian cavalry under its walls and afterwards took the city and made Crœsus prisoner. The Greek cities of Æolis and Ionia then sent ambassadors to Cyrus, and offered to submit to his rule upon the same terms and conditions which Crœsus had granted them. Except as to Miletus, the proffer was refused, and the Asiatic Greeks prepared to resist the tyranny threatened by the arms of Persia. Cyrus left the subjugation of the Æolians and Ionians to his generals, while he began his campaigns against Assyria and Babylonia and upper Asia. After his death, the Greek cities in his dominions having been subjugated, Cambyses prosecuted his campaigns in Egypt. When Darius ascened the throne of Persia, he divided his empire into twenty-three satrapies and apportioned the tribute each was required to pay into the royal treasury. The Greek cities on the sea-coast were embraced in the satrapy of Sardis over which he appointed his brother Artaphernes. Thus the Æolians and Ionians late in the sixth century B. C. became subject to the Persian yoke.

The cause of the Ionian wars was the desire of these cities to free themselves from the power of Darius and to re-establish their independence. It took the Persian monarch six years to subdue their formidable revolt in Æolis and Ionia. The war commenced by the attack upon Sardis which was burned by the insurgents aided by a contingent from Athens and Eretria, after which the conspicuous events were the battle of Lade, the siege and fall of Miletus, and the reduction of the islands Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos. A brief review of the character and progress attained by the Ionians at this period will be interesting.

Long before Cyrus had conquered Lydia and reduced

the Greek cities in Ionia and the adjacent islands to subjection, the Greek colonists which flourished along the eastern coasts of the Ægean were highly civilized and excelled in literature, art and philosophy. They were not only a literary people, but an energetic, commercial people. They were the most skillful seamen and expert sailors, surpassing even the Phœnicians, who were also a commercial people, with fleets of merchantmen trading with all parts of the known world.

Before the kingdom of Lydia was founded, and within a century and a half after the fall of Troy, Greeks of the Ionian race migrated from Attica and settled on the west coast of Asia Minor, where they flourished for centuries. In the time of Cyrus the Great, Ionia embraced, besides islands of Samos and Chios, twelve important cities: Phocæa, the most northerly; Clazomenæ, Erythræ, Teos, Lebedus, Colophon, Ephesus, Priene, Myus and the most southerly Miletus. Smyrna, though originally Æolean, subsequently became an Ionian city and was admitted into the Ionian League, know also as the Dodecapolis. Three of these cities were located at or near the mouths of the three principal rivers which flow from the interior westward into the Ægean and drain the most fertile valleys in Asia Minor. Towards the south Miletus was on the promontory opposite the mouth of the Mæander. Phocæa on the north was located on the gulf of Hermæus, a short distance north of the Hermus, which flows westward through Lydia, almost midway between Phocæa and Miletus. Ephesus was located at the mouth of the Cayster, which flows into the gulf of the same name. Miletus was the chief city of Asia Minor. It was the commercial emporium on the east coast of the Ægean, and surpassed its neighbors in prosperity and opulence. Greek mariners and merchantmen of Asia Minor pursuing their commercial enterprises penetrated to the outlying frontiers and confines of the

known world. From the settlements thus established they opened commercial intercourse with the nomadic and barbarous tribes north of the Danube and the Euxine, and along the remote coasts of the Mediterranean, beyond the Gates of Hercules, or the straits of Gibraltar. They founded colonies and trading posts in these far away and almost unknown regions; in Mauretania, in Africa, in Lusitania, in Spain; in Italy, Sicily and Gaul, and along the northern and southern shores of the Euxine and at the mouth of the Danube.

Miletus was the mother city of eighty colonies, situate on the Propontis, or sea of Marmora; on the Bosphorus, in modern Bulgaria, and north of the Ister or the Danube, in Scythia, the country now embraced in the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, in the Kingdom of Roumania, and round the shores of the Euxine or Black Sea, in southern Russia, and on the south shore, on the coasts of Bythnia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, now Armenia, and on the east in Colchis, first visited by Jason in search of the Golden Fleece, the modern Caucasia embracing Georgia and inhabited by Caucasians. The principal colony on the south coast was Sinope, in Paphlagonia; and Trapezus and Phasis on the east coast at the mouth of the Phasis, in Colchis. Istria was founded at the southern mouth of the Delta of the Ister (Danube).

Miletus was also the mother city of Tyras, on the right bank of the Tyras, now the Dneister; and of Olbia at its mouth, on the right bank of the Hypanis, now the Bug, not far from the present site of the City Odessa. Also the city of Tanais on the Tanais, now the Don, near its mouth. They founded colonies on the Tauric peninsula, or the Taurian Chersonese, now the Crimea, near the modern sites of Inkerman, Balaklava and Sevastopol.

From these outposts of civilization, the Greek subjects of Darius traded with the natives and thus became familiar with the manners and customs of the Scythians, upon whose frontiers they had established themselves.

The intellectual attainments of the Greek subjects of Darius are further evidenced by the fact that the City of Miletus was early distinguished as a seat of philosophy, literature and art. One of its most eminent citizens was Thales (640-546 B. C.) born more than a century before Darius undertook his expedition against the Scythians. He was the founder of Greek geometry, astronomy and philosophy, and his name is the most conspicuous of the seven sages of Greece. It was Thales who calculated the solar eclipse which occurred, according to eminent authorities, May 28, B. C. 585, when the battle of the Halys above referred to, was being fought, and predicted it among the Ionians long before it took place. The advance of learning among the Asiatic Greeks at this early period will be appreciated when we remember the proficiency in knowledge attained by Thales, the foremost sage of antiquity. He had no teacher, except when he visited Egypt and associated with the priests. In his discoveries, however, he surpassed the Egyptians in scientific knowledge. The latter understood the geometry of surfaces; Thales discovered the geometry of lines, and laid the foundation of the science of algebra. He was the first who applied theoretical geometry to the measurement of heights and distances. He divided the year into 365 days, and determined the diameter of the sun to be the 720th part of the Zodiac. He discovered the constellation of the Lesser Bear, and taught the mariner to steer by it, but had not sufficiently advanced in the field of scientific discovery to learn the spherical form of the earth. Instead of a globe he believed it to be a flat disc. Such was the proficiency in learning attained and taught among the Asiatic Greeks in the age of Darius. In science and art, philosophy and

literature, they far surpassed all of the subjects of Darius within the domain of the Persian Empire. To his Greek subjects, therefore, Darius looked for material aid in his expedition against Scythia, and relied upon their superior knowledge and skill as necessary to enable him to subjugate Europe north of the Danube as a preliminary step to his ultimate purpose, to enslave Hellas itself.

The knowledge in various departments of learning acquired by the ancients challenges our admiration. Indeed in some respects they surpassed modern scholars, and were familiar with branches of the arts and sciences which are unknown to us. These attainments acquired by the sages of antiquity are often classed or referred to as the lost arts. It seems clear, however, that the early investigators were unable to fathom the secrets of nature and knew nothing of experimental philosophy or the law of gravitation. The paths of learning trod by Newton and Bacon, Farrady and Edison were unknown to them and they never conceived of the notable discovery made in our time by Kirchhoff of Berlin concerning the spectrum analysis. Thales of Miletus understood mathematics and some interesting facts in astronomy. He could calculate an eclipse, but he could not weigh the earth, or determine its specific gravity. He understood the utility of the signs of the Zodiac, but he could not measure the energy of the centrifugal and centripetal forces which hold the planets in their orbits and sustain the harmony of the solar system and of the stellar universe. Thales of Miletus was apparently ignorant of the spherical form of the earth, and although he was familiar to some extent with the movement of the heavenly bodies, he could not measure the parallax of a star, or calculate the distance from our planet to the sun; nor tell how far the moon, hanging in the heavens, is from the earth.

Newton discovered the nature of light less than three

centuries ago. Kirchhoff analyzed it and his discovery enabled him to ascertain the composition of the stars by the aid of his spectrum analysis, and of the sun shining through infinity of space. This discovery enabled the scientists to measure one hundred and fifty-four billions of miles into space and indicate that as the distance of the star Arcturus from our planet. Wonderful as were the attainments of Thales of Miletus, still more wonderful are the attainments of modern scholars.

The Ionian revolt was instigated by Histiæus of Miletus and his son-in-law and cousin Aristagoras. It will be remembered that Histiæus was appointed by Darius governor of Miletus. He accompanied his sovereign on his Scythian expedition, an account of which is given in the preceding chapter. During the absence of Histiæus in Europe, Darius appointed Aristagoras governor of Miletus. To Histiæus Darius owed his life. When Miltiades, governor of Cardia and the Thracian Chersonese, suggested to his fellow officers to remove the bridge of boats on the Ister (Danube) and allow the Persian monarch to perish in the wilds of Scythia, it was Histiæus who succeeded in preventing the design. Darius, in recognition of these services, at the request of Histiæus, gave him a town in Thrace called Myrcinus, as a reward for his services in preserving the bridge. This province of Myrcinus was not far from the Strymon, four or five miles north of the site upon which the Athenians, some years later, built the city of Amphipolis. It will be remembered also that when Darius quitted Europe, he ordered Megabazus to remain and conquer the semi-barbarous tribes of Thrace and Macedonia, and for that purpose assigned him an army of eighty thousand men. Some time afterwards Megabazus discovered that Histiæus was fortifying Myrcinus and building a wall round it. Megabazus on his return to Sardis reported to Darius what was being done by Histiæus. He informed the

King that the subtle and crafty Greek possessed a region where there was abundance of fine timber and rich silver mines, and that he had surrounded himself with multitudes of Greeks and barbarians, who acknowledged him as their leader, and were ready at all times to do his bidding. He advised Darius that it would be wise for him to invite Histiæus to his court at Susa, and there detain him, and never permit him to return to the Greeks, if he would prevent domestic war. Darius sent a kindly message to Histiæus, assuring the latter of his confidence, saying he had planned certain things which he desired Histiæus to execute, and secured his presence at Susa. While Histiæus was thus detained, virtually a prisoner under the eye of Darius, an insurrection broke out in the opulent and prosperous wine-island of Naxos, one of the larger of the Cyclades, immediately east of the island of Paros. The people grew weary of the oppression they suffered under the oligarchy which had been established, overthrew it, substituted a democracy, and drove the oligarchical party into exile. Prominent members of the latter fled to Miletus, and implored the aid of Aristagoras and besought him to subdue the island and restore them in power and authority.

The popular party in Naxos had gathered a strong navy and an army of eighty thousand heavy armed. Aristagoras, alone, was not able to cope with them. He therefore applied to Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, who in turn sought the sanction and approval of his brother, King Darius, who authorized two hundred triremes from his ports in Asia Minor to be got in readiness and collected a large army, the command of which he assigned to his nephew, Megabates. The expedition was designed to subdue not only Naxos, but Paros, Andros and Eubœa also.

This armament was dispatched by Artaphernes to Aristagoras, at Miletus. The Naxian exiles were taken

on board, and the fleet under the direction of Aristagoras put to sea. In order to conceal their real destination, the expedition sailed northwesterly as if bound for the Hellespont, but when they reached Chios, steered directly for Naxos. One night, Megabates went the rounds of the various triremes to inspect the watches. On going aboard a Myndian ship, commanded by Scylax, a friend of Aristagoras, he found that no watch had been detailed, whereupon he ordered that Scylax be bound, and placed in a lower rowlock, through which the prisoner's head projected. When it was reported to Aristagoras that his Myndian friend had been punished and disgraced, he interceded for him, but the Persian commander refused to release Scylax. A quarrel resulted, in which Aristagoras claimed that Artaphernes had given him, and not Megabates, supreme command. The proud Persian deeply incensed at the conduct of the Greek governor of Miletus, determined to defeat the success of the expedition, rather than see his enemy triumph. He secretly dispatched some men in a ship, bade them sail to Naxos and apprise the islanders of their danger. The Naxians, on being informed of the approach of the hostile fleet, returned within their walls and made preparations for a protracted siege. When the expedition from Miletus arrived, they were surprised to find the islanders well fortified. Aristagoras remained at Naxos four months, when, finding his provisions exhausted, he was obliged to give up the siege, having accomplished nothing. He built a fortress for the Naxian exiles, and returned to Asia.

Aristagoras now faced ruin and despair. He had failed to make good his promises to Artaphernes, because his ambitious undertaking resulted in failure. He had incurred the hatred of Megabates, a nephew of both Darius and Artaphernes, and was in dread lest he should be deprived of the government of Miletus. His

father-in-law, Histiæus, who was under suspicion at the court of Darius, planned to escape from Susa, and sent a message to Aristagoras, to inaugurate a revolt among the Greek cities, believing that in the event of civil war, he might be sent to the coast in command of a body of troops, to quell the insurrection.

Aristagoras then conferred with his loyal supporters, all of whom counselled revolt against Darius, with the sole exception of Hecatæus, the historian, who reminded his friends of the vast power and resources of the Persian monarch. Being unable to dissuade Aristagoras, he advised him to make himself master of the sea, but reminded him that he must have money to carry on his war. He suggested that he should seize the vast treasures in the temple of Apollo at Branchis, which had been bestowed by Crœsus. These wise and prudent counsels, for some reason, were not followed. Aristagoras, however, revolted from the authority of Darius, and thus inaugurated the Ionian War.

The first act of the leader of the revolutionary party was to overthrow the tyrannies in every city in Ionia. Aristagoras knew that the Greeks would not fight for a tyranny. For this reason he ordered the removal of the governors, or tyrants of all the cities, and called upon the people to establish democracies in each and elect their own magistrates. The various governors, who had accompanied the fleet to Naxos, who were not expelled, were seized by stratagem, and delivered to the new magistrates or popular assemblies. In some instances they were released, but the people of Mitylene when their tyrant Coes was delivered to them, led him out and stoned him to death. Thus the oligarchies were overthrown and democracy established.

Aristagoras knew that it was well nigh impossible for the Greek cities of Asia Minor alone to contend successfully against the unlimited resources of the Persian empire. He believed that his kinsmen in Hellas

might be persuaded to aid the cause of liberty, and assist their countrymen to destroy the power of Darius, and spread the influence of Hellas in the trans-Ægean countries of western Asia. With this end in view he applied first to Sparta, deeming the Lacedæmonians the most powerful of the Hellenese. He pleaded his cause to Cleomenes, to whom he pictured the wealth and resources of the kingdom of Darius. He reminded the Spartan that the Persians were not valiant, and fought only with bows and short spears. When in line of battle they wore loose trousers, and turbans on their heads, and were no match for the warriors of Sparta. When Aristagoras had finished his appeal, he was promised an answer in three days. At the time appointed, Aristagoras was asked by Cleomenes how far it was from the coast of Ionia to the palace of Darius at Susa. He was told the distance was three months' journey. On learning this the Milesian was bidden depart from Sparta before sunset, as the Lacedæmonians would not advance into an enemy's country three month's journey from the sea. Thus Aristagoras failed to draw the Spartans into Asia.

The Milesian then journeyed to Attica and appealed for aid to the Athenians. The time was opportune, for the Athenians had concluded their wars to overthrow the tyranny which Hippias had established, and had substituted in their stead a democracy under the leadership of Clisthenes. Hippias sought to persuade the Lacedæmonians to espouse his cause against the Athenians. His efforts failed and he fled to Asia. He was well received at Sardis by Artaphernes, to whom he made false accusations concerning the Athenians, and appealed to him to restore him as tyrant of Athens, and subject not only Attica, but all Greece to the power of Darius and Hippias. When the Athenians learned what Hippias contemplated, they sent ambassadors to Sardis, warning the Persians not to credit

Hippias and the political exiles who accompanied him. Artaphernes, however, told the ambassadors if they desired to avert war, they must restore Hippias to power on certain conditions, named by the Persians. The Athenians rejected the proposals and declared themselves enemies of the Persians.

At this juncture Aristagoras arrived at Athens and pleaded his cause before the public assembly on the hill of the Pnyx. His appeal fell upon willing ears. The Athenians were persuaded, and the Assembly voted to send a squadron of twenty triremes to succor the Ionians, and assigned Melanthius to the command of the expedition. "These ships," observes Herodotus, "were the source of calamities both to the Greeks and barbarians."

Aristagoras did not wait for the ships to be fitted out, but sailed to Miletus. In order to harass the Persians in every possible way he sent a messenger to Phrygia to the Thracian colony, which Megabazus had brought from Peonia on the Strymon. The Peonians were told that all Ionia had revolted from Darius, and that they could now return to their native land, if they could but reach the sea-coast. The Thracians were eager to be liberated from the land of bondage. They made haste to follow the advice of the envoy of Aristagoras, and reached the island of Chios just in time to escape a strong body of Persian cavalry, who pursued, but failed to overtake them. The Persians then sent a messenger to the island begging the Peonians to return. The flattering inducements held out by the Persians were refused. Aided by Chians and Lesbians, the Thracians arrived at Doriscus, whence they came safely again into Peonia, their native province.

Shortly after the departure of the Milesian, the Athenians arrived with their squadron at Ephesus. They were accompanied by five triremes from Eretria. Aristagoras assembled his forces and joined them at

Ephesus, at the mouth of the Cayster, whence they proceeded on a campaign into Lydia, with Sardis as the objective point of the expedition.

Sardis was on the Pactolus, about forty-five miles east of Smyrna. It was built on the northern slope of Mount Tmolus, and was well fortified except on the precipitous mountain side, which was deemed inaccessible. The ships of the Ionians and their allies were left at a seaport under Mount Thorax, about five miles from Ephesus. The troops under Charopinus proceeded up the valley of the Cayster, conducted by scouts familiar with the mountain roads and passes, till they reached a point at which they were separated from Sardis only by the mountain range of Tmolus. They crossed the heights, descended into the valley of the Pactolus, and made a direct attack upon Sardis. Artaphernes resisted the assaults of the enemy, who set fire to the city. Artaphernes withdrew into the citadel which he held until reinforcements arrived. The Persians then made an aggressive attack upon the enemy, who, being largely outnumbered, fled in good order, but before they arrived at Ephesus, they were overtaken. A severe engagement took place near that city which resulted in the defeat of the Greeks and Ionians.

After the defeat of the Ionians at Ephesus, the Athenians, for reasons satisfactory to themselves, concluded to withdraw their alliance, and return to their own country. When Darius learned that Sardis had been burned and that the rebels were aided in the work of destruction by a detachment of obscure foreigners, he inquired who these insolent strangers were who assumed to enter his dominions and strike a blow at his sovereignty. He was informed they were Athenians. "The Athenians," he said, "who are they?" When told that they dwelt in Hellas in Attica, he took an oath to be revenged, and shooting an arrow into the heavens,

he instructed his cup-bearer, thrice daily, at his midday meal to bid him remember the Athenians. He was unable to fulfill his threat, however, until after the Ionian insurrection had been put down, which required a period of six years.

After the burning of Sardis, the revolt spread along the shores of Asia involving the coast islands, including the island of Cyprus. The Phœnicians, the best mariners in his dominions, who remained loyal to Darius, took an active part in the succeeding campaigns. A strong Phœnician fleet was sent out to reduce the island of Cyprus, which was accomplished in a year. The Ionians fitted out a fleet which sailed to the Hellespont and thence to Byzantium, which they captured, and the cities in the immediate vicinity yielded obedience to the rebels.

Darius, after the affair at Sardis, sent for Histiæus, and informed him that he had information which involved him as a party to the revolt. But Histiæus persuaded his sovereign that he had been falsely accused, and was entirely innocent of complicity with Aristagoras. He told Darius that if he would give him a sufficient number of troops that he would proceed to the coast, and make short work of the rebellion. He then took an oath that, if entrusted with this mission, he would not change the garments he should wear as an officer in Ionia until he had not only put down the insurrection, but made Sardinia the largest island in the world tributary to Darius. The King was persuaded by the false boasts of Histiæus, and bade him proceed to the coast, make good his promises, and then return to Susa.

In the meantime the war progressed and many engagements took place on land and sea, until finally Persian forces entered Ionia and Æolis. Aristagoras then became alarmed for his personal safety. He held a conference with his advisers in Miletus, and suggested that he proceed to Sardinia or to Myrcinus in Thrace to found a colony, in which they could take refuge if the war went against them. Hecatæus, the historian, and others opposed the plan. But Aristagoras gathered a force of his own and went to Myrcinus in Thrace, the city given to Histiæus, by Darius, and which he had begun to fortify. There, while laying siege to a Thracian city, Aristagoras and all his army perished at the hands of the Thracians.

Histiæus, when he left Susa, commissioned to suppress the rebellion in Ionia, repaired to Sardis to confer with the satrap Artaphernes. The latter, who distrusted Histiæus, inquired of him what he believed to be the reason for the insurrection. Histiæus affected surprise and assured the satrap that he was entirely ignorant of the cause. Whereupon Artaphernes made the significant remark, "The truth is, Histiæus, you made the shoe, and Aristagoras put it on." At nightfall Histiæus, fearing that he might soon be apprehended as one of the conspirators with Aristagoras, fled and besought the Ionians to confer upon him a command, having offered to fight in their defence. Through treachery on the part of his messenger, he became involved in treasonable correspondence which fell into the hands of Artaphernes. He fled to Chios, and thence to Lesbos, where he succeeded in getting a squadron of eight triremes, whence he sailed to Byzantium.

In the meantime, the Persians concluded to concentrate their forces against Miletus, believing that if they could take the city, the Ionian rebellion could speedily be suppressed. With this end in view, they collected their land and naval forces.

The Milesians, when they learned that an effort would be made to reduce their city, determined to fight at sea, and mass their navy at Lade, at the mouth of the bay of Latmus, and there make the defence of

Miletus, leaving the inhabitants in case of defeat to defend their walls.

Lade, in the fifth century B. C., was a small island at the mouth of the bay of Latmus, opposite the city of Miletus. The river Mæander flowed through the valley at the foot of Mount Messogis on the north, and Mount Latmus on the south, and discharged its waters through two mouths into the bay of Latmus. Mount Mycale is a continuation of Mount Messogis projecting from a peninsula into the sea almost to the shores of the island of Samos. South of this peninsula is another into which Mount Grion projects, at the extremity of which, opposite the small island of Lade, stood the city Miletus.

Miletus, Myus and Priene were three maritime cities situated on the bay of Latmus near the mouth of the Mæander. Priene was at the foot of Mount Mycale on the north, Miletus at the foot of Mount Grion on the south, the two cities being immediately opposite each other across the bay. Myus was to the east at the foot of Mount Latmus, also on the shores of the bay of Latmus in the delta formed by the mouths of the Mæander.

The locality now has changed materially. The alluvial deposits washed into the bay of Latmus for centuries caused the waters to recede and the coast line to gradually extend; so that what was once the island of Lade is now a hillock on a plain. The locality where the navies contended at the siege of Miletus is now dry land.

In the memorable engagement at Lade, the Ionians assembled a fleet of three hundred and fifty ships deployed in line of battle as follows: The east wing was held by the Milesians with eighty ships; the Samians occupied the west wing with sixty. Next the Milesians on the east wing were the Prienians with twelve ships, and the Myusians with three; then the Teians with

seventeen; then the Chians with one hundred; next to these were the Erythræans and Phocæans, the former with eight ships, the latter with three; next in order were the Lesbians with seventy ships, joining the Samians on the west wing.

The fleet of the Persians consisted of six hundred ships, but knowing well the courage of the enemy, all of whom were expert seamen, they doubted whether they would be able to defeat them at sea. Before hazarding a battle, they endeavored to bribe their leaders, and sent the governors, who had been exiled by the Ionians to approach their countrymen, and to promise them great rewards if they would renew their allegiance to Darius. If they refused, they were to tell them that if they were conquered in battle, they would be sold into slavery; their sons would be made eunuchs, their daughters bartered to the Bactrians, and their country given to others. But the Ionians were steadfast.

They might have succeeded at Lade, had they been willing to submit to the training and discipline inaugurated by Dionysius of Phocæa. He offered to assume command of the fleet, if they would obey him. He reminded them that if they were willing to undergo hardships, they would overcome the enemy. The alternative was chains and slavery. They assented and Dionysius, knowing the value of thorough training, daily caused the ships to form in line. He then exercised the rowers, practised them in the manœuvre of cutting through one another's lines. He also put the marines under drill and kept the ships at anchor. For seven days they continued to obey Dionysius, and then doggedly refused to continue the drill. The weather was hot, many became ill, unaccustomed to such unusual toil in the hot sun. Worn by fatigue, they pitched their tents on the island to enjoy the pleasant shade, and refreshing breezes.

The commanders from Samos perceived that the disorder and disobedience which prevailed presaged defeat and disaster. They again opened negotiations with their exiled governor, who had promised them immunity and arranged to desert the fleet, when the engagement commenced. The Lesbians, also, seem to have been a party to this agreement. The Persian commander, knowing that treachery would give him victory, then attacked the Ionian fleet. When the line of battle was formed, the Ionians beheld with consternation and dismay the Samian ships sail away, and desert their allies. The Lesbians followed. These movements caused a momentary panic. Their forces had been depleted by the absence of one hundred and thirty ships. But the love of liberty prevailed, and those who remained loyal fought with great determination, until they were finally overpowered by superior numbers. Thus the island of Lade was taken and the Ionian navy defeated.

After this naval engagement, the Persians besieged Miletus, both by land and sea, using in the siege all kinds of devices and military engines which were known in that age. They resorted also to driving mines under the walls of the city. The Milesians were finally obliged to capitulate and the fleets and armies of Darius took the city in the sixth year of the war, presumably about B. C. 594. All the inhabitants who were not slain were reduced to slavery. The wives and children of those who were butchered were sold. Those of the adult male population whose lives were spared were carried captives to Susa. Darius for some unaccountable reason, shall we say, in the plenitude of his mercy, as the word mercy was understood in that age of tyranny, did not treat them with cruelty, but established them at Ampe, a city somewhere on the shores of the Erythrean Sea (supposed in this instance to mean the Persian Gulf), near the spot where the Tigris flows into it.

Many escaped out of Asia. The Samians migrated to Sicily and established themselves on that fertile island. Dionysius, the great disciplinarian and intrepid commander at the battle of Lade, captured three Persian ships and when he saw that the day was irretrievably lost, sailed directly to the Mediterranean and plundered the coasts of Phœnicia. He then became a pirate, a calling which was considered altogether respectable in that age, and figured as one of the famous corsairs of his time. He ravaged the coasts of Africa and amassed great wealth in his new pursuit. He permitted no harm, however, to befall the Greeks, being proud of his Hellenic blood and endowed with commendable patriotism.

So the Ionian revolution failed, not because of lack of courage or patriotic devotion, but because the Greek cities of Asia, like the Greek cities of Hellas, while they loved freedom and hated tyranny, would not yield enough of their independence and political autonomy for the common weal, in order to secure unity, and collective harmony. They believed in democracy, in freedom, in political independence, but failed to appreciate the fact that to secure and make permanent these ends, it was absolutely essential to act in unison, and work in unison, in order to unite their energies, and fight only the common enemy, and thereby avoid fighting among themselves, about mere trifles, engendered by foolish prejudices. The Ionians, had they followed the advice of Dionysius, submitted to his discipline, and loyally supported his leadership, might easily have won the battle of Lade, saved Miletus, and secured their independence. The Persians themselves had no confidence in their own ability to defeat the enemy in that naval engagement. They feared to join battle in the bay of Latmus, until they had first resorted to bribery, and learned that they might win by the aid of treachery.

In this connection history records the fate of the unfortunate Histiæus. It will be remembered that after he had fled from Sardis, and was refused a command by the Ionians, he went to Lesbos and there secured eight triremes. With these he sailed to the Hellespont, and became a pirate. He seized all the ships that sailed out of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) except such as were willing to submit to him. He was at Byzantium when he learned the fate of Miletus. He then assigned Bisaltes, one of his officers, to take charge of affairs on the Bosphorus, and taking the Lesbians with him, made a descent upon Chios, and with force and arms plundered the island, slew many of the inhabitants, and reduced to subjection those whose lives had been spared. Notwithstanding his hostile incursions in Ionia, he succeeded in enlisting in his service a body of Ionians and Æolians, and with these he made an attack on Thasos. While engaged in the siege of the principal city on the island, he received intelligence that a well equipped Phœnician fleet had sailed from Miletus to make war on those parts of Ionia which still refused to yield allegiance to Darius. Histiæus then abandoned his operations at Thasos, and sailed with all his forces to Lesbos. Shortly after his arrival, his supplies became exhausted. Histiæus then crossed the channel from Lesbos to Æolis on the continent. From thence he entered the plain of Caicus, in the territory of Mysia, to reap the corn and grain in the fields. Harpagus, a Persian general, with a considerable force happened to be in the vicinity. He learned of the presence of the marauding army, attacked them, took Histiæus prisoner and almost annihilated his forces. Histiæus contrived to escape, but was overtaken in his flight and would have been stabbed by his captor, had he not revealed his identity. He was brought to Artaphernes at Sardis, who knowing the apparent fondness which Darius entertained for Histiæus, and fearing the

monarch would spare the life of the traitor, immediately ordered his execution. After he had been impaled, Artaphernes ordered that his head should be embalmed and sent to Darius at Susa. The Persian monarch was much incensed at the conduct of his brother, because he did not send his prisoner alive to the court at Susa. He ordered that the head of the governor of Miletus be washed and adorned, and directed it to be buried with honors, notwithstanding his treasonable conduct towards his sovereign. Darius must have believed in the innocence of Histiæus and regarded the man who once saved his life on the Danube, as his friend and benefactor.

CHAPTER XIII

FIRST PERSIAN WAR — MARATHON

MARATHON — mar-a-thon [Μαραθών] — A plain six miles long and a mile and a half wide, extending along the bay of Marathon on the northeast coast of Attica. It is distant about twenty-six miles from Athens by the most traveled road between the mountain ranges of Hymettus and Pentelicus. Back of the sea extends a chain of rocky hills and rugged mountains encircling the plain. Above one of the valleys or passes through these hills is the hamlet of Vrana from which point, it is believed, the Greeks charged the Persians who suffered defeat September 17, B. C. 490.

THE campaign of the First Persian War, B. C. 490, which was begun in Eubœa and ended with the battle of Marathon, was the most notable, and perhaps the most important in the history of Greece. The prestige of that victory enabled the Hellenese to defeat the Persians ten years later at Salamis, and in the following year at Platea and Mycale. These campaigns ended for all time the ambition of the despots of Asia, to extend their dominions on the soil of Europe.

At Marathon occurred the first formidable clash between Persia and Hellas, on the shores of Europe. The contest was conducted by an army of slaves sent by Darius, and a handful of freemen determined to prevent the conquest of Greece. What Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill meant to the American colonies, Marathon meant to the free cities of Hellas. At Marathon the Athenians fought for independence. That engagement was the first clash in the irrepressible conflict, which was to determine whether the west should

remain free or become part of the dominions of the sovereign of Asia, whose object was universal empire. The duel was on in earnest. The declaration of independence for Greece was embraced in the answer given by Callimachus to Miltiades, when the Athenian generals were evenly divided as to whether they should retreat or attack the army of Datis and Tisaphernes, which outnumbered the Greeks ten to one. Callimachus, as Archon-Polemarch, had the casting vote. On that vote the destinies of Greece depended. He was to decide whether to enslave Athens by declining to give battle, or by fighting, preserve its liberties, and leave a memorial of himself to every age. Callimachus decided that his vote should be for liberty and independence. The decision made possible the battle of Marathon, and posterity knows the result.

Before giving an account of this memorable engagement, it will be profitable to seek the causes that culminated at Marathon. These had their genesis, not alone in the importunities of Hippias, and other exiled tyrants, who had been driven from Greece, and who sought to persuade Darius to invade Hellas, but in the military operations instituted by the Persians in their efforts to extend their empire to the eastern shores of the Ægean Sea, and in the struggles of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to throw off the Persian yoke. For more than fifty years the Persians had threatened to visit condign punishment upon Hellas. These hostile declarations were encouraged from time to time by tyrants and leaders of the oligarchical party in Greece, who had been driven out of their native country by revolutions, having for their object the establishment of a democracy. These exiles frequently took refuge in the Persian court, where they were usually made welcome in consideration of the information they gave and the aid which they tendered in order to assist any expedition which the Persian monarch might see fit to

send across the Ægean to subjugate their native country.

The conquests of Cyrus the Great in Asia prevented temporarily any attempt on his part to extend his conquests in the West. In the middle of the sixth century B. C., about fifty-six years before the battle of Marathon, Cyrus defeated Crœsus, King of Lydia, took Sardis, his ancient capital, and extended his empire to the Ægean sea. Then turning to the east he defeated Belshazzar and took Babylon. Before setting out on his campaign against the Assyrian and Babylonian empire, he planned the subjugation of the Ionic and Æolian Greeks, who had been allies of Crœsus, but was obliged to entrust to others the conduct of these operations. Tabalus, and afterwards Harpagus, undertook the execution of these designs, while Cyrus was engaged in his operations against Babylon. The Asiatic Greeks turned in this hour of peril to their Peloponnesian kinsmen, and appealed to Sparta for succor. The Lacedæmonians, however, did not send military aid, but dispatched envoys to investigate. On arriving at Miletus, these envoys sent a herald to Cyrus, who was still at Sardis, to admonish that proud monarch not to attempt to reduce any city of Hellas, for the Lacedæmonians forbade, and would not permit it. This impudence seemed refreshing to Cyrus. His interest was aroused. He asked, "Who are these Lacedæmonians?" When informed that they dwelt in the Peloponnesus, in a city called Sparta, a market town, he expressed contempt and declared according to Herodotus (i, 153), "I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have in the midst of their city, a place set apart, where they meet to cheat one another by false oaths. If I live, they will be obliged to discuss, not the calamities of the Ionians, but their own."

Cyrus did not live to fulfil his threat against Hellas. Soon after his imprecations against the Lacedæmonians,

he quitted Sardis, in order to prosecute his campaigns, and extend his dominions in upper Asia. He conquered Assyria, and took the cities of Nineveh and Babylon. Belshazzar was slain in his palace B. C. 538. Babylon became a satrapy of Persia. Cyrus then reduced the countries inhabited by the Bactrians and the Sacæ, and was killed in a campaign against the Massagetæ in the remote regions on the confines of his dominions, not far from the western boundary of Chinese Tartary B. C. 529. Cyrus was succeeded by his son Cambyses. He had no opportunity to punish the Hellenes as his time was largely occupied in the conquest of Egypt. On the death of Cambyses, B. C. 522, Darius Hystaspes, after the assassination of the usurper Smerdis, succeeded to the throne of Persia.

After Darius had restored order in his dominions, his queen, Atossa, daughter of Cyrus the Great, besought her husband, while yet in the flower of his age to perform some illustrious action, which should shed lustre on his reign. He then determined to lead an expedition into Europe to subdue the Scythians. Had Darius followed the importunities of his queen, and lead his army into Greece instead of into the country beyond the Danube, the battle of Marathon might have been anticipated nearly a quarter of a century. The campaign would have been conducted by Darius in person. The time was opportune. Hipparchus had been assassinated (B. C. 514), and his brother Hippias was fighting desperately to sustain his supremacy in Athens, and when Darius started on his Scythian expedition, he had not yet been driven into exile. The factions who were seeking to overthrow Hippias were aided by Cleomenes with a contingent of Spartan soldiers. Hippias, who was in constant fear of assassination, had a band of Thracians constantly in his pay to protect himself from the attacks which he contemplated would be made upon him.

But Darius remained indifferent and failed to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the dissensions and quarrels which divided and distracted Attica. He failed to act on the advice of Atossa, his queen, and let pass the opportunity to invade Greece. Instead he led an expedition seven hundred thousand strong into Europe (B. C. 513-12) and invaded Scythia. Perhaps he resolved to postpone the contemplated invasion of Greece because he desired the aid of his Greek subjects in Asia Minor on his Scythian expedition, deeming their coöperation indispensable, by reason of the fact that they were the most expert and experienced mariners in his dominions, and part of the equipment, on that occasion, consisted of a fleet of six hundred sail.

An interesting fact in connection with this expedition was the presence of Miltiades, who was with the Asiatic Greeks, whom Darius had ordered to accompany him. On the Scythian expedition,[1] Miltiades, who ruled the city of Cardia and the Thracian Chersonese, used all his endeavors to induce his fellow countrymen to destroy the bridge of boats over the Danube, which they were left to guard, after Darius had led his army into the unexplored regions north of that river, and north of the Euxine, and urged them to permit his sovereign to perish among the savage nomads of Scythia. His advice was not followed. Darius lived to send Datis and his brother Artaphernes to seek to enslave Greece; and Miltiades lived to defeat them at Marathon.

After the return of Darius from the Danube he suffered additional insults from the Athenians and Eretrians, who aided their kinsmen in Ionia, in Asia Minor to sack and burn the city of Sardis (B. C. 500). This uprising, known as the Ionian revolt, resulted in the Ionian War, in which the Greek subjects of Darius

[1] For an account of the Scythian Expedition, see *ante*, Chap. XI.

fought to regain their independence, and the political liberty they had enjoyed when Crœsus was King of Lydia. This struggle lasted six years, the conspicuous events being the battle of Lade, and the siege and fall of Miletus (B. C. 495) and the subjugation of the islands, Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos.

Having subjugated the Greeks in Asia, Darius determined to subjugate the Greeks in Europe. He appointed his son-in-law Mardonius to succeed Artaphernes in the government of the Persian provinces on the eastern shores of the Ægean. He placed him at the head of a strong infantry force, with which he was ordered to march through Thrace and Macedonia, and make a junction with Megabazus, whom Darius had left in Thrace with an army of 80,000 men, on his return from the Scythian expedition, with orders to proceed through Thrace and Macedonia to Therma, at the head of the Thermaic Gulf, and there await the arrival of the fleet, on which a large body of infantry was being transported. From this rendezvous the entire armament, under command of Mardonius, was to invade Greece, march south through Thessaly and Beotia to Attica; reduce and burn Athens, and bring to the court of Darius at Susa, the insolent Athenians and Eretrians, who had burned the city of Sardis. The fleet was obliged to double the rocky promontory of Mount Athos, at the extremity of the Chalcidean peninsula of Acte, on its way to Therma. The fleet, unfortunately for Mardonius, ran into the teeth of a hurricane off the dangerous promontory of Mount Athos. Three hundred ships were dashed to pieces on the rocks, and 20,000 men perished (B. C. 492). This calamity caused the abandonment of the expedition.

The disappointment and mortification of Darius, however, did not dampen his ardor, nor modify his anger against the Athenians. Hippias was at his court urging him to lose no time in fitting out a new arma-

ment. He was willing and anxious to pilot the expedition. He advised that the fleet sail directly across the Ægean, among the Cyclades, touching at the island of Delos, and at Eubœa, in order to burn the city of Eretria, and then disembark the land forces on the plain of Marathon, some twenty miles from Eretria, and about twenty-five miles northeast of Athens. At that point, the idea was to coöperate with the supporters of Hippias, who still had a considerable following in his native city. Heralds were sent out, in advance of this new expedition, to demand from the cities of Greece, earth and water, as an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of Darius. These cities, with the exception of Athens and Sparta, believing themselves too weak to withstand the power of Persia, complied with the demands of the heralds. The Athenians and Spartans, however, treated them, not only with disdain, but defied Darius. To show their utter contempt for his demands they slew his heralds. The Athenians cast the Persian ambassadors into a deep pit. The Spartans threw them into a well and in derision bade them, in their sad plight, take earth and water to their master.

Darius now determined to retrieve the disaster which overtook his first expedition under Mardonius, especially in view of the fact that all the Greek cities to whom he sent his heralds, except only Athens and Sparta, had acknowledged his sovereignty. He took the command of the army from Mardonius, who had failed in his campaign the year previous, and appointed Datis, by birth a Mede, and his nephew Artaphernes, son of his half-brother Artaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, to command the Persians. The place of rendezvous was the Aleian plain, in Cilicia, which stretches south to the Mediterannean, between the rivers Pyramus and Cydnus. On the banks of the latter is situate the flourishing city of Tarsus. Here the entire land and naval forces assembled. The infantry were embarked in six

hundred triremes. There were four hundred transports in which the cavalry were transported. Estimates vary as to the numerical strength of the army of Datis. There is reliable authority which would indicate that it numbered not less than two hundred thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry. Col. Leake estimates that at Marathon the armament of Datis numbered 177,000, including 7,000 cavalry. He points out that the ancient penteconter contained but a single bank of oars, and was rowed by 50 men. The trireme contained three banks of oars, and was propelled by 150 rowers, and accommodated also 50 combatants. The small ships were each equipped with 30 oars. The rowers fought on shore as archers. His estimate is as follows:[1]

Infantry, 50 in each of the 600 triremes	30,000
Cavalry (in 300 cavalry transports)	7,000
Rowers of the 600 triremes, who fought on shore as archers	90,000
Seamen of the triremes	30,000
Seamen of the cavalry transports	20,000
Total armament	177,000

Datis was an experienced officer who had served against the Greeks in the Ionian War in Asia Minor, and Artaphernes, who accompanied him, was a prince of the royal family. The order given by Darius to his commanders when they set out on their campaign was brief. They were directed to proceed to Athens and Eretria, reduce them to ashes, and bring the inhabitants into the King's presence at Susa in chains. Datis was doubtless aware that failure to comply with the order according to oriental custom would cost him his head.

History does not record what exquisite tortures were designed for the Athenians and Eretrians by Darius and his queen Atossa, when these prisoners should be brought before him. But in view of the disastrous

[1] Leake's Demi of Attica, Vol. 2, p. 220.

failure of the expedition and its humiliating defeat at Marathon, we may well conceive the extreme chagrin and mortification which Darius must have experienced and his keen disappointment at being unable to punish the Athenians who had insulted his dignity and mocked his authority; who had burned Sardis, and murdered in cold blood his heralds and ambassadors. Datis, however, after his defeat, was able to take in his fleet his Eretrian prisoners whose city he took, by reason of the traitors within its walls. But we are told that Darius, when the Eretrians were brought to him at Susa, instead of putting them to the torture, treated them with great kindness, and directed them to settle on lands which he assigned to them, and decreed that they should dwell in Asia as his subjects.

The armament sailed from the coast of Cilicia, probably from Tarsus, in the spring or summer B. C. 490, pursued its course west and thence north along the coast of Asia Minor to Ionia and the island of Samos. Fearing a fate similar to that which had recently befallen the expedition of Mardonius off the promontory of Mount Athos, Datis sailed west, through the Cyclades, and touched first at the island of Naxos. The inhabitants fled to the mountains, but many were made prisoners and their port town was reduced to ashes.

But Datis respected the sacred island of Delos and would not permit it to be plundered. Instead he sent a herald to the Delians who had fled to Tenos. The herald declared that no harm was intended to their sacred island and its inhabitants, because that island was the birthplace of two deities, Apollo and Artemis (Diana), and Darius had ordered that their sacred precincts should be respected. He bade them, therefore, return to their homes where they might abide in peace. In memory of this deliverance, the Delians burned three hundred talents of frankincense upon the altar of Apollo.

Datis then directed his course to the southern extremity of the island of Eubœa, and attacked the city of Carystus, the latter having refused to give hostages to the Persians; nor would they consent to join the invaders and aid them in their assault on Eretria and Athens. The Persians finally reduced Carystus and burnt and ravaged the neighboring country.

From Carystus Datis sailed north through the Eubœan channel, and attacked the city of Eretria. For six days the Eretrians fought to maintain their freedom, but the love of Persian gold induced some prominent men in the city to betray it. These traitors, prototypes of the Benedict Arnold of American history, opened the gates of Eretria to the enemy on the seventh day of the siege. The Persians having gained an entrance into the city pillaged it, set fire to the temples, and reduced the city to ashes, as the Eretrians and Athenians had burned Sardis, ten years before.

Part of the mission of Datis had now been accomplished. Eretria was in ashes, and its inhabitants were in chains. His energies were now centred on the destruction of Athens. Hippias was enthusiastic. He longed to punish his political enemies who had driven him into exile and to reward his friends and supporters. Datis, after a brief rest, sailed south to Marathon, on the northeast coast of Attica, it being not more than twenty miles from Eretria, and near also to Athens, the plain being best adapted for the movements of his cavalry. Thither he was conducted by Hippias.

The Athenians, in anticipation of the approaching struggle with the Persians, had elected in the spring B. C. 490 their ablest men as strategi. Under the constitution of Clisthenes it was customary to elect ten generals or strategi annually, one from each of the ten tribes. The supreme command of the army was given to each of the ten generals on alternate days. Nine archons were also chosen annually. The third archon,

known as the Archon polemarch, or war Archon, was the military governor of Attica. He had the right to vote in the counsels of the strategi, and the law also conferred on him the honor to command the right wing in battle. The name of this war Archon was Callimachus, of the tribe of Æantis. We have also the names of four of the strategi elected that year, namely, Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles and Stesilaus.

As soon as the news reached Athens that Eretria had fallen, the Athenian army about ten thousand strong, prepared to take the field. Just before the troops set out for Marathon, the strategi sent a herald to Sparta, to ask aid of the Lacedæmonians to assist in repelling the Persian invaders. A professional courier and trained runner, named Phidippides, was selected to carry the message. He set out at once from Athens, on September 7, B. C. 490, and arrived in Sparta, one hundred and fifty miles distant, on the evening of the following day. He was brought before the Ephors at once, and delivered this brief message:

"The Athenians entreat the Lacedæmonians to aid them, and not suffer the oldest city in Greece to be reduced to bondage by the barbarians. Eretria has already fallen, its inhabitants are now slaves, and Greece has become weaker by the loss of a renowned city."

The Ephors declared that they would lend their aid to the Athenians, but they could not advance with their armies in violation of law, because it was the ninth day of the current month, and the moon's circle was not yet full, but that they would advance immediately after the full moon.

Later, when Xerxes was prosecuting his march through Thessaly, the Spartans, who were then celebrating the Carneian festival, delayed sending the full strength of their army to support Leonidas at Thermopylæ, until the festival had been concluded. The

other allies did likewise, it would seem, on account of the Olympic games, Herodotus declares, which occurred at the same period as these events. The Olympic festival was celebrated at the time of the first full moon after the summer solstice, which would occur late in June or early in July. It was earlier, therefore, than the Carneian festival, which took place in the Spartan month Carneius, which corresponds nearly with our month of August. The Dorians held sacred the entire month Carneius (Thuc. v, 54) during which they celebrated their national festival in honor of Apollo Carneius. The contests commenced on the seventh day of the month and continued for nine days. One of the important ceremonies consisted in crowning the Carneian Apollo with garlands in commemoration of the passage of the Dorians, and Achæans from Naupactus to the Peloponnesus.

The Lacedæmonians also kept the ancient Achæan feast of Hyacinthia, which occurred annually after the middle of June. This festival would precede the period for the celebration of the Olympic games, which, however, were celebrated only quintennially. Hyacinthus was a beautiful youth slain accidentally by Apollo, and took his name from the flower which was afterwards revered as an emblem of his death.

The Dorian superstitions, therefore, on this occasion proved stronger than their love of country and patriotic devotion, for they waited till the moon was full, and left Sparta on the 16th of the month with an army of two thousand hoplites and reached the field of Marathon, the day after the battle. Thus according to Col. Leake, whose views are adopted by Canon Rawlinson, the battle of Marathon was fought on the 17th day of the Spartan month which corresponds with our September. He estimates that Phidippides set out for Sparta on September 7, the day the Athenians marched to Marathon, and arrived at his destination on the eve-

ning of the 8th, seven days before the full moon which occurred on the 15th. The day following, the 16th, the Spartans set out on their march and arrived at Marathon on the third day thereafter, namely, on the 18th, in time to view the Persian dead, who still lay unburied on the plain, but too late to participate in the engagement which occurred the day previous. Thus it appears that the battle was fought ten days after the courier Phidippides started from Athens with his message for aid. It appears further that the Spartans were not delayed in consequence of the celebration of any religious festival, as we have shown that those which they were accustomed to celebrate occurred in June, July and August. They postponed their march to Marathon by reason of a peculiar superstition with regard to the phases of the moon.

If Phidippides left Athens for Sparta the same day that the Athenians marched to Marathon, the Greeks must have arrived on the field on September 7th. Probably the Persians had already disembarked with their infantry and cavalry, and were encamped on the plain, when the Athenians arrived. It will appear, therefore, if the battle was fought on the 17th, that the two armies lay facing each other for ten days before the attack was made by the Greeks. If Miltiades waited ten days before giving battle, why did he not wait another day to give the Spartans an opportunity to reach the field and reinforce his slender army? He knew from the report received from Phidippides that as soon as the moon was full-orbed the Spartans would come to his aid. He knew, or should have known, that the day on which he ordered the attack, the Spartans were on the road to Marathon, and were only distant a day's march. These facts concerning this interesting engagement will be considered presently. Herodotus does not supply information on the points above suggested, but he gives a graphic sketch of the engagement and has preserved the argument that Miltiades made to Callimachus, the war Archon, to gain his vote, because, had the archon voted against the proposition of Miltiades, the battle of Marathon could not have taken place.

Mr. Finlay describes the plain of Marathon as extending in a perfect level along the bay of Marathon. It is in length about six miles; its breadth never less than a mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain, the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree, and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior.

When the Athenians reached Marathon, they drew up in order of battle, in a place sacred to Hercules, and while awaiting orders from their generals, they were joined by the Platæans, who, when they learned that Eretria had fallen, and that Athens was threatened, sent every available man in the city to aid their good friends and allies the Athenians, who had on several occasions protected them from unfair treatment which they had experienced from the Bœotians. It is said that the full strength of the Platæans was one thousand men. The Athenians never forgot this act of devotion on the part of Platæa, and always in the religious exercise, at the Panathenæaic festival blessings were asked for the Platæans also.

The Greeks were posted in the timber or wooded ridges, on the high ground which rises back of the plain. From their position they could see every movement of the enemy, scarcely a mile distant, and could

observe the ships moored along the beach. Miltiades had fought the Persians in Asia Minor. When the Asiatic Greeks were struggling to regain their independence in the Ionian War, he conquered Lemnos and Imbros. Afterwards, while he was sailing from the Chersonese with five triremes, he was pursued by the Phœnicians, allies of Darius, but escaped to Imbros with four of his ships, and sailed thence in safety to Athens. He was familiar also with the tactics of the Persians, and doubtless knew Darius personally, as he was one of the governors who accompanied his Scythian expedition, and counselled the other rulers of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, who also accompanied the expedition, and were detailed to guard the bridge over the Danube (Ister), to return to their homes and leave Darius to perish in the wilds of Scythia.

Miltiades was of the tribe of Œneis. He was a man of ripe experience, of great courage, and unusual energy. He comprehended the situation, and believed that he would be able to defeat the army of Datis, although it outnumbered the Greeks more than ten to one. An attack, under the circumstances, would, ordinarily, be considered as suicidal. How could ten or eleven thousand Greeks expect to defeat and rout an army of more than one hundred and twenty thousand? Miltiades canvassed the situation with the other generals as to the expediency of an attack. A vote having been taken on the question, the result stood five to five. It was necessary, therefore, for Miltiades, in order to fight Datis at Marathon, to win over to his view, Callimachus, of the tribe of Æantis, who had the casting vote. Herodotus has preserved the patriotic and stirring appeal which Miltiades made to the Archon.

"It now depends on you, Callimachus," said Miltiades, "either to enslave Athens, or, by preserving its liberty, to leave a memorial of yourself to every age, such as not even Harmodius and Aristogiton have left.

For the Athenians were never in so great danger from the time they were first a people. And if they succumb to the Medes, it has been determined what they are to suffer when delivered up to Hippias, but if the city survives, it will become the first of the Grecian cities. How, then, this can be brought to pass, and how the power of deciding this matter depends on you, I will now proceed to explain. The opinions of us generals, who are ten, are divided: the one party urging that we should engage; the other, that we should not engage. Now if we do not engage, I expect that some great dissension arising amongst us will shake the minds of the Athenians, so as to induce them to a compliance with the Medes. But if we engage before any dastardly thought arises in the minds of some of the Athenians, if the gods are impartial, we shall be able to get the better in the engagement. All these things, therefore, are now in your power, and entirely depend on you. For if you will support my opinion, your country will be free, and the city, the first in Greece; but if you join with those who would dissuade us from an engagement, the contrary of the advantages I have enumerated will fall to your lot."

This appeal won the vote of Callimachus, who became his enthusiastic supporter. When the majority had agreed to give battle, the generals surrendered to Miltiades their right to command on the days when they would be entitled to that right respectively, so that he might manage the contest without the embarrassment which his temporary loss of command might occasion. It was practically left to Miltiades to select the day when he should attack. Doubtless Miltiades did everything to conceal his intentions from the enemy. He wished to have them believe that the Greeks intended to remain on the defensive. Datis concluded, perhaps, that the Greeks were content to guard the mountain passes through which the roads communicating with

Athens extended. The latter cut down a number of trees from the wooded ridges, and piled them so as to form an abattis, to protect their left flank from the Persian cavalry. With this exception, the armies remained inactive a little more than a mile apart facing each other. This inactivity continued for nine days.

Suddenly on the tenth day after the Greeks arrived on the battle-field, namely, on the 17th day of September, Miltiades drew up his army in line of battle. The extent or length of their line was equal to that of the Medes; the wings of the Greek army were strongest, but the centre was weak, being only a few files deep. It was commanded by Aristides and Themistocles at the head of their respective tribes of Antiochis and Leontis. Callimachus was in command of the right wing, the Platæans were posted on the left.

The Persians were on the plain between the Athenians and the sea. As has been observed two marshes bounded its extremities which protected their flanks. When the command was given by Miltiades to charge, the space between the two armies was about a mile; not less than eight stades, Herodotus says. A stade is equal to 600 feet. Before the astonished Medes had time to put themselves in a proper posture to defend themselves against this sudden onslaught, Miltiades gave the command to his entire line to advance at a double-quick. They had no cavalry and no archers, but were armed with pikes or long spears and swords. The astonished Persians could scarcely believe their eyes when they beheld the Greeks precipitating themselves upon them. The Persian centre, however, advanced with spirit, and pierced the weak centre of the Greeks, and pursued them to the interior, but the victorious wings of the Athenians and Platæans united, driving the enemy in flank, and fighting those who had broken the centre. They followed the Persians who

retreated towards the shore, cutting them to pieces, and then called for fire and attacked the ships.

The battle continued for "a long time," Herodotus says, but Miltiades finally gained a decisive victory. He "allowed the defeated portion of the barbarians to flee," and followed them in their flight "cutting them to pieces, till, reaching the shore, they called for fire and attacked the ships." The entire fleet of Datis, however, escaped with their Eretrian prisoners, except seven ships, which were destroyed on the beach. Among the slain was Callimachus, the Archon Polemarch, who made the battle possible by voting with Miltiades to attack the enemy; also Stesilaus, one of the strategi, Cynægirus also, a brother of the poet Æschylus, was killed on the beach. He seized a Persian vessel, but a sailor on board cut off his hand with an axe, and was slain in the encounter. The total loss of the Greeks was 192. Of the Persians sixty-four hundred perished.

The question has been suggested as to why Miltiades waited ten days without attacking. After delaying so long, why did he not wait till the Spartans came up? Why did he wait at all, after he gained the vote of Callimachus? The only answer to these questions, which I have been able to find, is suggested by Col. Leake in his comments on this memorable engagement. His views on this point are shared also by Canon Rawlinson. He calls attention to the fact that the plain of Marathon was selected by Datis, under the conduct of Hippias, because it was the spot best adapted for cavalry. He observes further that Herodotus makes no mention of any cavalry having been engaged, and concludes there were none on the plain of Marathon the day the battle was fought, though Datis had with him perhaps ten thousand horsemen. Cavalry was the most serious obstacle the Greeks had to contend with. They had none themselves, nor did they have any archers or bowmen.

The conclusion, therefore, seems justified, that the Persian cavalry were absent, and that when Miltiades learned this, he immediately took advantage of the important circumstance, believing that in the absence of the cavalry he could succeed against the Persian infantry. This fact, according to Suidas, gave rise to the Athenian proverb — Χωρις ἱππεις — "the horsemen are away." It is reported also that some of the Ionians, in the army of Datis, found opportunity to climb trees, and signal the Athenians that the cavalry were absent.

The reasons assigned for the temporary absence of the horse is, that during the nine or ten days that the cavalry were at Marathon, they had exhausted the forage in the immediate vicinity, and in the belief that the Greeks intended to remain on the defensive, the horses, on this day, had been sent off to forage for themselves in the plain of Tricorythus, or the valleys which open out of it. The absence of cavalry gave Miltiades the opportunity he most desired. It would never do to allow it to pass, because, he was well aware that dissensions existed at Athens, fomented by the adherents of Hippias. Had not traitors opened the gates of Eretria? Miltiades must attack, therefore, when opportunity offered, even if he was obliged to do so in the absence of the reinforcements then on their way from Sparta.

One of the legends as to this engagement declares, that the Athenians were inspired while contending with the might of Persia, fighting against overwhelming odds, by a vision which revealed to their eyes Theseus, the Attic hero, who destroyed the fire-spitting bull, on the plain where they were then fighting. The Athenians erected a temple to his memory, in the Agora near the foot of the Acropolis in Athens. This venerable structure has been preserved, and still attracts the admiration of mankind.

The fears of Miltiades that treachery was at work in Athens were now fully corroborated. Having driven the invaders into the sea, and into their ships, the Persian commanders sailed south, away from Marathon, and rounded cape Sunium, at the extreme end of the Attic peninsula, and thence north into the Saronic gulf, and directed their course for the port of Phalerum, the old port town of Athens. It was believed that the Persians were apprised of the designs of the traitors in Athens by signals directed by means of a burnished shield displayed conspicuously from a high point on Mount Pentelicus by secret spies of Hippias. Miltiades, immediately at the close of the engagement, ordered his entire army to march with all speed to Athens, save only a contingent left on the battle-field under Aristides, to guard the rich spoils of the defeated Persian army. The Greeks believed that the traitors who displayed the shield on Mount Pentelicus, to signal the Persians, intended to notify Datis to land his army at the port of Phalerum, but a short distance from Athens, and advance upon the city in the absence of the Athenian army, and while they were yet at Marathon, with the assurance that the adherents of Hippias would receive them gladly, and coöperate with them to capture Athens. Whether these fears were, or were not, well founded is not material. They were believed at the time. Miltiades, with his faithful followers, who had borne the brunt of battle all day, were still fresh, and made the march of twenty-four or twenty-five miles, and arrived in Athens before the Persian fleet reached Phalerum. Datis, when he arrived in the Saronic gulf, meeting no encouragement from the traitors, who sent their signals from Mount Pentelicus, sailed away, and directed his prows to the shores of Asia.

The rapid advance of the Greeks at Marathon, who attacked the enemy at a run, has been frequently criticized by modern writers. It has been said in this con-

nection that a run of a mile, the distance between the two armies, must have disordered the troops and unfitted them for the engagement upon the supposition that such violent exertion would cause them to be out of breath, and place them at a disadvantage. Some ascribe to this cause the confusion in the Greek centre. The assumption is wholly unwarranted. The centre gave way after a long contest not because the troops of Aristides and Themistocles were not physically fit to fight, by reason of their rapid advance with the rest of the army, over a mile of ground, but because the files in the centre were few, and that part of the line much weaker than the wings. The fact remains also not only that the Greeks fought the battle out and were victorious, but from the further fact that after fighting all day, the entire Greek army except only the tribe commanded by Aristides, marched from the field of Marathon back to Athens, a distance of twenty-five or twenty-six miles, in anticipation of an attack on the city by Datis, who sailed around the point of Sunium to the port of Phalerum, in the Saronic gulf, where it was supposed he would land his army and advance upon Athens.

This march, after such a battle, was a wonderful feat. But when we consider the kind of men the Hellenese were, we can readily understand it. The Greeks spent a large part of their time in celebrating their local and national games and festivals, in which men and boys engaged in athletic sports and contests, contending for prizes in feats of running, leaping, boxing, wrestling, hurling the quoit and the javelin, and managing horses in their splendid chariot races. The Spartans were the finest trained athletes the world ever saw, and spent all their time in training for war, which in those days was a struggle of athletes fighting for the most part hand to hand with sword and spear. Their couriers were trained runners able to traverse one

hundred and fifty miles with ease, as did Phidippides, who carried from Athens to Sparta tidings of the fall of Eretria and the advance of the Persians. The Hellenes were continually preparing in the local festivals for their national festivals, more especially for the Olympic games, the most famous athletic contests in the ancient world. The victor at these national festivals was honored even more than the statesmen, artists and philosophers, and in Athens received a pension for life. Great honors attended success, also, at the Pythian, Nemean and Isthmian games. What was a mile run to men, accustomed to such physical training? The fact recorded by Herodotus that the Athenians on this occasion introduced for the first time the custom of charging the enemy at a run, furnishes no argument in support of the supposition that the troops were fagged out by reason of that mode of beginning the contest. On the contrary, the impetus given to the attack by the swift advance of the charging column threw the enemy's flanks into confusion, contributed to the success of the Greeks and proves the genius of Miltiades.

Modern warfare is not without instances of physical endurance almost without parallel. The armies of Grant and Lee were not composed of trained athletes. One instance of the hardihood of American soldiers will be found in the Wilderness campaign of 1864, which embraced the battle of the Wilderness and the engagements at Spottsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. During that campaign men were put to the limit of physical endurance, some even slept while marching, and parts of the army were under fire, more or less severe, continuously for a period of thirty days.

The day after the battle, the Spartans, two thousand strong, reached the field of Marathon. The six thousand, four hundred Persians whose ghastly corpses strewed the plain were still unburied. Aristides was

looking after the Greeks who fell in the conflict, and keeping strict guard and watch over the rich spoils and plunder of the enemy. Marathon was won by the Athenians alone and the one thousand faithful and devoted Platæans, who cast in their lot with Athens, their friend, benefactor and protector.

CHAPTER XIV

MILTIADES

THE father of Miltiades was Cimon. The latter had a brother named Miltiades. Care must be taken not to confuse the uncle with his illustrious nephew. The Cimon who won the double victory at the Eurymedon and became the most illustrious admiral of his age, was the son of Miltiades and grandson of the elder Cimon, whose name he bore. The father of Miltiades and his paternal uncle dwelt in Athens in the time of Pisistratus by whom they were treated with great injustice. Xanthippus, in whose veins ran the blood of Pisistratus and of the Alcmæonidæ, was the father of Pericles. From Pisistratus and from the elder Cimon, therefore, sprung four of the most distinguished men in Hellas; Miltiades, who defeated Datis at Marathon, his son Cimon, who, as a naval commander, must be classed with Themistocles; Xanthippus, who commanded the Athenian fleet at Mycale, took Sestus and secured the control of Hellespont; and his son, Pericles, the first orator and statesman of his age.

Xanthippus was the enemy of Miltiades and was instrumental in bringing about his downfall. Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was the political rival of Pericles, the son of Xanthippus. Cimon was defeated as a party leader by Pericles, although Cimon used all his great influence as the head of the Athenian navy, and admiral of the Athenian empire, to compass the defeat of his rival.

Miltiades was of noble lineage. He could trace his ancestors to Æacus and Telamon of Ægina, and Ajax, mythical hero of the Trojan War. Long before that memorable struggle Telamon migrated to Salamis, and became King of the Salaminians. Ajax joined the expedition of Agamemnon with twelve ships, and, next to Achilles, was regarded as the bravest among the Greeks. The Athenians revered his memory, and when Clisthenes established the Attic tribes, the tribe of Æantis was named in his honor. When the constitution of Clisthenes was adopted establishing the Athenian tribes, Miltiades was in the Thracian Chersonese, but as an Athenian, he was enrolled, not in the tribe of Æantis named in honor of his distinguished ancestor, but in the tribe of Œneis, son of Priam, King of Troy. As to the date of the birth of this distinguished man we are not informed. Assuming that he was fifty-one when he died, he was born B. C. 540. Consequently, he was twenty-seven or twenty-eight (B. C. 513-12) when he accompanied Darius on his Scythian expedition, and advised the destruction of the bridge across the Ister, that his sovereign might perish in the wilds of Scythia. He was fifty when he defeated the Persians at Marathon, and died the following year (B. C. 489) from injuries received when he broke his thigh on his ill-starred expedition to the island of Paros.

Miltiades and Cimon, the father and uncle of the great Miltiades, were men of ample fortune. For some reason the elder Cimon incurred the displeasure of Pisistratus, who caused him to be banished from Athens. He took with him into exile his famous horses, which he trained for the four-horse chariot race, and contended for the prize at the Olympian games. The mares of the banished Athenian won the race, which conferred the highest distinction upon their owner. At the next Olympiad, when the games were celebrated, Cimon, with the same mares, again won the olive

crown. This great honor being within his gift, he purchased peace with Pisistratus, yielded him the honor and caused him to be proclaimed the winner, on condition that he should be allowed to return to Athens. After the death of Pisistratus, he won the crown at Olympia the third time. The sons of Pisistratus, Hippias and Hipparchus, presumably jealous of this phenomenal success, and the great honors paid to Cimon, caused him to be put to death. Miltiades, the elder, when his brother Cimon was assassinated, was absent from Athens, residing at Cardia, having been seated on the throne as first king of the Thracian Chersonese, which was conferred upon him under the following circumstances.

The Chersonese was inhabited by a Thracian tribe, known as the Dolonci, who became engaged in a war with the Apsinthians, another Thracian tribe, dwelling to the north of the peninsula. While hostilities were in progress, the Dolonci sent an embassy to Delphi to consult the oracle as to what was the wisest course to pursue in behalf of their tribe. The pythoness in response to their inquiries gave the mystic response, "Take back as a colonist into your country the man who, after quitting the temple, shall first offer you hospitality." The embassy left Delphi by the Sacred Road through Phocis and Bœotia, but no one proffered hospitality. They then journeyed into Attica and came to Athens. As they were passing the house of Miltiades, the wealthy patrician, who was seated in front of his dwelling, was attracted by the striking appearance and picturesque dress of the approaching pilgrims. He became interested, accosted their leader, and bade them partake of his hospitality. The strangers then disclosed their mission, repeated what the oracle had said, and invited Miltiades to sojourn with them to the Chersonese in obedience to the divine command.

The imperious conduct of Pisistratus toward his

family was distasteful to Miltiades. He therefore decided to go to Delphi. He consulted the oracle and was convinced that it was his duty to comply with the wishes of the Dolonci. He gathered a number of colonists, and having arrived in the Chersonese, was installed as governor of the peninsula. It was this Miltiades who built the wall across the neck of the Chersonese from the city of Cardia on the gulf of Melas to Pactya on the Hellespont, a distance of about four miles, and secured the Chersonese against the inroads of the Apsinthians. He then made war on Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont. In one of his campaigns he fell into an ambush and was made prisoner. Fortunately Miltiades stood high in the favor of Crœsus, King of Lydia, who commanded the Lampsacians to release him. Fearing the anger of Crœsus, they liberated their prisoner who returned to his dominions. Some time afterwards he died childless, leaving his kingdom to his nephew Stesagoras, son of Cimon, and brother of Miltiades. Before the war with Lampsacus was ended, Stesagoras was assassinated. He left no descendants. The sons of Pisistratus, perhaps in an effort to atone for the wrong they had done Cimon, and to secure the government of the Chersonese, to an Athenian, fitted out a squadron, and sent Miltiades to rule on the Hellespont. When he arrived, the inhabitants came to condole with him for the loss of his brother, but Miltiades, fearing treachery, commanded them to be thrown into prison, and thus began his reign. He entered into a treaty with Olorus, king of Thrace, who provided him with a body of Thracian mercenaries for his protection. Miltiades cemented his relations with Olorus by marrying his daughter the princess Hegesipyla. From this union was born Cimon, the illustrious Athenian admiral.

Miltiades, by reason of his experience and training, seems to have been especially designed by providence

to lead the Athenians at Marathon. He was familiar with the mode of warfare practised by the half savage Medes and their barbarous allies, the Scyths and Thracians. As has been observed, he was married to a Thracian princess, the daughter of King Olorus. He had fought under the eye of Darius himself, and accompanied his expedition on the Ister (Danube). He was one of the officers chosen by the Persian monarch to guard the bridge of boats, across the Ister, during the king's absence into the wilds of Scythia. Had the counsel of Miltiades prevailed on that occasion the bridge would have been destroyed, and Darius left to perish in the desolate regions into which he had penetrated. The native Persians were reputed to be endowed with extraordinary courage, and their barbarous allies were noted for their cruelty and barbarous customs. These facts, doubtless, prompted Herodotus to say that up to the time of the battle of Marathon, "the very name of the Mede had been a terror to the Greeks." Their reputation for cruelty was established, no doubt, by reason of the atrocities they had committed during the Ionian Wars, an account of which is given in a preceding chapter, in which a small number of Athenians and Eretrians had participated in the campaign which resulted in the burning of Sardis.

Just as the English colonists at the outbreak of the American revolution regarded the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare was "an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions," so the Attic Greeks, who had not participated in the Ionian Wars, regarded the savage inhabitants of Thrace, Scythia and Media. To extend the illustration. The French and Indian war was the school in which Washington and Stark and Putnam and Prescott were trained to fight the cannibal and savage Iroquois and Algonquins. The American revolution began as the French and Indian War closed. The vet-

erans of the latter became the leaders of the patriots in the revolution. They were skilled in Indian warfare, and familiar with the customs and habits practised by the savage allies, which the British sovereign brought on the defencelsss inhabitants of our frontiers. Miltiades was no stranger to the allies, mustered under Datis and Artaphernes. Their reputation for savagery and barbarism had no terrors for him any more than the mode of warfare practised by the savages had for the veterans of the French and Indian War.

Miltiades knew also what defeat at Marathon meant for him. He had not only been enrolled in the navy of Darius, and sought his destruction at the Ister bridge, but during the Ionian Wars he fought against him. While the Persian fleets and armies were engaged in the reduction of Miletus and other Greek cities, Miltiades took advantage of the oportunity to descend upon the islands of Lemnos and Imbros from which he drove the Persian garrisons and Pelasgian inhabitants, and ceded the islands to Athens. We have no data from which we can state positively the time when Miltiades took these islands. The assumption seems reasonable that the event took place immediately preceding or during the early part of the Ionian War. Mr. Grote says some time between 502 and 494 B. C.

The Athenians at an early day drove from Attica a colony of Pelasgians, who had been employed as laborers to build a wall upon the Acropolis. In payment for these services they ceded to them certain lands at the foot of Hymettus just outside the walls of the city, which the new owners cultivated with diligence and converted them from barren tracts to fruitful gardens. Hecatæus, whose writings were consulted by Herodotus (Herod. vi, 137), quotes him as saying that the Athenians drove out these Pelasgians unjustly, because they coveted the lands which they had given them, after they had become productive. According to the

Athenians, however, the cause of their expulsion was just. The Pelasgians, they said, were bad neighbors. Their sons and daughters were accustomed to go for water outside the city walls to the "Nine Springs." Whenever the young women went, they were insulted by the Pelasgians who offered violence to them. They claimed further that these Pelasgian neighbors were constantly plotting to attack the city. For these reasons they were compelled to leave Attica, and settled on the island of Lemnos. Thence they continued their depredations, in order to be revenged upon the Athenians. They engaged in piratical enterprises, and carried into captivity Athenian women, whom they kept as concubines. The children of these women, as they grew older, were constantly engaged in strife with the Pelasgian youths. For these reasons these barbarous people slew not only these half-breed children, but their mothers also.

Many years after these occurrences, when Miltiades ruled in the Thracian Chersonese, he took advantage of the disturbances which resulted in the Ionian War, in which the king of Persia sought to subdue the Greek cities of Asia Minor. While the officers in the service of Darius were engaged in suppressing these revolts, Miltiades, from the Chersonese, descended with a fleet upon the islands of Imbros and Lemnos, drove out the Persian garrisons, and expelled the Pelasgian inhabitants. Darius, after he had reduced Miletus, sent a Phœnician fleet to the Hellespont to take Miltiades and regain possession of the islands he had conquered. The latter succeeded in evading the vigilance of the enemy, and with a squadron of five ships escaped across the Ægean, and reached Athens in safety. So close was the pursuit that one of the vessels which accompanied Miltiades was captured by the Phœnicians.

Complaints meantime had reached Athens concerning the despotic conduct of Miltiades while governor

of the Chersonese. When he reached that city he was put on trial on these charges, doubtless preferred against him by his hereditary enemies, but the valuable services he had rendered his country, in driving the Persians and Pelasgians from Lemnos and Imbros, militated in his favor and led to his acquittal. His military skill and fitness were recognized also, and when tidings were received of the approach of the Persian fleet under Datis, and the destruction of Carystus and Eretria, Miltiades was elected strategus, and was one of the ten generals who commanded at Marathon.

The successful issue of that engagement which resulted in the liberation of his country from the threatened dominion of Persia, made the name of Miltiades immortal. He stood in the reflected glory of Marathon, the most conspicuous figure in the ancient world. The earth was filled with his fame. The achievement he secured that day over Datis and Artaphernes made his name familiar to posterity, which will revere his memory while history continues to be written.

The termination of the career of Miltiades presents a mournful spectacle, one of the most melancholy pictures which time has thrown upon the screen of history. His sun was destined to set amid clouds and storms which involved him in humiliation and disgrace. The besetting sin of this man of genius, like the sin of many of his illustrious race, was avarice. He seems also to have possessed a spirit of vindictiveness, which the glory and honor heaped upon him as the reward of his military success could not soften or ameliorate. He declared that he had been slandered by an inhabitant of the island of Paros, and he determined to avenge the wrong or fancied wrong he said he had suffered. Avarice, however, must have dictated his course, for while his secret purpose was to punish an enemy, his real object seems to have been to levy blackmail on the prosperous and wealthy people of Paros, one of the larger

of the Cyclades. It is situate some fifteen miles south of the sacred island of Delos, immediately west of the wine island of Naxos, and distant about seventy-five miles southeast of Attica. It is famed for its quarries of pure white Parian marble.

Some months after his victory at Marathon, Miltiades resorted to fraud and deceit to secure the means necessary to execute his plans. He stated and represented to the Public Assembly that if they would furnish him with a fleet and an armed force, he would bring great wealth to Athens and would enrich every one who accompanied his expedition. He did not disclose the destination of his armament, nor furnish any details as to what he purposed to do. The fact that these things were requested by Miltiades was enough. No bill of particular was asked. The people had reposed in him unbounded confidence, and were delighted with his promise of wealth and riches which he said would result from his operations. Unhesitatingly, without question, and it would seem by unanimous consent, the Assembly voted to entrust to his command a fleet of seventy ships, with a full complement of armed men, and the funds necessary to equip the expedition.

Miltiades steered to the island of Paros. He disclosed to his officers that his object was to punish the Parians because he said they had taken sides with the Persians at Marathon, and claimed that one Parian trireme had joined the Persian fleet and accompanied it on the expedition. This obviously was only a pretense. He wished to punish Lysagoras, who happened to be a Parian by whom, Miltiades asserted he had been slandered, saying that Lysagoras lied about him to Hydarnes, the Persian. This Hydarnes presumably was in the service of Darius, and was the father of the Hydarnes, who commanded the "Immortals" in the army of Xerxes. The sequel shows also that the real purpose of Miltiades was blackmail, because as soon as

his fleet reached Paros, he landed his forces, drove the Parians within their walls, laid siege to their city, and immediately made a demand for one hundred talents, a sum in excess of $100,000, and threatened to take the town if the money was not paid.

The Parians rejected the demand with scorn, and at once began to increase the height of their walls, where they were likely to be carried by assault, and defied the army of Miltiades. The hero of Marathon was astounded at the attitude of the enemy, whom he doubtless believed would fall an easy prey, and comply speedily with his extortionate demands. So rapidly were the walls raised to a great height, that the Athenian general was unable to take the city by assault. A siege would consume many months. His position from a military point of view was wholly indefensible. Among his prisoners was a woman named Timo, an underpriestess in the temple of Demeter (Ceres). She told Miltiades in confidence, that she could disclose to him a plan which would enable him to capture the city of the Parians. Her advice related to the enclosure where the Thesmophorea, a festival in honor of Demeter, was celebrated, in which women alone participated. This precinct was within an enclosure on a hill in front of the city. Miltiades was desperate. After consultation with the priestess, he visited the hill, but being unable to open the door of the enclosure, climbed over the fence, and went to the sanctuary of Demeter, intending, Herodotus says, "to do something within it." What he intended to do is not disclosed. But suddenly Miltiades was seized with superstitious fear. The man who courted danger, loved adventure, and never quailed before an enemy on the battlefield, was seized with horror at the idea of incurring the wrath of an offended deity. He returned the way he had come, climbed the enclosure, but in jumping down fractured his thigh and dislocated his hip. This misfortune permanently disabled the Athenian commander, who was forced to retire from Paros and return to Athens after an absence of twenty-six days.

Soon every tongue in Athens was busy. Miltiades, the idol of the people, who had been a short time before the object of universal admiration, suddenly became the object of denunciation, and the topic of universal criticism. He had deceived the people. He had attempted to avenge his private quarrels, and to augment his private fortune at the public expense. He had betrayed the trust reposed in him and forfeited public confidence. His principal accuser was the proud Xanthippus of the hostile house of the Alcmæonidæ. He was instrumental in formulating the charges, and apparently assumed control of the impeachment proceedings in the Public Assembly, where Miltiades was placed on trial for his life. The specific complaint was, that he had "wilfully deceived the people." Those who stood by the noted prisoner were doubtless some of his comrades in arms, who remembered only Marathon.

The scenes which now gathered about Miltiades are cast in sombre colors. The man who had endured the hardships of the Scythian campaign, defied Darius at Lemnos and Imbros during the Ionian revolt, and taught his countrymen to face the proud Persian and barbarous Scyth at the critical moment in his country's history; the man whose daring at Marathon has been applauded by posterity for more than twenty centuries; this distinguished man in the last hours of his earthly career was destined to suffer extreme physical and mental torture. The hurts which he received while attempting to extort large sums of money from a peaceful community of Hellenic blood on the island of Paros were beyond the skill of the physicians of that age, who knew very little about surgery as we understand it, and were entirely ignorant of anæsthetics. These injuries were mortal. When his trial came on, Miltiades

was unable to rise from his bed. Gangrene had made its appearance. Mortification had supervened and the patient endured extreme physical agony. The animosity and bitterness with which he had been pursued by Xanthippus, his chief accuser, were wholly unwarranted. His hatred seems to have been inherited because Hippias and Hipparchus, the sons of Pisistratus, who were also related to Xanthippus, had compassed the death of Cimon, father of the accused. It was the same Hippias whose treasonable designs Miltiades had defeated at Marathon. When the trial opened before the Public Assembly on the hill of Pnyx, the distinguished culprit was borne before his accusers reclining on his couch, unable to rise. It was doubtless his presence which prevented his countrymen from inflicting on him the death penalty. The trial went against him, but Xanthippus was unable to persuade the Athenians to impose a sentence of death. Instead, he was fined fifty talents, approximately $50,000, presumably a sum sufficient to reimburse the public treasury for the moneys which had been expended in fitting out the expedition to Paros. Miltiades did not long survive his conviction, but died shortly after the trial was concluded.

Miltiades, it has been said, was poor when this final misfortune overtook him. His landed property in the Chersonesus, together with a large proportion of his wealth, had fallen into the hands of the Persians (Curtius Hist. Greece, Vol. 2, p. 257). However this may be, it is certain, he spent his last days in prison, because of his failure to pay the fine imposed upon him by his ungrateful countrymen. Notwithstanding the fact that this distinguished prisoner had conferred upon Athens the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, after he had driven out the Persians and conquered the Pelasgian inhabitants; notwithstanding he had saved his country from the invading armies of Persia, nevertheless, the Athenians did not see fit to release the fine they had imposed on him, and which he was unable to pay, and permitted him to die in prison.

According to the oppressive and unjust laws of Athens, Cimon, the only son of Miltiades, was compelled to discharge this obligation which had been imposed upon his father. He was obliged not only to pay the debt, for which he was in no way responsible, but was deprived automatically of his rights of citizenship; was forbidden to exercise the franchise; and became ineligible to office, so long as the debt imposed on his father remained unpaid. It has been said, also, that the son, after the death of his father, was obliged to take his place in prison.[1] At all events, the great Cimon was ruined and doubtless would have died in obscurity had not Callias, one of the wealthiest men in Athens, assisted him in his distress, and paid the debt which the law imposed upon him. All this came about because Callias loved Elpinice, the daughter of Miltiades, and sister of Cimon. His devotion to the lady was such that he cheerfully discharged the obligation which gave freedom and citizenship to the brother of his fiancée, and Cimon subsequently became the greatest admiral of his time, except perhaps Themistocles.

How strangely inconsistent appear the decrees of fate, when we remember that this Elpinice, the sister of Cimon and daughter of Miltiades, afterwards won the esteem and friendship of the dignified Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, to whom she afterwards appealed to intercede for her brother, Cimon, to avert a decree of ostracism about to be pronounced against him.

In charity we must overlook the manifold sins and transgressions of Miltiades, and remember only his virtues and his patriotism, the undaunted courage and marked determination which enabled him, at a critical

[1] See Cimon, Chap. XXXV, *post*.

moment, to avert the sword of Persia, which threatened destruction to his country. The benefits which flowed from his triumph accrued to all mankind. As a result Greece became the most famous country in the world, whose poetry and literature, philosophy and art, is our abundant inheritance and possession forever. Pausanias, the distinguished traveller and critic, who flourished in the second century of our era, referring to Marathon, says that there was erected on the field a tomb of the Athenians upon which are pillars bearing the names of the men who fell in the battle, arranged according to their tribes. In the same place, he says, there is a monument to Miltiades. Here, according to the legend, every night is heard the sound of horses neighing, and of men fighting. Yet there is no authority for the supposition that any cavalry took part in the battle.

CHAPTER XV

SECOND PERSIAN WAR — INVASION OF XERXES — ADVISABILITY OF THE EXPEDITION — DREAM OF XERXES — DEPARTURE FROM SARDIS

DARIUS HYSTASPES, while engaged in preparing for a third invasion of Greece, to retrieve the ignominy of the defeat of his army at Marathon, which marked the close of the First Persian War, died B. C. 486, and his son Xerxes succeeded to the throne of Asia. The most memorable event in his reign, and one that will be remembered by posterity for all time, was his invasion of Greece, and the lamentable failure of his attempt to conquer Hellas, and extend his empire in the west, known as the Second Persian War.

The conspicuous features of this episode in the reign of Xerxes are: (1) The extent of his military operations, and the magnitude of his armament, which, prior to the Austro-Servian war, of 1914, was the greatest that ever assembled on the planet; (2) The shameful cowardice of Xerxes, who after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, retreated with his land forces as well as his navy, the former never having fought a battle save the encounter with a handful of Greeks under Leonidas at Thermopylæ; (3) The superhuman courage and prodigies of valor displayed by the Greeks in the struggle for their liberties and independence.

What we know about the Persian Wars and especially of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, we learn from Herodotus, who wrote a graphic account of his military operations. His style is charming, and his

narrative one of the most interesting in the literature of antiquity. After more than twenty-three centuries, we are enabled through the pages of Herodotus to look through the vista of ages, and see the ancient world, as it existed in the fifth century before Christ. He has thrown upon the canvas of history pictures of the stirring events growing out of the attempt of the Persians to conquer Greece. He paints his scenes in fair colors, and we can look at them as they pass in review like a panorama. The perspective of time and distance is abridged, and we can enter the camp of Xerxes and see the files of his army on its way from Critalla; see the glittering hosts issuing from the gates of Sardis, and again behold the great armament which covered land and sea as far as the eye could reach, as Xerxes viewed it from the throne he erected on the shores of the Hellespont. Also the exciting scenes which occurred amid the forests of Thrace and Macedonia, when the lions attacked the camels from Arabia and Bactria which accompanied the expedition. We can enter the councils of the Persians and listen to the discussion respecting the operations of the fleet of Xerxes at Salamis. We can see Xerxes and Mardonius and hear the arguments advanced by the King of Tyre and Sidon and Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, as to the advisability of an attack on the Greeks in the narrow strait off the island of Salamis. We can see the hosts of Xerxes collected from three continents as they marched in review on the plain of Doriscus, and tell the dress, the arms and accoutrements of troops from forty-six nations, and speaking many languages. We can see them counted and registered and their numbers taken down and recorded by the scribes appointed by Xerxes to secure a roster of his army. We can hear the conversation of Xerxes with Demaratus, the Spartan exile, when the Persian monarch, in anticipation of a physical contest in the field, inquired of him

concerning the constancy and valor of his countrymen. The picturesque Vale of Tempe is before us, the narrow gateway of Greece, with its mountain gorges through which the Peneus rolls on its way to the sea. So, likewise, the famous pass of Thermopylæ whose vertical walls of rock washed by the waters of the gulf of Malis witnessed the most daring feat of arms recorded in history. We witness the efforts of Mardonius on the field of Platæa, after Xerxes had fled to Asia, who would rather die and leave his bones to bleach on the shores of the Asopus than suffer defeat and return in disgrace to the royal palace at Susa.

These events make up the story of Xerxes' invasion of Hellas, one of the most picturesque and interesting episodes in the history of Greece.

After the defeat of the Persian army at Marathon B. C. 490, Darius, filled with rage and mortified and chagrined beyond expression, was more than ever determined to subjugate Greece and extend his empire in the west to the gates of Hercules. He had previously, with that end in view, sent an army of 100,000 men under Datis and Artaphernes, accompanied by a strong fleet. This army, formidable as it seemed, was defeated by a handful of Greeks. The figures seem justified when we remember that Athens alone fought at Marathon with 10,000 men, supported by 1,000 troops from patriotic loyal Platæa, who sent to the aid of her friend and ally every man in the city capable of bearing arms. In view of these facts Darius purposed to collect an army in which should be enrolled every available soldier in his empire. He was accustomed to commanding large armies. In his expedition against the Scythians he led 700,000 men. By the defeat of his arms at Marathon he was made aware of the military prowess of the Greeks and their unrivalled valor. He determined, therefore, to assemble an army compared with which the numerical strength of the

forces he commanded in the Scythian campaign would seem insignificant. He at once sent recruiting officers throughout the confines of his empire to levy troops and require ships, horses, coin and transports for the mighty host. Some idea of the magnitude of the work of enrollment may be had, when we consider the extent of his dominions and time consumed in mustering his forces. His empire embraced the civilized world, excepting Greece, Italy, Sicily and Carthage. Among the Israelites, the Persian monarch is known as Ahasueras, and his kingdom is thus referred to in the Hebrew Scriptures (Esther, i, 1). "This is Ahasuerus which reigned from India even unto Ethiopia, over a hundred and seven and twenty provinces." The Indus marked the borders of his dominions on the east, Arabia, Egypt and Lybia on the south, the Ægean on the west. On the north it extended into the vast regions on the Caspian, and the Oxus, inhabited by Scythians and Tartars. It included in Europe, Thrace south of the Ister (Danube), extending from the Euxine west to the mountain ranges of Pelion, Ossa and Olympus, which form the boundaries of northern Greece, and constitute the barrier which separates Thessaly from the regions of Macedonia. Darius spent three years in mustering troops from all parts of this vast territory over which he exercised absolute sovereignty. Then the work was interrupted because Egypt, which had been conquered by Cambyses, revolted. While engaged in these preparations, and before he set out on his expedition to subdue the revolt in Egypt, Darius died, and his son Xerxes succeeded to the throne of Persia.

The new monarch, at first, was not favorably impressed with the idea of invading Greece, but was persuaded to consider the matter, when he should have conquered Egypt. After two years he conducted a vigorous campaign against the Egyptian rebels and subdued them. On his return to his capital at Susa, he assembled the chief men of his court and invited them to give their opinions in regard to the expedition against Greece. He told them that Persia had never been inactive since it wrested the sovereign power from the Medes. After the lapse of twenty-four centuries we may read the speech of Xerxes, which Herodotus (vii, 8) has preserved for us. He spoke as follows:

"Men of Persia," he said, "what deeds Cyrus and Cambyses and my father Darius have achieved, and what nations they have added to our empire no one need mention to you who know them well. On mature consideration I find that we may at once acquire an increase of glory, and a country not inferior nor poorer, but even more productive than that we now possess, and at the same time that satisfaction and vengeance will accrue to us. I have called you to communicate to you what I now purpose to do. I intend to throw a bridge over the Hellespont and march an army through Europe against Greece, that I may punish the Athenians for the injuries they have done to the Persians and to my father.

"You have already seen Darius preparing to make war against these people; but he died, and had it not in his power to avenge himself. But I, in his cause, and that of the other Persians, will not rest till I have taken and burnt Athens. For they first began by doing acts of injustice against my father and me. First of all, for having come to Sardis, with Aristagoras, the Milesian, our servant; on their arrival they burnt down both the groves and the temples. And, secondly, how they treated us on our making a descent on their territory, when Datis and Artaphernes led our forces, you all know well enough.

"For these reasons, therefore, I have resolved to make war upon them. And on reflection, I find the following advantages in this course; if we shall subdue

them and their neighbors, who inhabit the country of Pelops, the Phrygian, we shall make the Persian territory co-extensive with the air of heaven; nor will the sun look down upon any land that borders on ours; but I, with your assistance, will make them all one territory, marching through the whole of Europe. For I am informed that such is the case that no city or nation in the world will remain which will be able to come to battle with us, when those whom I have mentioned have been brought into subjection. Thus, both those who are guilty, and those who are not guilty, must equally submit to the yoke of servitude. You, therefore, by doing what I require, will gratify me exceedingly, when I shall have informed you of the time, it will be the duty of each of you to come promptly. And whosoever shall appear with the best-appointed troops, to him I will give such presents as are accounted most honorable to our country."

This very clear and explicit address of Xerxes assigns the reasons, which to his mind justified his invasion of Greece. His reference to Marathon, however, will provoke a smile. He assumes that the conduct of the Greeks was outrageous in his reference as to how Datis and Artaphernes were treated, when they made a descent on the territory of the Greeks. What else could the Persian monarch expect when his army went into their territory with arms in their hands, to make slaves of the Hellenes?

Xerxes, however, when he had finished his address, requested each man in the assembly to boldly declare his opinion on the subject under discussion.

Mardonius warmly advocated the project outlined by his sovereign. He reminded him of the fact that Persia had already brought into subjection the Greeks residing in Asia, the Ionians, Æolians and Dorians. He referred to his own experience when he led a Persian army into Thrace and conquered the barbarous tribes

in Europe on the northern shores of the Ægean, as far as Macedonia and the confines of continental Greece, which countries, he said, submitted to his authority, fearing even to risk a battle.

There was, however, one man in the Assembly who, at the peril of his life, dared to advise his sovereign that, in his judgment the expedition contemplated by Xerxes would be unwise and unprofitable. This courageous counsellor was Artabanus, the brother of the late monarch Darius, and the uncle of Xerxes. He made a very clear and convincing address, and brought to the attention of his sovereign some facts which had not been adverted to and which he thought it well that Xerxes should not forget. He reminded him of Marathon, and of his father's narrow escape when he made an expedition into Scythia, beyond the Ister (Danube). Among other things in this remarkable address (Herodotus, vii, 10), Artabanus said:

"I warned your father and my brother not to make war upon the Scythians, a people who have no city in any part of their territory, but he, hoping to subdue the Scythian nomads, heeded not my advice, and having led an army against them, returned with the loss of many brave men. But you, O King, are about to make war on men far superior to the Scythians; who are said to be most valiant, both by sea and land. It is therefore right that I should inform you of the danger we have to fear. You say that having thrown a bridge over the Hellespont, you will march an army through Europe into Greece. Now it may happen that we shall be worsted either by land or sea, or even by both; for the people are said to be valiant, and this we may infer since the Athenians alone destroyed so great an army that invaded the Attic territory, under Datis and Artaphernes. They were not, however, successful in both, but if they should attack us with their fleet, and having obtained a naval victory, should sail to the Hellespont

and destroy the bridge, this surely, O King, were a great danger.

"Nor do I found this conjecture on any wisdom of my own, but from the calamity that once all but befell us, when your father, having joined the shores of the Thracian Bosphorus, and thrown a bridge over the Ister, crossed over to attack the Scythians. Then the Scythians used every means to induce the Ionians, to whom the guard of the passage over the Ister had been intrusted, to break up the bridge. And if, at that time, Histiæus, tyrant (governor) of Miletus, had assented to the opinions of the other tyrants (governors), and had not opposed it, the power of the Persians would have been utterly ruined. It is dreadful even to hear it said, that the whole power of the King depended on a single man. Do not, therefore, willingly expose yourself to any such danger, when there is no necessity. Be persuaded by me; dismiss this assembly, and hereafter, whenever it shall seem fit to you, having considered with yourself, proclaim what appears to you to be most advantageous."

The effect of this very prudent and sagacious address, coming as it did after the stirring appeal of Mardonious, angered Xerxes at the moment, notwithstanding the fact that he had bidden every one present to express freely his opinion, whatever it might be, without fear. After having rebuked Artabanus, however, Xerxes assured him that no harm would come to him but only because of the fact that he was the brother of Darius, would he be protected. But, however strange it may seem, the address of Artabanus wrought a change in the views of Xerxes shortly after the dissolution of the assembly, and the Great King resolved to abandon the expedition, and give up the idea of extending the borders of his empire in the west. He sent for Artabanus and acquainted him with his intentions, and thanked him for the advice he had given.

And now comes the most remarkable part of the story of this fated expedition of Xerxes. As we read in the book of Daniel, and elsewhere, in the Hebrew Scriptures, concerning the manifestations of a supernatural power, through the instrumentality of dreams and visions, which required the interposition of diviners and soothsayers and magicians and prophets, to read and interpret, so we read in the chronicles of profane historians contemporaneous with the historians of the old testament of similar dreams and visions.

Nebuchadnezzar, as he lay on his bed, had strange visions full of political significance as to his kingdom, so did the prophet Daniel. Belshazzar saw the strange vision and the hand that wrote on the walls of his palace, the night that Cyrus the Great, the grandfather of Xerxes, took Babylon and slew Belshazzar in his banquet hall.

So Herodotus records (vii, 12), that Xerxes saw visions and dreamed dreams, and had a dream and vision of his head upon his bed. In his sleep a tall, handsome figure appeared before him, and upbraided him for changing his mind and abandoning the idea of subjugating Greece. A second time he saw the vision and dreamed the dream. Then he became alarmed, and sent for Artabanus, and communicated to him what had been revealed in his dreams. Xerxes suggested that Artabanus should wear the clothes of his sovereign and sleep in his bed, and if the same dream came to him they would take further counsel. Accordingly this was done, and to Artabanus came the same dream that Xerxes had. A second time the vision came, but the apparition endeavored to take vengeance on Artabanus, and threatened to burn out his eyes. Under these remarkable circumstances, we are told Xerxes and Artabanus concluded that they had been in error. Xerxes now was fully determined to assemble and equip the great-

est armament the world had ever seen, and lead it in person to Greece.

He chose as the place of rendezvous for his army, Critalla, in the valley of the Halys in Cappadocia. Critalla is about 400 miles east of Sardis in the Kingdom of Lydia, and nearly the same distance west of the Tigris, on whose banks stood the ancient city of Nineveh. The empire of Xerxes embraced nations on three continents. In Asia, however, although his dominions extended beyond the Indus, Critalla was much nearer the geographical centre of his realm than Sardis, where he was joined later by contingents from Egypt and Libya.

Critalla probably was chosen as a place of rendezvous not only because it was convenient for troops from all parts of Asia, but because it was remote from the Greek world in Asia Minor and the Greek colonists in Ionia, Æolia and Doris and the islands along the eastern shores of the Ægean. These colonists, it is true, were under the jurisdiction of Persia, yet they were kin to the Greeks of Hellas, which was the objective point of Xerxes' expedition. At remote Critalla, therefore, the military operations of the Persians could more readily be concealed from Greek spies and informers, although at a later period, when Greek spies were apprehended, Xerxes showed them the magnitude of his armament, set them free and bade them inform their countrymen that his hosts were invincible.

In the fall B. C. 481, Xerxes led his mighty hosts from Critalla. He crossed the Halys and proceeded on his march westward through Lycaonia into Phrygia, passing probably north of Pisidia into the valley of the Mæander to Celænæ, a distance of about 175 miles. Thence the troops marched northwest into Lydia to Sardis, the ancient capital of Crœsus, a distance from Calænæ of about 125 miles, where Xerxes went into winter quarters. Sardis is but 150 miles southeast of

the Hellespont and afforded a convenient and suitable place for winter quarters for the army.

Two memorable feats of engineering were performed by the engineers of Xerxes. In anticipation of his entry into Europe, he ordered a bridge to be thrown across the Hellespont, and directed that the rocky promontory of Mount Athos, where the fleet of Mardonius had perished eleven years before, be severed from the mainland by a canal cut across the peninsula of Acte. The work must have been begun soon after Xerxes came to the throne, B. C. 486, for we are told it consumed nearly three years. The canal was nearly a mile and a half long when completed, and was wide enough to accommodate two triremes sailing abreast.

The bridge on the Hellespont, after it had been completed, was destroyed by gales and tempests and Xerxes, disregarding every sense of justice, held his engineers responsible for the operations of nature, during the seasons when storms are most violent. Those who were so unfortunate as to have charge of the bridge construction were promptly beheaded. It is said also that Xerxes, in a fit of insane rage, ordered the Hellespont to be "scourged." Other engineers were selected and ordered to again construct the bridge. The work was accomplished in the spring B. C. 481. The termini of the structure were at Abydus in Asia, and Sestus in Europe on the Thracian Chersonese where the strait is about a mile wide. It rested on penteconters over which cables were laid and secured to the shore. Trunks of trees were laid on the cables and fastened together. On the logs was placed brushwood and this was covered with earth, and pressed down to make a firm highway. Then on each side a fence was erected that the beasts of burden and horses might not be frightened by looking down upon the sea.

When news reached Xerxes that the bridge was completed, and the canal finished in the rear of the promon-

tory of Mount Athos, he at once set out with his hosts, which were so numerous that it was remarked in a general way that Xerxes went down out of Asia, and all mankind with him, for what nation did he not lead out of Asia against Greece. It was in the spring B. C. 480, when the army of Xerxes passed out of the gates of Sardis, marching northwest for the Hellespont. This is the order in which the troops wound their way out of the city into the plain in the valley of the Pactolus. The baggage bearers and beasts of burden formed the head of the column. Then came hosts made up of contingents from all nations promiscuously. After more than half the army had passed, there was left a wide space to separate the King's troops, attached to his royal person, from the rest of the army. They were deployed in the following order. First, there were one thousand picked horsemen all of Persian blood; then came one thousand chosen spearmen, selected also from Persians of pure blood, carrying lances turned downward towards the earth; then came the ten sacred Nisæan horses caparisoned in gold and purple. The sacred chariot of Jupiter (Ormuzd) came next in the line, drawn by eight white horses. Into the seat of this sacred car no mortal ever dare ascend, but the charioteer followed the horses on foot, holding the reins in his hands. Immediately behind this was the chariot of Xerxes, sovereign lord of the Persian empire and leader and commander of the mighty host. It was drawn by Nisæan horses. His charioteer stood by his side. Xerxes had also a covered carriage close beside his chariot, in which he rode when he did not occupy the royal car. Immediately behind the Great King marched one thousand spearmen, the bravest and most noble of the Persians. Their weapons were adorned with apples of gold. After these came one thousand Persian horsemen; then came ten thousand Persian infantry. Of these one thousand surrounded the remaining body of

nine thousand. Their spears were adorned with gold pomegranates, instead of ferules, but the nine thousand within had silver pomegranates. Thus the weapons adorned with silver were surrounded by a fringe of weapons adorned with gold. They carried their spears turned to the earth, so that their pomegranates of gold shone resplendent in the sun.

Then came the famous Immortals commanded by Hydarnes. They consisted of a body of ten thousand cavalry, select men of Persian blood. They were called Immortals, because when their ranks became depleted by death or illness, their places made vacant were immediately filled from among those of Persian blood, so that this chosen body of horsemen always numbered just ten thousand. They always accompanied the person of the sovereign, just as the Old Guard always accompanied the Emperor Napoleon, and took their orders from the Emperor alone.

After the Immortals there was left a space of twelve hundred feet, and then the rest of the army followed promiscuously. This was the order and alignment of the hosts of Xerxes as they defiled through the gates of Sardis on their memorable march to the Hellespont.

CHAPTER XVI

SECOND PERSIAN WAR — MARCH OF XERXES FROM ASIA — CROSSING THE HELLESPONT — REVIEW AT DORISCUS — COLLOQUY WITH DEMARATUS

IN the previous chapter we have a picturesque view of the army of Xerxes, as it defiled out of the gates of Sardis into the plain in the valleys of the Pactolus and the Hermus, as it began its long and tedious march through Asia Minor, Thrace and Macedonia into Thessaly, and thence south through Bœotia to Thermopylæ and to Athens, the objective point of the expedition, together with a description of the army, the arms the troops carried, and the order in which they marched. It is the purpose now to follow the expedition to the plain of Doriscus where the armament was numbered and passed in review under the eye of Xerxes. When the army was quitting Sardis, a strange phenomenon of nature occurred. The sun disappeared from the heavens in broad day. Or as Herodotus relates, "the sun quitting his seat in the heavens disappeared, though there were no clouds, and the air was perfectly serene, and night ensued in the place of day." (Herod. vii, 37.) The Magi, or diviners and astrologers, were called upon to interpret the phenomenon, and declare to the King what the prodigy might portend. The interpretation given was that the sun was the portender of the future of the Greeks, and the moon of the Persians. Therefore, the disappearance of the sun foreshadowed to the

Greeks the extinction of their cities. The words of the Magi removed from the mind of Xerxes his superstitious fear, and he renewed his march, delighted with the interpretation which had been placed on this phenomenon which modern astronomers would call a solar eclipse. His course was northwest from Sardis, through Lydia into Mysia, thence north through the valley of the Pactolus, across the Hermus, which is a short distance from Sardis, and then northwest across the Caicus, probably to Pergamus in Mysia. Thence across the Mysian territory along the coast of Æolis through Adramyttium on the gulf of Adramyttenus, on the coast of Phrygia. Thence through the city of Antandrus near Mount Ida. Xerxes was now approaching classic ground sacred to the memory of Grecian heroes made immortal in the Iliad. When the Persian monarch halted for the night under Mount Ida, a severe storm arose. The air was surcharged with electricity. The peals of thunder and sharp lightning flashes were terrific. Many were killed by lightning. Here, near the dominions of the ancient Priam, this violent electric display might be said to be a precursor of the fierce tempests which later wrought havoc for three days, and destroyed hundreds of the vessels of the Persian fleet off the rocky coast of Eubœa. Leaving Mount Ida the army crossed the Scamander. This was the first stream since the troops left Sardis, whose waters failed and did not afford sufficient drink for the immense army and beasts of burden.

Doubtless Xerxes was versed in the literature of the Greeks. Whether Homer had ever been translated into Persian we do not know, but one of the favorites at the palace at Susa was Demaratus, an exile from Sparta, who, before his expatriation had been a Spartan King. He could, if requested, read Homer to Xerxes, giving him the Persian equivalent. At all events Xerxes was anxious to visit the site of the famous Pergamus, or

citadel of Priam, a conspicuous figure in the Iliad. He became enthusiastic over the old story of Troy and the heroes, who for ten years waged war on these storied plains. He sacrificed a thousand oxen to the Ilian Minerva, and caused the Magi to pour out libations in honor of the heroes, making no distinction as to the Hellenes, into whose country he was now about to enter. When these ceremonies were over they marched to Dardanus on the Hellespont. Thence the army moved north to Abydos, where was erected the bridge which spanned the waters from Asia to Europe.

Before quitting the shores of Asia, Xerxes wished to look upon his entire armament, marshalled under his eye, on land and sea. A throne of white marble had been erected for his use on an eminence on the side of a hill sloping down to the Hellespont. From this lofty seat Xerxes looked on his countless myriads, his millions — all slaves — though marshalled on land or upon ships, as soldiers or seamen, in his invading armament. As far as the eye could reach, in either direction, the plain and hillsides skirting the Hellespont were covered with masses of human beings, and the sea, stretching southward into the open Ægean, was covered with ships, which formed his great navy. Xerxes desired to see his ships manœuvre and directed that a sham battle be fought in the Hellespont. The Phœnicians, who were natives of Sidon, were victorious, and received whatever reward or prizes were conferred in recognition of their superior skill and seamanship. In this connection it is related that Xerxes, while expressing supreme gratification at the grand display before him, suddenly burst into tears. Artabanus, his paternal uncle, observing the change in the King's demeanor, ventured to remark that while a short time before he was happy, now he was weeping. Xerxes answered that it was extremely sad to contemplate the brevity of human life. Looking down upon the great navy, and upon all the shore and

plains of Abydos, covered with men, he observed that we must remember that numerous as they were, yet within the limits of a century, all will have passed away, and not one of the vast hosts before him would survive to the hundredth year; so brief, he remarked, is the span of human life. His uncle then assumed the rôle of a philosopher and suggested that very often misfortune and calamities make life a burden, and from these pains and sufferings the only refuge is death, the sweet sleep which alone affords surcease from sorrow, which the deity has kindly and graciously provided, because, said Artabanus, the god having given us a taste of sweet existence, is found to be jealous of his gift.

Xerxes, however, seemed to be solicitous as to the outcome of his expedition, notwithstanding he had with him the most numerous army that had ever been assembled. He was still desirous of knowing the true opinion of Artabanus, who had originally advised against it. The King asked him whether if the vision of the dream had not appeared to him, would he have retained his first opinion, and sought to dissuade Xerxes from making war against Greece. The answer Artabanus gave was veiled and mysterious. "O King," he said, "may the vision of the dream that appeared terminate as we both desire, but I am still full of alarm, and not master of myself, when I consider many other circumstances, and moreover, perceive two things of the greatest importance, most hostile to you." He told Xerxes that these two things were (1) land, and (2) sea. He argued that there was not anywhere any harbor large enough, in case a storm should arise, to shelter the navy. And yet there was need, not only of one such harbor, but many, along the continent about which Xerxes was about to coast. Since there were not harbors sufficiently capacious, he bade Xerxes remember that accidents rule men, not men accidents. As to the land,

he reminded Xerxes that it would be hostile to him, and would become more hostile the farther the Persians advanced. And even if no one were to oppose the invaders, yet the country becoming more extensive in process of time, they would be menaced by famine.

These miserable forebodings of Artabanus were dismissed by Xerxes, who told his uncle that success attended only those who were ready to act and to hazard something. He reminded him of the greatness of the Persian empire, and observed that if his predecessors had had such counsellors as Artabanus, and had followed their advice, they never would have extended their dominions or attained to such a height of power as he, ruling in their stead, now possessed. Great undertakings, he said, are only accomplished at great hazards. He declared he would emulate his ancestors and, after having subdued Europe, would return home without having experienced famine or suffered any reverses. Artabanus then attempted to advise Xerxes not to lead his Ionian troops against their fathers in Attica, and begged to remind his nephew that Cyrus the Great subdued all Ionia, except the Athenians. But Xerxes reminded him that the whole Persian army which Darius led against the Scythians was in the power of the Ionians, at the bridge over the Ister (Danube), but the Ionians were true and refused to follow Miltiades, who wished to destroy the bridge and leave his father to perish in the Scythian wilds. He had, therefore, no fear that the Ionians would desert his army. Xerxes then sent Artabanus to Susa to exercise the functions of royalty during the absence of the Great King "for to you alone of all men," he said to Artabanus, "I entrust my sceptre."

Preparations were now made to quit the shores of Asia and cross the Hellespont. Xerxes called in counsel the chief men of his army, and addressed them as to the importance of the expedition and the objects to be

attained. He exhorted every man to do his duty, saying that they were marching against brave men, and if they conquered, no other army would dare oppose them. That victory would mean that the arms of Persia would be supreme throughout the world. "Now let us cross over," he said, "having first offered up prayers to the gods who protect the Persian territory." They then burned all sorts of perfume on the bridges (one for the troops, the other for the beasts of burden) and strewed the roads with myrtle branches. They did no more that day, but waited till the next, as they wished to see the sun rising and flooding the eastern heavens with its golden glory, that the army might bow in adoration to the majestic god of day. When the morning broke and the eastern horizon showed the golden rim of the sun, Xerxes poured a libation into the sea from a golden cup, and offered up a prayer to the sun, beseeching that no accident would befall that would prevent the subjugation of Europe until his empire was extended to its utmost limits. When he had finished his prayer, the Persian King threw a golden bowl and a Persian sword, or scimitar, into the Hellespont. When these ceremonies were concluded, the army began its memorable march. The infantry and cavalry crossed over the most northerly of the two bridges, the one towards the Propontis. The beasts of burden and attendants crossed on the most southerly bridge, nearest the open Ægean. First of all the ten thousand Persians led the van, all wearing crowns, and after them the conspicuous host of all nations. These crossed in one day and night. On the following day, first the horsemen and those who carried the lances downwards. These also wore crowns. So the army crossed in the order in which it departed through the gates of Sardis. The time occupied in crossing was seven days and seven nights without halting at all. We have observed that the army of Xerxes was an army of slaves. Other-

wise no power on earth could have defeated it. It was driven across the bridges under the lash. Later it was driven day after day for three days, into the mouth of the pass at Thermopylæ under the lash. What could an army of slaves accomplish against a handful of freemen? When we consider the time occupied in crossing the bridges over the Hellespont, we get some idea of the magnitude of this unprecedented army. It is little wonder that when a native of the Chersonese who witnessed the passing of the army from Asia remarked that when Xerxes entered Europe to subvert Greece "he brought all mankind with him."

The army then proceeded through the Thracian Chersonese around the head of the gulf of Melas immediately west of the shores of the Propontis, crossed the river Melas, which flows into the gulf of the same name, whose waters failed, being insufficient to furnish drink for the multitude of men and beasts of the army. Thence the route lay westward to Doriscus, a shore and plain of Thrace through which flows the Hebrus, south into the Ægean or Sea of Thrace. The fleet, when the army moved, was ordered to sail south into the Ægean, and thence north past the island of Imbros, and thence along the southern shores of Thrace to cape Sarpedon, near the mouth of the Hebrus, where it was to await the coming of the army. At Doriscus there was a Persian garrison, which had been established there by Darius on the occasion when he conducted an expedition against the Scythians beyond the Ister (Danube). A strong fort also had been built there for the accommodation of the garrison, and from which to conduct military operations. This place Xerxes deemed convenient for reviewing and numbering his army. Thither all the ships were ordered. When they arrived, they were hauled up on the beach and repaired. Xerxes, accordingly, numbered his army at Doriscus. The mode of enumeration which was customary with the Persians was this, having counted ten thousand men, they stationed them in one place, and then traced a circle on the outside of these, where they stood. The men were then withdrawn and an enclosure built on the line so traced, to reach as high as a man's navel. Others then filled the enclosure, and then others, continuing until all the troops were numbered. The infantry filled the enclosure 170 times. The troops were then deployed on the plain according to the nations to which each belonged. The ships in like manner were drawn up near the beach for review.

The numbers of this armament as enumerated and recorded by the King's scribes, or secretaries, together with the estimate of Herodotus as to the crews and the probable number of non-combatants, is as follows:

Naval Force		
1207 ships. Crews of 200 to each	241,400	
" " 30 marines to each	36,210	
3,000 Penteconters, crew of 80 to each	240,000	
Total naval force	517,610	517,610
Infantry		
Total Infantry of all nation		1,700,000
Cavalry		
Total Cavalry		80,000
Drivers		
Camel Drivers and Charioteers		20,000
Total forces from Asia		2,317,610
Forces from Europe		
Thrace, 120 ships	24,000	
Levies from Thrace and other parts of Europe	300,000	324,000
Total number of combatants, including camel drivers and charioteers		2,641,610
Non-combatants including servants, concubines and camp followers, estimated at		2,641,610
Entire forces of Xerxes		5,283,220

Herodotus describes the wonderful spectacle when the entire heterogeneous mass of humanity, exclusive of the non-combatants, passed in review before Xerxes, representing forty-six nations and tribes from three continents. He describes in detail the dress worn by those of each tribe and nation, and the weapons each carried. Among these nations and tribes were Persia, Media, Hycarnia, Assyria, Chaldea, Bactria, the Sacæ, India, Aria, Parthia, Chorasmia, Sogdia, Gandaria, Dadicæ, the Caspian, Sarangae, Pactyas, Utia, Mycia, Paricania, Arabia, Ethiopia, Libya, Paphlagonia, Ligyes, Matienians, Mariandynians, Cappadocia, Phrygia, Lydia, Mysia, Thrace, Bithynia, Meionians, Milyæ, Moschians, Tibarenians, Mares, Marcones, Mosynœci, Colchians, Alarodi and the Saspires.

Among the great mass the most picturesque attire was worn by those who were clothed with skins of wild beasts. The Caspians, who dwelt in the valleys of the Ossa and Araxes, on the western shores of the lower Caspian, near the remote wilds of Armenia, were clad in goat skin mantles and carried scimitars, and bows made of cane peculiar to their country.

The dress or costume worn by the Ethiopians was exceedingly picturesque. The Ethiopians included those who dwelt above Egypt, in Libya (now designated Abyssinia), and those from the sun-rise, who were marshalled with the Indians, and did not at all differ from the others in appearance, but only in their language and their hair. The eastern Ethiopians were straight haired, but the hair or wool of those of Libya was more curly than that of any other people. In addition to the Ethiopians, who dwelt in the country above Egypt (now known as Abyssinia), there were also Libyans from the northern coast of Africa, west of Egypt, extending to Cyrene, which was the extreme western boundary of the dominions of Xerxes. All the region south and west of Egypt as far as Cyrene was

then designated Libya. But the inhabitants of the land in the south were called Ethiopians. Those along the southern shores of the Mediterranean were called Libyans. The name Ethiopian was also given, as has been observed, to those inhabitants of Asia, who dwelt in the country west of India and the Indus and east of the Persian gulf, bordering on the Erythræan sea (Indian Ocean).

The Ethiopians who dwelt south of Egypt were clothed in panthers' and lions' skins, and carried long bows, not less than four cubits in length, made from the branches of the palm-tree, on which they placed short arrows of cane, tipped with a stone, which was made sharp, and of the sort on which they engrave seals. They also carried javelins tipped with antelopes' horn, made sharp like a lance. They carried also knotted clubs. When they go into battle they adorn themselves with war-paint, smearing one-half the body with chalk and the other half with red ochre. The Ethiopians from Asia, we are told, were accoutred almost like the Indians, except that they wore on their heads skins of horses' heads as masks, stripped off with the ears and mane, the ears were made to stand erect, while the mane served as a crest. As defensive armor they used the skins of cranes instead of shields.[1] It will be observed that the latter wore garments made of cotton cloth, and carried bows of cane, and arrows of cane tipped with iron.

The skins of wild beasts were also worn by the Bithynians and Thracians. These people originally inhabited that part of Thrace off which is the island of Thasos, and through which flowed the Strymon. Before the time of Xerxes these people migrated into Asia, to the country known as Bithynia, east of the Propontis and south of the Euxine, and for that reason

[1] Herod. vii, 70.

were called Bithynians. On their heads they wore fox-skins, and tunics around their body. Over the tunics they wore various colored cloaks. On their feet and legs they had buskins of fawn skin. They carried javelins, light bucklers, and small daggers.

Another very picturesque dress was worn by troops who dwelt in a country, the name of which is lost forever to posterity, by reason of the fact of a hiatus in the manuscript of Herodotus.[1] Only one word is missing, but that word was the name of the nation. With this exception the text is perfect. Wesseling, however, a distinguished scholar, believes that the name of the people here referred to was the Chalybians, who were in fact Scythians, and this view has been adopted by later scholars. These people had small shields made of raw hides, and each carried two javelins used for hunting wolves, and on their heads brazen helmets; in addition to the helmets they wore the ears and horns of an ox in brass. Over these were crests. As to their legs, they were wrapped in pieces of purple cloth. Among these people there is an oracle of Mars.

Among this mighty host the Persians displayed the greatest splendor, and were conspicuous for their great profusion of gold. They brought with them also covered chariots, and concubines in them, and a numerous and well-equipped train of attendants. The harems of these oriental Sybarites with their attendants and eunuchs were transported with the mighty stream of humanity on this wonderful expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Camels and other beasts of burden transported provisions for the special use of those of pure Persian blood.

Of cavalry 80,000 accompanied the expedition, besides camels and chariots. These mounted men were furnished by the following nations, Persia and the

[1] Herod. vii, 76.

Pactyans. The Medes and Cissians, Indians, Bactrians, Caspians, Libyans, the Caspirii, the Paricanii, and the Arabians. The cavalry commanders were Armamithres and Tithæus, sons of Datis.

The navy consisted of 1,207 ships, collected from the chief maritime ports of the Persian empire. Those who contributed the naval armament are as follows:

Phœnicians and Syrians of Palestine	Ships contributed		300
Egyptians	"	"	200
Cyprus, including those from Salamis and Athens Arcadia Cythnus Phœnicia and Ethiopia	"	"	150
Cilicians	"	"	100
Pamphylians	"	"	30
Lycians	"	"	50
Dorians (of Asia)	"	"	30
Carians	"	"	70
Ionians	"	"	100
The Islanders	"	"	17
Æolians	"	"	60
Hellespontines (except Abydos)	"	"	100
Total Navy			1,207

Herodotus must have seen the roster of this army, not only because of his minute and detailed description of the troops of the various countries, tribes and nations respectively, and the weapons they carried, but because he is also able to give the names of the respective commanders assigned to the men from each nation, tribe and country, and the names of their fathers also. After naming the country and describing the dress and accoutrements of its troops, he tells who commanded them. For example, referring to the troops from Lydia and Mysia, after describing their dress and accoutrements, he says: " Artaphernes, son of the Artaphernes, who was with Datis at Marathon, commanded the

Lydians and Mysians." [1] In like manner he calls the roll of nation after nation. Hystaspes, he says, son of Darius and Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, commanded the Bactrians and Sacæ. The Arabians and Ethiopians, who dwell above Egypt, were commanded by Arsames, son of Darius and Artystone, daughter of Cyrus, whom Darius loved more than all his wives, and whose image he had made of beaten gold. Sisamnes, son of Hydarnes, commanded the Arians. Bassaces, son of Artabanus, commanded the Thracians of Asia. And so on through the list, Herodotus calls the roll of the commanders of the army of Xerxes, no doubt as it appeared on the muster-roll prepared at Doriscus with so much care by the scribes and secretaries of the Great King.

The details are important in view of the fact that some very able and distinguished modern writers have expressed grave doubt as to the correctness of the numbers of the Persian army as recorded by Herodotus. Some deny his statements dogmatically, and others have declared that no muster-roll of the army ever existed. A careful analysis of all the facts, as evidenced by the record of Herodotus, is sufficient to sustain the integrity of his narrative, and to justify the conclusion that his estimate of the numerical strength of the army of Xerxes, and of the number of people he led into Greece, at least as to the fighting men as distinguished from the non-combatants, is correct.

Mr. Rawlinson assumes that the only mode in which the infantry were numbered was by having them enter and leave an enclosure which held 10,000 men, until all were numbered, and that this method of enumeration was rather crude, and wholly unreliable. From the fact, however, that commanders were appointed over bodies of thousands and of ten thousands, also over

[1] Herod. vii, 74.

hundreds and over tens, this conclusion is scarcely justified. These criticisms, as to the accuracy of Herodotus, will be discussed in the following chapter.

The commanders of the troops of the various tribes and countries, above referred to, we are told, set the army in order " and numbered them, and appointed commanders of thousands, and of ten thousands. But the commanders of ten thousands appointed the captains of hundreds, and captains of tens." (Herod. vii, 81.) We are also told the names of the commanders-in-chief of the whole army. Those who commanded the land forces were Mardonius, Tritantæchmes, Smerdomenes (both brothers of Darius and cousins of Xerxes), Masistes, Gergis and Megabyzus. These were the generals of the whole land force except the " Immortals," who were commanded by Hydarnes. Here we have a perfectly clear and detailed account first of the names of the subaltern generals, then of the generals of superior rank, commanding the entire land force, those who numbered the army and assigned the commanders over regiments and brigades or divisions or bodies of thousands, and bodies of ten thousands. We have the fact also that in the organizations of the forces, the regiments of one thousand were divided into companies of one hundred, and the latter into squads of tens.

These details of the organization of the Persian army are here given, with a view of showing that there seems to be no merit in the criticism of some modern scholars who doubt the accuracy of the statements of Herodotus on this point, especially in view of the fact that they give no arguments and rely solely on dogmatic assertion.

After his army had been numbered, Xerxes desired to inspect it. It was deployed on the plain of Doriscus extending for miles. Xerxes then drove in a chariot accompanied by his scribes or secretaries, and personally inspected his vast host by nations. As he passed the

various troops he made inquiries, and the answers which he received to all questions, his secretaries wrote down so that a record was kept of the information Xerxes received. Thus the Great King personally inspected his entire army both horse and foot. The navy was reviewed also. The ships were drawn out a short distance, then their prows were turned towards the land, leaving a sufficient space for the galley of Xerxes to sail between the beach and the prows of the entire line of vessels. The crews were armed as if for battle. Then Xerxes boarded a Sidonian ship and sat under a gilded canopy. He sailed in front of the prow of each vessel, asking questions as he had done while inspecting the army. All answers were written down, so that a careful record was made of the information received.

After the review and inspection of the available forces of the Great King, Herodotus gives us a verbatim report of the remarkable conversation Xerxes had with Demaratus, a former King of Sparta, who fled from his native city and took refuge in the Court of Darius. Indeed, Xerxes was under a debt of gratitude to Demaratus, who was largely instrumental in securing the decision of Darius, naming Xerxes as his successor. When the former was about to lead an army into Egypt to suppress the revolt there, he was obliged before leaving his capital to designate his successor. He had children who were born before he ascended the throne, and the children who were born after that event. It was upon the suggestion of Demaratus among others that Darius named Xerxes as his successor, because he was the first male child born to him, after he became king. Xerxes, therefore, held Demaratus in the highest esteem, and consulted him freely as to the habits and customs and the military prowess of his countrymen. After all it was not strange that he should consult him, when he remembered how many brave men of noble

blood his father lost at Marathon, and how his father's army, which outnumbered the Greeks ten to one, suffered overwhelming defeat at the hands of this small number of Hellenes, all of them Athenians, except the one thousand men from Platæa. When he recalled also the dismal forebodings of his uncle, Artabanus, and the advice he had given him, Xerxes sent for Demaratus and asked him whether in his opinion the Grecians would venture to lift their hands against him, "for as I think," said Xerxes, "if all the Grecians, and all the rest of the nations that dwell towards the west, were collected together, they would not be able to withstand my attack, unless they were united together. However, I am desirous to know what you say on this subject." Demaratus asked whether he could speak the truth, or speak only what was pleasing to the King. But he was admonished to speak only the truth. This is the remarkable answer he gave:

"Poverty has ever been familiar to Greece, but virtue has been acquired, having been accomplished by wisdom and firm laws; by the aid of which Greece has warded off poverty and tyranny. I commend, indeed, all the Greeks who dwell round those Doric lands; but I shall now proceed to speak not of all, but of the Lacedæmonians only. In the first place, I say it is not possible that they should ever listen to your proposals, which bring slavery on Greece. Secondly, that they will meet you in battle, even if all the rest of the Greeks should side with you. With respect to their number, you need not ask how many they are, that they are able to do this, for whether a thousand men or more or even less should have marched out, they will certainly give you battle."

Xerxes deemed the statement of Demaratus incredible, that a thousand men would think of giving battle to the tremendous host he was leading against them. He then tried to have the Spartan verify his answer,

as to the courage of his countrymen, by asking if Demaratus, being a Spartan, was willing on the spot to fight single-handed with ten men, reminding him that if all his citizens were as Demaratus represented them, he being their King, ought by the institutions of his country to be matched against twice that number, because if each of his former subjects was a match for ten men, he ought to be a match for twenty, if his boast were correct. "Let us consider every probability," said Xerxes. "How could a thousand men, or even ten thousand, or even fifty thousand, being all equally free, and not subject to the command of a single person, resist such an army as this? For if they are five thousand, we are more than a thousand against one. Were they, indeed, according to our custom, subject to the command of a single person, they might, through fear of him, prove superior to their natural courage, and compelled by the lash, might, though fewer, attract a greater number; but now being left to their own free will, they will do nothing of the kind. And I am of opinion that even if they were equal in numbers, the Grecians would hardly contend with the Persians alone. For there are Persians among my body-guards, who would readily encounter three Greeks at once." [1]

Demaratus answered that he did not pretend to be able to fight with ten men, nor with two, and would not willingly fight with one, but in case of necessity would most willingly fight with one of those men who pretended to be singly a match for three Greeks. That in single combat the Lacedæmonians were inferior to none; but together are the bravest of all men. For though free, their freedom was not absolute, as they had a master over them, the law. They do whatever it enjoins "and it ever enjoins the same thing," said Demaratus, "forbidding them to fly from battle before

[1] Herod. vii, 103.

any number of men, but to remain in their ranks, and conquer or die."

This is the remarkable colloquy between the Persian and Spartan with respect to the valor of the Greeks. The statements of Demaratus, however, were ridiculed by Xerxes, though he evinced no anger towards his guest, but treated him with marked kindness, notwithstanding the fact that he entirely discredited his opinions.

In view of the doubt which has been cast upon the accuracy of the narrative of Herodotus with respect to the numerical strength of the army of Xerxes by prominent critics, it will be necessary in the following chapter to examine the views entertained by some of them on this point.

CHAPTER XVII

SECOND PERSIAN WAR — NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMY OF XERXES — HERODOTUS AND HIS CRITICS

THERE is nothing more fascinating in the military annals of Greece than the last attempt of Persia to conquer Hellas, and extend her dominions to the gates of Hercules. One of the most interesting incidents connected with this attempt involves the inquiry as the numerical strength of the army of Xerxes, which, prior to the Austro-Servian War of 1914, was universally conceded to have been the most stupendous military force ever assembled. This question has attracted the attention of many scholars and historians, and considerable controversy has arisen as to the accuracy of the account furnished by Herodotus, who has placed the number of combatants at 2,641,000 and estimates that the number of non-combatants was at least equal to that of the fighting men, thus making the grand total of the force of Xerxes 5,282,000. These figures at first blush seem to be incredible and not worthy of belief, because such a multitude in an army was never before heard of, and seems altogether contrary to human experience. In this connection, we might suggest that it is estimated that Moses led 3,000,000 Hebrew slaves out of the land of Egypt. This surmise alone, however, is not sufficient to overthrow the narrative of Herodotus in view of the fact that it contains internal evidence that in the preparation of his work, he must have had access to official

data and authentic written documents, prepared at Doriscus, under the eye of Xerxes himself.

There are evidences also which will be referred to presently to indicate that the narrative of Herodotus on this particular subject is absolutely correct, at least as to the fighting men, and that as to the number of non-combatants there is such a strong probability as to his accuracy as to throw the burden of proof upon those who assail his credibility. It is our purpose now to examine some of the arguments which have been advanced by scholars and learned men who refuse to credit the accuracy of Herodotus on this point. The examination is especially important in this skeptical age, in which the fad seems to be to break down the records of the past simply for effect and with a view to attracting public attention. Of course, the truth is desirable at all times, but the iconoclast must base his discoveries on authentic and reliable evidence, rather than on mere dogmatic assertion.

The first consideration which presents itself is as to the witnesses competent to speak on the subject. It would seem that if we exclude Ctesias these are confined to Æschylus and Herodotus himself. It is true that the latter was but four years of age when the Persian troops were reviewed at Doriscus, but we may assume that he knew Æschylus well for he lived until Herodotus attained the age of twenty-eight. The latter doubtless frequently conversed with the soldier-poet, who was present at Marathon and Artemisium at Salamis and Platæa, and probably received from him much information which he incorporated in his history. Both were literary men, both were deeply interested in the subject of the Persian invasion. Æschylus must have talked with Persians, taken in battle. From these eye-witnesses who saw the review at Doriscus and were familiar with the incidents which occurred on the march through Asia Minor, Thrace and Macedonia, he learned

much which he used in his plays, many of which have perished. Posterity, however, may still read his great tragic drama, "The Persians," in which he describes the battle of Salamis. In view of this fact, it may be said that Æschylus, who was himself a living witness of the events discussed, was also a contemporaneous writer, because in "The Persians" he puts in the mouth of the herald or messenger, who hastened from the scene of battle, to communicate the tale of disaster and defeat to the palace at Susa, to Atossa, daughter of Cyrus the Great, sister of Cambyses, widow of Darius and mother of Xerxes. Æschylus is an authority for Herodotus as to the number of ships commanded by the Persians, which he states were 1,207.

The only other writer within the limits of reasonable propinquity was Ctesias. He was a physician, born at Cnidus in Caria, Asia Minor, and was taken prisoner by the Persians, B. C. 415, and spent seventeen years at the Persian Court, where he acted as private physician to Artaxerxes. He accompanied him in his expedition against his younger brother Cyrus, and was present at the battle of Cunaxa, B. C. 401, where the latter was killed. He wrote a history of Persia, nearly a century after the battle of Salamis. Only fragments of his work remain. He had access to Persian archives and derived his materials largely from Persian sources. His chief object was to discredit Herodotus, in order to please his benefactors. His writings contain nothing which might cast discredit on the memory of Xerxes, the father of his illustrious patient. His tastes and inclinations were Persian. He entertained no sympathy with his kinsmen in Greece, or with the loyal Greeks in Asia Minor. As an authority, therefore, his history is worthless. Ctesias places the number of the army of Xerxes at 800,000 and his navy at 1,000 ships. He can scarcely be said to be a contemporaneous historian. Diodorus, a Greek historian of antiquity, Ælianus or Ælian, who flourished about A. D. 180, who also wrote Greek, and the late Professor Curtius, in his very able and interesting history of Greece, have for some reason adopted the figures of Ctesias. The latter, however, makes no comment or criticism as to the accuracy of the narrative of Herodotus on this point. We have also the judgment of Professor Rawlinson, one of the greatest scholars of his time, who declares that the work of Ctesias is wholly unreliable and unworthy of credit. These reasons justify the assertion, therefore, that Herodotus and Æschylus are the only reliable witnesses and contemporaneous authorities whose writings have come down to us.

What data, then, did Herodotus have for his narrative, and on what sort of evidence was it based? Did he have documentary evidence before him when he wrote, or was his authority oral information obtained from extended talks and desultory conversation with eye-witnesses? The crucial point in this connection is as to whether there was an official muster-roll of the Persian army prepared at Doriscus, and if so, did Herodotus have access to it, or to a copy of it.

This question has been discussed by Mr. Grote and Professor Rawlinson, men distinguished for their ability and learning. The former is the author of the most exhaustive and scholarly history of Greece yet written. The latter renowned for his scholarship and proficiency in ancient history, and his historical works in which is portrayed the career of the empires of early antiquity. These two eminent men disagree upon the crucial point involved in the inquiry; namely, as to whether there was a written document, or official muster-roll of the army of Xerxes. The correct answer to this inquiry ought to be sufficient to settle the question, because if no such documentary evidence existed, as Mr. Grote is inclined to believe, the narrative of Herodotus must have been based on information received from eye-witnesses,

collected and digested in the form of the narrative written by him, and as we have it to-day. Such evidence, which is not derived from written sources, must be considered in connection with the frailties and infirmities of human memory. Mr. Rawlinson, however, contends that the narrative as we have it, with its minute details, which includes not only the names of the generals and commanders of the great armament, but the names of their fathers also, could not possibly have been compiled without access to written documents and must, of necessity, have been prepared after a careful study of official records, or copies, to which the writer had access. If Mr. Rawlinson is correct as to the existence of documentary evidence, as the basis of the narrative of Herodotus, some of his conclusions as to the accuracy of the numerical strength of the Persian army can not well be justified. If Herodotus had access to the official muster-roll of the army, or to a transcript taken from the original, then at least as to the number of fighting men, as distinguished from the number of non-combatants, his narrative bears conclusive evidence of its accuracy. The observations of these eminent latter day historians are interesting.

On the point that the account of Herodotus was based on documentary evidence, Mr. Rawlinson rests his conclusions (1) on the minuteness of the details comprising a description of the dress and armor of forty-six nations; (2) the mode in which he tells us the army was marshalled, whether separately or in combination with others; (3) the names given of the commanders and other generals, including thirty-nine admirals, with the names of their fathers also. These convincing details, Mr. Rawlinson declares, furnish positive proof " that the foundation of the whole is not desultory inquiry, but a document."

The preponderance of evidence on this important point clearly supports his views. The minute details

as to the organization of that vast armament show conclusively, if they show anything, not only that a careful, accurate and complete muster-roll was prepared by the secretaries and scribes of Xerxes, but that Herodotus must have had access to it at the time he wrote his history. Otherwise it would have been absolutely impossible for him, more than a quarter of a century after the event, to have written his remarkable and detailed account of the Persian armament, and to have described it as it was marshalled on the plain of Doriscus. There is nothing in historical literature, which has since been written, that surpasses it in clearness and detail. We can now, after the lapse of nearly twenty-three centuries, call the roll of the chief officers of the Persian army, that marched with Xerxes into Europe to enslave Greece.

Notwithstanding this clear and convincing narrative, Mr. Cox, in his very clever short history of Greece, says: " There is, however, no solid foundation for the belief that Herodotus, in drawing up his narrative, had before him the official muster-rolls of the Persian army. We have no sufficient ground for thinking that such muster-rolls ever existed, or that, if they existed, they were left in any place where they would become accessible to the historian."

The solid foundation for the belief that such a muster-roll existed, and that Herodotus had access to it, is obvious from the fact that in the absence of documentary evidence, it would have been an impossibility for Herodotus or any one else, more than a quarter of a century after the review of that army, to have called the roll of its principal commanders, and given a perfect and accurate description of the entire armament as it appeared at Doriscus B. C. 480. The memory of the bard and the poet in the ages of antiquity was wonderful, it is true, but we have no record of any great poem containing the details of the numbers of

the Persian army, or the data from which such numbers could have been compiled. True, Æschylus, shortly after the battle of Salamis, wrote his great tragic drama, "The Persians." But his work contains no sufficient data upon which to construct the detailed narrative of Herodotus. As has been observed, Æschylus was a contemporary of Herodotus, and the latter doubtless consulted him, and received perhaps interesting material which he used, because Æschylus fought at Marathon and Artemisium at Salamis and Platæa. But there is nothing in "The Persians" to justify the belief that Herodotus got any data for his history from the poem.

But Mr. Cox, in view of the fact that as to the number of ships, the drama of Æschylus corroborates Herodotus, and perhaps convinced of the fact that there must have been some written evidence from which Herodotus procured his data, does not strengthen his argument by resorting to a "spurious or forged" muster-roll. He argues that no muster-roll ever existed, but if it did exist, that it was not accessible. But in the face of corroborating proof from the drama of Æschylus, as to the ships, he resorts to the theory of a "spurious or forged" document.

As to the numerical strength of the Persian army, many modern writers follow the conclusions of Mr. Grote and Professor Rawlinson, without independent inquiry or investigation. In pursuing this subject, however, it will be necessary to distinguish as between the fighting men and the non-combatants. As to the latter, Herodotus professes to give only his own estimate as to their number, based on his knowledge of surrounding facts.

With reference to the combatants, then, upon what grounds, and upon what evidence do Mr. Grote and Mr. Rawlinson base their conclusions, as to the accuracy of the narrative of the great historian. In this connection, after quoting the figures, given by Herodotus, Mr. Grote observes:

"So stands the prodigious estimate of his army, the whole strength of the eastern world; in clear and express figures of Herodotus, who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater, for he conceives the number of 'camp followers' as not only equal to but considerably larger than that of fighting men. To admit this overwhelming total or anything near to it, is obviously impossible; yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn upon Herodotus are no way merited."

But the bare conclusion of a writer so eminent and highly esteemed as Mr. Grote, that he cannot credit the statement of another eminent writer as to some particular historical fact, proves nothing. Herodotus, as has been observed, has given an array of facts and convincing details which are amply sufficient to sustain his conclusions and the truth of his narrative. In other words, Herodotus, in treating his subject, has made a *prima facie* case, and the burden is on his critics to show that he is mistaken. In this, those who assail his accuracy, or his opinions, must advance sound argument, and give some plausible reason to show wherein he is mistaken, and point out clearly why his statements or conclusions are erroneous. We most respectfully submit that Mr. Grote has not done this, because there is a discrepancy and infirmity in the argument he advances, which we will refer to presently, which weakens his conclusions. His reasons are not sufficient to discredit the accuracy of Herodotus, or to justify the conclusion that he is mistaken.

For example, Mr. Grote says that it is highly improbable that Herodotus ever saw the roster of the army of Xerxes at Doriscus, or at any other place, and concludes that no muster-roll of the army ever existed. On this vital point, Mr. Rawlinson does not

concur in the views of his friend and contemporary. In order to explain how Herodotus could have prepared his narrative with its array of convincing details, without access to written documents, Mr. Grote says that he must have conversed with many persons who were present at the review at Doriscus " and had learned the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators."

Here we have the significant admission that there were enumerators; that they numbered the armament; that these numbers were recorded in such manner that " separate totals " were arrived at. Is not this admission sufficient to support the contention of Heeren, Rawlinson and other scholars, that a muster-roll was prepared, and that the document or documents embracing it, or copies of it, were extant when Herodotus wrote? Are not these statements of Mr. Grote absolutely inconsistent with his prior observations that no muster-roll ever existed? Is it probable or possible that the details of the most stupendous military force that the world ever saw could have been communicated orally to Herodotus, and that isolated facts could have been furnished to him by many witnesses from which he could have composed his wonderful description of the vast hosts at Doriscus, with an accuracy of detail that carries conviction? The only conclusion, which is probable, in view of all the facts, is that there was a muster-roll thorough and complete in all its details, at least as to the infantry and fighting men of the fleet, giving numbers, names of commanders and subalterns of all grades, and that the document or a copy of it was studied by Herodotus, and furnished the data for his narrative. Professor Arnold Herman Ludwig Heeren, a distinguished German scholar, and voluminous author, in his " Nations of Antiquity," accepts the catalogue of the host of Xerxes, as Herodotus has given it, which he regards as one of the most interesting of all the

records of history to the mind of the philosophical historian.

If it is conceded that the muster-roll was made, then the reason for impeaching the accuracy of Herodotus fails. In order to discredit his narrative, it is necessary to impeach the accuracy of the muster-roll, and to show that the number of combatants therein enumerated are grossly exaggerated. This last assumption as to the inaccuracy of the roster is a mere conjecture. It is pure invention, resorted to to support the conclusion that somehow somebody is mistaken. There are no facts given by anybody to support the conclusion that Xerxes lied in his muster-roll, or caused it to be padded to gratify his selfish pride. On the contrary, after his defeat, the documents being in his control at all times, it would have been to his interest to have diminished materially the number of his forces, to show that his army was not so formidable. But as to this we shall refer presently. On this point Mr. Grote says:

" There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate; an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself, so that the military total of land force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives at 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ may be dismissed as unwarranted and indefensible."

It will be observed that Mr. Grote concedes the number of ships stated by Herodotus to be correct, because he says nothing about the ships, but only " the land force and ships' crews."

The difficulty with his argument is that it is based on mere conjecture, mere dogmatic assertion, without any facts or even tradition or vague rumors to support it. To say that there would be no motive for the enumerators, or those who compiled the muster-roll of

the army, to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate, is a mere conclusion based only on surmise. There is not even a rumor or tradition cited from any source to support the statement. There is no mention of the fact, if it was a fact, that Xerxes was ever accused by any contemporary with padding his muster-roll. But after his defeat he was doubtless diligent in having it appear that his armament was small. Ctesias, who wrote more than eighty years after the battle of Salamis, undertook the task of impeaching the history of Herodotus, but scholars concede that his undertaking was a failure. He gives the number of Xerxes' land forces at 800,000, exclusive of chariots, and of his fleet as 1,000.

The only other contemporaneous authority, if we may class Ctesias as a contemporary, is the poet Æschylus. Doubtless Herodotus conversed many times with this gifted man. In "The Persians," he describes the battle of Salamis, but only makes a brief reference to Platæa. He gives the number of ships of the Persian fleet at Salamis as 1,207. The words which the poet puts in the mouth of the herald, who hastened from the scene of the conflict with the news of the naval disaster to inform Atossa, who received him at the palace in Susa are as follows:

> Know — if mere count of ships could win the day,
> The Persians had prevailed. The Greeks in sooth
> Had but three hundred galleys at the most,
> And other ten, select and separate.
> But — I am witness — Xerxes held command
> Of full a thousand keels, and those apart,
> Two hundred more, and seven, for speed renowned;
> So stands the reckoning, who shall dare
> To say we Persians had the lesser host.

The above translation is by Morshead. Miss Anna Swanwick thus renders the lines:

> But Xerxes, this I know, led fifty score,
> While those for swiftness most preëminent,
> Two hundred were and seven.

There is a slight discrepancy between the narrative of Herodotus and the account in the drama of Æschylus as to the number of ships in this; the former gives the number at Doriscus as 1,207. In the storms that ensued off the coast of Eubœa, and in the naval engagements at Artemisium, 647 ships were lost, while but 120 were added to the fleet. Consequently Xerxes' naval force at Salamis must have numbered but 680. It is clear, therefore, that the poet states the number as originally enrolled at Doriscus.

Professor Rawlinson gives a plausible reason to show that this discrepancy is more apparent than real. He observes that the fleet was counted but once. When Æschylus inquired its number of the captives taken at Salamis, they would tell him the number as ascertained at Doriscus. The testimony of Herodotus and Æschylus, who agree as to the number of ships, is contradicted only by Ctesias.

What then becomes of the assumption that Xerxes must have padded his muster-roll, and greatly exaggerated the numbers composing his armament? It is conceded that the number of ships in his fleet at Doriscus is correctly stated at 1,207. If this is correct, then there was no exaggeration as to the number of vessels. It is claimed, however, that the exaggeration was as to the number composing the crews. If the motive of Xerxes was to exaggerate, why did he not exaggerate the number of ships also, as well as their crews? He could have requested his enumerators to write in the records 2,414 ships just as easily as 1,207, the correct number. Or if one hundred per cent. seemed too great an increase, the number could have been placed at 1,810, which would have been but fifty per cent. over the actual number. It can hardly be assumed that if

the object of the King was to gratify his foolish pride, by increasing his armament on paper, that he would have increased it, as to the army alone and not as to the navy.

On the question, however, as to the numerical strength of the army, Mr. Rawlinson adopts the views of his friend and contemporary, Mr. Grote, although he believes there was a muster-roll, and that Herodotus had access to it. He does not, however, advance any argument to sustain his theory, other than suggestions and suppositions which had already been advanced by Mr. Grote. He adopts the theory of the latter that the number of the infantry was greatly exaggerated, and declares that their number "could only be guessed at." Indeed, Mr. Rawlinson, on this point, indulges almost wholly in conjecture. He says:

"The Asiatic infantry was no doubt purposely exaggerated by its commanders, who did order their men, when they entered the enclosure, not to stand close together. The amount of this exaggeration, it is almost impossible to estimate, but it can scarcely have amounted to so much as one-half."

But he gives no facts, and no authority from any writer of antiquity (with all of whom he was very familiar), to sustain his surmise, for it is nothing but a surmise. The opinions of men like Rawlinson or Grote would indeed have very great weight, in the absence of any contemporaneous authority on the subject. But the opinions given by them are directly contrary to those expressed by Herodotus, who must have based his statements upon positive evidence obtained both from written data, and from statements of living witnesses.

Mr. Rawlinson assumes, in support of his conclusion, that the only mode employed for numbering the infantry was by measurement, marching them into an enclosure capable of holding just ten thousand men,

which was filled 170 times. He then states positively that when the men entered the enclosure, their commanders ordered them "not to stand close together." This assumption is scarcely worthy of serious consideration, because computation by measure was not the only means employed to number the infantry, and also for the reason as stated above, that if it was desired to make a false count, it would not have been confined to the army only, but would have extended to the ships of the navy also. It may be conceded that the method employed for numbering the troops, by marching them into an enclosure, capable of holding just ten thousand men, was somewhat crude, and not entirely reliable, although Mr. Rawlinson tells us it had long been resorted to by the Persians, and was quite a customary method with them. It is obvious, however, that this mode of enumeration was but an initial method, because, after it was measured, the army was counted; organized into companies of one hundred, and regiments of one thousand, and these again were formed into divisions of ten thousand, each division being composed of ten regiments. The decimal system was used, for the companies were divided into squads of ten. In this way any errors made in the method of enumeration by use of the enclosure, would readily be corrected. This work of organizing the army was done by the commanders whose names are given. "They set the army in order," says Herodotus, "and numbered them and appointed commanders of thousands, and of ten thousands. But the commanders of ten thousand appointed the captains of hundreds and captains of tens."

Mr. Rawlinson says that in estimating the numbers of the Persian army, in some instances, Herodotus made merely a "rough guess." In this connection it is important to quote the words of the historian. He says:

"The numbers were at this time (referring to the time when Thermopylæ was reached), as I find by calculations the following amount: of those in ships from Asia amounting to 1,207, originally the whole number of the several nations was 241,400 men allowing 200 to each ship; and on these ships 30 Persians, Medes and Sacæ served as marines in addition to the native crews of each. This further number amounts to 36,210. To this and the former number, I add those that were on the penteconters, supposing eighty men on the average to be on board of each; but, as I have said before, 3,000 of these vessels were assembled; therefore the men on board of them must have been 240,000. This then was the naval force from Asia, the total being 517,610.

"Of infantry there were 1,700,000 and of cavalry 80,000. To these I add the Arabians who rode camels, and the Libyans who drove chariots reckoning the number at 20,000 men. Accordingly, the numbers on board ships and on the land added together, make up 2,317,610. This is the force assembled from Asia itself, exclusive of the servants that followed, and the provision ships, and the men that were on board them.

"The force brought from Europe must still be added to this whole number that has been summed up, but it is necessary to speak by guess." [1]

Herodotus then enumerates thirteen nations, who furnished the European forces including 120 ships furnished by Grecians from Thrace and contiguous islands, which he estimates in all at 324,000 men, which, added to the 2,317,610 Asiatics makes the grand total of combatants 2,641,610.

Mr. Rawlinson tabulates these numbers with comments as follows:

[1] Herod. vii, 184, 185.

Infantry	1,700,000,	Measured at Doriscus.
Cavalry	80,000,	Common report, probably counted at Doriscus.
Arabs and Libyans	20,000,	Rough guess.
Crews of Triremes	241,400,	Calculated from 1207 known number of triremes, 200 to each.
Armed force on Triremes	36,210,	Calculated from 1207 known number of triremes, 30 to each.
Crews of smaller vessels	240,000,	Rough guess from supposed number 3,000 and presumed average crew of 80.
Land Army, Europeans	300,000,	Rough guess.
Crews of triremes, Europeans	24,000,	Calculated from number of triremes likely to be known.
Total forces	2,641,610	

Mr. Rawlinson then revises the careful calculations and estimates of Herodotus to suit his own conjectures. He says that the following numbers appear to be beyond suspicion, which we tabulate for convenience, as follows:

Crews of Triremes, Asiatic	241,400
" " " European	24,000
Armed forces on Asiatic Triremes	36,210
Asiatic Cavalry (a low estimate)	80,000
Approved as correct	381,610

The following numbers Mr. Rawlinson considers open to question:

Crews of penteconters and smaller vessels guessed at 3,000 supposed average 80	240,000
From this estimate Mr. Rawlinson deducts	200,000
Mr. Rawlinson's estimate or guess	40,000
Arabs and Libyans	20,000
Mr. Rawlinson deducts	10,000
Mr. Rawlinson's estimate	10,000

Land forces, Europeans	300,000
Mr. Rawlinson deducts two-thirds	200,000
Mr. Rawlinson's estimate	100,000
Asiatic Infantry	1,700,000
Mr. Rawlinson deducts	700,000
Mr. Rawlinson's estimate	1,000,000

Referring to the Asiatic forces, Herodotus explicitly states that his results were obtained by calculation. As to the European forces, however, he says that he can speak only from conjecture. The forces, from Europe, were not present at Doriscus, but were drafted on the march after leaving the scene of the grand review. When Xerxes advanced from Doriscus "he forced all the nations through which he passed to take part in the expedition." (Her. vii, 108.) There is no mention of any review of these forces, which were enrolled on the march in Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly. For convenience we tabulate the figures as to the strength of the Persian army, when it reached Thermopylæ as follows:

Naval Forces from Asia

In 1207 Asiatic ships, allowing a crew of 200 to each ship	241,400	
Marines, Persians, Medes and Saccæ; 30 in each ship	36,210	
80 men on each of the 3,000 Penteconters	240,000	
Total Naval Forces from Asia		517,610

Land Forces from Asia

Infantry	1,700,000	
Cavalry	80,000	
Arabs on camels, and Libyans who drove chariots	20,000	
Total from Asia		1,800,000
Total land and naval forces		2,317,610

Of the troops recruited in Europe, Herodotus expressly declares it is necessary to speak from conjecture. These were estimated as follows:

European Forces

Greeks from Thrace and neighboring islands in 120 ships	24,000	
Other European land forces	300,000	
Total European forces	324,000	
Total from Asia		2,317,610
Total from Europe (estimated)		324,000
Total force of fighting men		2,641,610
Number of servants, camp followers and crews of provision ships and other vessels, which accompanied the fleet — not less than the number of fighting men		2,641,610
Total armament of Xerxes		5,283,220

The careful computations, and studied estimates made by Herodotus, who derived his information from written documents and official data, to which he had access, as Mr. Rawlinson concedes, and from information obtained from eye-witnesses, has been revised and corrected by the distinguished Oxford scholar, writing more than twenty-two centuries later, and we are asked to substitute the revised summary of the latter for the careful enumeration of the first great historian, whose accuracy has never been questioned by any contemporaneous author except Ctesias, whose principal object was to impeach the integrity of Herodotus. Here is the summary of Mr. Rawlinson, who confessedly bases his conclusions on what might with propriety be termed a "rough guess."

MR. RAWLINSON'S ESTIMATES

Asiatic Infantry about	1,000,000
" Cavalry "	80,000

Libyans in chariots about	10,000	
European land force "	100,000	
Total land force.....	1,190,000	1,190,000
Crews of Asiatic triremes	241,400	
Armed force on Asiatic triremes.....	36,210	
Crews of smaller vessels about	40,000	
Crews of European triremes.....	24,000	
Total sea force	341,610	341,610
Total fighting force		1,531,610
Strength of armament of Xerxes given by Herodotus	2,641,000	
Strength of armament as revised by Mr. Rawlinson	1,531,610	
Total deductions	1,109,390	

A synopsis of Mr. Rawlinson's argument to sustain his reasons for correcting and revising the record of Herodotus may be summarized as follows: He says in regard to the crews of smaller vessels: (1) " The crews of the penteconters and smaller vessels, which are guessed at 3,000 in number with a supposed average crew of eighty giving a total of 240,000 men. The average of 80 seems unduly large since it is difficult to suppose that even the crew of a penteconter much exceeded that number, and the smaller vessels must have carried very many less. Perhaps 40 or 50 would be a fairer average. And the number of three thousand might safely be reduced to one, for the trireme had now become the ordinary ship of war. These reductions would strike off 200,000 men."

Herodotus had no data on which to base the number of the European contingent, and says so. He declares as to these it is necessary to speak by guess. As to the vessels, however, he speaks positively. Mr. Rawlinson says that the crew of a penteconter did not *much* exceed eighty. The smaller vessels to which he refers are the Trieconters, light boats and long horse transports. We have no record as to the number of these, aside from the penteconters. Mr. Rawlinson concedes that the crews of the penteconters exceeded 80, but how much in excess of that number he does not state. Herodotus, however, who knew the usual number of the crew of the penteconter, gives a general average of 80 to 3,000 auxiliary vessels, and no reason has been shown on which to impeach his judgment as to this, and Mr. Rawlinson's assumption is mere conjecture. Indeed, we may be justified in assuming that this auxiliary fleet was composed chiefly of penteconters.

(2) Again Mr. Rawlinson observes: " The Arabs and Libyans seem overrated at 20,000. If the entire cavalry to which so many of the chief nations contributed was not more than 80,000, the camels are not likely to have reached 10,000. It must be doubted, too, whether the Arabian camel riders, who were stationed *in the rear*, did not really belong to the baggage train, in which case Herodotus would have counted them twice."

What is there to support the assumption that the Arabs and Libyans were overrated at 20,000? Herodotus says the Libyans drove chariots, and the Arabians rode camels. The latter were in the rear of the horses, for the horse cannot endure the smell of a camel, and when placed behind them, become unmanageable. Herodotus reckons these at 20,000 and no good reason is given to substitute the number 10,000 upon a mere statement that the camels and chariots are not likely " to have reached 10,000."

(3) As to the European land force, Mr. Rawlinson says it fell " probably far short of 300,000," as the levies were hastily raised on the line of march of the Persian army, and was " not likely to have reached one-third that amount."

Mr. Rawlinson, however, overlooks the fact that these levies were not " hastily raised on the line of march." Preparations for this expedition had been

made on a large scale for several years; magazines and stores had been laid up on the line of march, by natives in Thrace and Macedonia, as well as in Asia, who had been ordered to prepare food and supplies of all kinds in anticipation of the necessities of the great armament contemplated by Darius, and later by his son Xerxes. The European levies were doubtless recruited long before the Persian army reached Doriscus and the careful estimate of Herodotus, who after enumerating the nations or tribes who furnished the troops, estimates the number at 300,000.

(4) As to the Asiatic infantry, 1,700,000, the argument used by Mr. Rawlinson in support of his claim that it did not reach more than 1,000,000 is that the number "was no doubt purposely exaggerated by its commanders, who ordered their men, when they entered the enclosure not to stand close together. The amount of this exaggeration it is almost impossible to estimate, but it can scarcely have amounted to so much as one-half."

The weakness of this position is obvious because, as has been already observed, if the intention was to augment the real number of the force of Xerxes, it is fair to presume that the fictitious increase would not have been confined to the infantry alone, and that no attempt would have been made to augment the cavalry forces, the crews of the Asiatic and European triremes, or the number of ships. If the reason for distrusting the number of infantry was based on the assumption that the men were measured and not counted, the answer is that they were counted after they were measured and assigned to company's regiments, and divisions each containing definite numbers — 10 men to a file, 10 files to a company, 10 companies to a regiment and 10 regiments to a division, all clearly set forth in the narrative of Herodotus.

Herodotus is further supported by the popular belief

at the time. The current report as to the number of barbarians Leonidas encountered, was that Xerxes commanded 3,000,000 at Thermopylæ, as appears by the inscriptions on the monuments erected on the field. In memory of those who fell at the pass, Herodotus says the following inscription has been engraved over them: "Four thousand from Peloponnesus once fought on this spot with three hundred myriads."

With respect to the non-combatants, a somewhat different question is presented. Herodotus does not say that the number he estimates is based upon an accurate count, or enumeration. He makes no such claim.

"I think," says Herodotus, "that the servants who followed them" (the fighting men), "and with those on board the provision ships and other vessels that sailed with the fleet, were not fewer than the fighting men, but more numerous; but supposing them to be equal in number with the fighting men, they make up the former number of myriads. . . . Of women who made bread, and concubines and eunuchs, no one could mention the number with any accuracy." [1]

As to the non-combatants, therefore, Herodotus deserves not censure, but is rather to be commended for his clear and convincing statements. He says plainly that as to these followers of the army no one can mention the number with any accuracy. But what Herodotus believes, as distinguished from that for which he had reliable evidence, must have been founded on data and observation which his modern critics in this age do not possess. We must not forget that Herodotus stands before us in the pages he has written as a witness, and the only contemporaneous witness we have of the scenes he describes in the Second Persian War. True, he was but four years of age when Xerxes reviewed and numbered his troops at Doriscus, but there

[1] Herod. vii, 186-187.

can be no question that he saw the muster-roll of that army if it was in existence a quarter of a century after it was made by the royal scribes by command of Xerxes. He talked, also, with men who had seen it and discussed fully with them the details of the grand review which he describes so graphically. He talked with men who fought at Artemisium and at Salamis. He is careful and painstaking throughout his work. His fondness for the stories, the anecdotes, and the gossip of his time, does not weaken the historical value of his narrative, for the reason that he is always careful to give these interesting bits of information for what they are worth, and tells the reader he must discriminate as to the weight to be given to them. He devoted years in collecting material for his work and visited personally many places described in his history. No man was better qualified than Herodotus to judge of the number of non-combatants with the army of Xerxes. His candid opinion is that the non-combatants, as matter of fact, outnumbered the fighting men. To be on the safe side, however, he makes his estimate of the number of the former the same as the number of the latter.

Those who claim that this estimate is not trustworthy do not furnish any facts upon which to have us credit their statements. Mr. Rawlinson observes as to the non-combatants:

"With respect to the non-combatants, Mr. Grote's remark (Hist. Greece, Vol. 5, p. 48) is most sound, that Herodotus has applied a Greek standard to a case where such application is wholly unwarranted. The crews of the vessels would decidedly have had no attendants and the 'great mass of the army' would likewise have been without them. 'A few grandees might be richly provided,' yet even their attendants would mostly have carried arms, and been counted among the infantry. It was therefore scarcely necessary for Herodotus to have made any addition at all to his estimate

on the score of attendants, and if he made any, it should have been very trivial."

The observations are wholly unauthorized, and derive their chief importance from the eminence and ability of the men, who suggest them. Mr. Grote, quoted in this connection by Mr. Rawlinson, is eminently fair, and while he does not credit the statement of Herodotus as to the numbers of the Persian army, observes that "the disparaging remarks which it has drawn upon Herodotus, are no way merited."

Mr. Rawlinson's suggestion that it was "scarcely necessary for Herodotus to have made any addition at all to his estimate, on the score of attendants, and if he made any, it should have been very trivial," are unjust and wholly unwarranted. If Mr. Rawlinson means that Herodotus should only have given an account of the fighting men, and said nothing at all about the non-combatants, the observation has no force, because, it was intended by the author to show how many people accompanied Xerxes on his memorable expedition. But if the point made is that in giving the number of non-combatants, Herodotus should have given his estimate of these so far as numbers are concerned as "very trivial," we respectfully ask, why? Is it because Mr. Grote suggests that the only attendants might have been those who accompanied "a few grandees" and that even these usually bore arms, and were counted with the infantry? The facts, however, do not warrant this assumption. Professor Curtius, a man of great learning, a distinguished scholar and writer, in his history of Greece, refers to the Persians as habitually luxurious and declares that on this expedition they had their women with them. "The Persians," he says, "were distinguished before all the rest of the troops, as members of the ruling race; they glittered in gold, and were accompanied by their women, and numerous servants, having their separate train assigned to them

in the army." (Curtius, Hist. Greece, Vol. 2, p. 277.)

Another point apparently overlooked by those who seek to discredit Herodotus, is the fact that practically the entire male population of the ruling race, the Persians, and likewise the Medes, accompanied this expedition. They travelled into Europe with their women, their eunuchs, their slaves and attendants, who surrounded them in the camp, and on the march just as they attended and surrounded them at home. Herodotus characterizes them as "women who made bread, and concubines and eunuchs," and servants and those on board provision ships and other vessels. In view of these facts, as Mr. Grote correctly says, Herodotus does not merit the unjust criticism which has been made by some modern writers.

Until some argument is advanced to show how Herodotus was mistaken, there is no reason to discredit the estimate of the great historian as the number of non-combatants, who accompanied the army of Xerxes in the second Persian war.

One plausible argument on which the credibility of Herodotus might possibly be assailed, is the probability that the presence of such a great number of human beings passing in a body through the country was not consistent with conditions of possible subsistence, to support such a vast multitude. This point occurred to Herodotus himself. He discusses it, and shows that he made estimates and computations to show the quantity of food that such an armament would consume daily. On this point he doubtless consulted intelligent eye-witnesses who accompanied Xerxes on the march, and others who had talked with Persian officers, on the subject. From his thorough treatment of the matter, it is obvious that the historian exhausted all available sources of information. After stating the grand total of human beings, including all camp followers, and non-

combatants 5,283,270, he observes: "I am not astonished that the streams of such rivers failed, but rather, it is a wonder to me, how provisions held out for so many myriads. For I find by calculation, if each man had a chœnix of wheat daily, and no more, one hundred and ten thousand, three hundred and forty medimini (equivalent to 1,324,080 gallons), must have been consumed every day, and I have not reckoned the food for the women, eunuchs, beasts of burden and dogs." With respect to this computation, Mr. Rawlinson says that there has been a miscalculation. "The actual amount according to the number at which Herodotus reckons the host," he says, "would be 110,067½ medimini. The mediminis contained about 12 English gallons."

We are told that while Xerxes was at Acanthus on the Chalcidian peninsula, he was entertained with part of his army, a host so numerous that the banquet cost 400 talents of silver ($400,000) and beggared the distinguished citizens who gave it. For months the people of the country through which he passed had been collecting provisions in anticipation of his coming, grinding corn and wheat and preparing meal. They brought also their flocks and herds, and land and water-fowl. It must be remembered also that Darius and his son Xerxes had been collecting provisions for years in anticipation of this expedition, that magazines of stores had been laid up on the line of march, and vast numbers of transports laden with corn and provisions kept moving with the army as it advanced along the shore. It will be noted further that the army, in passing through the country from Doriscus, did not march in one body. The entire land force was divided into three divisions, one of which accompanied the fleet along the coast, another marched far inland, and between these marched the other division which was accompanied by Xerxes. In this way the Persian forces were dispersed over a wide range of territory, which made it perhaps better

able to procure supplies from the inhabitants along the route. And yet at times the army suffered. In view of the clear statements of Herodotus, and the source from which he must have derived his material, no good reason has yet been assigned to doubt his accuracy. He raised precisely the same question which Mr. Grote raises, namely, as to how so large a force could possibly have subsisted, while on the march or in the camp, and how it was possible to feed so many, even with an ample commissary in addition to supplies furnished *en route*. In order to ascertain how much wheat was necessary for the daily consumption of each fighting man, we have his calculation. He tells us exactly how much grain must have been consumed daily by the army alone, irrespective of the women, eunuchs, beasts of burden and dogs. He went over carefully the same ground, which his modern critics have traveled, and raised the same questions they have raised. The latter, however, have not as yet produced any evidence to overthrow the accuracy of his assertions or to impugn the correctness of his narrative.

In this connection we might suggest that it is estimated that Moses led 3,000,000 Hebrew slaves out of the land of Egypt. These were fed with manna in the wilderness. Joseph interpreted the dream of Pharaoh and foretold seven years of plenty to be followed by seven years of famine. Like Darius and Xerxes, the Egyptians filled the granaries and depots built for the purpose during the years of plenty. From these stores the Egyptians and those who came into Egypt when the famine was sore, were fed, as the Persian army was partially fed from the granaries and storehouses erected in Thrace and Macedonia by Darius and Xerxes for years prior to the Persian invasion.

CHAPTER XVIII

SECOND PERSIAN WAR — PREPARATIONS IN GREECE TO RECEIVE THE ARMY OF INVASION

ON the arrival of Xerxes at Sardis, where he went into winter quarters (*ante*, page 250), he sent heralds to Greece, to demand earth and water, as if the Hellenes were already his subjects. He did not, however, send either to Athens or to Lacedæmon (Sparta) for the reason that his father Darius had sent heralds to Greece to demand earth and water before sending thither an invading army, but those who had been sent to Athens and to Lacedæmon were treated with cruel indignities and were slain. Those sent to Athens were cast into a deep pit, prepared for the destruction of certain criminals who had been sentenced to death. The heralds who came to Sparta were cast into a well from which they were bidden carry earth and water to the King. But Xerxes sent his heralds to every other city in Greece. The Hellenes knew all about the preparations that were being made for the invasion of their country, long before the heralds took their departure from Sardis. The time spent by the Persians in preparation had been extraordinary. From the time of the reduction of Egypt, Xerxes employed four entire years in assembling his forces, and providing whatever might be necessary for the expedition. In the course of the fifth year he began his march. But the Hellenes did not all take the same view with regard to the Persian in-

vasion. Some had sent earth and water as commanded, and these were satisfied that the great forces of the barbarians would do them no harm. But those who imbibed their inspiration from Marathon; those who would rather die free men than live as slaves; those whose patriotism and love of liberty emphasized their resolution, and determination to resist to the last man and the last ship, bestirred themselves. Those who signified their submission to the Persian heralds were the Thessalians, the Dolopes, the Enians, the Perrhæbi, the Locrians, the Magnetes, the Melians, the Achæans of Phthiotis, the Thebans and all the rest of Bœotia, except the Thespians and the Platæans.

Those who determined to fight for the independence and liberties of their country were Sparta, Arcadia, Elis, Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Philius, Trœzen, Mycenæ, Tiryns, Hermione, all in the Peloponnese; Athens, Megara, Platæa and Thespia were the only states and cities in all central Greece who stood for liberty. Also the island of Ægina in the Saronic Gulf. The burden of the war of liberation and independence, therefore, devolved practically on Athens and Sparta. The resolution and constancy of these cities and their allies remained unshaken. It became necessary, now, to engage in this second war for independence, and to bring about harmony and unity among those who had resolved to fight. At this juncture circumstances brought into prominence Themistocles, whose wisdom and prudence afterwards made him conspicuous as the leader of his people. His was the master mind, which controlled and guided their actions in the crisis which now confronted them. His acts of patriotism and valiant deeds earned for him the title of the Saviour of Greece. Themistocles knew that it was essential to secure unity and harmony among his people in order to successfully resist the threatened invasion. He brought about a counsel or Confederacy of those cities

and States who were determined to fight for their liberties. It was agreed among them to send representatives to a Congress or assembly, to confer upon the ways and means to promote the object in view. Themistocles was largely instrumental in bringing about this union, and pleaded with all the representatives that what was most essential to success was harmony. He pointed out that all dissensions must be dropped, intestine wars suspended and that Greece, if it would win, must present to Persia a united front.

The place finally agreed upon as most suitable for the assembling of the delegates was the City of Corinth. It was situated upon the isthmus connecting the Peloponnese with Central Greece. It was convenient not only to Sparta and Athens, but all routes by land and sea, from both sides of the Greek peninsula by which all parts of Hellas could be speedily reached, converged at this narrowest part of the isthmus. At Corinth, therefore, the delegates assembled. Athens, for the sake of harmony, laid aside all claim to leadership and consented that the Presidency of the assembly might be conferred upon Sparta, although Athens, through the efforts of Themistocles, the most energetic and conspicuous man in Greece, was entitled to credit, for bringing into existence this important Congress. Skill and diplomacy of a high order were necessary to preserve unity, for Athens was at war with Ægina. Argos had been at war with Sparta, in which six thousand of her citizens had been slain; Corinth had also been hostile to Ægina; Sparta was hostile also to democratic Athens. The task for the statesmen, whose duty it was to unite Greece and resist the invasion of Persia was to bring tranquillity out of the military commotion and the hostile dissensions which had disturbed the Greek cities and states. For the sake of harmony, and to secure unity in the face of a foreign foe, it was finally agreed that all wars and feuds for the present, at least, should

cease, and that the confederacy should unite to secure aid to carry on military operations against the Persian invaders.

The first resolution adopted by the Confederacy was designed to punish those Hellenes who, without compulsion, gave in their adherence to Persia. Each member took an oath binding upon the city or state he represented, that as soon as order was restored those Greeks who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, should be compelled to pay a tithe to the god at Delphi. Whether this particular form of punishment designed to enrich the oracle, or priestess of the temple, who would be the nominal recipient of the fine, was conceived with the idea of bribing the oracle, so that favorable responses should be received by the patriotic Greeks when the oracle was consulted, we do not know. The responses, however, just before the battle of Salamis, were outrageous, and portended all sorts of dire calamities to the Greeks. Had it not been for the master mind of Themistocles, who insisted on giving to the riddles of the oracle an interpretation favorable to his country, when every one else construed them as portending disaster, the Athenians might have fled ignominiously before Xerxes and migrated to Italy.

When the Assembly learned that Xerxes was in Sardis with a mighty army, they sent spies to Asia to discover the true state of affairs. They resolved also to send ambassadors or envoys to Argos, to conclude an alliance against Persia; another to Sicily to King Gelon; another embassy to Corcyra, and another to Crete, begging their countrymen to come to the assistance of Greece.

When the three spies came to Sardis, they were detected, seized and sentenced to death. But before the decree was executed, Xerxes heard of it, and sent for the spies. He inquired if they came to find out the military strength of the Persians and then commanded the

guards to show them all the infantry and cavalry which composed his great army, and then released them, in order that they might go back and tell their countrymen that the arms of Xerxes were invincible.

The endeavor of the envoys to secure aid from Sicily, from Corcyra and from Crete, came to nothing. The Argives demanded as a condition to an active alliance against Persia, that the Lacedæmonians should enter into a thirty years' truce with them. This was denied and the Argives refused to enter into an active alliance.

Gelon of Sicily agreed to furnish a formidable fleet and a numerous army, but only upon condition that he should be assigned to the sole command of all the allied forces. This demand was refused. Gelon then modified his request and said he would be content if he were given command of the fleet or the land forces. "If then," he said to the ambassadors, "you choose to command the army, I will command the fleet, or if it please you rather to have command at sea, I will lead the land forces, and you must either be content with these terms, or return destitute of such allies." The ambassadors, however, told Gelon that they did not come to secure a general, but to secure troops. That as to the fleet, the Athenians would command it unless the Spartans desired to, but that they would never cede to any one but the Spartans the command of the navy. No aid, therefore, was sent from Sicily.

When the envoys went to Corcyra, they were promised aid. They assured the delegates that they could not look on and see Greece ruined. They manned sixty ships, but instead of sending them to aid the Athenian and Spartan fleet, they anchored in the neighborhood of the bay of Pylus, on the west side of the Peloponnese. Their object was to espouse whichever side won. If the Persians, then these traitors were prepared to say that while they were asked to take sides against them, they declined. If the Greeks won, they were prepared to

plead with their countrymen that they " were unable to double cape Malea, by reason of the eastern winds," and were, for this reason unable to reach Salamis, and it was not their fault that they took no part in the battle.

When the Cretans were approached to join the league, they sent persons in the name of the commonwealth to consult the oracle at Delphi, but the answer of the Pythian was altogether unfavorable, intimating that the Cretans would be fools to do so. The Pythian, therefore, checked the inclination of these superstitious people in their desire to assist the Greeks. The Thessalians, however, stood in a different position than any of the others. They dwelt upon the northern frontiers, and their country extended to the lofty mountain ranges of Pelion and Olympus, between which the Peneus flows into the sea, through the Vale of Tempe. This mountain gorge is the gateway into Greece, through which the army of Xerxes must enter. The Thessalians, therefore, would feel the first impact of the hostile armies. Their forces were altogether inadequate, and were insignificant when compared with the Persians. The Thessalians, therefore, sent ambassadors to the isthmus, who appeared before the council, and told them that it was necessary to guard the pass at Olympus, that Thessaly and all Greece might be sheltered from the war. They said they were ready and willing to guard it, but the Council must send thither an adequate force. They further declared that if no army was sent, they, of necessity, would be obliged to come to terms with the Persians, because it would be unjust that they should be left to perish alone, without defense, or aid, from the other states of Greece.

It was resolved, accordingly, to send an army into Thessaly to guard the pass. Ten thousand heavy armed troops were mustered composed of Spartans and Athenians. The former under Euænetus, the latter under Themistocles. They sailed through the Euripus

and the straits of Eubœa, into the gulf of Malis, and north into the Gulf of Pagasæus, between Achaia, and the Peninsula of Magnesia. The army disembarked at Alus in Achaia, and marched thence north into Thessaly to the river Peneus, and the Vale of Tempe, which is the gateway from Macedonia, into Thessaly. The army remained, however, but a short time. They received word from Alexander of Macedonia, that the army of Xerxes was so formidable, that an attempt to prevent its entry into Greece would be futile, especially as the army was accompanied by a formidable fleet, and an attempt to guard the pass would subject the defenders to attacks from the rear, by troops landed on the shore below the pass. Also for the reason that a passage could be made a short distance north of the Peneus at another pass near Gonnus. The Macedonians seemed well disposed towards the Greeks, and the latter finally concluded that the advice was good and withdrew, and then determined to defend Greece at the pass of Thermopylæ. This occurred while Xerxes was at Abydos, before he had crossed the Hellespont. Under these circumstances, nothing was left for the Thessalians to do but to make terms with the Medes.

When the Greeks abandoned the pass at the Vale of Tempe, they returned as speedily as possible to the isthmus. The gateway into Thessaly, through the pass at Mount Olympus, was thus left open. The Thessalians were too weak to defend it alone. It was certain, therefore, that Xerxes would meet with no obstacle to prevent his entry into Greece. The invader, with countless hosts on land, and a strong fleet at sea, would, in a comparatively short time, be in Central Greece, at the doors of Athens. Never, however, did Athens and Sparta, or their allies, falter in their determination to resist the foe. The numerical strength of the army of Xerxes or the vast number of his ships, and the comparative weakness of the defenders, does not seem to

have been taken into consideration as a factor in discussing the situation. The only question considered in council was as to the most available place to meet the foe. The opinion finally prevailed that the Greeks should defend the pass at Thermopylæ, as it appeared to be narrower even than that into Thessaly. They defended the pass and posterity knows the result.

It was resolved also to fight the enemy both by land and sea. As the path at the foot of the precipitous cliffs which form the sides of Mount Œta is washed by the waters of the Gulf of Malis, directly west of Artemisium, on the northern shores of the island of Eubœa, it was agreed to send a fleet through the Euripus and the straits of Eubœa to the strait between the southern extremity of the peninsula of Magnesia, and this coast called Artemisium, to prevent the Persians from commanding the Euripus, which commands the channel of Eubœa, and constitutes the inside passage by sea to the Saronic gulf. To this fleet the chief command of the naval forces was given to the Spartan Eurybiades, but the Athenian vessels were commanded by Themistocles, who shared with the Spartan the command of the fleet.

In the preceding chapters is given an account of the march of Xerxes from Abydos. It will be necessary to complete the narrative to note the advance through Thrace and Macedonia, to Thessaly, and south to Thermopylæ, and thence to Athens and Salamis. The subsequent defeat of Mardonius at Platæa, and of the Persian fleet at Mycale, B. C. 489, concluded the Second Persian War, and established the independence of Greece.

CHAPTER XIX

ADVANCE OF XERXES THROUGH THRACE, MACEDONIA, AND THE VALE OF TEMPE

THE previous chapter contains an account of the preparations which the Greeks made to receive the Persian army, which was advancing to subjugate Hellas. Tidings of the anticipated invasion reached Athens, long before Xerxes sent his heralds from Sardis, demanding from the Greeks earth and water, as tokens of submission to his rule. As has been observed, the plan to engage the Persian army in the Vale of Tempe, the entrance into Thessaly had been abandoned before Xerxes had quitted Abydos. The Council assembled on the isthmus of Corinth finally concluded to engage Xerxes at Thermopylæ.

After the grand review at Doriscus, the Persians advanced in three main columns or divisions, one skirting near the coast of the Sea of Thrace, or upper Ægean at times within sight of the fleet; another many miles inland, and the remaining division with the Persian monarch at its head, midway between the two. The army in turn passed many cities, and crossed numerous streams and rivers, flowing south into the Ægean. Among them the Lissus, and the Nestus, which latter forms the boundary between Thrace and Pæonia, which afterwards was embraced in the Kingdom of Macedonia. When the Strymon was reached, the Persians marched by the Nine Ways of the Edonians, to the bridge thrown across the river at that point by the engineers whom Xerxes had ordered to dig the canal

across the extremity of the peninsula of Acte, to avoid the necessity of doubling the rocky promontory of Mount Athos, where the fleet of the first expedition sent out by Darius against Greece was wrecked B. C. 492. At the place where this bridge was erected, known as the Nine Ways, a colony of Athenians afterwards founded the city of Amphipolis, which was taken by Brasidas in the ninth year of the Peloponnesian War. The army then advancing westward crossed the Echedorus, in Macedonia, which flows south into the Thermaic Gulf, a few miles west of Therma (Thessalonica); they crossed also the Axius, the Haliacmon, and the Baphyras, in Pieria, about eighteen miles north of the mouth of the Peneus, which flows through the Vale of Tempe into the sea, through which valley Xerxes at first contemplated his march into Thessaly.

The first objective point after leaving Doriscus was Acanthus on the easterly shore of the Chalcidian peninsula, which extends into the Ægean between the Thermaic Gulf, on the west, and the Gulf of Strymon, on the east. Thence the army advanced northwesterly across the peninsula (about sixty miles in a direct line) to Therma, a city at the head of the Thermaic Gulf, the waters of which separate the Chalcidian peninsula from the eastern coasts of Macedonia, Thessaly and the peninsula of Magnesia. When the two divisions of the army reached Therma, they halted until the third division should arrive. The route assigned to this division led through a wild mountainous country, covered in many places by dense forests. Their march was consequently delayed until the axmen detailed for that purpose could fell the timber on the Macedonian range to enable the baggage trains to pass through. The naval forces of the expedition collected at the head of the Gulf of Therma, and about the mouth of the river Axius.

Herodotus refers to the fauna whose habitat was in

that part of Europe in the fifth century B. C. He tells us that the country between the river Nestus, in Thrace, and the river Achelous which flows through Acarnania and Ætolia into the Ionian Sea, was infested with lions and wild bulls. He declares that no one ever saw a lion east of the Nestus or west of the Achelous. The lion, like the horse, cannot endure the sight or smell of a camel. A horse, if placed to their windward, becomes unmanageable, as did the Lydian cavalry of Crœsus when assailed by Cyrus on the plain at Sardis. A lion in like manner becomes infuriated at the approach of a camel. While the troops of Xerxes were advancing through the mountain regions of Macedonia, the lions fell upon the camels that carried the provisions and accompanied the baggage train. They came by night leaving their dens in the mountains, and seized upon the camels. The beasts of burden and drivers accompanying the train were not molested, and escaped the fury of these formidable beasts of prey.

While awaiting the concentration of his forces at Therma, Xerxes determined to visit the pass at the mouth of the Peneus. From Therma was visible the snow-capped peaks of Pelion and Olympus. Between these mountain ranges, the Peneus flows through a narrow gorge from the plains of Thessaly into the Thermaic Gulf. This pass, with its charming scenery and romantic beauty is known as the Vale of Tempe, the gateway from Macedonia into Greece. The distance from Therma to the mouth of the Peneus, as the crow flies, is about fifty miles. From this point about eighty miles south, on the Gulf of Malis, against the precipitous walls of Mount Œta, is the famous pass of Thermopylæ.

Xerxes accompanied by his fleet sailed southwest through the Thermaic Gulf to the mouth of the Peneus, and ordered his guides to examine the immediate vicinity, to ascertain if there was any other outlet from the

low plains of Thessaly, through the mountains to the sea, save only the channel of the Peneus. Finding there was none, he observed that it would be easy to take Thessaly which lay like the bed of a dry basin or lake shut in from the sea, by lofty walls of mountains. All that would be necessary, he suggested, would be to dam the mouth of the Peneus and force its waters back, and thus inundate the plains of Thessaly.

This engineering feat to reduce Thessaly was doubtless suggested to Xerxes by the memory of the clever strategy of his maternal grandfather, Cyrus the Great, who, in order to reduce Babylon, deflected the course of the Euphrates, which flowed through the city, and under its massive gates. When the trench was completed, the waters were turned into the new channel dug for it by the army of Cyrus, at night-fall. The waters began to recede from that part of its ancient bed within the city. Nothing prevented the Persians, when the bed of the stream was drained, from entering the city under the gates which spanned the dry channel, instead of a broad stream. Thus Cyrus took Babylon and slew Belshazzar in his palace (B. C. 538). Emulating the deeds of Cyrus, Xerxes, in like manner, directed a canal to be cut across the extremity of the peninsula of Acte, through which his fleet sailed, and thereby escaped the necessity of doubling the rocky promontory of Mount Athos, where the fleet, sent out by his father Darius, perished twelve years before.

Xerxes, however, determined not to enter Greece through the valley of the Peneus and the Vale of Tempe, but by an upper road, through the country of the Perrhæbi, in Macedonia, through another pass, near Gonnus, which he was informed was the safest way. This city is a very short distance north of the Peneus. The axmen were obliged to open the way through the forests of the mountains of Pieria, through which Xerxes, after leaving Therma, marched his army. He

entered Thessaly near Gonnus, and proceeded thence south through Achaia, and came into the territory of Malis, on the Gulf of Malis, and encamped at Trachis, about five miles west of the western entrance to the pass of Thermopylæ. Trachis is situated on a plain, surrounded on all sides by high and impassable mountains called the Trachinian rocks, which enclose the territory of Malis. Through this plain four rivers find their way among the mountains, flowing easterly into the gulf of Malis. The two most northerly are the Sperchius and the Dyras; south of these flow the Melas and the Asopos. The City of Trachis, where Xerxes encamped, is situated between these last named. South of Trachis there is a ravine, through which the Asopus winds its course along the base of Mount Œta. The distance between the Melas and Asopus is less than two miles. The camp of Xerxes at Trachis was less than a mile south of the Melas. Here in August, B. C. 480, Xerxes assembled his army, the most formidable ever assembled. His fleet was proceeding south through the Thermaic Gulf, directly towards Artemisia, which lies on the northern coast of the island of Eubœa, which lies immediately west of the gulf of Malis. The campaign opened with the land and naval engagements at Thermopylæ and Artemisia, which will now be considered.

CHAPTER XX

THERMOPYLÆ

THERMOPYLÆ — Ther-mop-i-le — [Θερμοπυλαι]. A narrow pass in Locris between the Gulf of Malis and the precipitous wall of rock on the side of Mount Œta, which forms an opening or gateway into Central Greece. It is seventy-six miles south of the Vale of Tempe, a park leading to a gorge through the mountain ranges of Olympus and Ossa in Thessaly. In August B. C. 480, Leonidas, with his Spartans and Thespians, perished, defending the pass against the hosts of Xerxes.

THE first campaign (B. C. 480) in the Second Persian War embraced three notable engagements, one on land, and two on sea, namely Thermopylæ, Artemisia and Salamis. At Thermopylæ, three hundred Lacedæmonians commanded by Leonidas, King of Sparta, and seven hundred Thespians, remained in the pass, after the other Greeks, who had survived the first part of the engagement had been bidden to depart, and voluntarily sacrificed their lives in the bloody defile between the inaccessible cliffs of Mount Œta and the waters of the gulf of Malis, defending the pass at the foot of the mountain, on the edge of the sea, against an army of invaders numbering more than two millions, commanded by Xerxes, the ruler of the Persian empire.

The pass at Thermopylæ does not now present the appearance it did at the time of the Second Persian War. The topography has changed considerably in recent centuries. The waters of the Malic Gulf, which formerly approached within a few feet of the base of Mount Œta, has receded more than a mile, and what was once a morass at the foot of the mountain is now

an open plain, marshy in places during the Spring of the year. In many localities the mountain slopes have been denuded of timber, and the open spots are under cultivation. Many of the minor streams have changed their courses or have entirely disappeared. At the time the battle was fought, the pass was at the foot of vertical walls of rock formed by the precipitous cliffs on the side of Mount Œta, on one side, which rose abruptly almost from the water. On the other side of the narrow roadway, the shallow waters of the gulf formed an extensive swamp or marsh. The pass was about a mile long and varied in width. At its extremities the rocks almost touched the water. At these points the footpath was less than twenty feet wide. The entrance and exit at the ends were termed the pylæ, or gates. There are thermal springs in the pass. Hence the name Thermopylæ, "Hot Gates."

Near the western end of the pass the Phocians in early times had constructed a wall with strong gates to keep out their enemies, the Thessalians. Behind this wall was a hillock or knoll. The Greeks on arriving at Thermopylæ repaired the wall and strengthened the gates in anticipation of the struggle to force the pass.

In the previous chapter it is shown why no attempt was made to prevent the army of Xerxes from entering Greece through the Vale of Tempe. The Spartans, in July, about the time of the celebration of the Olympian games, and before Xerxes had left Therma, sent forward their King Leonidas, who claimed direct lineage from Hercules, with a comparatively small army to hold the pass, on the gulf of Malis against the invading Persian hosts, until the termination of the Olympian games, and the celebration of the festival in honor of the Carneian Apollo, which followed. It was intended as soon as the sacred exercises were over, to send a strong army of Peloponnesians to relieve Leonidas, whom they considered abundantly able to hold the pass

for the required period. In view of the fact that the forces of Xerxes were accompanied by a formidable fleet, it was also arranged to send a squadron, under Eurybiades and Themistocles, to guard the gulf of Malis, the Euripus and the straits of Eubœa, and prevent the entry of the Persians, both by land and sea.

The Greek forces numbered perhaps less than 7,000 men as follows:

Spartans	300
Tegeans and Mantineans	1,000
From Orchomenus in Arcadia	120
" the rest of Arcadia	1,000
" Corinth	400
" Phlius	200
" Mycenæ	80
Thespians from Bœotia	700
Thebans (held as hostages)	400
Phocians	1,000
Opuntian Locrians (number not given)	
Total Greek forces	5,200

Estimating the Locrians at 1,600 the army of Leonidas did not exceed 7,000 men. This estimate is exclusive of the Helots, the slaves who usually accompanied their Lacedæmonian masters in war. Herodotus mentions the fact that many were included among the slain at Thermopylæ. The number of Helots is variously estimated. They did not exceed 2,100, namely, seven to each Spartan.

When Leonidas quitted the isthmus he believed that the pass of Thermopylæ was the only entrance by which an army could enter Central Greece. He did not know that there was an unfrequented pathway over Mount Œta, commencing near Trachis, winding along the tortuous banks of the Asopos, which flowed among rocky defiles near the base of the mountain, thence leading northward to its summit, and descending the precipitous side of Œta, to the pass near its eastern entrance,

in the rear of the western gate where the Greeks were posted. The Phocians, however, were aware of its existence. When they joined the main body from the Peloponnesus, they informed Leonidas about it. At their request, he posted them near the summit of Œta, to guard it, and prevent surprise. Some of the troops consisting of a small percentage of the army, when facing the camp of Xerxes, realized that without immediate assistance, they were too few to resist the hosts of Persia, and advised their leader to retire to the Peloponnese, and guard the isthmus. The Locrians and Phocians, whose territory was immediately menaced, protested vigorously. Leonidas decided to defend the pass, and despatched couriers to summon immediate assistance.

Meantime, Xerxes from his camp at Trachis, sent his scouts to ascertain the exact number of the insignificant body who had the temerity to resist the myriads which he had brought to enslave Greece and avenge Marathon. When apprised of the facts, and told that the strength of the army of Leonidas did not exceed 7,000, he could not credit the rumor that the enemy was serious in their determination to engage the Persians, and allowed four days to pass to give them an opportunity to retreat or surrender. But the enemy was steadfast. Xerxes again consulted with the Spartan exile, Demaratus, as he had previously done at Doriscus, and was told that the Spartans would never abandon their posts, while one of them remained alive. On the fifth day Xerxes, with haughty arrogance, ordered a powerful body of Medes, who had fought with Datis at Marathon, to advance to the mouth of the defile, take the rash men from the pass, and bring them or as many as survived, should they resist, into his presence. Xerxes, as at Salamis, determined to witness the execution of his order, and see the capture of the enemy. He caused a throne to be erected near the mouth of the

pass, on a rocky eminence from which to witness the assault of the Medes.

The first contact proved to the son of Darius that Demaratus had spoken the truth, when he said that the Greeks would die, but never surrender. They advanced into the open space in front of the pass beyond the Phocian wall to meet the assault. The struggle resulted in dreadful carnage. Thousands of Persians were slain, although the officers again and again drove with the lash their military slaves against the spears and pikes of the enemy. The mouth of the pass was filled with bleeding corpses, and at the close of the day the Medes retreated having suffered overwhelming defeat.

Xerxes, in despair, on the following day, ordered into action his 10,000 "Immortals," the flower of his army, held in the esteem of their sovereign as the apple of his eye, as Napoleon, centuries later, threw the Old Guard against the columns of Blucher at Ligny, and of Wellington at Waterloo. All day long from his improvised throne, Xerxes saw his cherished "Immortals" perish. Three times he sprang from his seat, in alarm for the safety of his army. In vain the picked body of Persians, clad in light tunics, armed with short swords, charged again and again, and melted away, as they were hurled against the pikes and long spears of the Greeks, clad in greaves of steel and breast-plates of brass. Their javelins and arrows availed but little against the armor and shields of the enemy. The mouth of the pass was narrow, and superiority of numbers gave little or no advantage to the charging masses. Thousands of strong men were ordered to be posted in the rear of the broken, flying masses of Persian slaves, and drove them forward with scourge and lash, to certain death against the pikes of steel, in the hands of trained athletes. To advance was death, to retreat was to meet a similar fate, at the hands of their own troops. So they died of spear-thrust or sword-cut, or

were trampled to death among the bloody corpses that covered the narrow approach to the fatal pass on the edge of the marsh, at the foot of the vertical walls of rock that formed the precipitous sides of Mount Œta.

The first day had ended in gloom and disaster for the defeated Persians. The second day was a repetition of the first. The alarm and anxiety of Xerxes was relieved late on the second day, when he learned that Æphialtes, a Malian traitor, agreed to betray his countrymen, on receiving from the Persians the price of his treason. He informed Xerxes of the secret path and hidden trail above referred to, which led through the ravine, which formed the bed of the Asopos, across an adjoining mountain, over the heights of Œta, and descended the opposite slope, to the shore of the Malic Gulf, directly in the rear of the eastern gate of the pass of Thermopylæ. Xerxes lost no time in availing himself of the traitor's services. At lamp-light, Hydarnes, at the head of a large body of picked men, was in motion, led by Æphialtes, along the tortuous paths of the secret trail, which led to the rear of the position of Leonidas. At dawn the Persians had reached the point where the Phocians were stationed to guard the mountain road. They were Phocians, however, not Spartans. They were overwhelmed, and to save their lives, forgetting their comrades, fled to a stronger position in the hills, and Hydarnes was master of the pathway. He descended with practically no opposition to the rear of the Greeks.

Leonidas, who had learned of the approach of Hydarnes, at dawn, called a council of war. Among his troops opinion was divided, some refusing to quit their posts in the face of the enemy, others advocated retreat to the isthmus to guard the highway to the Peloponnesus. The Phocians and Locrians, whose territory was immediately in the path of the advancing Persians,

again, as at the first council, objected strongly. Leonidas determined to hold the pass while a survivor remained in his ranks. He bade those who desired to quit the field depart, and leave his Spartans to fight and die. The seven hundred patriotic and devoted Thespians begged the honor to remain and die with the Spartans in mortal combat.

The spirit of valor that hallowed the patriotic devotion of Leonidas on this last day of his life, when he bade those who desired to do so, to quit their posts, doubtless inspired the bard of Avon, when he wrote the stirring drama Henry V. The English sovereign at Agincourt, like Leonidas at Thermopylæ, bade those depart who had no stomach for the fight and dismissed them with the haughty declaration:

> We would not die in that man's company
> That fears his fellowship to die with us.

Leonidas, in whose veins ran the blood of Hercules, said he could never desert the post he was assigned to defend. "As for myself, and my fellow Spartans," he said, "we are obliged by our laws not to fly; I owe my life to my country, and it is now my duty to fall in its defence." The Spartans had been told by the priestess at Delphi, when they consulted the oracle, before they advanced to Thermopylæ, that either Sparta must fall by the arms of the barbarians, or their King, descended from Hercules, must perish. The answer as framed by the Pythoness declared, "O inhabitants of spacious Lacedæmon, either your vast city shall be destroyed by men sprung from Perseus, or, if not so, the confines of Lacedæmon mourn a King deceased, of the race of Hercules." Leonidas was eager to achieve the honor of saving his country by sacrificing his life in obedience to her laws.

He prepared to die for the glory of Sparta. He did not lead a forlorn hope. He and those who accompanied him deliberately remained at their posts till every man had perished. Thermopylæ was to be their tomb and the rocky heights of Mount Œta was to be their monument, a mausoleum piled up by the gods, enduring while earth itself endures. He was eager for the sacrifice, and advanced his men from the rear of the Phocian wall which spanned the narrow pass into the open part of the defile. Here they fought till all their spears and pikes were shattered and broken. With the use of the sword they continued the struggle. When Leonidas fell, the Persians and Greeks contended for his body. The Spartans, doubtless, in this contest over the body of their fallen King, were inspired by the example of the heroes of the Iliad on the plains of Troy, who contended with the Trojans for the body of Sarpedon and of Patroclus. The Greeks in the pass that day displayed superior courage and drove back the enemy from time to time, until the body of their King was covered and piled with the corpses of the honored dead. When the "Immortals," under Hydarnes, entered the eastern gate of the pass, and attacked the enemy in the rear, the plan of battle changed. The besieged withdrew behind the wall to the hillock, and there made their last stand. With lines facing both attacking bodies, the survivors of Leonidas fought till the last man had perished. No mortal arm remained to lift the sword against Persia.

> "Dawn bares a silver sabre in the east,
> A million blades fast follow to the quest;
> But now the day is o'er, the din has ceased,
> One crimson blade waves faintly in the west." [1]

It is true that all the Spartans who were engaged, fell on the battle-field, but Herodotus says that two hoplites, of the three hundred, Eurytus and Aristode-

[1] Thos. E. Burke.

mus, had been dismissed from the camp by Leonidas, and were lying at Alpeni, in the immediate vicinity, desperately afflicted with a disease of the eyes. They disagreed, as to whether, blind as they were, they should be led to the field and die with their comrades, and so fulfil the law of Sparta. Eurytus called for his armor, and having put it on, he directed his helot to lead him into the conflict. The helot ran away, but Eurytus perished. Some say that Aristodemus was sent as a messenger from the army, and might have returned while the battle was in progress; but would not, and having lingered on the road, survived, while his fellow-messenger arrived in time for the battle.[1]

When Aristodemus returned to Sparta, he met with insults and derision, and was declared infamous, and none would give him fire, or converse with him. He was called "Aristodemus the coward." In order to retrieve his honor, he led in the charge of the Tegeans and Spartans at Platæa, and performed feats of prodigious valor. While in pursuit of the picked cavalry of Mardonius, after the latter had been killed, Aristodemus was pierced by an arrow in the attack on the stockade at Thebes whither the Persians sought refuge. "In my opinion," says Herodotus referring to those who displayed the greatest valor in the engagement, "Aristodemus proved himself by far the bravest."[2] All those among the Greeks who perished at Platæa were honored except Aristodemus, whom the Spartans never forgave, because he did not die with Leonidas at Thermopylæ.[3]

[1] Herod. vii, 229, 230.

[2] Herod. ix. 71.

[3] The account of the battle of Salamis, in the poem of Æschylus, has been translated by several eminent Greek scholars. But one of the best translations is credited to a woman, Mrs. Anna Swanwick. Perhaps the most graphic account of the engagements at Thermopylæ and Platæa is also from the pen of a woman, Caroline Dale Snedeker, which she describes in her entertaining novel, "The Spartan." It is a most interesting biography of Aristodemus, the friend of Leonidas, the coward of Thermopylæ, and the hero of Platæa.

Xerxes paid an enormous price for his victory. Two of his brothers and many of his nobles perished in the contest over the body of Leonidas. The Persian loss was estimated at twenty thousand.

As a conspicuous example of patriotic devotion the heroism of the defenders of the famous pass is not surpassed in military annals. The third decade of the last century witnessed the struggle of the inhabitants of Texas to secure their independence. The courage and devotion of the little band of one hundred and eighty-eight Texans under the command of Colonel Travis, and his subordinates Bowie and Crocket, at the Alimo, in resisting the assaults of from three to four thousand Mexicans under Santa Anna, March, 1836, reflected the patriotism and devotion of Leonidas. That engagement is sometimes referred to as the American Thermopylæ. Travis held the old Stone Mission at San Antonio until he and all his comrades perished to a man. When the Mexicans, who had lost at least a third of their number, entered the bloody enclosure, they bayoneted the five survivors, all that remained of the original one hundred and eighty-eight. The story of Thermopylæ has been repeated through the ages, and will continue to be repeated to coming generations as long as courage and patriotism are esteemed as virtues.

The rhetra of Lycurgus was the bible of the Spartan. They took from him their law, as the children of Israel received theirs from Moses. The Spartans were taught that they must die, rather than break their ranks before an enemy or abandon their posts in battle. They entertained also a superstitious veneration for oracles, and the celebration of their accustomed festivals, and public games, was part of their religious life. When, there-

fore, the oracle revealed to the Spartans that the only means whereby Sparta could be saved was the voluntary death of a King of the race of Hercules, Leonidas responded with pleasure to the demand of the State, and died willingly in defence of his country.

The Persian monarch desired to spread the news of his "victory" at Thermopylæ, to encourage the sailors of his fleet off Artemisium, the Greek fleet having already sailed south through the Euripus. In order to convey a false impression, and conceal the number of the slain, he buried nineteen thousand of the Persians, who had fallen, in trenches which were filled with earth, levelled over, and covered with foliage, leaving but one thousand on the field exposed to view. Xerxes then sent a herald across the gulf of Malis, to the fleet with an invitation to the seamen to come over to Thermopylæ, and view the battle field. Their herald, when he reached Histiæa, caused the naval force to be assembled and delivered this message:

"Comrades, King Xerxes gives permission to all who please, to quit their posts, and see how he fights with the senseless men who think to overthrow his armies." Many gladly accepted the invitation, indeed the Asiatics flocked to the shore in such numbers, that all available small craft was put in service and it was difficult to get a boat to be transported to the scene of the battle. Herodotus observes, however, that no one was deceived with what disposition Xerxes had made of the dead who perished in the engagement. After those connected with the fleet had returned to their ships Xerxes broke up his camp at Trachis and proceeded on his march towards Athens.

No Athenians fought at Thermopylæ. No Spartans or Peloponnesians fought at Marathon. The Athenians, however, were with Themistocles in the fleet off the headland of Artemisium, at the extremity of the island Eubœa, to protect the flank of the army of Leonidas, and the Euripus, the sea-Thermopylæ, or narrow strait between Eubœa and the mainland. The naval engagements off Artemisium were fought on the same days that the Greek land forces fought in the pass. These engagements will now be considered.

CHAPTER XXI

ARTEMISIUM

ARTEMISIUM — Ar-te-me-shum — [Αρτεμισιον]. A headland on the northern coast of Eubœa in the territory of Histiæotis. So called from a picturesque temple and grove sacred to Artemis (Diana). The strait of Artemisium separates Eubœa from the peninsula of Magnesia, in Thessaly, and the Gulf of Pagasæus (now Gulf of Volo). The strait varies in width from five to seven miles and on the west forms part of the Gulf of Malis. Its waters wash the narrow strip of beach at the base of Mount Œta, known as the pass of Thermopylæ. The pass is about thirty miles southwest of Artemisium.

THE headland of Eubœa, beyond the city of Histiæa, is a picturesque spot, surrounded by the charm and beauty of the landscape in northern Greece. There stands the temple of Artemis (Diana), surnamed the dawn, surrounded with trees, among which are erected pillars of white marble. On the opposite coast of Magnesia is Olizon. Near this city in a sheltered harbor is Aphetæ, in the bay of Magnesia. At this place, it is said, Jason abandoned Hercules who accompanied his expedition to Colchis, in Asia, for the Golden Fleece. He was sent ashore for water, and while absent the Argo sailed away. From this circumstance the name of Aphetæ was given to the place. Here, when the Persians learned that the Greeks ships were at Artemisium, they moored their fleet.

The first naval battle in the Second Persian War, B. C. 480, was fought off this headland, simultaneously with the attack of Xerxes on Leonidas in the pass at Thermopylæ. That engagement is described in the

previous chapter. After the Greeks had abandoned the idea of confronting the Persians in the Vale of Tempe, the troops under Themistocles returned to the isthmus to formulate new plans for the safety of Greece. It was agreed that the navy should coöperate with the army. The latter, under Leonidas, was to advance to Thermopylæ, to prevent the land forces of Xerxes from entering their country through the pass. The naval forces under Eurybiades and Themistocles were to guard the sea-Thermopylæ, and prevent the ships of Persia from entering the straits of Eubœa, and from passing through the narrowest part known as the Euripus, and prevent the Persians from reaching in that direction the coast of Attica. It was designed also that the navy should, as far as possible, protect the flank of the Greeks, assigned to hold the pass, at the base of the cliffs of Mount Œta, which, on the sea side, was washed by the waters of the Gulf of Malis, and prevent the Persians from attempting to disembark troops from the gulf, to attack the flank of the army of Leonidas. Thus the scheme was to guard against the entry of the Persian infantry at the pass of Thermopylæ, and to prevent the Persian fleet from reaching the coast of Attica through the Euripus in the straits of Eubœa.

The Greek fleet sent forward to Artemisium to cooperate with the land forces consisted of 271 ships besides nine penteconters, contributed as follows:

GREEK FLEET AT ARTEMISIUM

Furnished	by	the	Athenians	127
"	"	"	Corinthians	40
"	"	"	Megarians	20
"	"	"	Ægenitæ	18
"	"	"	Sicyonians	12
"	"	"	Lacedæmonians	10
"	"	"	Epidaurians	8
"	"	"	Eretrians	7
"	"	"	Trœzenians	5
"	"	"	Styreans	2
"	"	"	Ceians	2

Carried forward	251
The Ceians furnished also 2 Penteconters, and the Opuntian Locrians, 7 Penteconters	
Chalcidians, manned ships furnished by the Athenians	20
The Plateans assisted the Athenians in manning their ships	
Total ships	271
Total Penteconters	9
Total number of vessels	280

The selfishness and lack of patriotism among the Spartans and Peloponnessians, was revealed when it became necessary to select a naval commander. They declared that they would not sail with the fleet if an Athenian was chosen. The latter, however, though they contributed nearly half the vessels which comprised the squadron, displayed wonderful forbearance, and the proper spirit of devotion to their country, in following the advice of Themistocles, the ablest naval officer of his time. The latter yielded gracefully, saying it was of the utmost importance that Greece should be saved, knowing that if they quarrelled about the commander, his country would be lost. Eurybiades, therefore, with the approval and concurrence of Themistocles, was chosen.

After they had formulated their plan of defense, the Greeks consulted the oracle in the temple of Delphi. The message from the gods, through the mouth of the priestess, was spoken in riddles, and the devout suppliants at the tripod in the temple were obliged to interpret the enigmas, which were designed to advise them as to their destiny. They were told to pray to the winds for they would prove powerful allies to Greece. This prophecy was literally fulfilled.

The numerical strength of the Persian fleet outnumbered that of the enemy more than four-fold. Before leaving Therma, the Persian admiral dispatched ten of his swiftest vessels, commanding them to sail direct to the island of Sciathos, which is situated off the southern extremity of the Magnesian peninsula, about ten miles north of the coast-line of northern Eubœa, and the headland of Artemisium.

Three scout ships, sent out by the Greeks, sailed north through the Thermaic Gulf beyond the mouth of the Peneus, to within about forty miles of Therma, at the head of the gulf. When they descried ten of the enemy's vessels bearing down upon them, being outnumbered three to one, they fled, but were soon overtaken off Mount Pelion. Two of the ships were captured after a desperate engagement, but the third, an Athenian vessel, ran ashore, at the mouth of the Peneus. The ship was captured, but the men leaped ashore and escaped through Thessaly, and made their way in safety to Athens. Signal fires were lighted on the island of Sciathos by Greek scouts stationed there, to inform the commanders at Artemisium of this event. This incident caused alarm among the Greeks and resulted in the withdrawal of the fleet from Artemisium to Chalcis on the Euripus, in the straits of Eubœa, leaving scouts on the lookout at Artemisium. The main fleet of the Persians, deeming the coast clear, set sail eleven days after the departure of Xerxes from Therma. A day's sail brought them to Sepias on the coast of Magnesia, almost opposite the island of Sciathos, where they took up their station close to land. There being no sufficient harbor, they were obliged to ride at anchor in eight files, their prows towards the sea. They did not anticipate severe weather. Suddenly the sea began to swell. A most violent northeaster, known as a Hellespontine, burst upon them, accompanied by a terrific electric storm. The sea was lashed by the tempest, and the Persian fleet was tossed in utter confusion. The vessels became unmanageable and were dashed against each other, and lashed by the ocean, until a large number became a mass of wreckage. The violence of the gale continued for three days with unremitting fury. Not

until the fourth day did the storm abate. No less than four hundred Persian vessels were destroyed. The wreckage was scattered on the shores of Cape Sepias, Melibœa and Casthanæa. Thus, as the Pythoness had predicted, the winds proved powerful allies to Greece.

The vessels of gold and silver which were later picked out of the wreckage, or which were washed ashore, and recovered by owners of the land, along the beach, were of great value. One Aminocles is particularly mentioned, who possessed land about Sepias, who is said to have acquired great wealth, having gathered many articles of gold and silver, thrown up by the sea, after the storm.

During this disastrous and protracted tempest, and after it had abated, the Magi sought to charm the winds by incantations and sacrifices. When the scouts brought tidings of the destruction of so many vessels belonging to the Persian fleet to their comrades at Chalcis, they offered up vows, and poured out libations to Poseidon (Neptune), as their deliverer, and hastened back to their station at Artemisium.

The Persians, after the storm, sailed south, doubled the extremity of Magnesian peninsula, and entered the friendly shelter of the protected bay of Pagasæus, known also as the gulf of Magnesia. They stationed themselves in the harbor of Aphetæ, a few miles west of Olizon, from which they commanded a clear view of the headland of Eubœa and Artemisium immediately opposite, some five or six miles distant. It derived its name by reason of the fact that in a charming grove, a short distance from the beach, had been erected a beautiful temple, dedicated to Artemis. This goddess was the daughter of Zeus, and twin sister of Apollo. She was the deity of light, and had power over the moon. She is depicted with her bow and quiver as presiding over the chase, known to the Romans as Diana.

After the squadron took its station at Artemisium a second time, when the Greeks learned of the great number of ships and saw the Persian fleet drawn up at Aphetæ, mindful also of the vast numbers of troops which filled the country, an assembly of officers was called, to deliberate as to the propriety of abandoning their station, and retiring to the inner parts of Greece. The occurrences which transpired at this critical stage of the campaign throws a strong light on the imperfections which marred and discolored the character of the Greeks. Two prominent characteristics are conspicuous. They are wholly inconsistent with patriotic devotion and love of liberty, and contrast strangely with the courage and valor which they displayed in battle. One trait confined chiefly to the Peloponnesians, was inborn jealousy and envy at the prosperity of their neighbors and commercial rivals, a moral delinquency, which finally resulted in the ruin and destruction of Greece. The other blemish, which was chiefly confined to the Athenians, was an inordinate love of money. The offense of bribery was practised to such an extent as to make the crime one of their easily besetting sins — a crime which subsequently ruined Themistocles, the victor of Platæa.

The plan to withdraw from Artemisium and abandon their countrymen in Eubœa, and Leonidas and his followers in the pass of Thermopylæ, and remove to the isthmus and there make a final stand against Persia, was strongly advocated by the Peloponnesians. It was strenuously opposed by Themistocles, who, with the Athenians, stood alone in their efforts to hold the fleet where it was.

In the meantime the inhabitants of Eubœa, fearing lest they should be abandoned, and their island unprotected, and left open to invasion, which involved their certain destruction, sought to prevail upon Eurybiades, to remain and protect their coasts, at least until they

could be afforded an opportunity to leave the island with their families, their herds and flocks, and such movables as they could take with them. But Eurybiades was obdurate. His country was the Peloponnesus, and he seemed to care little for the immediate welfare of the Eubœans. Failing to enlist the sympathies of the Spartan commander, they approached Themistocles with more success, and it is said, after offering him a bribe of thirty talents ($30,000) prevailed upon him to have the fleet remain, and defend their country from the inroads of the Persians, and from the sure destruction which would follow the withdrawal of the fleet. Themistocles, for reasons of his own, was entirely averse to retreating and abandoning his countrymen in Eubœa, and the Greek infantry assigned to defend the pass of Thermopylæ. He was obliged, however, to overcome not only the opposition of Eurybiades, but the jealousy of Adimantus, the Corinthian commander, who feared and hated the Athenians and especially their great admiral for the part he had taken in aid of Ægina, the commercial rival of Corinth. Themistocles, however, was the ablest and craftiest of the Greeks. He had been bribed by the Eubœans, and in his turn resorted to bribery. He concealed the fact that he had accepted thirty talents from the Eubœans. He paid Eurybiades five talents of silver ($5,000), pretending that the money came from his private purse, and by the use of this money overcame the scruples of the Spartan. Adimantus continued to urge his objections. But the ingenuity of Themistocles was equal to the occasion. He said to the Corinthian with an oath, "You shall not abandon us, for I will make you a greater present than the King of the Medes would send you for abandoning the allies." He then paid Adimantus three talents of silver ($3,000) which he led him to believe came from his own purse. The bribe was eagerly accepted. Themistocles secretly kept for his own use about $22,000, the

largest part of the bribe given him by the Eubœans. He had, however, accomplished his object and prevailed upon his associates to remain and guard the Euripus and the island of Eubœa.

The Persians planned to surround the Greeks. They sent secretly part of their fleet consisting of 200 vessels south along the eastern coast of this long narrow island, with orders to enter the straits after rounding its southern extremity and sail north through the Euripus, and attack the enemy in the rear while the remainder of the fleet attacked them in front from the bay of Magnesia.

Their plans were thwarted a second time, for the winds in their courses fought against Persia. The fleet designed to sail round the island, put out to sea, so as to avoid the scrutiny of the enemy, intending to return and sail close to the outer shore. The east coastline of Eubœa, washed by the Ægean, is without harbor facilities, being lined with precipitous and rocky cliffs, where it was impossible for boats to land. When the Persians were sailing along the vicinity of the coast and before they had reached the southern extremity of the island, a violent storm and hurricane burst upon them. Their vessels were dashed to pieces against the rocky shores of Eubœa and destroyed. The god of the winds again interposed as the oracle had predicted, and saved Greece from the arms of Persia.

In order to conceal their plans from the enemy this squadron of 200 vessels was ordered to sail east towards the island of Sciathos, as if they intended to direct their course towards the Hellespont and as soon as darkness set in, to sail direct for the east coast of Eubœa and follow its shore-line at a convenient distance. But the designs of the Persians were revealed to the Greeks by Scyllias, a Chalcidian from Scyone, who carried out his long-cherished plan to desert to the enemy. He was the most skilful and expert diver of his time, and in the

recent shipwreck off Mount Pelion saved much valuable property from the wrecks. He escaped from a Persian ship at Aphetæ, and it is said swam the channel, a distance of eight or nine miles, now known as the channel of Oreos, to Artemisium, at the time the contingent of 200 vessels was about to be dispatched to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa. He at once revealed to Themistocles and Eurybiades the designs of the Persians, narrated to them the severe losses they had sustained in the three day tempest off the coast at the foot of the Pelion range, and detailed the plan to dispatch a squadron to sail round Eubœa. The Greeks resolved to remain where they were till night-fall and then sail out to attack this contingent of 200 ships. They kept close watch with their scout ships, but no Persian sailed against them.

Themistocles then resolved to test the mettle of the Greek navy, and attack the enemy late in the day. Accordingly shortly before sunset, a number of their vessels sailed into the channel, towards Aphetæ, and the extremity of the Magnesian Peninsula. The Persians, observing the comparatively small number of vessels that were advancing towards them, regarded their conduct in the light of a banter as if daring them into action. They thought their advance madness and determined to punish their rashness, deeming their victory comparatively easy, as their vessels far outnumbered the Greeks. They sailed out and surrounded the ships of the enemy. Themistocles determined to break through the circle about him by a sudden assault. The Greek manœuvre was to project the sterns of their vessels inwardly and turn their prows towards the enemy on all sides like the points of a star, their prows pointing in all directions like spokes from a hub. At a given signal they made a terrific assault on the enemy's ships and engaged them prow to prow. They broke through their lines, and captured thirty Persian ships. Night

coming on, each returned to their stations. This engagement fought at eventide in the channel off the headland of Artemisium, was the maiden achievement of the Athenian navy, which was destined soon to become the most powerful in the ancient world, and to retain supremacy on the sea for more than half a century.

After the sun went down, at the close of this memorable battle, which marked the initial victory of the Greek navy, a terrific storm arose. In the blackness of night, the winds increased in fury to a fierce gale. The rain fell in torrents, the thunder rolled along the range of Pelion and the blinding lightning added terror to the storm. The wreckage and the dead bodies of those slain in the battle fought at the close of the day washed in among the Persian ships, and clogged the oars of the vessels, in their retreat to Aphetæ. The sailors were seized with terror and superstitious fear. The fate of the squadron which had secretly sailed and which, by reason of the storm, the Greeks were unable to intercept, were caught in the open sea, off the precipitous and dangerous cliffs and rocky shores of Eubœa. Lashed and driven by the tempest, they knew not where, the entire squadron was finally dashed to pieces, off "the Hollows," the most dangerous part of the coast, and there perished. Again Poseidon, who commanded the winds and controlled the tempestuous billows of the deep, proved a powerful ally to Greece.

Soon after the morning broke, after this wild and fatal night, the storm abated, but the enemy failed to advance from the sheltered harbor of Aphetæ, in the gulf of Pagasæus. Later in the day 53 Athenian ships, sailing north through the sheltered straits of Eubœa, arrived at Artemisium, with tidings of the disaster which had overtaken the Persian squadron which had perished in the storm off "the Hollows." Their forces having been augmented by the Athenian squadron,

Themistocles again sailed out shortly before sunset, as he had done the day before, and attacked some Silician ships, which he destroyed, and at night fall again returned to Artemisium.

The Persian commander now began to fear the displeasure of Xerxes, and the following day determined to make an attempt to dislodge the enemy, and retrieve in some measure the disasters which had overtaken him. He did not wait until the Greeks chose to sail against them late in the day, but got his squadron under way about noon. The Greeks were at their station off Artemisium. The Persian admiral formed his ships in a crescent, bore down on the enemy, and sought to encircle them and prevent their escape. Eurybiades and Themistocles did not wait until the enemy approached, but sailed out into the channel. A terrible engagement ensued. The fleet of Xerxes, by reason of its magnitude and the crescent-shaped formation of its alignment, became impeded as the ships ran foul of each other when attacked. Their position was desperate. They dare not yield, and the fight continued. The casualties were very great on both sides. The Greeks suffered severely, but the loss of the Persians, in both men and ships, was greater than that sustained by the enemy. Among the notable events of the day was the capture of five Grecian ships and crews by a contingent of Egyptian vessels. Clinias, also, who joined the Athenian fleet with two hundred men, and a ship of his own, won distinction in this engagement. He was the father of Alcibiades, who afterwards became a conspicuous figure in the Peloponnesian war, and achieved an unenviable reputation by his treason, when he espoused the cause of Sparta against his own city of Athens. The engagement resulted in a drawn battle. Both sides retired, but the Greeks were in possession of the dead, and of their wrecks. The Athenians sustained the heaviest losses.

Themistocles now began to devise some plan to persuade the Ionians, Carians, and other Asiatic Greeks, to desert the cause of Persia, believing them to be the most courageous and skilful sailors in the enemy's fleet. While they were deliberating what course to pursue, a scout ship from the Gulf of Malis (now the Gulf of Lamis) brought the sad tidings of the death of Leonidas, and the destruction of his forces in the pass of Thermopylæ. Upon receipt of this discouraging news, the Greeks retired from Artemisium, and sailed to the island of Salamis in the Saronic Gulf.

Themistocles wrote bold inscriptions and placed them in conspicuous places, where they would be read by the Ionians, and could be interpreted to the Persian admiral. His design was to create suspicion, as to the loyalty of the Asiatic Greeks, in the breast of the Persian commanders, who would be unable to ascertain what effect these inscriptions might have among their kinsmen who had been recruited from Asia. This is the message to his kinsmen which the crafty Greek posted conspicuously:

"Men of Ionia, you do wrong in fighting against your fathers and helping to enslave Greece. Rather, therefore, come over to us, or if you cannot do that, withdraw your forces from the contest and entreat the Carians to do the same. If neither of these things is possible, and you are bound by too strong necessity to revolt, yet in action, when we are engaged, behave ill on purpose, remembering that you are descended from us, and that the enmity of the barbarian against us, originally sprung from you." [1]

We now approach the close of the momentous campaign of Xerxes, which culminated in the defeat of the Persian fleet off the island of Salamis, on the 20th of

[1] Herod. viii, 22.

September B. C. 480. The march of the land forces under Xerxes, from Thermopylæ to Athens, the attempt to sack the Temple of Delphi and the prophecies concerning the battle of Salamis will now be considered.

CHAPTER XXII

ADVANCE OF XERXES FROM THERMOPYLÆ TO ATHENS — ATTEMPT TO SACK THE TEMPLE OF DELPHI — FALL OF ATHENS — TRADITIONS AS TO SALAMIS — ORACLES AND PROPHECIES

DELPHI [Δελφοί]. A town in Phocis on the southern slopes of Mount Parnassus, about six miles north of the plain of Crisæ, on the Gulf of Corinth, where stood the Temple of Delphi, sacred to Apollo. Attacked by a contingent of the army of Xerxes, August B. C. 480.

BEFORE discussing the battle of Salamis which concluded the first campaign of the Second Persian War, it will be necessary to refer to the events which occurred on the march of Xerxes from Thermopylæ to Athens, the ineffectual attempt of a contingent of his army to loot the Temple of Delphi, and to discuss briefly in this connection the remarkable prophecies concerning Greece, and their interpretation by Themistocles.

After the defeat of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, no enemy remained to oppose the march of Xerxes through Locris. It is true the Lacedæmonians, who were engaged in celebrating their national festival to the Carneian Apollo, when Leonidas advanced to Thermopylæ, had promised to assemble an army in Bœotia, in conjunction with the Athenians. But no troops were sent, and Xerxes prosecuted his campaign by marching through the country, across Locris, Phocis and Bœotia, ravaging and pillaging; and burning the towns and temples of those who refused to acknowledge his sov-

ereignty. The Thespians and Platæans, to their eternal honor, be it said, defied Xerxes and refused to give him their allegiance. Some of the Persian troops, on their way to Athens, sought to despoil the temple at Delphi, and carry away the immense treasures deposited there by Crœsus, King of Lydia, and by others, who had from time to time brought their offerings to the shrine of Apollo.

In permitting a part of his army to pillage the Temple of Delphi, Xerxes was less reverend than his father Darius. When the latter sent out his expedition under Datis and Artaphernes against Eretria and Athens, he gave orders to his commanders to spare the sacred island of Delos, because it was the birthplace of the twin deities, Apollo and Artemis (Diana), sacred to the Greeks. Xerxes, however, placed no restraint on his troops, but allowed them to burn and pillage at will all places in the enemy's country. Whether they were sacred or revered by the people seemed to be wholly immaterial to the haughty Persian. When tidings of the enemy's approach reached Delphi, the inhabitants consulted the priestess in the temple as to whether they should secrete the holy treasures to prevent their being plundered. The dignified answer came from the tripod; "Touch them not. The gods are able to protect them without human aid." The inhabitants, however, being too weak to resist the fury of the invaders, fled, some to the fastnesses of Mount Parnassus, others crossed the gulf of Corinth and took refuge in Achaia, on the northern coast of the Peloponnese. The prophet Ceratus, however, with only sixty of his chosen followers, remained alone in Delphi, and awaited the approach of the plundering hosts. Suddenly as the enemy drew nigh to the temple, the sacred armor, which it was not lawful for man to touch, which was accustomed to adorn the inner walls in the sacred edifice, by some miraculous agency was removed and was seen laying on the ground

immediately in front of its sacred portals. This wonder was immediately followed by another still more marvellous. When the enemy came to the doors of the chapel of Athene (Minerva), in front of the sacred edifice suddenly a fierce tempest arose. Amid flashes of lightning and peals of thunder immense rocks and crags from the sacred mountain were loosed, and came crashing down the sides of Parnassus, upon the invading forces. War cries and shouts of victory were heard from the temple of Athene. Vast numbers of the Persians were crushed amid the falling crags and rocks. They were filled with terror and superstitious awe, and fled from the place in great confusion. Then the Delphians, seeing their amazement, fell upon the flying troops and slew many. In terror and consternation, the invaders took refuge in Bœotia and related how they had been pursued by two hoplites, greater in stature than mortal men. These were said to have been sent by the gods to protect the temple sacred to Apollo. Thus runs the legend.

The army of Xerxes, after this incident, pushed on through Bœotia, crossed the borders of Attica. A contingent was stationed on the hill of Ares (Mars Hill), which commanded the Acropolis of Athens. The inhabitants of the city for the most part had fled, some to Salamis, others to Ægina, and Trœzen in Argolis. Attica was practically deserted. A determined band, however, believed that the "wooden wall" referred to by the priestess in the Delphic oracle, which declared that "Zeus grants to Athens that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered to defend Athens and her children," was intended to mean the wooden stockade about the temple of Athene on the hill of the Acropolis. Themistocles, indeed, had interpreted the words "wooden wall" to mean the decks of the Athenian navy, and not the palisade about the sacred temple of Athene. These patriots, however, determined to de-

fend the stockade. From the hill of Ares (Mars Hill), which commands the Acropolis, the Persian bowmen wrapped their arrows with tow which was ignited, and the burning shafts were shot against the stockade, but the defenders were successful in extinguishing the fires thus kindled. Then a precipitous path, an old Pelasgian stairway, on the side of the Acropolis was discovered, where it was not expected any one would attempt an ascent. The Persians, however, entered behind the gates and ascended the ancient stone stairway, where no guard was stationed, and reached the summit near the temple of Cecrops' daughter. The little band of defenders, when they beheld the enemy in force on the Acropolis, were in despair. Some threw themselves down from the wall and perished, others took refuge in the sacred precincts of the temple. The enemy now forced the gates of the stockade, slew the defenders, and set fire to the temple, and all the buildings on the Acropolis. So the capital of Attica was taken.

At last Xerxes was in possession of Athens. The burning of Sardis was avenged. He believed he had now accomplished the subjugation of Hellas. Immediately couriers were sent to the palace at Susa to announce the glad tidings to his uncle Artabanus, and to Atossa, the queen-mother, and daughter of Cyrus the Great.

Before giving an account of the memorable engagement at Salamis, it will be proper to note some of the traditions concerning that event. One of the most interesting concerns the supernatural. In the face of impending war, it is natural for opposing forces to ascertain, if possible, what destiny awaits them. It has been the universal custom of mankind, under such circumstances, to seek the aid of some supernatural agency, in order, if possible, to peer into the future, and learn in advance what the end may be. As it is

impossible for any ordinary mortal to foretell what will surely come to pass, men have always sought to reach the deity through those whom they believed are endowed with the spirit of divination. Among the Greeks this gift was believed to be possessed by the priestess in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, whose prophecies were regarded as revelations made by the gods to men.

Before Xerxes set out with his army from Sardis, while he was mobilizing his forces at Critalla, in Cappadocia, the patriotic leaders in Sparta and Athens secured the election of representatives to an assembly, which convened in the temple of Poseidon, on the isthmus of Corinth. This was the first pan-Hellenic military Congress. In order to ascertain the will of the gods, and peer a little way into the future, to divine the fate of Greece, a delegation was chosen to proceed to Delphi to consult the oracle.

It was the custom of the age, and as has been observed, had been the custom time out of mind, for man to seek aid of the supernatural. Even the Israelites, who first taught the doctrine of monotheism and worshipped Jehovah, a spirit invisible, eternal, unchangeable, approached him through the order of the priesthood; nor was any one, save the great high priest, ever permitted to enter the Holy of Holies. All the nations of the East consulted magicians, wizards, wise men, spirit-raisers, necromancers, soothsayers, and received revelations, either orally, or by signs; through the medium of dreams, or through communication with departed spirits. Even Saul, the first king of Israel, after he had banished the wizards, and witches, and spirit-raisers from his Kingdom, consulted a witch, or female necromancer at Endor, on the eve of his last battle with the Philistines on the plains of Gilboa.

On the southern slopes of Parnassus, about six miles from the gulf of Corinth, stood the famous temple of Delphi, dedicated to the worship of Apollo, prophet

of Zeus. Within its mysterious precincts the Pythoness from the sacred tripod deriving inspiration from the vapors arising from the fountain Cassotis, which gushed from the crevasses of the rocks beneath, chanted her incantations which revealed the divine will, forecasting the decrees of fate, as traced on the web of futurity. She was clad in flowing robes, her hair was adorned with gold ornaments. Before entering upon the discharge of her sacred office, she performed the ceremony of purification. She then entered the cavern in the recesses of the temple, drank of the waters of the fountain Cassotis, tasted the fruit of the old bay-tree, growing beside this mysterious spring, and ascended the tripod, the seat of prophecy and divination.

Under the influence of the sacred vapors she inhaled, the Pythoness was soothed by dreamy sensations, followed by a state of ecstatic delirium. While in this condition of religious frenzy, she was translated in spirit to the domain of the supernatural, and held converse with the gods. She revealed what she heard in mysterious utterances, which were taken down by the priest of the temple, who reduced them to poetic form, usually hexameter verse. In this manner, the supposed utterances of the deity were revealed to the suppliant.

The custody of the temple was with a corrupt and venal priesthood, chosen from the wealthy families of Delphi. The suppliants in order to secure the divine favor were required to offer sacrifices, and place upon the altar costly gifts. When they approached the temple, they wore crowns of laurel, adorned with fillets of wool. The first response of the Delphic oracle, received by those who had been sent to learn the future of Hellas, was a great disappointment. The prophetic utterances were ominous, yet there seemed to be no good reason why the oracle should fill with despondency and blight the hopes of those patriots who sought the welfare of Greece, in the impending conflict with Persia.

It may be suggested, however, that at this period the power and influence of the priesthood was on the wane. As the spirit of democracy and free government developed among the Hellenes, the power of the priesthood measurably diminished. This is the language of the prophecy which the suppliants received from the priestess of the temple in answer to their humble petitions for light and guidance:

"O wretched men, why sit ye here? Fly to the ends of the earth, leaving your houses and the lofty summits of your wheel-shaped city. For neither does the head remain firm, nor the body nor the lowest feet, nor the hands, nor is aught of the middle left, but they are all fallen to ruin.

"For fire and fleet Mars, driving the Syrian chariot, destroys it. And he will destroy many other turrets, and not yours alone; and he will deliver many temples of the immortals to devouring fire, which now stand dripping with sweat shaken with terror. From the topmost roofs, trickles black blood, pronouncing inevitable woe. But go from the sanctuary, and infuse your mind with courage to meet misfortune."

This deliverance was a cruel and savage onslaught aimed at the liberties of Greece. It foretold the failure of all patriotic efforts to resist the invasion of Xerxes, whose avowed purpose was to reduce the Hellenes to slavery. It wouldn't do at all. In sheer disgust and disappointment, the suppliants were about to return with their dismal report to their countrymen. But Timon, an influential citizen of Delphi, whose sympathies were with his countrymen, and who stood well with the aristocratic order of the priesthood, prevailed upon the pilgrims to remain and renew their prayers, and not depart until they had received more favorable responses from the gods. They accordingly continued their supplications, bringing other and further gifts to the altar. Figuratively speaking, they wrestled with the priests even as Jacob of old, according to the Hebrew records, wrestled with the angel. In due time a second utterance was received from the Py-

thoness. It was but a slight improvement on the first. But in it, the genius of Themistocles read the deliverance of Greece. He interpreted the "wooden walls" referred to by the oracle to mean the Hellenic navy, given by Zeus, which should remain impregnable and at divine Salamis, through its instrumentality, the enemies of Hellas should perish. Here is the second prophecy.

"Pallas is unable to propitiate Olympian Zeus, entreating him with many a prayer, and prudent counsel. But to you again I utter this speech making it like adamant:

"When all is taken that the limit of Cecrops contains within it, and the recesses of divine Cithæron, wide-seeing Zeus gives a wooden wall to the Triton-born goddess, to be alone impregnable, which will preserve you and your children. Nor do you quietly wait for the cavalry and infantry advancing in multitudes from the continent, but turn your back, and withdraw. You will still be able to face them.

"O divine Salamis, thou shalt cause the sons of women to perish, whether Ceres is scattered or gathered in."[1]

In view of the interpretation of this oracle, as construed by Themistocles, although the enemy had burned the sacred temples on the Acropolis and taken their city of the Violet Crown, the people were still persuaded that their fleet was invincible. No possible harm could befall Salamis, which the Gods had declared was divine.

[1] Herod. vii, 140-143.

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THE MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BY

WILLIAM L. SNYDER

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

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MILITARY ANNALS OF GREECE

CHAPTER XXIII

SALAMIS

SALAMIS — Sal-a-mis — [Σαλαμίς]. An island in the Saronic Gulf, about ten miles long, immediately south of Megara, north of Ægina, and west of Attica. It forms the southern boundary of the bay of Eleusis. The shore-line is separated from the Attic coast by a channel which varies in width, on the north and south, from two to eighteen miles. There is a narrow passage in the channel north of the peninsula of Cynosura, and south of the island of St. George which in some places is not more than 3,500 feet wide. The width between the little island of Psyttalea east of Cynosura and west of Attica is less than 4,000 feet.

The prehistoric town of Salamis was on the southern extremity of the island, and was the abode of the Telamonian Ajax. The city which flourished at the time of the battle was built by the Athenians in the Attic demus of Salamis, on a good harbor at the head of a deep bay in the east shore of the island known as the bay of Ambelakia, having for its southern boundary the peninsula of Cynosura. It is claimed, however, that the new Salamis is very ancient and was the abode of Telamon at the time of the Trojan War, and a stone is still pointed out on the bay of Ambelakia upon which it is said Telamon seated himself when his sons departed for Aulis on the expedition to Troy.

The conspicuous features of Salamis were a temple to Ajax and a temple to Artemis (Diana). In the Agora, or market place, was a statue of Solon, with one hand covered by his mantle. Close to the city, also at the head of the bay, was the Village of Ambelakia. In a wider bay, immediately to the north, is the island now known as St. George.

The weight of authority justifies the assumption that the Greek fleet was, at the time of the battle, drawn up in the bay of Ambelakia, off the town of Salamis, which by reason of the width of the bay, was distant about four miles from the coast of Attica. It sailed out of the bay into the channel at dawn, September 20,

B. C. 480, formed in the enemy's front, attacked and overwhelmingly defeated the fleet of Xerxes, and drove them southward through the channel into the open sea, past the peninsula of Cynosura and the island of Psyttalea, which marked the scenes of greatest slaughter. The carnage ceased only when night put an end to the conflict.

THE battle fought in the straits of Salamis, September 20, B. C. 480, was the most notable naval engagement of antiquity. The Greek fleet under Themistocles and Eurybiades defeated the Persian fleet, which fought under the eye of Xerxes, who viewed the battle from his gilded throne, erected on a rocky eminence on the shore of Attica, which overlooks the straits and island of Salamis. The Persians outnumbered the Greeks more than three to one. This engagement concluded the first campaign of the second Persian War B. C. 480.

The credit for the victory of Salamis belongs solely to Themistocles, the Athenian, the greatest admiral and strategist of his age. He compelled Eurybiades, the Spartan commander, to fight in the straits, after the proposition had been voted down twice, in council. Themistocles saw very clearly what his associates were unable or unwilling to see, that if he could get the Persians to fight in the narrow straits, the numerical superiority of the enemy would not avail, and their numbers would retard and embarrass rather than aid them, because they would not have sufficient sea room to manœuvre their many ships to advantage in the channel. The Greeks, on the other hand, with a comparatively small number of ships, would have the advantage because a large part of the Persian fleet would be precluded from taking part. But the clear and forcible argument of Themistocles fell upon deaf ears. The Spartans were dull or stupid or both, and they promptly voted against every plan proposed by the Athenian commander.

The latter saw clearly that if Eurybiades succeeded in holding the council to his determination not to engage, that Athens was lost. The Spartan admiral, being able to control the vote of his associates, intended to sail to the Peloponnese, to protect its ports, and leave Athens to her fate, urging as his excuse, that the numerical strength of the fleet was such that they could not afford to risk a battle in the straits, where the enemy, with their powerful armament, might be able to destroy the Greek navy. The features of the situation which to the dull mind of Eurybiades seemed most unfavorable, were those which to the mind of Themistocles afforded the greatest hope of success.

When the Greek fleet sailed from Artemisium, after the defeat of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, as narrated in a previous chapter (q. v.) and when news was received that Athens had fallen, the intention of Eurybiades was to proceed to the Peloponnesus, without offering any assistance to the inhabitants of Attica. He did not deem such assistance necessary, because Athens was too weak to resist alone the invading army of Xerxes and in anticipation of his approach, the inhabitants had deserted the city, and fled with their families for refuge to Salamis, Ægina, Corinth, Trœzen and other places in the Peloponnese. Themistocles, however, prevailed upon the Spartan admiral to tarry in the straits to give some measure of protection to the Athenians who had taken refuge on the island of Salamis. When the news of the fall of Athens reached the fleet, Eurybiades resolved to sail at once to the Peloponnesus, and leave Athens and Salamis to their fate. A council of war was held and the majority voted to sail to the isthmus to defend the Peloponnesus, but the approach of night alone prevented the order from being immediately executed.

Mnesiphilus, an influential Athenian, the same evening sought Themistocles to find out what the navy

intended to do at this critical juncture, and was told that the fleet was ordered to the isthmus. "If they remove the ships from Salamis," said Mnesiphilus, "you will no longer fight for any country, for they will each betake themselves to their cities, and neither will Eurybiades nor any one else be able to detain them, and all Greece will perish. If there is any possible way, have the decree annulled and persuade Eurybiades to alter his determination and remain here."

The situation in which Themistocles was placed was critical and perplexing. A man of ordinary abilities under the circumstances would have failed. If Themistocles had not been possessed of intrepid courage and commanding genius, Eurybiades and his short-sighted, selfish, unpatriotic associates would have deserted their countrymen, retreated to their own shores, and allowed the Persian hosts to remain in peaceful possession of Northern and Central Greece. The inevitable result would have been the subjugation of Hellas, and the extension of the empire of Cyrus to the shores of the Adriatic, perhaps to the gates of Hercules. Themistocles saw that failure at Salamis meant the destruction of his country, the abolition of free government, and the triumph of Persia. He determined to force Eurybiades to fight and to so manœuvre as to compel Xerxes to block both ends of the strait with his great navy, so that the Greek fleet could not possibly escape, but must conquer the enemy or perish where it lay in the waters of the Saronic Gulf.

Xerxes was to be unwillingly forced to aid the plans of Themistocles. The designs of Eurybiades, who contemplated retreat, were defeated through a clever bit of strategy which made Xerxes the instrument to bring about the result. The plan was to force both Greeks and Persians to fight where they were. The task which Themistocles undertook was difficult but it was successfully accomplished.

Posterity is indebted to Herodotus for a report of the discussions which took place in the councils of both Greeks and Persians, immediately before the battle. Xerxes, as soon as his fleet arrived at Phalerum, was desirous to learn the opinion of his commanders and admirals of the several nations which composed his navy as to the advisability of a naval engagement. A council was held for this purpose. Xerxes presided, with the King of Sidon seated at his right, and the King of Tyre at his left. Those assembled did not address their monarch on the floor of the assembly, but Mardonius, the King's brother-in-law, was instructed to ask each his opinion. All advised in favor of an engagement except Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, the city where Herodotus himself was born. Some writers assign this circumstance as a reason why the historian makes her appear to advantage in the council. She reminded Mardonius that she had fought well in the naval engagements at Artemisium off the north coast of Eubœa, so as to emphasize her loyalty and then said that she was justified in giving her real opinion, as to what would be most advantageous for the Persians. "Spare your ships," she said, "do not risk a sea-fight, for the Greeks in seamanship are as much superior to your crews as men are superior to women. Why do you desire to risk a naval engagement? It is not necessary. Have you not possession of Athens for the sake of which you undertook this expedition, and have you not the rest of Greece? No one stands in your way; and those who still hold out against you have fared as they deserved. You will readily accomplish your purpose, if you keep your fleet here, remaining near land, or even advancing to the Peloponnesus. Because the Greeks will not be able to hold out long. You will disperse them, and they will fly to their respective cities. I am informed they have no provisions on Salamis, and if you march your

land forces to the Peloponnesus, it is not probable that those Greeks, who came from thence will remain quiet; nor will they care to fight at sea for the Athenians. But if you risk a sea-fight, and are beaten, it might bring disaster to the land forces. Consider also that good masters usually have bad slaves, and bad masters good slaves. You, who are the best of men, have bad slaves among your allies, the Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilicians and Pamphylians; and these are of no use at all." [1]

Thus did the woman, the queen of the native city of Herodotus, the commander of a squadron in the navy of Xerxes, use her endeavors to dissuade her sovereign from risking a battle at sea. Her enemies in the council were pleased at what she said, because they believed that her words would anger the King, and might cost her her life. But Xerxes, we are told, was greatly pleased when her opinion was reported to him. He greatly admired her abilities and the courage she displayed in battle. Her objections, however, were overruled. Xerxes concluded to engage the enemy at sea, and said that his fleet did well at Artemisium, but did not do its best. This he attributed to the fact that he was not personally present to witness the engagement. He said the navy could do much better if he were present. He concluded, therefore, to disregard the sage advice of the woman, the most sensible suggestions he had received, and fight.

The discussions and fierce denunciations which characterized the debates in the council called by Eurybiades aboard his flag-ship, were in marked contrast with these calm and dove-like proceedings in the council assembled by Xerxes. After the departure of Mnesiphilus, who called on the Athenian admiral, as above stated, and urged him, if possible, to secure a reversal

[1] Herod. viii, 68.

of the order, directing the fleet to sail to the isthmus, Themistocles resolved to hinder the departure of the ships and force an engagement at the earliest possible moment. As soon as Mnesiphilus departed, he proceeded to the flag-ship and requested an interview with Eurybiades. The request was granted, and Themistocles tried to show the Spartan that the only hope of success was to stay where they were and fight. He finally prevailed upon Eurybiades to again convoke the commanders in council. When they were assembled, Themistocles made a strong and powerful plea in favor of remaining where they were. He was strongly opposed by his old enemy Adimantus, the Corinthian, who had formerly threatened to abandon the fleet at Artemisium and was bribed by Themistocles to remain and do his duty.

While making his argument, Adimantus interrupted him, saying: "In the games, Themistocles, those who start before the time are beaten with stripes." Then came the ready retort, "but those who are left behind are not crowned." Plutarch says that in the course of the debate Eurybiades became enraged and in his excitement advanced towards Themistocles, lifting his staff as if to strike, when the latter exclaimed: "Strike, but hear me." Eurybiades was amazed at his moderation, and bade him continue. Themistocles, then turning to Eurybiades and the assemblage, said:

"It now rests with you to save Greece. This you can do if you will remain and give battle, and be not persuaded by those who urge you to sail to the Isthmus. Analyze and compare each opinion. If you fight near the Isthmus, you must fight in the open sea, where it is least advantageous to us, whose ships are heavier and fewer in number. Consider also that even if you succeed, your departure for the Isthmus involves the abandonment and loss of Salamis, and Megara, and Ægina, because the Persian land forces will follow close

upon their navy, and thus you will be the means of leading them to the Peloponnesus, and expose all Greece to danger.

"If, however, you follow my advice, you will secure the following advantages: In the first place, it is obvious that by engaging in a narrow space with a few ships against many, if the probable results which experience has shown, are most likely to happen, we shall have a much superior advantage, because to fight in a narrow space is advantageous to us; but in a wide space to them. Again, we shall save Salamis, where are now our wives and children. Consider also that by remaining you will fight just as much for the Peloponnesus as if you fought at the Isthmus. If you are wise, therefore, you will not lead the enemy's land forces to the Peloponnesus. If we succeed with our fleet here, the barbarians will not advance to the Isthmus, but will retreat from Attica in confusion which we shall gain also by saving Megara, and Ægina and Salamis, where it is announced by the oracle, we shall be superior to our enemies.

"Fortune favors those who follow what is reasonable; but the fortunes of those who do not follow what is reasonable, the gods do not favor."

Thus Themistocles pleaded the cause of Greece, his demands were reasonable and just and had his associates possessed the liberal patriotic spirit of the Athenian, the order would have been given to fight at Salamis. The admiral was now to be insulted by his old enemy and rival, Adimantus of Corinth. Of course the latter dwelt on the Isthmus, and naturally desired the fleet as near his own door as possible. But this fact did not excuse him for the insult he addressed to a fellow-officer in whose veins also ran Hellenic blood. Adimantus challenged the right of Themistocles to address the officers of the fleet. He arose and addressing Eurybiades reminded him that Athens had fallen, that

Themistocles had no city to represent and that the admiral had no right to put a question to the council to vote upon, unless it was raised by some one who represented a Grecian city, and then turning to Themistocles bade him be silent, because as his city was lost, he had no right to speak.

Themistocles arose and made his final appeal. In reply to the ungrateful speech of the Corinthian, he reminded him that although Athens had fallen temporarily into the hands of the barbarian, he still represented a city, a powerful city, the strongest in Greece. That city was the Athenian navy, which comprised 200 ships, more than half of the entire Greek fleet, which numbered but 366 vessels. Then turning to Eurybiades, he continued: "If you remain here, you will show by your actions that you are a brave man. If you will not remain, then you will ruin Greece. Because the success or failure of the war depends upon the fleet, and on the fleet alone. Therefore, yield, I entreat, to my advice. But if you refuse, then we Athenians will take our wives and children aboard our ships, and depart to Siris in Italy, which is an ancient possession of ours, and the oracles declare it is fated to be founded by us. Then, when bereft of such allies, when it is too late, you will remember my words."

If the selfish Peloponnesians dreamed that the Athenians would meekly surrender Attica, at their behest, abandon Athens, and lend the Peloponnesians their ships to protect their shores, the dream was dispelled. Eurybiades was now compelled to choose between shame and honor. The assembly was obliged to decide either to support the Athenians, who contributed 200 ships out of a total of 336, to protect Attica and Salamis, or fight alone. They were plainly told that the Athenians would not remain in Greece, to be abandoned to the overwhelming hosts of Xerxes. They would sail away towards the setting sun and, in fair Italy, found an-

other Athens. On the answer of Eurybiades and his associates hung the fate of Greece.

We may be allowed to speculate on the momentous character of the issues impending. What if Themistocles had founded a new Athens on the shores of Italy? Would Rome, whose future fame filled the world, have been a Greek, not a Latin city? Would the language and civilization of the West and the East have been Greek? Would the Punic Wars which involved the fate of Carthage have been fought for the supremacy of Greek instead of Latin civilization? The fate of the ancient world was involved in the question as to whether Persian arms should force the civilization of Greece to establish itself in Italy, because Hellas refused to unite and stand together in the crisis caused by the fall of Athens.

The final appeal of Themistocles had its effect. Eurybiades determined not to sail, but to remain at Salamis. Herodotus says, in his opinion, Eurybiades reached this conclusion, not because he was convinced by the reasons assigned by the Athenians, but because he was afraid that if he went to the Isthmus, the Athenian fleet would desert them and sail to Italy. He knew that the remainder of his squadron of but 166 vessels would be no match for the enemy. The order was given to stay at Salamis, and the council dispersed.

At sunrise on the following morning the shock of an earthquake was felt on both land and sea. The Greeks then offered prayers and supplications to the gods and invoked the aid of Telamon and Ajax, the heroes of Salamis, and a vessel was dispatched to Ægina to fetch Æacus himself and other Æacidæ.

Meantime, the Greeks at the Isthmus toiled incessantly to put themselves in a posture of defense, to be able to repel an invasion of the Peloponnesus, for the barbarians had begun their march thither. When the

Lacedæmonians learned of the death of Leonidas, at Thermopylæ, the inhabitants of the peninsula flocked to the Isthmus under the command of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, regent for Pleistarchus, the infant son of Leonidas. They first blocked up the Scironian Way, a road which led from Megara to Corinth, along the eastern shore of the Isthmus. A short distance from Megara it passed along the Scironian rocks, a range of shelving cliffs, overhanging the sea, along the foot of a spur of Mount Gerania. The only other route by which the Isthmus can be traversed runs inland through the defiles of a higher part of the Geranian mountains. The number of land forces at the Isthmus amounted to many tens of thousands, including Lacedæmonians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, Hermionians and tribes of the Arcadians. After the Scironian Way was blocked, the Greeks built a wall across the Isthmus, which is about four miles wide at its narrowest part. Where the wall was built it was about five miles across. Every man in the army worked on the wall, which was of stone, brick, timber and bastions, or baskets filled with sand.

News reached the Peloponnesian commanders in the fleet as to what transpired at the Isthmus, and they began to fear for the safety of those in the peninsula, as it was rumored the barbarian land forces were going to invade the Peloponnesus. Notwithstanding, it was agreed at the council the night before to stay at Salamis, the officers began next day to murmur and express their discontent. They wondered at the imprudence of Eurybiades. At first they conversed in low tones, each man with his fellow. Then their mutterings grew louder, and before the day was over, they insisted that another council be held to reconsider what had been done the night before. When the commanders were assembled, Themistocles saw that the Peloponnesians

would carry the vote against him. He then determined to thwart them by contriving to make Xerxes close both ends of the strait, so that Eurybiades could not sail away, even if he wished.

He went secretly out of the council and sought Sicinnus, one of his household slaves, a man of ability and learning, who acted as tutor to his sons. Plutarch says that Sicinnus was a Persian captive, and was strongly attached and devoted to his master. Æschylus, in his drama, "The Persians," says he was a Greek. Mr. Grote, to reconcile these statements, suggests that he may have been an Asiatic Greek. The object of Themistocles was through the agency of Sicinnus, to make Xerxes believe that the Greeks were hopelessly divided among themselves, some being desirous even of aligning themselves with the barbarians, that their camp was in the utmost confusion; that they meditated flight; and all Xerxes had to do was to surround their fleet, enter the channel and seize the entire armament.

It was indeed a desperate expedient to which Themistocles now resorted. He was about to use Xerxes to shut in the Greek fleet, and close every avenue of escape to his countrymen. What if Persia shut his fleet in the strait forever? What if Hellas lost the battle? To the mind of Themistocles it were better the Hellenic navy should lie at the bottom of the Saronic gulf, than suffer humiliation and defeat, and become fugitives and wanderers on the face of the earth.

The remedy was desperate; but it was not more so than the disease. Themistocles carefully confided his plans to Sicinnus, and instructed him what to say. The faithful messenger was then put aboard a merchant ship and escaped into the Persian lines. Sicinnus asked to be taken at once to the commander and delivered this message: "The Athenian commander has sent me to you privately without the knowledge of the other Greeks for he is in the interest of your King, and prefers that you, rather than his own countrymen, should succeed. He bade me tell you that the Greeks are in a state of consternation and confusion, and are deliberating on flight. Now is your opportunity. Do not suffer them to escape. They will not oppose you. They are even now quarrelling among themselves. You may witness a fight already begun between such as favor and such as oppose you."

Having delivered his message he was permitted to depart. Darkness had set in. The barbarians were jubilant. A body of Persians, selected by Xerxes for their beauty, valor and fidelity to their sovereign, many of them of royal blood, was detailed and sent to the small island of Psyttalea, at the southern entrance to the straits and midway between the Piræus and the eastern extremity Cynosura, a promontory of Salamis. These were instructed to save their own men, but to permit none of the enemy to escape. As midnight approached, they advanced their western wing towards Salamis so as to enclose the Greeks. In order to prevent the escape of the enemy northward, through the straits of Megara, a detachment of two hundred ships was ordered to sail north into the bay of Eleusis and the Megaric channel, in order to block any attempt at flight in that direction. Diodorus says that this squadron was composed entirely of Egyptian vessels. At the same time the ships south and east along the shores of Salamis and Attica moved into the mouth of the channel, and filled the whole strait, so that the flight of their enemies was impossible. Eurybiades and the Greek fleet were shut in, and Themistocles had his way. These silent movements of the barbarians by which they surrounded the Hellenic fleet occupied the night, but Eurybiades and his associates were wholly unaware of what was being done, until told by Aristides that they were completely surrounded by the enemy.

Colonel Leake is of opinion, and his views seem to

be amply supported by the evidence we have on the subject, that the Persians made two movements. The first was in the afternoon, when they advanced their fleet from the bay of Phalerum to the Piræus. The second movement was made in the night. When the enemy learned from Sicinnus, after darkness had set in, that the Greeks would offer no resistance, if the Persians boldly entered the channel, and surrounded them. Then the Persian admiral sent the Egyptian squadron, above referred to, into the Gulf of Eleusis in the strait between the coast of Megara and the north shore of Salamis to block the straits on the north, and prevent the escape of the enemy in that quarter, and also sent his ships directly into the channel, thus surrounding the enemy on all sides.

The Persian admiral at Salamis, according to Ctesias, who compiled his history from Persian sources, was Onaphas, father-in-law of Xerxes. But Herodotus says the admiral's name was Ariabignes, the King's brother, born before Darius became king and who contended with Xerxes for the crown.

While the Greeks were disputing in council as to the propriety of sailing to the Isthmus, at dawn, Aristides crossed over from the island of Ægina, and sought out Themistocles with whom he desired to confer. The latter was at the council. A messenger entered and told him privately that a friend desired to talk with him. When Themistocles came out, Aristides stood before him. These distinguished men had fought together at Marathon; they held the centre in that engagement against the Persians and Sacæ, the flower of the barbarian army. Subsequently they had become bitter political rivals, and through the influence and machinations of Themistocles, Aristides was ostracised and banished for ten years. When Athens was again threatened with a second Persian invasion, the patriotism of Themistocles asserted itself, and he procured

the unjust decree of banishment to be vacated, and annulled, and Aristides was recalled. In the face of common danger to their country, the two men forgot their differences. According to Plutarch, Aristides thus addressed his old friend and comrade:

"If we have any discretion, Themistocles, laying aside at this time our vain and childish contentions, let us enter upon a safe and honorable dispute, vying with each other for the preservation of Greece; you in the ruling and commanding, I in the subservient and advising part; even, indeed, as I now understand you to be alone, adhering to the best advice, in counselling without any delay to engage in the straits. And in this, though our own party oppose, the enemy seem to assist you. For the sea behind, and all around us, is covered with their fleet; so that we are under necessity of approving ourselves men of courage. For we must fight, whether we will or no; for we are surrounded on all sides and can no longer escape by flight."

He then told that he had come from Ægina, and it was with great difficulty that he was able to elude the vigilance of the enemy which now surrounded the Greek fleet. He begged Themistocles to return to the council and break the news to Eurybiades, and tell him that an eye-witness had arrived, who would support the statement.

Themistocles greeted Aristides cordially and said he brought good news. Then he revealed to his old comrade the fact that what Aristides had seen, he had himself brought about, because he found it necessary, as Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians would not, of their own accord, fight in the straits. He then requested Aristides to go into the council and break the news, saying they would not credit it, coming from Themistocles. Aristides entered. The debate was in progress. He delivered his message. Many doubted what he said. At this juncture a Tenian trireme arrived, having de-

serted from the fleet of Xerxes. It was commanded by Panætius, who gave an account of the movements of the enemy, and assured the council that their fleet was completely surrounded.

A battle then and there was no longer a matter of choice, but of necessity. The enemy having surrounded the Greeks and defied them, the latter now became united and vied with one another, as to who could outstrip the other in deeds of valor. One touch of Persian defiance made Hellas one. Every man in the fleet felt proud of his Hellenic blood. His patriotism was kindled. The gauge of battle was thrown down by the sons of Perseus, and the men of Hellas must conquer or die. There was no alternative.

The bit of clever strategy resorted to by Themistocles to compel the enemy to surround the Greeks and make them fight against their will is referred to by Æschylus, who took part in the engagement, in his musical drama, entitled "The Persians." In this production an account of the reverse at Salamis is given by a courier fresh from the scene, who arrives at Susa and in the royal palace, pours into the ears of Atossa, the queen-mother, the mournful details. He thus refers to the strategy of Themistocles:

"The spring of all this misery,
Was some Avenger; or some angry god.
For from the Athenian host a Greek arrived,
And to thy son, King Xerxes, tidings spake;
To wit; that if night's blackness should arrive,
The Greeks would stay not, but upon their decks
Leaping in panic, seek their lives to save
By secret flight, one here, one there afar.
Now Xerxes heard, yet marking not the trick
Of Greek informer, nor ill-will of heaven
To all his captains proclamation make;
When Helios, lighting with his rays the earth
Shall cease, and gloom the Ether's temple hold;
To range the throng of ships in triple lines
To guard all exits and the seaward paths;
Others he bade round Ajax's Isle to wheel;

For if the Grecians should escape their doom
By finding hidden loop holes for their ships,
Beheading was, to all, the stern decree.
And all night long the captains of the fleet,
Kept their crews moving up and down the strait,
So the night waned, and not one Grecian ship
Made effort to elude or slip away."

When morning broke it became apparent that Sicinnus, the messenger sent by Themistocles, had deceived Xerxes, when he told him that the Greeks were in a state of confusion, and would make no resistance, when they saw that flight was impossible. There was no confusion in the Greek alignment. On the contrary the enemy presented a united front, and the Persian monarch began to realize that a terrible struggle was imminent. Xerxes, as he had done at Thermopylæ, had ordered a throne to be erected under Mount Ægaleos, on an eminence which overlooked the straits on which was placed his silver-footed chair, beneath a purple canopy fringed with gold. Here the King seated himself early in the morning to view the conflict. About him were gathered the principal officers of his household. An attendant held the imperial parasol over his head. At his side were the scribes, who were directed to write down the names of those who had distinguished themselves in the action. The spot where Xerxes' throne was erected was doubtless under Mount Ægaleos, not upon its summit. The highest point of that eminence commands a view not only of the Saronic Gulf, but of part of Attica, Megara and Corinth, also. But Colonel Leake argues that Xerxes desired to be near enough to communicate speedily with the ships, to distinguish each vessel, observe the conduct of those on board, and commit the memorials of that conduct to writing. He thinks, therefore, that the place from which Xerxes witnessed the humiliating defeat of his navy was an eminence on the Attic shore nearly opposite the island of Psyttalea.

The Persian right towards the bay of Eleusis and the westward was held by the ships of the Phœnicians and Cyprians; on the left toward the Piræus and the east were the Ionians, Persians and Egyptians; the Cilicians and Pamphylians held the centre. On the left of the Greek line were stationed the Athenians, opposite the Phœnicians and Cyprians on the Persian right. The Lacedæmonians and other Peloponnesians occupied the Greek right, opposite the Ionians, Persians and Egyptians on the Persian left. The Ægenitans and Eubœans occupied the centre.

As the sun began to mount into the heavens, Themistocles made an eloquent appeal to his countrymen assuring them that if they but remained steadfast they must win the victory. He reminded them that on that day's business depended their future, whether they should emerge from the contest free men, for the only alternative was chains and slavery. History has not preserved a record of the language used in this appeal of Themistocles. What the oracles of Bacis had spoken was now to come to pass for he declared, "When they shall bridge with ships the sacred shore of Artemis (Diana) with the golden sword, and sea-girt Cynosura, having with mad hope destroyed beautiful Athens, then divine Vengeance shall quench strong Presumption, son of Insolence, when thinking to subvert all things. *For brass shall engage with brass, and Ares shall redden the sea with blood.* Then the far-thundering son of Saturn and benign victory shall bring a day of freedom to Greece."

After Themistocles had finished his speech, he ordered the men to go on board their ships. The order was obeyed with alacrity. At this juncture the trireme from Ægina which had gone to fetch the Æacidæ arrived. The Greeks then as soon as Eurybiades advanced with the flag-ship sounded the trumpet and gave the command to go forward, were suddenly assailed by

the Persians. One tradition says that at the outset some of the Greeks backed water, when suddenly the apparition of a female figure appeared, and they heard her voice as if from heaven, declare, "Dastards, how long will you back water?" Thereupon the entire line advanced with enthusiasm. This tradition is not referred to in the account given by Æschylus.

Plutarch says that the Persian admiral from his flag-ship, which was a ponderous affair, with a lofty structure on its prow, from which, as from the walls of a castle, the Persian men-at-arms shot their arrows among the enemy, singled out the trireme of Themistocles, seeking to destroy the ship commanded by the most illustrious of the Grecian leaders. While the Phœnician ship directed its darts against the vessel of this illustrious man, an Athenian trireme commanded by Aminias darted from the line and bore down upon the Persian, seeking to strip it of its bank of oars with its sharp prow. In this movement the brazen beaks of the contending vessels became fastened together. Pikes were used as grappling irons, and the crew of the Persian headed by Ariaramenes (the Ariabignes of Herodotus), attempted to board the Greek trireme, but no sooner had he reached the deck of the enemy than he fell pierced by the pikes of the Athenians, and his bleeding corpse was cast into the sea. If we may credit Diodorus, the Athenian Aminias was a brother of Cynægirus, who distinguished himself at Marathon, and the brother also of Æschylus, who also took part in the engagement. The latter notices this assault which his brother made on the Phœnician flag-ship in his poem, "The Persians." The lines are rendered by Professor Blakie as follows:

> A Greek ship led on the attack,
> And from the prow of a Phœnician, struck
> The figure-head,

What Herodotus says about the exploit of Aminias is (viii, 84), that when the other ships backed water, and made for the shore, Aminias of Pallene, an Athenian captain, being carried onwards, darted forth in front of the line, and charged a ship of the enemy. The two vessels became entangled and could not separate, whereupon the rest of the fleet came up to help Aminias, and engaged with the Persians. Thus, the Athenians say the battle commenced; but the Æginetans maintained that the ship which had been to Ægina for the Æacidæ was the first to begin the fight.

The Persians were inferior in seamanship, and unable to withstand the repeated attacks, and skilful manœuvres of the Greeks. Their ships were rammed in many instances by a dexterous movement, whereby the Greek prows were so managed as to strip from the side of an enemy's ship the entire bank of oars, a piece of seamanship practised by the Greeks, but with which the barbarians were not familiar. The conflict raged until more than half the Persian fleet was destroyed or disabled. The ships of Xerxes, as had been predicted by Themistocles, were at a disadvantage in the narrow channel by reason of their numbers and the multitude of disabled ships obstructed those who desired to save themselves by flight.

Herodotus gives no detailed account of the engagement. He observes that the greater part of the ships were run down at Salamis, some being destroyed by the Athenians, others by the Æginetæ. The Greeks fought in good order, in line, but the barbarians were neither properly formed nor did anything with judgment. He mentions this incident with respect to Artemisia, queen of Hellicarnassus, that being pursued by an Athenian ship, she bore down upon a friendly ship manned by Calyndians, with the Calyndian King on board. Whether she had any trouble with this monarch at the Hellespont, Herodotus says, he is unable to say; nor

does he know whether she did it on purpose, or whether the Calyndian ship happened by chance to be in her way. However, she ran it down, sunk it, and gained a double advantage thereby. For the captain of the Attic ship, when he saw her bearing down on a ship of the enemy, concluding Artemisia's ship to be a Grecian, or one that had deserted from the enemy and was assisting the Greeks, turned aside and attacked others.

She escaped, and what is even more incredible, she won the favor of Xerxes, who was watching the engagement. One of his counsellors said to the King, "Do you see Artemisia, how well she fights, and she has sunk one of the enemy's ships." Xerxes said, "Are you sure the exploit was that of Artemisia?" The answer was that they knew the ensign of her ship perfectly well, but supposed she had sunk a ship of the enemy, and no one on board survived to disabuse the mind of Xerxes on that point. The King was much pleased with the woman's courage and it is said he exclaimed, "My men have become women and my women men."

On account of the confusion and panic among the barbarians, occasioned by the severity of the struggle, and the great mortality among them, the entire Persian fleet and Xerxes himself became demoralized and panic-stricken and the ships withdrew as best they could into the open sea.

Since the dawn, the Son of Darius, from the rocky eminence he occupied, had been watching the attempt of his captains to execute his orders to destroy the Greeks and sink their ships. But he was compelled to witness the destruction of more than half his fleet. The damage done to the enemy, however, was comparatively slight. Xerxes, however, instead of giving orders to renew the contest on the following day, really became solicitous, and alarmed for his personal safety. It is true he had taken Athens and reduced it to ashes.

He had on the Attic peninsula a formidable army, numbering more than two millions of fighting men, many of whom, doubtless were near enough the coast to witness the engagement off Salamis, yet Xerxes was afraid. The grandson of the Great Cyrus seemed to be altogether lacking in the qualities that made his distinguished ancestor the greatest conqueror up to that time, that the world had seen. He became seized with the idea that the victorious Greeks would dispatch a squadron to the Hellespont, destroy the bridge of boats he had constructed to bring his army into Europe, cut off his retreat and harass his retreating army in the wilds of Thrace.

He sought the advice of his brother-in-law, Mardonius, who had begged Xerxes to undertake the expedition. Fearing the wrath of his sovereign, and not wishing to incur his displeasure by advising contrary to what he knew Xerxes wished to do, he concurred in the view that it would be wise to retreat and return with the entire armament to Asia. It is clear, however, if we may judge from his subsequent conduct at Platæa, that Mardonius, had he been free to act according to his own will, would never have retreated. He would, in all probability, have renewed the contest at the Isthmus, and united the land and naval forces, in an attempt to invade the Peloponnesus. Had Mardonius been Xerxes, and Xerxes Mardonius, a different page would doubtless have been written concerning the destinies of Hellas.

Xerxes unquestionably was weary and disgusted. He longed for the luxurious ease and comfort of his royal parks, gardens and palaces at Susa and Ecbatana. Orders were given for the fleet to proceed with all despatch to the Hellespont and very soon after the battle of Salamis, the army took up its march north through Attica, Bœotia, Locris, through the bloody pass at Thermopylæ, where Leonidas and his followers

slept in honored graves, to Thessaly and thence north to Macedonia and into Thrace, thence eastward into Asia.

But all the while Mardonius was anxious for permission to stay in Hellas and accomplish the purpose for which the expedition had been undertaken. When the army reached Thessaly Xerxes consented that he might remain there during the winter with a detachment of 300,000 men, and in the spring renew the contest for the conquest of Hellas.

With the remainder of his forces Xerxes finally reached the Hellespont. The bridge of boats during his absence had been destroyed by the severe storms, and he was obliged to transport his troops into Asia by means of his fleet.

The net results of this memorable campaign B. C. 480, which covered a period of a few weeks, was the destruction of a garrison of eleven hundred men under Leonidas at Thermopylæ; an indecisive sea fight off Artemisium, on the northern coast of the island of Eubœa; the burning of Athens; an unsuccessful attempt to sack the temple of Delphi; and the decisive naval engagement in the Saronic Gulf off the island of Salamis.

One incident in connection with the battle of Salamis must be noted. On the island, almost within bow-shot of the contending fleets, amid the clash of resounding arms, a mother, driven from Athens by the invading Persians, gave birth to a son, whose name was destined to live forever in the world of letters. They called him Euripides. While Æschylus, a great poet, was that day doing battle, to preserve and redeem Athens, a poet, destined to become equally famous, first saw the light.

A detailed account of the battle of Salamis is given by Æschylus in his musical drama entitled "The Persians," a quotation from which is given above. He was

a native of Eleusis in Attica, born B. C. 525, and hence was contemporaneous with Pindar and Simonides. He fought at Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis and Platæa. He is one of the great poets of antiquity. "The Persians" is the first page of Greek history ever written. It was produced in Athens B. C. 472, eight years after the battle, when Herodotus was but twelve years of age. The latter began to write his famous history when he was a young man. He read his works at public assemblies, the first recorded recitation of Herodotus having taken place at the festival of the Panathenæa, at Athens B. C. 446.

Æschylus laid the scene of his drama in Asia. On the stage was represented a room in the royal palace of Xerxes at Susa. When the curtain rises a chorus of Persian elders is discovered. They sing of the absent Xerxes, and express hopes for his safe return to his capital, and magnify and extol his powerful armament. Operatic dialogue is then introduced, expressing confidence in the result of the campaign. Suddenly the singers begin to express forebodings as to the intervention of Heaven, and the mysteries of fate. Presently Atossa is seen approaching in a royal chariot, attended by a numerous train. The singers all prostrate themselves before her.

Atossa then discloses her forebodings as to the safety of her son and members of the royal household. In one place she sings of the visions that came to her on her bed. She tells of a dream she had and relates that the night before she saw two women, one in Persian robes, the other in Dorian garb:

> Between these twain, for so methought I saw,
> Some feud arose, which learning, straight my son
> Strove to appease and soothe; he to his car
> Yoked them, and placed the collar on their necks.
> Proudly the one exulted in this gear,
> And kept her mouth submissive to the reins;

> Restive the other was; she with her hands
> The chariot-harness rends, then without bit,
> Whirls it along, snapping the yoke asunder.
> Prone falls my son, and close at hand, his sire,
> Darius, pitying stands, whom, when he sees,
> The robes about his person Xerxes rends.
> Such was, I say, the vision of the night.

She then relates what strange portents she saw when she awoke. The chorus then sings and seeks to put a good construction and interpretation on the visions the queen had seen, and a dialogue ensues extolling the traditions of Persian arms, when suddenly a courier out of breath rushes on the stage and the chorus sings:

> But soon, if I mistake not, thou the whole truth shalt learn
> For here a courier speedeth whose gait proclaimeth him
> Persian, and he will bring us clear news of weal or woe.

Æschylus now introduces an account of the Persian defeat at Salamis, which this courier relates to Atossa. He was dispatched to Susa immediately after the battle. He thus begins his doleful narrative before the miserable queen.

> O fencèd homes of all the Asian earth
> O Soil of Persia, haven of vast wealth,
> How, by one stroke, our full prosperity
> Hath shattered been, and blighted Persia's flower.
> Woeful his office first who heralds woe!
> Yet all our sorrow must I needs unfold —
> Persians, the whole barbaric host is lost.

The messenger then relates the terrible and bloody spectacle he witnessed in the straits of Salamis. He describes it thus:

> Darkness advanced, yet not in secret flight
> Ionia's host was minded to escape;
> But when white-steeded Day, bright to behold,
> Held the wide earth, from the Hellenes first,
> Like joyous chant, rang out their battle-cry,
> And forthwith Echo, from the island rocks,
> Sent back responsive an inspiring shout.

On all the Persians, cheated in their hopes,
Fell terror; for by no means as in flight
Their solemn pæan did th' Hellenes sing,
But with stout courage speeding to the fray.
The trumpet's blare fired all their ranks, and straight,
With simultaneous dip of sounding oar,
They at the signal smote the surging brine,
And instant all conspicuous were to sight.
First the right wing, well marshall'd, took the lead;
Then their whole naval force in fair array
Bore down against us. All at once was heard
A mighty shout: *"Sons of Hellenes, on,*
Your country free, your children free, your wives,
The temples of your fathers' deities,
Your tombs ancestral; for your all ye fight."
And from our side clamour of Persian speech
In answer rose; no time was then for pause,
But instant galley against galley dashed
Her armature of brass. A ship of Hellas
Led the encounter, and from Punic barque
Sheared her high crest. Thereon as fortune led,
Ship drave on ship; at first the Persian host,
A mighty flood, made head; but soon their ships
Thronged in the strait, of mutual aid bereft,
Each against other dashed with brazen beak,
Crushing the oar-banks of their proper fleet;
While the Hellenes ships, not without skill,
Circling around them smote; dead hulks of ships
Floated keel-upwards, and, with wrecks o'erstrewn
And slaughtered men, lost was the sea from sight,
Ay, shores and reefs were crowded with the dead.
In flight disordered every ship was rowed,
Poor remnant of the Persian armament.
Then as men strike at tunnies, or a haul
Of captured fishes, the Hellenes, armed
With splint of oar, or fragment from the wreck,
Batter'd, and clave with dislocated blows.
Shrieks and loud wailing filled the ocean brine,
Till all 'neath eye of swarthy night was lost.
But all our losses, though for ten whole days
I told them over, could I not recount.
Of this be sure, that never in one day
Perished of men so vast a multitude.

There have been a number of very excellent translations of Æschylus. The rendering given above is the work of a woman, Anna Swanwick, Litt. D., an eminent Greek scholar, who by reason of her accomplishments,

is certainly entitled to the admiration of all. Her work is equal at least to that of any of the eminent scholars who have enriched literature with their labors in rendering into English verse the musical drama of Æschylus.

Professor Symonds, commenting on "The Persians," the first work of its kind of which we have any knowledge, says: "The real point of that fearful duel of two nations, which decided the future of the human race, the contrast between barbarians and men in whom the spirit was alive; between slaves driven to the fight, like sheep, and freemen acting consciously, as their own will determined; between the brute force of multitudes and the inspiring courage of a few heroes, has never been expressed more radiantly than in this play."

CHAPTER XXIV

HIMERA.—DEFEAT OF HAMILCAR IN SICILY, BY THERON AND GELON OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 480

HIMERA — Hi-me-ra — [Ἱμερα]. A Greek city on the north coast of Sicily at the mouth of the river Himera, about twenty-five miles east of Panormus (now Palermo), eleven miles west of Cephalœdium, and about ninety-five miles northwest of Syracuse. Agrigentum, a city ruled by Theron, was on the river Acragas on the southern coast of Sicily directly south of Himera.

THERE are two theories with regard to the presence of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily, during the second Persian War. According to Diodorus, when Xerxes was maturing his plans for the invasion of Greece, he sent ambassadors to Carthage, and entered into negotiations with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian King, whereby that sovereign agreed to send an expedition to invade Sicily, and engage the Greek colonies and cities on that island, to the end that they might thereby be prevented from lending aid to their countrymen in Hellas. At the instigation of the Persian monarch, Hamilcar planned to invade Sicily at the time when Xerxes was to invade Greece.

Herodotus, however, does not seem to have been aware of any such negotiations between the Persians and the Carthaginians, and he assigns an entirely different reason for the Punic invasion of Sicily. He declares (vii, 165) that Gelon would have led an army into Greece to aid his kinsmen against the hosts of Persia, even although he was denied supreme command as set forth in a previous chapter, and would have been

obliged to serve under the Lacedæmonians had it not been that Terillus, a deposed King of Himera, was instrumental in bringing into Sicily at this particular time a Carthaginian army of 300,000 men. The reason given for this act on the part of Terillus was because Theron, King of Agrigentum on the southern shore of Sicily, drove King Terillus out of Himera, and took his city. Whereupon the fugitive monarch, with the aid of his son-in-law Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, who had great influence at Carthage, applied for redress to Hamilcar, and besought him to right the wrong he had suffered at the hands of Theron, and reinstate him as tyrant of Himera. Anaxilaus gave to the Carthaginian his children, the grandchildren of Terillus, as hostages to induce him to enter Sicily to avenge the wrong done to his father-in-law. Hamilcar yielded to the entreaties of the Sicilians, and espoused their cause. He assembled a powerful army consisting of three hundred thousand men, and a fleet of two thousand sail, supplemented by three thousand transports to be used for carrying the horses, chariots, provisions and supplies.

Whatever may be said as to how the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was brought about, it seems certain that the presence of the Punic invaders prevented the Greeks in Syracuse from lending aid to their countrymen at the time Xerxes was advancing through Thessaly. Herodotus says that the defeat of Hamilcar at Himera occurred on the very day that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Salamis, while Diodorus says it occurred on the day of the defeat of Leonidas of Thermopylæ.

Hamilcar made great preparations for the war in Sicily. His army included not only Phœnicians, but a large number of mercenaries, including Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Elisycians, Sardinians and Corsicans. In addition to these land forces, aggregating three

hundred thousand men, his fleet of two thousand ships, was assembled in what is now known as the bay of Tunis. It was accompanied also by three thousand transports which were convoyed with the expedition. Hamilcar in person took supreme command of this formidable armament. Being of royal lineage, he was doubtless the ancestor of Hamilcar Barca, and of his son Hannibal the Great, who fought the last Punic war, and is known to posterity as one of the greatest masters of strategy in military annals.

Shortly after this expedition put to sea, perhaps midway between the shores of Africa, and the western coast of Sicily in the waters of the Mediterranean, known at that period as the Libyan sea, a violent tempest arose. Hamilcar lost in this storm the transports containing the horses and chariots, and many of his ships also were damaged. Hamilcar put into the bay of Panormus under the shelter of the lofty peak now known as Mount Pelegrino, which shelters the bay of Palermo. Here he landed his troops, and spent several days repairing his ships which had survived the storm.

Having rested his men after the severe voyage, he marshalled them in order, and began his march eastward along the rocky and mountainous shores of Sicily to Himera, distant about twenty-five miles from Panormus. His fleet sailed in line with the infantry along the coast, carrying the supplies and provisions. When the objective point of the expedition was reached, Hamilcar encamped his army about the city and prepared to besiege it. He extended his fortifications from the lines of the naval forces, with which he barricaded the shore, having dug trenches about the ships, which were drawn on the beach, the line of his fortifications having been carried to the hills which overtopped the city. The troops of Theron, which had sallied forth to oppose the Carthaginians, were attacked with vigor,

and driven within the lines of their fortifications. The bold and skilful manœuvres of the enemy struck terror into the hearts of the besieged, and Theron, though his forces were ample, became alarmed for his safety, and dispatched couriers with all haste to Syracuse, some ninety-five miles distant, at the eastern extremity of the island imploring Gelon, its Governor, to send him succor, with all possible expedition. Gelon, intending to give aid to his kinsmen in Greece, had already assembled an army consisting of fifty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, which he commanded in person. As soon as he learned of the condition of affairs at Himera, and of the presence of an invading army from Carthage, he set out with his entire command to the relief of Himera, proceeding by forced marches. When Gelon arrived near the city, he deployed his troops to the best advantage and fortified himself both with a wall and a deep trench.

Hamilcar meantime was doing all the mischief he could to the Sicilians in the neighborhood of his camp. He was accustomed to send out large bodies of foragers. These usually divided themselves into marauding parties, and scoured the country far and near in search of provisions and supplies of all kinds. The first move on the part of Gelon was to operate with his cavalry to break up and capture these bands of marauders. He was successful in his raids, the enemy being deficient in cavalry, and in a short time took more than ten thousand prisoners. His success greatly revived the spirits of the besieged, and shed lustre on the arms of Gelon.

The latter now began to plan how he might compass the defeat of the enemy by some clever strategy. He sought to devise some way by which to mislead and deceive the Carthaginians, and destroy their forces without danger to himself or to his army. His great desire was to burn the enemy's fleet in order to deprive

them of their only means of escape, in case of defeat, and if possible, kill Hamilcar, believing that the death of their leader might serve to demoralize and discourage his followers, who were mostly mercenaries and hirelings, and render them helpless in a strange land, harassed and annoyed on all sides by active and vigilant enemies who were not fighting for conquest, but seeking to preserve their country from the hand of the spoiler, and the dominion of the invader.

After Gelon had broken up the bands of marauders and foragers by the dexterous use of his cavalry, Hamilcar sought to invoke divine assistance. He began preparations to celebrate a grand festival in honor of Poseidon (Neptune) and to offer sacrifices in his camp, in which both the army and navy should join. In the meantime, being greatly in need of cavalry, his own horses and chariots having been lost at sea, Hamilcar sent a courier to Selinus directly across the island on the south shore, some sixty miles distant, requesting the Selinians, who were supposed to favor the cause of Terillus, the exiled despot of Himera, to send to his aid a strong body of horse. The courier was requested, in case the horsemen were sent, to have them enter his camp on a certain day designated by Hamilcar.

Gelon was interrupted in his tent one day about this time by the announcement that one of the enemy's scouts had been captured. The prisoner was brought before the commander-in-chief, and searched. On his person was found a letter written by the tyrant of Silinus, to Hamilcar, stating that the aid he required would be furnished, and that a body of cavalry was about to be dispatched which would arrive at the camp of the Carthaginian on the day appointed by Hamilcar. This incident gave Gelon the opportunity he sought, and enabled him to devise a plan to entrap the Carthaginians. He sent a body of his own cavalry to personate the horsemen which Hamilcar was expecting, disguised as if they were Selinian troops. They were instructed to proceed secretly by night to places nearest and most convenient to enable them to enter the camp of the enemy at dawn, on the day appointed for the arrival of the Selinians. They were ordered to enter the Carthaginian camp representing to the enemy that they had been sent from Selinus to aid Hamilcar, and carry out the deception by producing the letter the Selinian tyrant had written to the Carthaginian general. As soon as they were admitted into the camp they were ordered to kill Hamilcar, make a sudden attack on the Carthaginians, and set fire to their ships. Gelon also posted his spies on the adjacent hills and ordered them, as soon as the horsemen were admitted into the fortifications, to give notice by raising aloft some conspicuous object, as a sign to apprise their commander when the assault should be made by his troops. Gelon drew up his army-in-waiting, to cooperate with the cavalry while they were attacking the enemy within the fortifications.

The plan was successfully executed. Gelon's horsemen were admitted to the enemy's camp at sunrise, when the Carthaginians were engaged in offering sacrifices and suddenly threw themselves upon the unsuspecting enemy, slew Hamilcar, who was engaged in sacrificing, and seeking favorable victims. They then set fire to his ships. The signal was instantly given by the spies from the hill tops, and Gelon rushed into the enemy's camp, the entrances having been thrown open by his own troops within. The enemy perceiving the treachery and the ruse which had been employed, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible.

The trumpet sounded and the barbarians succeeded in drawing their forces out of their confused camp in good order and made a terrible onslaught on the forces of Gelon. The struggle was fierce and bloody. The

carnage was appalling. Suddenly when dense clouds of black smoke from their burning ships began to settle over the field of slaughter, news of the death of Hamilcar reached the troops and spread among them like wildfire. Despair now seized the barbarians and they fled precipitately from the field. Gelon ordered that no prisoners should be taken, reminding his men that the enemy were invaders from foreign shores. Diodorus says that half of the army of Hamilcar, namely, one hundred and fifty thousand men were killed at Himera. The remnant who fled succeeded in getting away, and reached a spot on that rough and mountainous coast which was fortified by nature. This afforded a brief respite from the fury of the enemy. The country where they were was dry and barren, and because they could get no water and while dying of thirst they surrendered themselves.

Diodorus, who was a Sicilian, indulges in unstinted praise of Gelon, also a Sicilian, and declares that his fame now surpassed that of any commander of his age, because he says no general before ever planned such a clever strategy, or slew so many barbarians or took so many prisoners in one battle. The Sicilian historian refers to the cunning device practised by Themistocles, who deceived Xerxes through his messenger Sicinnus and induced him to enter the straits of Salamis with his ships, where they were crushed by the Greeks on the following day. But Diodorus, while giving great praise to Themistocles, places the feat of Gelon first, urging in his favor the fact that he never betrayed his country and fled like Themistocles did, but enjoyed a long and prosperous reign in Syracuse, as did his successors for three generations. He argues also that the feat of Gelon at Himera was not inferior to that achieved at Platæa, and reminds us that Pausanias, the victor of Platæa, afterwards became a traitor to his country, and like Themistocles, died in disgrace.

Herodotus gives a slightly different version of the death of Hamilcar than that given by Diodorus. He says, according to the account given by the Carthaginians themselves, that the battle at Himera lasted all day from morning till late in the evening. That during that time Hamilcar continued in the camp offering sacrifices, and observing the omens, and burning whole victims on a huge pyre. That when he saw the defeat of his army, as he was pouring libations on the victims, he threw himself into the flames and was consumed.[1] Thus perished Hamilcar in the flames at Himera, as the Phœnicians relate.

[1] Herod. vii, 167.

CHAPTER XXV

THEMISTOCLES

IT may be said of Themistocles that his talents, his energy, his mastery of the art of strategy, his resourcefulness, and his sagacity, made him indispensable to his countrymen in time of war; his greed, his avarice and his utter disregard of all limitations imposed by law, made him intolerable in time of peace. The perseverance and untiring energy which characterized his efforts to arouse the patriotism of his countrymen, and to persuade them to take arms and defend their homes against foreign invasion, in the unequal struggle with the hosts of Xerxes, merits unqualified praise and admiration. The decisive victory of Miltiades, at Marathon, was regarded by Themistocles as only the beginning of a long struggle with Persia. The indefatigable energy of the latter; the patriotism he inspired and his wonderful strategy in bringing on the navel engagement in the straits of Salamis, against the express wishes of Eurybiades, the Spartan commander of the fleet, resulted in a decisive victory, which saved his country a second time from chains and slavery. The triumph of Themistocles in that engagement was equally as important, as the signal success achieved by Miltiades at Marathon. If the armies of Datis had triumphed at Marathon, or had Xerxes been successful at Salamis, Greece would have sunk into insignificance, as an integral part of the Persian empire. In the second invasion of Hellas, conducted by Xerxes, in person, Themistocles was to Greece what Washington was to the American

colonists in their struggle for independence against the fleets and armies sent across the Atlantic by the British sovereign. To Washington more than to any other one man, the English colonists in America were indebted for their success. To Themistocles more than to any other one man, Greece owed her independence during the second Persian War. He was the most conspicuous man of his age, and one of the greatest strategists of antiquity. In that regard he may be classed with Hannibal, the most consummate master of strategy perhaps that ever lived.

Themistocles was indeed a military genius, if we may be permitted to apply that term to a commander early in the fifth century B. C., a period when the game of war had not been reduced to a science. Recondite tactics were practically unknown prior to the time of Epaminondas, the Spartan general, who was killed at Mantinea early in the fourth century (B. C. 362). Like the military men of his age, Themistocles was not only a successful general, but excelled as an admiral. He was perhaps more skilful in command of a fleet than in command of an army. His achievements on the sea were approached only by the great Cimon, son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. Themistocles was the John Paul Jones of his age, and was properly regarded as the father of the Athenian navy. The fleet with which he afterwards saved his country at Salamis was built from the income derived from the silver mines at Laurium, which Themistocles induced the assembly to use for that purpose, rather than distribute it among the Attic tribes. He constantly reminded his countrymen that they must make the sea their domain, if they would build up and maintain their supremacy. "He took from his countrymen," says Plato, "the spear and the shield, and bound them to the bench and the oar." In this regard his judgment was sustained by Pericles, under whose guidance the Athenian empire flourished

and expanded, and attained the height of its power and influence.

Themistocles was of the tribe of Leontis. We are not informed as to the year of his birth, nor the date of his death. The authorities seem to indicate, however, that he died at the age of sixty-five. His death occurred in Magnesia, a city in Ionia, situated a short distance north of the river Mæander. If we may assume that he died B. C. 464 he was born in the year B. C. 529. If this date is correct he was thirty-nine years of age when he fought at Marathon. In that engagement he marched with his tribe side by side with the tribe of Antiochis, led by Aristides, his great contemporary. Plutarch says that the enemy fought for a long time "making opposition there against the tribes of Leontis and Antiochis. Themistocles and Aristides being ranged together fought valiantly." The former, if he was at that time one of the strategi, at the critical moment, voted with Aristides to give battle, and attack the Persians on the plain of Marathon, a place sacred to Hercules. Notwithstanding his valuable services and his decisive victory at Salamis, Themistocles became involved in political intrigues and among other delinquencies was accused of bribery, a crime not considered especially heinous in Hellas in that age. Finally his enemies became so aggressive that ten years after he had been elected Archon Eponymus, he was ostracized and retired to Argos.

From the narrative of Thucydides, we must infer that the ostracism of Themistocles took place B. C. 471. He says that when the exiled Athenian sent the letter to Artaxerxes, referred to below, that monarch had just succeeded to the throne on the death of his father Xerxes. The authorities agree that Xerxes died 465 B. C. This date is sufficient evidence of the fact that Themistocles must have presented himself to the Great King in that year. "Aristotle's Constitution

of Athens," a lost work of the great philosopher of antiquity, which had not been seen by mortal eye for nearly eighteen centuries, was discovered in Egypt in 1890, written on rolls of papyrus. In this book, Aristotle presents some new views of history. He declares (Ch. 25) that in the archonship of Conon, 462 B. C., Æphialtes brought about a revolution in which the council of Five Hundred, instituted under the Constitution of Clisthenes, was stripped of its prerogatives from which it derived its guardianship of the constitution. In this revolution, Aristotle says, Æphialtes was assisted by Themistocles, who at that time was a member of the Areopagus, but was expecting to be tried before it on a charge of treasonable dealings with Persia. If we accept the evidence, thus presented in Aristotle's work, the date of the ostracism of Themistocles could not have occurred earlier than 461 B. C., four years after the death of Xerxes. The conflicting statements cannot be reconciled. The weight of authority indicates that the narrative of Thucydides is correct, and that 471 B. C. is the correct date of the ostracism of Themistocles.

When the treason of Pausanias was revealed, Themistocles was implicated as a co-conspirator and having fled secretly, he succeeded in reaching the City of Ephesus, in Ionia. He went to Susa and took refuge as a suppliant in the Court of Artaxerxes Longimanus, son of Xerxes, whose fleet Themistocles had defeated fifteen years before at Salamis. In B. C. 465 he had just succeeded to the throne, on the death of his father. The distinguished fugitive offered his sword to the Persian monarch and promised to aid him in any expedition he might wish to undertake for the conquest of Greece. He sent a letter to Artaxerxes which has been preserved by Thucydides in which he writes: "I, Themistocles, have come to you, I, who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was

compelled to defend myself against your father; but still greater benefits when I was in safety, and he in danger, during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me." Here the writer related how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution his countrymen to withdraw, and how, through his influence as he pretended, they had refrained from destroying the bridge across the Hellespont to cut off his retreat. "Now, I am here," he continues, "able to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year and then I will myself explain why I have come."[1]

He captivated Artaxerxes with his blandishments, and was made governor of Magnesia. The King also assigned to him for bread the latter city, which produced a yearly revenue of fifty talents, a sum equal to more than $50,000. For wine he was assigned Lampsacus, in the Troad, the richest wine-growing district then known. For meat he had the city of Myus in Ionia, about fifteen miles south of Magnesia. Themistocles, however, did not long survive after receiving these favors at the hands of the Persian monarch. He sickened and died presumably 464 B. C. In this connection Thucydides remarks, that in some quarters it was said, that Themistocles poisoned himself, because he felt that he could not accomplish what he had promised to the King. In other words it was believed that he was goaded by remorse and rather than lift his sword against his countrymen, he chose to perish by his own hand.

To illustrate his overweening ambition, as indicated by his jealousy of Miltiades, stimulated by the growing fame of his great achievement at Marathon, Plutarch says that he frequently passed sleepless nights, and avoided his usual places of recreation, and by way

[1] Thucyd. i, 137.

of explanation told those who wondered at these things, that "the trophy of Miltiades would not let him sleep." Ambition was the scarlet sin that robbed this extraordinary man of rest and sleep. His utter fearlessness and contempt for all sorts of religious superstitions which prevailed in that age, is demonstrated by his method of interpreting the answer of the Pythoness at the Temple of Delphi, whither the Athenians had sent a delegation to consult the oracle, as to the threatened invasion of Hellas by the innumerable hosts of Xerxes, then mobilizing at Sardis.

Scarcely had the envoys finished the customary rites about the sacred precincts, and taken their seats within the sanctuary, when the oracle delivered the prophecy, which filled them with gloom and despondency. It was not a prophecy at all, but a fierce and uncalled for denunciation in the nature of a curse, and wound up with a demand that the suppliants get out of the sanctuary. It began as follows:

> "Wretches, why sit ye here? Fly, fly, to the ends of creation,
> Quit your homes and your city of the violet crown."

All was lost, all ruined, they were told. Fire and the impetuous Ares speeding in a Syrian chariot hastens to destroy you; and your shrines and towers will be given to fiery destruction. Black blood shall trickle from the roofs of your dwellings, prophetic sign of impending destruction. Get away from the temple; and brood on the ills that await you.

Seeing the despondency occasioned by this infamous prognostication, Timon, a man of influence at Delphi, persuaded the suppliants to enter the temple with olive branches, and consult the oracle a second time. Whether Timon was seeking a bribe from the envoys we are not informed. The Athenians then supplicated the priestess as they were advised, and asked for a

further prophecy more favorable to them. Otherwise, they declared, they would never leave the sanctuary, but would remain till death released them from their despondency. The second answer was not much of an improvement on the first. It declared that Athene had not been able, with her prayers and supplications, to soften Olympian Zeus. "But when the foe shall have taken whatever the limit of Cecrops holds within it, and all which divine Cithæron shelters, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assaults of horse and foot, but turn your backs to the foe and retire. A day will come when you will meet him in battle. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed time or at the harvest." [1]

When this prophecy was made known at Athens many interpretations were put upon it. Some supposed the "wooden wall" referred to an ancient barricade, which once defended the citadel on the acropolis. All were filled with dismal forebodings. Then Themistocles gave his interpretation. He declared that the "wooden wall" in which the gods told them to put their trust was their ships, and that their salvation lay in the Athenian navy, not in the barricades on the acropolis. He reminded them that the language referred not to wretched Salamis, but to divine Salamis, indicating that the island was endeared to them and beloved by the gods. The result proved the unerring sagacity and judgment of this remarkable man.

His forbearance and complete self control was shown at the conference of commanders, on the night before the memorable naval engagement at Salamis. Eurybiades, with others from Corinth and the Peloponnesus, had overruled Themistocles and voted to withdraw the

[1] Herod. vii, 141.

fleet from the straits at dawn on the following morning. The latter, nothing daunted, continued to argue as to the wisdom of remaining where they were. His persistence so enraged Eurybiades, that rising in his place he advanced with threatening words, and shook his staff at the Athenian. "Strike, but hear me," was his only reply to the Admiral. He might have drawn his sword and smote the offender. But as Carlyle observes, to forbear, and waive redress for the insult, in order to extinguish his resentments, soothe his hearers, and keep the fleet where it was for his country's sake, exhibited the highest patriotism and displayed true greatness.

The way in which Themistocles outwitted the Lacedæmonians, who sought to prevent the Athenians from rebuilding the walls about their ruined city, which, after the slaughter at Thermopylæ, had been captured and burned by the Persians, furnishes a further illustration of his sagacity and resourcefulness. After the victory at Mycale, which tradition says was won on the same day that the hosts of Mardonius were defeated at Platæa, the Peloponnesian fleet went home. The Athenians, however, under the command of Xanthippus with their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, continued the war, and besieged and took the city of Sestus. They then returned to Attica, in the spring B. C. 478, and brought back their wives and children from Trœzen, Ægina and Salamis whither they had taken refuge at the approach of Xerxes, and set about to rebuild their city and reconstruct its walls. Thucydides relates, what then occurred, substantially as follows:

The Lacedæmonians, who were decidedly averse to walled cities impelled by the importunity of their allies who feared their growing navy and the spirit which animated the Athenians in the Persian War, requested them not to restore their walls, but in order to place all cities upon an equality to join with them in razing

the fortifications of other towns. They concealed their real designs, but in support of their request, advanced the argument that if the Persians should again invade Greece they would find no fortified place in which to make their headquarters as Mardonius had lately done in Thebes. The Peloponnesus in such an event, they argued, would furnish a safe retreat for all Hellas and a good base of operations. And now comes Themistocles with his sage advice and wise council. In order to get rid of the Spartans the Athenians suavely replied that the matter would be taken under advisement and the envoys quietly departed. Themistocles then proposed that he himself should repair to Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who should not follow at once, but wait until the walls had reached a height, when they could be used as a defense. He urged that that work should be carried on with all possible dispatch, and that everybody including women and children should assist. He said he would himself manage the business in Sparta, and departed. On his arrival at the capital of Lacedæmon, he did not at once present himself officially to the ephors, but continued to make excuses, and when asked "why he did not appear before the assembly," he said "that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained by some engagement." He was daily expecting them, he said "and wondered why they did not appear." (Thucyd. i, 90.)

"The fox barks not when he would steal the lamb."

The Lacedæmonians were well disposed towards Themistocles. After his great achievement at Salamis, he visited Sparta, and was honored as no foreigner had ever been. As a token of esteem, he was presented with a chariot and loaded with honors. The magistrates, therefore, were induced to believe him. But when everybody who came from Athens reported that the walls were being rapidly constructed, and had already reached a considerable height, they were astounded. Then the wily Themistocles displayed his craft and cunning. He begged the ephors not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens select men whom they could trust to make a personal inspection and report what they had themselves discovered. He then secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain these envoys quietly, and not permit them to depart until he and his colleagues Aristides and Lysimachus (who had arrived in the meantime, and reported that the walls were of sufficient height) had returned in safety.

The Athenians accordingly detained the envoys, and when the Lacedæmonians became aware of this, Themistocles blandly informed them that Athens was now a walled city, and could protect her citizens.

The most wonderful achievement in the annals of war was his victory over the Persians at Salamis. Immediately after that event, he became the most conspicuous man in Hellas. The world was filled with his fame. He was regarded everywhere as the wisest among all the Greeks. When he visited Sparta, the Lacedæmonians accorded him the highest honors. They presented him, Herodotus says (viii, 124), with a crown of olives, as the prize of wisdom and dexterity, and on his departure he was escorted as far as the borders of Tegea by the order of the Knights, a body of three hundred picked Spartans, a most unusual honor which was never conferred by the Lacedæmonians upon any one before or since. According to Diodorus, he received also on his visit a sum of money double the amount that was given to any other commander who fought at Salamis. Lord Rosebery, referring to Napoleon, observes that besides that indefinable spark which we call genius, the Corsican represented a combination of intellect and energy which has never perhaps been

equalled, never certainly surpassed. He carried human faculty to the furthest point of which we have accurate knowledge. Until his time he says, no one could realize that there could be so stupendous a combination of military and civil genius, such comprehension of view, united to such grasp of detail, such prodigious vitality of body and mind.

Did any of the wonderful military achievements of Napoleon surpass the feat accomplished by Themistocles at Salamis in the Second Persian War?

The eminent historian Thucydides (471-396) a contemporary of the great Athenian thus briefly sketched the prominent characteristics of Themistocles. "He was a man whose natural force was unmistakable. This was the quality for which he was distinguished above all other men. From his own native acuteness, and without any study, either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future. Whatever he had in hand, he had the power of explaining to others, and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient judgment. No man could foresee with equal clearness, the good or evil event which was hidden in the future. In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with the least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporize the right thing to be done." (Thucyd. i, 138.)

CHAPTER XXVI

PLATÆA

PLATÆA — pla-te-a — [Πλαταια]. A historic city in the Valley of the Asopus, in Bœotia, under the shadows of Cithæron, the mountain range that forms the boundary between Bœotia and Attica. It is eight miles southwest of Thebes, and four miles south of the river Asopus, which flows between the territory of Platæa and Thebes, and thirty-one miles northwest of Athens. Here the Persians, under Mardonius, were defeated by the Greeks under Pausanias, September B. C. 479. This defeat and the reverse of the Persians on the same day at Mycale, ended the Second Persian War.

THE final campaign of the Second Persian War in Europe began and ended with the battle of Platæa, B. C. 479. It may be regarded as the most memorable engagement in the history of Greece. It was equally as important as Marathon because, although the Persians suffered ignominious defeat there, they mustered new armies and new fleets with which they sought to conquer Greece. It was equally as important as Salamis, because at the latter only the fleet of Xerxes was vanquished, while his formidable army remained unharmed. At Platæa, Mardonius endeavored to retrieve on land the disastrous defeat suffered by the Persians at sea the previous year. Marathon was the first battle fought by a Perisan army in Greece, Platæa was the last. At Platæa, the fruits of Marathon and Salamis were made permanent. Greece there won finally her liberty and independence. The momentous results of the struggle caused her to regard the field of Platæa as hallowed

ground, and henceforward the historic city was consecrated as the battle monument of Hellas.

Three hundred thousand Persians with about fifty thousand Greek allies, under Mardonius, were defeated at Platæa by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies, who numbered one hundred and ten thousand, under Pausanias, King of Sparta. This was the largest Greek army ever assembled fighting as allies. Mardonius was killed, his forces routed by the army of Liberation, and the Persian wars in continental Greece were brought to a close. The victory at Mycale (q. v.) off the island of Samos, and the headland of Mycale in Ionia, achieved on the same day on which the battle was fought at Platæa, brought disaster to the Persian arms in Asia.

To ameliorate the shock and bitter disappointment which the Persians sustained in view of their inglorious retreat, after the battle of Salamis and to save his own reputation, Mardonius, who was instrumental in urging and advising the invasion of Greece, besought Xerxes, who had ordered the entire army, to retire with all expedition to Asia, to permit him to remain in Thessaly, with three hundred thousand men. With these troops, augmented by Grecian auxiliaries, who went over to Xerxes, and fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia, he promised Xerxes that he would complete the subjugation of Greece in the following spring. The request was granted. In May or June B. C. 479, Mardonius quitted his winter quarters in Thessaly. He marched through the pass of Thermopylæ, unopposed into Bœotia, invaded Attica, and made his headquarters in the partially burned city of Athens, whose inhabitants had again fled for safety to the island of Salamis. The Persian commander held out the most flattering inducements to persuade the Athenians to make terms with him, and to become an ally of Persia. He offered to rebuild Athens on a magnificent scale, fill its treasury

with gold, and make the Athenians supreme, and lords of Greece. The lofty patriotism of Athens is reflected in the reply which was sent to the Persians in response to his proposals. Aristides gave the answer to Alexander, King of Macedon, the envoy selected by Mardonius. "Tell Mardonius," said Aristides, "that as long as the sun shall keep the same path in the heaven, we will never make peace with Xerxes, and will wage war with the Persians for the country they have wasted, and the temples they have profaned and burnt." Can any one doubt, that if these terms had been offered to the Spartans, as they were offered to the Athenians, that the offer of Mardonius would have been accepted.

Meantime, the Spartans, fearing that the Athenians might ally themselves with the Persians, sent ambassadors to prevail upon them not to make terms with Mardonius, and promised to send at once a strong army to succor Athens. These ambassadors were present in the council when the patriotic refusal of Athens to accept the overtures of the Persians was communicated to Alexander. Aristides then to assure the Spartans that Athens would do her duty to her country, told their ambassadors to tell the Lacedæmonians that all the treasure on the earth, or under it, was of less value to the people of Athens, than the liberty of Greece.

The Lacedæmonians, however, were not possessed of the lofty ideals which prevailed in Attica. During the time these negotiations were progressing, the Spartans and their allies busied themselves in completing the fortification on the isthmus of Corinth to prevent an invasion of the Peloponnese. This work had been pushed vigorously the previous year, when Xerxes threatened the Dorian peninsula, and was restrained only by his defeat at Salamis. The Lacedæmonians and their allies believing that they could defeat the Persians if they should attempt to enter the Peloponnese, delayed sending the promised succor to the Athenians or to the

Megarians and Platæans. They did not in the slightest degree appreciate the patriotism of their countrymen who for love of liberty rejected the alluring proposals of Mardonius, but remained steadfast in their loyalty to Greece, and defied the threatening power of Persia. The Athenians were imbued in declining the tempting offers of the invaders with a commendable spirit of patriotism and devotion to the best interests of Hellas. The selfish conduct of the Lacedæmonians in seeking to shut out the Persians and permit Athens and her two allies on the hither side of their fortified wall to shift for themselves, showed that the Peloponnesians were neither patriotic nor public-spirited, nor possessed of even common honesty towards their own kinsmen in Central Greece. Their conduct on this occasion illustrates the difference between the enterprising, active, alert Ionian and the dull, stupid, phelgmatic Dorian. Indeed, had the Peloponnesians continued to ignore the claims of the Athenians, the latter, deserted by their kinsmen, save only Megara, and patriotic Platæa, might finally have been forced to become an ally of Persia, under the proposals of Mardonius, who wanted to make the Athenians not subject allies, but independent allies and give Athens control of Greece. The stupid and selfish Spartans, however, were at length reminded by Chilos, a Tegean, that the fortifications on the isthmus of Corinth would avail nothing against the combined fleets of the Persians and Athenians, should the latter form an alliance with Mardonius, as the Peloponnesian peninsula was on all sides, save at the isthmus, open to the sea.

The Spartan ephors, now for the first time, seemed to realize the danger of delay. They found that they could not with safety segregate themselves from Central Greece. On the night of the day the council was held, they sent forward an army of Spartans under Pausanias, their King. They then dispatched to Attica

and Salamis their swiftest couriers to apprise the Athenians that troops were on their way to aid in the liberation of Greece. The chosen rendezvous was Eleusis in Attica. Here the Athenians, under Aristides, crossed over from Salamis and joined the Peloponnesians. Allies arrived daily at Eleusis.

News of the Spartan advance was quickly communicated by his couriers to Mardonius, who feared to remain longer in Attica. He deemed it prudent to evacuate Athens. He recalled a body of horse which had been sent to ravage Megara. He had allies in Thebes and elsewhere in Bœotia, and decided to retreat to its more friendly territory. That city had warmly espoused his cause, and in Bœotia Mardonius determined to conduct his campaign for the subjugation of Hellas. His line of retreat from Athens was northward over the road leading to Dekelia, from there he advanced into Bœotia to Tanagra on the Asopus, and thence northwest to Thebes. He encamped north of the Asopus, near the city, where he collected all his forces in the hope of being able to defeat Sparta and Athens, and their allies in a pitched battle, on the plain on the banks of that river which divides the territory of the Platæans and Thebans, the latter being allies of Mardonius.

In order to form some idea of the operations on the Asopus, it is encessary to ascertain the character and topography of the ground on which the armies contended. The battle-field of Platæa embraced the territory lying between the city of Thebes on the north, and the city of Platæa on the south. These cities are about eight miles apart, the latter being southwest of Thebes. The Asopus rolls about midway between them. It flows from west to east across Bœotia and empties into the straits of Eubœa. The southeastern portion of the field is skirted by a range of hills, a spur of the Cithæron range, at the foot of which a branch of the

Asopus flows north into the main stream. In these hills are the villages Erythræ and Hysia, the latter being the most southerly. About seven miles to the northwest of Platæa stands the historic city of Leuctra, where, more than a century after the battle fought by Pausanias, Thebes, under the leadership of Epaminondas, gained the supremacy in Greece, and defeated the hegemony of Sparta. The river Œrœ flows down to the plain from Mount Cithæron, in front of the city of Platæa. Its branches proceed from their sources a short distance apart, Herodotus says about three stades (600 feet to a stade), and unite near the city, forming the main stream, which flows west and southerly into the Corinthian gulf. The land between these branches of the Œrœ is called the Island. The northern slope of Mount Cithæron forms the southern boundary of the field. This range also forms the boundary between Bœotia, Attica and Megaris.

Three principal roads cross the Asopus, and extend from Thebes south, through this territory. The most easterly runs to Panacton, through Attica to Athens. The middle road runs to Eleusis in Attica; the most westerly extends directly to Platæa, and thence south through the mountain passes to the Isthmus, and ports on the gulf of Corinth. The temple of the Platæan Here (Juno) occupied some point in or near the city of Platæa. The fountain of Gargaphia, which supplied the army of Pausanias with water for a time, is south of the Asopus, some distance west of the Molœis, a branch of the Asopus, and near the middle and eastern roads leading from Thebes. Not far from this fountain was the sacred grove of the hero Androcrates, near the extreme right of the Greek line, when aligned in its second position. Much speculation exists as to the location of the temple of the Eleusian Demeter (Ceres) around which the main battle was fought. It was not far from this temple that Mardonius was killed. Mr. G. B. Grundy, who spent much time on the field and compiled an elaborate map showing its topography, places the location of this temple south of Gargaphia in the plain beyond the foot of the long ridges extending from Cithæron, near the valley of one of the small tributaries of the Asopus. Herodotus says that while the barbarians fought near the grove in which the temple stood, not one was seen to enter the sacred enclosure, or to die in it, but most of them fell round the precinct in unconsecrated ground. Mr. Grundy thinks the grove and temple stood on elevated ground. Mardonius directed large quantities of timber to be cut down, and between the city of Thebes and the river, constructed a fortified stockade, more than a mile square, ten stades, Herodotus says (600 feet to a stade), with immense towers at the corners, and over the entrances to the stockade. This fortified camp was built as matter of precaution, should it become necessary to seek refuge in case of defeat. He deployed his cavalry from the river Skolos, a tributary of the Asopus, so as to threaten Erythræ and Hysia, and the entrance to the Platæan territory.

The army of Pausanias consisted entirely of infantry. He had no cavalry, and but few archers. It will be observed in this connection that the Persians were skilfully trained horsemen, and expert archers. As soon as the Athenians under Aristides reached Eleusis, the soothsayer having consulted the slain victims and having pronounced the signs favorable, Pausanias began his march into Bœotia, without waiting for all his allies, who were instructed to join him. His army marched through the passes of the Cithæron and when they reached the northern slope of the mountain, were posted among the hills and ridges to Erythræ. Here Pausanias learned that the barbarians were encamped and strongly entrenched on the Asopus. He decided to form his line opposite the enemy. Here, on the slopes

of Mount Cithæron, opposite Erythræ, the Greek army took up its first position. The second position was south and west to the spring of Gargaphia, and the river Asopus. The third position was south and slightly west to what was called the Island, namely, a stretch of land between the branches of the river Œroe, which flowed southwest from Platæa into the Gulf of Corinth. The Greek infantry when they formed their first line among the hills, at the foot of Mount Cithæron, refused to march out on the plain. Pausanias had no cavalry to oppose the Persian horsemen. Mardonius had commissioned as his first cavalry officer, Masistius, a Persian of noble birth. He was a skilful officer, a man of large stature and commanding presence. His armor consisted of a breastplate of golden scales, over which he wore a rich scarlet tunic. He rode a white charger, reared on the Nisæan plain in Medea, famed for its horses. The animal was richly caparisoned, and was controlled with a golden bit. This Masistius was the Maherbal, the Murat, the Sheridan of the Persian army at Platæa.

Mardonius sent his cavalry under command of Masistius to dislodge the enemy from the hills. They were armed with bows and javelins and though archers, fought as cavalry. The position of the Megarians on the line of battle exposed them to the concentrated attacks of Masistius. They did not consider themselves a match for the Persian cavalry and finding themselves outnumbered, sent word to Pausanias that they must be relieved or they would be compelled to abandon their posts. Pausanias then called for volunteers to relieve the Megarians. A body of three hundred Athenians, picked men, commanded by Olympiodorus, undertook to confront Masistius, and his body of cavalry. They were hoplites supported by a body of perhaps 3,000 archers. The contest was fierce and for a long time neither side would yield. The barbarians from time to

time charged in divisions, and being received by showers of arrows, wheeled and returned to the attack. During one of these charges, led by Masistius, the latter's milk-white charger, as the division was about to wheel, was struck in the flank by an arrow, and rearing on its haunches threw its rider. The Athenians knew from the conspicuous uniform of the wounded man that the Persian leader lay on the ground. They rushed upon him, and tried to kill him, but his golden armor resisted their assaults, until a spear or javelin was driven through his visor, pierced his eye, and caused his death. His soldiers were not aware at the moment that their leader had been killed. When they learned that he had fallen and was taken into the enemy's lines, the entire contingent of horse charged in a mad attempt to recover the body. Other troops in the line now came to the support of the Athenians and succeeded in driving off the enemy. The Persians being no longer able to hold their ground were forced to retire without recovering the dead body of their leader. Mardonius and the entire Persian army made great lamentations on account of the severe loss they had sustained. They shaved their heads and their beards, and filled all Bœotia with their wailings.

The Greeks were correspondingly elated. They took the body of the dead general and placed it in a conspicuous position in a cart, and drove it through their lines, that every soldier might see the remains of the commander who, next to Mardonius, was considered the best man in the Persian army.

After this incident the Greeks determined to leave the neighborhood of Erythræ, and take a new position past Hysia, in the Platæan territory, and here they drew themselves up, nation by nation, " near the fountain of Gargaphia, and the precinct of the hero Androcrates, on slight elevations and the level plain." The exact location of this second line forms the subject of discus-

sion concerning which modern historians are unable to agree. The language of Herodotus is given above. The difficulty arises from the inability to correctly locate the fountain, and the precincts sacred to Androcrates. We may safely assume, however, that Pausanias deemed it imperative to take up this new position. The reason assigned by Herodotus was that the Platæan territory appeared to be much more convenient for them to encamp in "and it was better supplied with water." Hysia was much nearer the main Theban road, and commanded important passes of the Cithæron, through which fresh troops and supplies would have to come from Attica. Doubtless, the Persian cavalry hindered the Greek infantry and prevented them from obtaining water from the Asopus, or its tributaries. Pausanias, for reasons which appeared to him sufficient, abandoned his position near Erythræ, and moved his forces to the south and west, which commanded the spring of Gargaphia, which furnished an abundant water-supply. It was the ancient fountain of Diana, near which was the rock of Actæon, on which he was accustomed to repose when fatigued with the chase. Here it was said Actæon had seen the goddess bathing in the fountain.

Ever since Pausanias had entered Bœotia, he had constantly been receiving reinforcements. When he deployed his army in his new position, they were aligned nation by nation. Those who contributed to the army of liberation in the aggregate 110,000 men, are as follows:

1. Spartans (on the extreme right),	5,000	8. Epidaurians	800
2. Laconians (Perioci),	5,000	9. Trœzenians	1,000
3. Tegeans	1,500	10. Lepreats	200
4. Corinthians	5,000	11. Mycenæans Tirynthians	400
5. Potidæans	300	12. Phliasians	1,000
6. Arcadians (of Orchomenus)	600	13. Hermionians	300
7. Sicyonians	3,000	14. Eretrians and Styrians	600

15. Chalcidians	400	19. Æginetans	500
16. Ambraciots	500	20. Megarians	3,000
17. Leucadians and Anactorians	800	21. Platæans	600
18. Paleans	200	22. Athenians (on the extreme left),	8,000

Of these troops there were both heavy armed and light armed. The Spartans were also accompanied by their Helots who were light armed. Every Spartan was accompanied by a contingent of seven Helots. The army of Pausanias, therefore, may be summarized as follows:

Hoplites (Heavy armed)	38,700
Light armed Helots (7 to each Spartan)	35,000
Other light armed troops	34,500
Thespians	1,800
Total Greek forces	110,000

It may be observed, also, that Xerxes permitted Mardonius to choose the troops that he wished to remain with him to complete the conquest of Hellas. They consisted of picked men in the expedition, namely, all of the Immortals except Hydarnes, their commander, who refused to be separated from Xerxes. The Persian cuirassiers also were retained and all the Medes, Sacæ, Bactrians and Indians both horse and foot, with picked troops drawn from other nations. His troops at Platæa numbered 300,000 and about 50,000 Greeks who formed an alliance with him.

Mardonius took up his position, as has been observed, on the opposite bank of the Asopus, facing the enemy. Both armies were desirous of engaging but feared to do so until the sacrifices were declared favorable. In that age, war had not yet been reduced to anything like a science. The soothsayer, or diviner, controlled the movement of armies. The advice of the soothsayer depended on what indications were derived from the

animal sacrifices which were offered to the gods, and the signs and portents which they revealed.

The soothsayer who accompanied the Greeks was Hippomachus. He advised that the victims were favorable so long as they stood on the defensive, but not if they began battle or crossed the Asopus. It is a singular coincidence that the soothsayer in the Persian camp, advised Mardonius precisely the same as the soothsayer in the Greek camp had advised Pausanias. He told the Persian commander that the victims boded well so long as the Persians remained on the defensive. Thus by the will of heaven, apparently, the opposing armies were obliged to remain inactive, as neither could safely attack the other, with promise of success.

Seven days had passed, and no general engagement had taken place. A Theban scout, who had been active in reconnoitering close to the enemy's line, brought intelligence to Mardonius, that supplies and fresh contingents were constantly coming in through the mountain passes. On the eighth day after the armies faced each other, Mardonius was advised to send at dusk a strong detachment of cavalry to a pass in the mountains which opens into Platæa, known as the Oak-Heads; but designated by the Bœotians as the Three Heads. They overtook a detachment of Greeks in the pass and captured five hundred beasts of burden, as they were about entering the plain. They slew all the cattle, and nearly all the men who had been sent with them. After this incident two days more passed but no general engagement had yet taken place.

Eleven days had now passed since the opposing armies faced each other in line of battle. During that time their operations consisted in sorties and raids of the Persian cavalry in their attempts to harass and annoy the Greeks among the foot-hills and passes of the Cithæron and cut off their supplies, sent through the mountain defiles, and prevented them from obtaining

water from the Asopus. The net results were the death of Masistius, the chief officer of the Persian cavalry, and the capture and slaughter of five hundred beasts of burden bringing supplies to the Greek army and a large part of the detachment accompanying them. There had been no general engagement, but during that time fresh bodies of Greeks had been arriving almost daily, until the army of Pausanias now numbered 110,000 men as above enumerated. The soothsayers of both armies had consulted the sacrificial victims and both commanders had received similar advice, that it would be inadvisable to take the offensive. The delay was irksome and tedious. Mardonius became impatient. He determined to break the fetters of superstition which compelled him to remain inactive. He held a council of war. The wisest advice was given by Artabazus. He seemed to understand the Greek character thoroughly. He told Mardonius that bribery was the most powerful weapon at his command and in the end would surely bring about the purpose he sought to accomplish. He argued that the Persians had gold and silver plate and utensils in abundance, and large quantities of gold coin. He advised that this should be used liberally to bribe the leaders in the army of Pausanias to corrupt them, and create dissensions in their camp. The result, he predicted, would lead to their disintegration. He argued that numbers of the enemy from corrupt motives would soon ally themselves with the Persians, as the Thebans and Thessalians had done. The views of Artabazus were supported by the Thebans who urged the adoption of the policy he had outlined. But Mardonius was proud and high-spirited. He regarded the methods proposed by Artabazus as base and cowardly and construed them as a reflection upon the courage and martial spirit of his army, and as tantamount to a confession that the Persians were unable to defeat their enemies in battle, but were obliged to resort to bribery

as the only means whereby they could prevail. He realized that he could not conduct his campaign on military principles or exercise any strategic manœuvres, so long as the movements of his army were dictated by soothsayers, who derived their information solely from the knowledge obtained from signs indicated by the smoking entrails of fresh slain victims, which were offered as sacrifices to the gods.

He finally inquired if any man in the council knew of any prophecy which foreshadowed the defeat of the Persian arms. None dared speak, well knowing the impatient temper of their commander at this particular time. Then Mardonius himself announced the prophecy with which he was familiar, which declared that if their arms should sack the Temple of Delphi, they would meet defeat and destruction at the hands of their enemies. But Mardonius declared that his troops would not attack the Temple of Delphi, and that he had not the slightest intention of doing so. And as this was the only divine utterance on the subject, it could have no possible application. He then gave orders to attack the enemy early the next morning and bring on a general engagement. Herodotus says that the prophecy which Mardonius related, with respect to sacking the Temple of Delphi, was well known. It had no relation to the Persians, but referred to the Illyrians and Enchelians. But he says there was a prophecy delivered by Bacis, which foretold the destruction of the bow-bearing Medes, despite Lachesis and the fates, when the destined day shall come.[1]

Herodotus, at this stage, introduces the story of the visit of Alexander, King of Macedon, who came in disguise to the Greek camp to disclose to the Athenians the intention of Mardonius to attack on the following day. This action on the part of Alexander was prompted as

[1] Herod. ix, 43.

he himself declared, because in his veins ran Hellenic blood. "I also am a Greek," he declared, "and do not desire to witness the defeat of my countrymen. I am Alexander of Macedon."[1]

A distinguished Greek scholar, in a paper entitled the "Greeks at Platæa,"[2] seeks to discredit this incident related by Herodotus. He declares that the dramatic declaration of Alexander, when he had delivered his message to the Greek generals, whereby he revealed his identity, was at least wholly unnecessary, because the writer assumes that Alexander was speaking directly to Aristides, commander of the Athenian forces. Aristides knew Alexander personally, because early in the season, the latter was chosen by Mardonius as his messenger, to visit Athens, and delivered to their leader, Aristides, his flattering proposals to make the Athenians nominal masters of Greece, not as subject allies, but tribute allies, and to create an Athenian oligarchy under the supervision and control of the Persian monarch, such as Thebes was. The writer assumes that this circumstance is enough to discredit this incident related by Herodotus. The fact that Alexander was personally acquainted with Aristides, without more, is wholly insufficient to discredit the incident, or to impeach in the slightest the narrative of the historian. It is probable that Aristides, who commanded the extreme left of the line, was present at the interview. It is possible, also, that Pausanias may have been present with other officers, not personally known to Alexander. The fact that Alexander disclosed his identity was perfectly natural, after he had given the important information. Those present, who did not know the messenger who came to them at night, in disguise, could verify his statement by referring to Aristides, who did

[1] Herod. ix, 45.
[2] Journal of Hellenic Studies, 1898.

know him. The declaration disclosing his identity, therefore, was far from being improbable, and added force to the statements made by Alexander.

When Pausanias was advised that he was to be attacked at daylight next morning, he determined to make a change in his line, so as to shift the position of his troops, in order that the Athenians and not the Lacedæmonians should face the native Persians, in the army of Mardonius. His line of battle in his second position, extended from the middle Thebes road, west, to cover the fountain of Gargaphia, a short distance south of the main stream of the Asopus. The right wing of the Greek army was at Gargaphia, the line then extended in a westerly direction past the grove of the Platæan hero Androcrates. The Lacedæmonians had the post of honor on the extreme right wing. The next most honorable position was on the extreme left, which was assigned to Aristides and the Athenians. The Tegeans took post on the left of the Lacedæmonians. The centre was occupied by the other cities and nations, as they called themselves, who composed the Greek army.

And now when it was believed a general engagement was about to begin, we read with astonishment that Pausanias, a Spartan, in whose veins ran the blood of Hercules, sought to change places in the line, yielding to the Athenians, the post of honor, the post occupying the place fraught with the greatest danger. Because the native Persians and Sacæ, the flower of the army of Mardonius, occupied the left of his line, which was opposite the Greek right, Pausanias ordered the Athenians from the left to the right of the line, assigning as a reason that the Athenians had tried the mettle of the Persians at Marathon, while his Spartans had never fought directly with them. And this proposal from a Spartan of royal blood, despite the sacred memories of Thermopylæ, destined to make the name of Sparta

immortal. Shades of Leonidas, cover the shame and temporary weakness of Pausanias.

Aristides, when he heard that his Athenians were to occupy the post of honor on the extreme right, received with genuine satisfaction the welcome intelligence. From the first he had expressed the desire to lead the right wing.

The Athenians, when on the extreme left, faced the Bœotians and other Greeks who had allied themselves with Mardonius. The Spartans, therefore, were placed on the extreme left opposite the Bœotians, while the Athenians who had been ordered to the right, now faced the Persians and Sacæ, the bravest men in the army of Mardonius.

When morning broke the Bœotians soon discovered that they were to fight Spartans and not Athenians. Mardonius, as soon as he learned the fact as to the new alignment, determined to fight with the Athenians and began to lead the Persians from his left opposite the Greek right. Herodotus observes that "when Pausanias saw that this was being done, perceiving that he was discovered, he led the Spartans back to the right wing; and Mardonius, in like manner, led his Persians toward the left." [1]

Mardonius then sent a herald to Pausanias to challenge him to fight with an equal number of Lacedæmonians against an equal number of Persians, and let the armies abide the result of the duel. He upbraided Pausanias, charging that he and his Spartans who claimed to be the bravest of men, should shrink from direct conflict with barbarians. Pausanias, however, declined the challenge. Mardonius did not bring on a general engagement that day, as had been anticipated, but sent his cavalry to raid and harass the enemy. They shot their arrows and hurled their javelins from their horses

[1] Herod. ix, 47.

into the Greek infantry, and succeeded in driving them from the fountain of Gargaphia for a sufficient length of time to enable them to choke and fill up the spring, which, it seems, was their sole source of water-supply at this time, as it was impossible for Pausanias to get water from the Asopus, "by reason of the cavalry and the arrows." [1]

A council of war was held in the Greek camp. The enemy's cavalry had practically cut off their water-supply, and were patrolling the mountain passes, making it impossible for the Greeks to get supplies for their army. It was resolved for these reasons to take up a new position on the Island between the forks of the Œrœ, in front of the city of Platæa. In that locality, there was abundance of water, and the many streams and ridges would largely protect them from the enemy's cavalry. It was determined to make the move in the second watch of the night, in order that the enemy might not see them setting out, and to escape pursuit by the Persian horsemen. It was resolved, also, that when they reached their new position between the forks of the Œrœ they would detail half their forces into the passes of the Cithæron, in order to bring in the attendants who had gone for provision, for they were shut up in the mountains.

When night brought relief from the arrows of the enemy's cavalry, and hostilities were suspended by reason of the darkness, a large part of the army marched away, "without any intention of going to the place agreed upon," while others fled towards the City of Platæa, and in their flight arrived at the Temple of Here (Juno) which stands before the city more than two miles (twenty stades, 12,000 feet) from the fountain of Gargaphia. Before the precincts of this sacred temple, they stood to their arms. Then Pausanias or-

[1] Herod. ix, 49.

dered the Lacedæmonians to proceed in the same direction, being under the impression that the other troops had gone to the Island, the place agreed upon. But the departure was hindered by a Lacedæmonian captain named Amompharetus, who had not been present at the council of war. He was astonished at the movement of the troops and declared impetuously that he would never fly from foreigners "nor willingly bring disgrace on the name of Sparta." A quarrel ensued which delayed the movement of the Peloponnesians until nearly dawn. Meantime, the Athenians, who occupied the extreme left, sent a herald to ascertain the movements of Pausanias. The herald arrived and was made aware of the conduct of Amompharetus. Finally, Pausanias lost all patience and declared that the obstinate captain was mad, and had lost his senses. He then addressed the herald which had been sent by the Athenians, and informed him of what had occurred, and bade him request the Athenians to act in harmony with the Lacedæmonians with regard to their departure from their present position. Amompharetus, however, continued to be obstinate, and refused to obey the orders of Pausanias. The latter, then fearing to delay his departure till broad day, withdrew his forces just before dawn, and kept to the rising ground, and the base of Cithæron, to avoid the enemy's cavalry, but the Athenians marched towards the plain. Amompharetus, then finding himself and his band alone, slowly retreated towards the main body, and joined Pausanias "at the river Molœis, at a place called Argiopius, where stands a temple of the Eleusian Demeter (Ceres)" which is a little more than a mile (ten stades) from their former position at the fountain of Gargaphia.

When it was day, the Persian cavalry, as was their custom, rode out to harass and annoy the enemy. When they approached the vicinity which the Greeks had occupied the previous day, they found no enemy to oppose

them. They then rode on till they came upon the troops of Amompharetus, and pressed them closely. This cavalry force, however, were raiders and marauders, who carried on their operations independent of the main body of troops, far in advance of the Persian lines.

When Mardonius was advised by couriers from the cavalry, who operated south of the Asopus, that the Greeks had retired under cover of the night, he summoned three of his Greek allies, Thorax of Larissa, and his two brethren, who dwelt in Thessaly, and addressed them as follows:

"Sons of the royal house of Aleuas, what have you to say now when you see the place occupied by the Greek army deserted? You who dwell in their neighborhood reported to me that the Lacedæmonians never fled from battle, but were the bravest of mankind. But you recently saw them change their place in the line; and now, as all can see, they ran away in the night. When the time came for them to fight with the bravest warriors in all the world, verily they showed plainly that they were men of no worth, but had gained distinction among worthless Greeks. I can excuse you for praising the courage of men of your acquaintance, because you were ignorant of the worth of the Persians. But I marvel at Artabazus, that he should fear the Lacedæmonians, and on that account gave us foolish advice, bidding us break camp and remove to Thebes, and be there besieged by the enemy. As to this I shall take pains to acquaint the King. But of this hereafter. Now the enemy must be pursued. We must be avenged for all the wrongs they have inflicted, and which the Persians have suffered at their hands. We must not allow them to escape." [1]

Having made this brief address, he crossed the Asopus with the main army, for the first time during

[1] Herod. ix, 58.

his operations in Bœotia. Mardonius mounted on a blooded charger led the advance, and ordered the infantry forward at a double-quick. He directed his march against the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans only, whom he believed to be in actual flight; because, on account of the hills, he could not see the Athenians who had turned into the plain. When the commanders of the other divisions of the barbarians saw their general lead his Persians and Sacæ across the Asopus, they immediately took up their arms and standards, and all advanced pell-mell with a shout, in a throng without observing either rank or order, believing they were about to overwhelm the Greeks.

Meantime, Pausanias, when he saw the enemy's cavalry approaching, sent a courier to the Athenians, entreating them to come to his aid. From the tenor of the despatch, it would seem that Pausanias was under the impression that all of his army save only the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, who were with him, and the Athenians, who had marched forward on the plain, had deserted the field. The message is as follows:

"Men of Athens! Now that the crisis has arrived which is to decide the freedom or slavery of Greece, we twain, Lacedæmonians and Athenians, are deserted by all the other allies, who have fled from us during the past night. Nevertheless, we are determined what to do — we must endeavor, as best we may, to defend ourselves, and succor one another. Had the horse fallen upon you first, we with the Tegeans (who remained faithful to our cause) would have been bound to render you assistance against them. But since the entire body has fallen upon us, it is your place to come to our aid, as we are sore pressed by the enemy. If, however, you are so straightened that you cannot come, at least send us your archers, and be sure you will earn our gratitude. We acknowledge that throughout the entire war there has been no zeal to be compared to yours, and

entertain no doubt that you will listen to our request."

As soon as Aristides received the despatch, he resolved to go to the relief of the Spartans. As the Athenians were marching to their assistance, the Thebans and other allied Greeks on the side of the Persians, whose place in the line the day before was opposite the Athenians, fell upon them, and so harassed them, that they were unable to give to Pausanias the succor they desired. Thus it transpired that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, aggregating about 53,000 men, were left alone to fight the flower of the Persian army, led by Mardonius in person.

And now as the decisive conflict was about to begin, the Greeks began to offer sacrifices. For some time the victims were not favorable. While the Greeks thus remained inactive, awaiting the word of their soothsayer to pronounce the victims favorable, the enemy showered their arrows upon them with deadly effect. Many were killed and wounded during this period of inactivity. For the Persians made a rampart of their wicker shields, which they planted in the earth in their front, and from behind this improvised barricade shot clouds of arrows into the ranks of the enemy. The victims remained unpropitious, till at last, appealing for divine aid, Pausanias raised his eye towards the temple of Here (Juno) which stood in front of the city of Platæa. He called on the goddess, and besought her not to disappoint the hopes of Greece.

While he was still praying, his hands outstretched in supplication, amid the hail of arrows and javelins showered upon them by the enemy, the Tegeans, unable longer to remain inactive under the destructive darts of the Persian archers, advanced apparently on the impulse, before the Lacedæmonians received orders to attack. While Pausanias was yet supplicating the victims became favorable; the soothsayer foretold victory,

and then, after their long delay, the Peloponnesians advanced. The Persians, then laying aside their bows, prepared to meet the enemy in a hand to hand conflict.

At this point it might be profitable to pause and reflect upon the injustice of those modern critics, who seek to discredit the narrative of Herodotus, and declare that he was unjust, because he failed to recognize the merits of Pausanias as a great general. Some of these writers seem to think that Pausanias was a wonderful strategist and was not given credit by Herodotus for making his turning movement from Erythræ to the fountain of Gargaphia. It is obvious, however, that Pausanias did not depend upon military strategy at all in conducting the movements of the Greeks at Platæa. At the critical moment in that engagement Pausanias made no move when first attacked. He did not seem to contemplate strategy or seek to execute any sort of movement which might give him an advantage on the field. When attacked he prayed. When assaulted by the expert archers of Mardonius, when his men were falling about him, he was looking towards the Temple of Juno, his hands raised in supplication. This was in accordance with the superstition of his age.

In the fifth century B. C. public men engaged in important enterprises were accustomed to seek knowledge concerning future events by the art of divination. They depended in military affairs, in the great majority of instances, upon revelations made through the agency of soothsayers, who were supposed to be able to interpret signs and omens. Their armies were instructed as to their movements not by their commander who employed clever tactics, or who was particularly skilled in military training, but who relied on the diviner's art. When a critical situation arose, animal victims were sacrificed to the gods, to whom the soothsayer appealed for divine guidance. From the signs or

tokens revealed by the smoking entrails of the victims, he interpreted the answer to his supplications. These answers, it was believed, foretold future events. Thus, as at Platæa, the movements of the Greeks were directed, not so much by their commander, not by the skilled soldier, but by the prophetic seer.

It is obvious, also, that the military tactics of that period were exceedingly primitive. No general had, as early as B. C. 479, conceived the idea of deploying troops in echelon. Epaminondas, it is said, having been the first to devise the movement which was resorted to at Leuctra. Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, refers to the engagement at Platæa, and observes that the Lacedæmonians kept "together in the order of a phalanx" and in the final struggle forced the shields from the hands of the Persians. But though the phalanx was known to the Egyptians and Persians, and was resorted to at the battle of Delium, in the Peloponnesian War, it was first developed to a high degree of efficiency by Epaminondas, and was finally perfected by Philip of Macedon, and was thereafter designated as the Macedonian phalanx. We must also remember that Plutarch wrote nearly six centuries after the battle of Platæa, and after the art of war had developed to a point of efficiency, which was wholly unknown to military men in the time of Herodotus.

Pausanias, standing with his hands outstretched in supplication, gazing toward the temple of Juno, his troops falling about him under the severe assault of the Persian archers, presented a remarkable spectacle. But Platæa saw another sight. It has been observed that the Tegeans, unable longer to withstand the fierce assaults of the enemy, charged their lines without waiting for the prophetic utterance of the soothsayer. But we are told as soon as the Tegeans attacked, the victims became favorable, and victory was predicted. Then Pausanias ordered the Peloponnesians to charge. The

carnage was terrible. The Persians withstood them laying aside their bows. Herodotus, the only contemporaneous authority, gives this interesting description of the engagement (ix, 62 et seq.) using Cary's translation.

"First of all a battle took place about the fence of bucklers; and when that was thrown down, an obstinate fight ensued near the temple of Demeter (Ceres) and for a long time, till at last they came to close conflict, for the barbarians, laying hold of the enemy's spears broke them. Indeed, in strength and courage, the Persians were not inferior, but they were lightly armed; and were moreover ignorant of military discipline, and not equal to their adversaries in skill; but rushing forward singly, or in tens, or more or fewer in a body, they fell upon the Spartans and perished. In that part where Mardonius happened to be, fighting from a white horse, at the head of a thousand chosen men, the best of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries vigorously. As long as Mardonius survived they held out, and, defending themselves overthrew many of the Lacedæmonians. But when Mardonius fell, and the troops stationed round him, which were the strongest had fallen, then the others fled, and gave way before the Lacedœmonians. . . . Although the rest of the Greeks in the army of Mardonius behaved ill on purpose, the Bœotians fought with the Athenians for a considerable time. For those Thebans who sided with the Medes displayed no little zeal, so that three hundred of the most valiant among them fell by the hands of the Athenians. . . . At last the Bœotians too were routed and fled to Thebes."

Artabazus was never in sympathy with the schemes of Mardonius; he had under his command forty thousand men. After Mardonius had advanced across the Asopus, and brought on a general engagement, Artabazus drew up his divisions in order. After a time he

led out his forces towards the Asopus, as if he intended to cross the river and join in the engagement, but being in advance of his troops, when he saw the Persians scattered and broken, flying towards Thebes, he rode back along his lines and gave orders to retreat, not towards Thebes, but towards Phocis, his object being to get out of Greece as quickly as possible and reach the Hellespont at the earliest possible moment. That part of the Greek army which formed the centre, which fled to the Island, and were drawn up close to the temple of Here (Juno) in front of the City of Platæa, when they learned that Pausanias was gaining the victory, took up their arms and pressed forward without any order, and taking the upper road across the hills and skirts of Cithæron, marched straight towards the temple of Demeter (Ceres). The Megarians and Phliasians followed over the road on the plain at the foot of the ridges. The latter, not having advanced in compact order, were attacked by a body of Theban cavalry, who killed six hundred of them. The others, in order to evade the Thebans, retreated into the Cithæron mountains.

The barbarians and their allies fled across the Asopus, and took refuge in the wooden fortress, which Mardonius had erected between the City of Thebes and that river. They succeeded in ascending into the towers before the Lacedæmonians came up. On the arrival of the pursuers, a sharp conflict took place. But the Spartans were not skilled in attack upon fortified places, but when the Athenians came up, after a hard fight, a breach was made in the stockade and the Greeks led by the Tegeans poured into the enclosure. The fortified camp which Mardonius had constructed then became a charnel house, in which thousands of the barbarians and their allies perished. It is said that, excluding the contingent of forty thousand men led into Phocis by Artabazus, the entire Persian army and its

allies were all slain, except about 3,000. This scanty remnant alone survived the battle.

The list of casualites among the Greeks was comparatively small. Of Spartans there perished ninety-one; of Tegeans, sixteen; of Athenians, fifty-two. Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, says that of the Greeks there perished in all thirteen hundred and sixty; and that the fifty-two Athenians who fell, all were of the tribe of Æantis. This apparent discrepancy between these two authors may be reconciled, if we assume that Plutarch included, in his estimate, the six hundred Megarians and Phliasians, who had fallen in the attack made upon them by the Bœotian cavalry, and that the remainder of those who fell in order to make up the total of thirteen hundred and sixty, included Helots who accompanied the Spartans.

The operations of the Persian army in Bœotia occupied about twelve days. The result was the death of Mardonius, who was slain by a Spartan named Arimnestus, by a blow on the head with a stone as had been foretold by the oracle, and the practical annihilation of his army, with the exception of the contingent of forty thousand men, under Artabazus, who were not engaged at all. Thus ended the battle of Platæa, which rendered impossible for all time the extension of the empire of Cyrus on the continent of Europe.

Scarcely had the Greeks achieved their victory over the Medes when, according to the account given by Plutarch, in his life of Aristides, a violent quarrel arose, as to whom, as between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, the first honors of right belonged, and who was entitled to erect the trophy to commemorate their triumph. Both nations claimed it. By reason of this dissension ruin was impending. The weakness arising from diversity, and the strength presented by unity and concord was never more apparent than on this occasion. The violence of the quarrel might have re-

sulted seriously had not the patriotism and constancy of Aristides saved his countrymen from themselves. He counselled the commanders, and pacified and finally persuaded them to leave the matter in dispute to be decided by a vote. One member of the council said the honor would have to be accorded to some city other than Sparta or Athens, if civil war was to be averted. The Solomon of the occasion happened to be Cleocritus, the Corinthian. When he arose to speak, all supposed he was going to ask for the honor on behalf of Corinth. But he won the applause of his hearers when he advised that in order to eliminate all contention and bitterness, they should give the reward and glory of the victory to the Platæans, at whose gates the victory was won, because such a selection could give offense to none. His suggestion was heartily seconded by Aristides on behalf of the Athenians, and then Pausanias voted aye on behalf of the Lacedæmonians. So the breach was healed, and all were reconciled; but the Lacedæmonians and Athenians each erected a trophy apart to themselves.

When the Greeks had broken into the fortified camp on the banks of the Asopus, where the enemy had taken refuge, the Tegeans fell upon the gorgeous tent or pavilion of Mardonius which they plundered. There was collected, also, when the battle was over, an immense amount of valuable booty including vast quantities of gold and silver coin and plate and tents decked with gold and silver, gilt couches and plated and golden bowls, and caldrons of gold and silver, and golden goblets and drinking vessels. The bodies of the slain were stripped of bracelets and necklaces of gold and of garments, encrusted and embroidered with gold, and numbers of scymetars, adorned with gold and precious stones. Xerxes, also, when he undertook his expedition for the conquest of Greece, sought to mitigate the hardships and rigors of a military campaign, by surrounding himself as far as practicable, with the elegance and luxuries of a Persian court. He, as well as his nobles and commanders, were accompanied by their favorite women in charge of the eunuchs collected in their harems. They were also surrounded by numberless slaves and servants, and had horses and camels and beasts of burden in abundance. Mardonius and his chosen officers, after Xerxes had returned to Susa, retained their luxurious harems, and their slaves and these formed part of the spoils of war which fell to the more frugal and abstemious Greeks, who seem to have been wholly unacquainted with these elegant surroundings, characteristic of oriental luxury.

The Helots were directed to collect the spoil. They stole what articles they were able to conceal about their persons, which they afterwards sold to the Æginetæ, as if it had been brass. When all the treasure had been collected, a tithe was set apart for the Olympian Zeus (Jupiter); a tithe to the Isthmian Poseidon (Neptune) and a tithe to the Delphian Apollo. One-tenth of the spoils was awarded to Pausanias and the remainder, including the balance of the Persian concubines and slaves, the horses and camels and beasts of burden, were apportioned among the victors. Pausanias was delighted with the elegant equipage, golden furnishings and various colored hangings of the Persians. He ordered the bakers and cooks of the household of Mardonius to prepare a supper, exactly as they would prepare it for their master, and was astonished at the profusion set before him. He then, in order to emphasize the contrast, directed to be prepared the simple frugal repast, to which the Laconians were accustomed. He then gathered his officers about him to note the great difference and remarked, "Men of Greece, I have called you together to show you the folly of the commander of the Medes, who having such fare as this, has come to us, who have such poor fare, to take it from us."

Among the spoils dedicated to Apollo was the golden bowl taken from the tent of Mardonius. This was placed upon a golden tripod placed upon a column of three brazen serpents, twisted round each other, their heads with gaping mouths supporting the golden bowl. This trophy was deposited in the temple of Delphi, and is known to posterity as the serpent of Delphi. Upon it Pausanias, upon his own authority, and without consulting with any one, placed this inscription:

> Pausanias, Grecia's chief, the Mede o'erthrew
> And gave Apollo that which here ye view.

The pride, vanity, arrogance and treachery of Pausanias subsequently proved his ruin. The Lacedæmonians at once caused the inscription to be erased, and upon the coils of the serpent of brass was inscribed in archaic Greek characters the names of the cities and states or nations who fought at the battle of Platæa.

The ancient relic, one of the most precious remains of antiquity, has been preserved through more than twenty-three centuries. During the second Sacred War waged by Philip of Macedon, the golden tripod was confiscated by the Phocians, but the bronze stand remained in the temple of Delphi for centuries. The modern Pausanias, traveller, archæologist, geographer and critic, who flourished about 160 A. D. visited Delphi, nearly seven hundred years after the battle of Platæa. He saw the serpent and wrote an account describing it. About a century and a half after the time of the modern Pausanias, Constantine the Great, early in the fourth century of our era, took the serpent from the temple of Delphi and placed it in the Hippodrome at Constantinople, where it still remains, a venerable relic of the past, and a memorial to the valor of the Greeks who fought at Platæa. The column of twisted serpents is bereft of the heads having been injured by the Turk,

Mahomet the Second, who with a stroke of his battle-axe, broke the under jaw of one of the serpents. The remnant of the stand on which the tripod and golden bowl of Mardonius rested is eighteen feet nine inches high, and is believed by scholars and archæologists, and among them Canon Rawlinson, to be the veritable stand of the original tripod. Professor Rawlinson says that "chemical solvents have been skilfully applied, and the characters now appear to have been well and deeply cut, the orthography has proved to be regular; and the form of the pedestal is recognized as stately and appropriate." Upon it also is found traces of the erasure of the elegiac couplet, which Pausanias caused to be inscribed upon it, without authority from any one, as stated by Thucydides (i, 132).

After those who had fallen in the engagement had been buried with appropriate honors, a council of war was held, as to what ought to be done with the leading citizens of Thebebs, who had joined the Medes, given aid and comfort to the enemy, and fought with barbarians against their own countrymen. It was resolved to march at once to the gates of the city, and demand that the two conspicuous traitors, whose names were well known, should be surrendered into their hands. The army marched to the gates of Thebes, and demanded the two men Timagenides and Attaginus. The demand was refused, and the army of liberation began to besiege the rebellious city. They laid waste the surrounding territory and vigorously attacked the walls for a period of twenty days when at the request of Timagenides himself, the Thebans agreed to surrender the men, but Attaginus made his escape. When his sons were surrendered in his stead Pausanias refused to hold them, saying, the children had no part in the offense. Other offenders were, however, surrendered, all of whom were taken to Corinth and executed without trial.

Artabazus, in fear, pursued his retreat through

Phocis and Thessaly. He was afraid that if the inhabitants learned that Mardonius had been killed and his army defeated, they themselves might be surprised, attacked and cut to pieces. Artabazus, therefore, told the Thessalians that he was sent into Thrace with all despatch on important business; that Mardonius and his army were close behind and might be looked for shortly. Artabazus succeeded in reaching Byzantium, but a great part of his army perished on the road, many being cut to pieces by the Thracians, others dying from hunger and excess of toil.

On the same day that the Greeks gained their great victory at Platæa, their countrymen, who sailed from Delos in the fleet commanded by Leotychides and Xanthippus, the father of the illustrious Pericles, obtained a decisive victory over the Persians at Mycale in Ionia. This campaign in Asia Minor will now be considered.

CHAPTER XXVII

WARS FOR PERSIAN EXPULSION

MYCALÉ — Mik-a-le — [Μυκαλη]. A headland in Ionia, on the coast of Asia Minor, stretching westward into the Ægean Sea, separated from the island of Samos by a narrow channel less than a mile wide. It is at the base of Mount Mycale, the last peak of the Messogis range extending from Lydia to the extremity of the peninsula, which terminates in the promontory or headland of Trogylium. Miletus, on the north shore of the peninsula, is fifteen miles southeast. In the channel which separates Samos from the mainland and on the shore of the continent, the Persians were defeated, on the 22d of September B. C. 479, the same day that Mardonius was killed and his army defeated at Platæa.

PLATÆA and Mycale. Both fought on the same day. Both contests were waged by Greeks against Persians, and in both the Greeks were victorious. At Platæa was secured the liberty and independence of European Hellas. At Mycale the Ionian Greeks were delivered from the gauling tyranny of Persian despotism. At Platæa, the death of Leonidas was avenged. At Mycale the murderous raids, conducted by Artabazus against the Greek colonies of Potidæa and Olynthus, were likewise avenged. At Platæa the wars of liberation were ended, and the remnants of the invading army of Xerxes driven from the soil of Hellas. At Mycale was begun the wars of expulsion, designed to drive the Persians from the western shores of Asia Minor, from Thrace and the northern and eastern islands of the Ægean sea. On the day when these two engagements took place, Greece entered upon a new career. Her arms had driven the invader from her shores, and had

begun also a series of campaigns to drive the hosts of Persia from Europe and Asia Minor. At Mycale was laid the first stone in the foundation on which was constructed the supremacy of Greece and the future glory of the Athenian empire.

These two battles, fought September 22, B. C. 479, one on the plains of Bœotia, near the base of the Cithæron Mountains, the other on the headland in Ionia, at the foot of Mount Mycale, constitute the final Persian disasters in the third and last expedition for the invasion of Greece. The first expedition fitted out by Darius was wrecked on the rocks of Mount Athos B. C. 492. The second was shattered on the plain of Marathon, B. C. 490. The third and most formidable of all, under Xerxes, was defeated at Salamis, B. C. 480. This was supplemented, B. C. 479, by the dual victory of the Greeks at Platæa and Mycale. This double defeat of the barbarians not only extinguished the hopes and ambitions of Xerxes to extend the sceptre of Cyrus and Darius in the west, but destroyed his power over his Greek subjects in Asia Minor. The final effort of Persia to enslave Hellas and to retain its supremacy in the Ægean, later met disaster at the mouth of the Eurymedon on the coast of Pamphylia, B. C. 466, where Cimon, the son of the great Miltiades, completed in Asia Minor, the work which his illustrious father begun at Marathon.

When Xerxes fled to Asia, after his overwhelming defeat in the naval engagement at Salamis, his son-in-law, Mardonius, the ablest man in his empire, could not endure the spectacle of the most formidable army ever collected, retreating from Europe, without having engaged the enemy, except at Thermopylæ, where a few hundred men led by Leonidas were massacred. He prevailed upon Xerxes to permit him to retain a part of the army in Thessaly, in order that as soon as the spring opened he could advance into Attica, and defeat the

Hellenes, conquer Greece in a land engagement and retrieve the name and glory of Persia. The Persian fleet, however, sailed across the Ægean, and was stationed by Xerxes in Ionia, to guard the island of Samos and other Greek islands on the coast of Asia Minor and prevent them from throwing off the Persian yoke and achieving their independence.

The Grecian fleet, during the winter B. C. 480-479, collected at the island Ægina in the Saronic Gulf. The Greek colonists in Asia Minor were anxious to revolt and gain their independence. To aid in this design they secretly sent ambassadors to Sparta and to the Greek fleet at Ægina, commanded by Xanthippus, the Athenian, and Leotychides, the Spartan, who claimed direct lineal descent from Hercules. They besought their countrymen to sail to Samos, in order to assist the Samians and other Greek colonists to gain their liberty and independence, assuring them that as soon as their fleet came to Samos, the inhabitants would turn against their Persian masters, and with the aid of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, they would be able to overthrow the power of Xerxes. The Greek admirals, however, aware that Mardonius was in Thessaly with a powerful army, with which he contemplated conducting military operations against Attica in the spring, consented to sail only as far as the island of Delos, which lies nearly midway between Greece and Asia. It is 100 miles southeast of Ægina, and 75 miles southwest of Samos. Herodotus says the Greeks at first would not sail further east than Delos, and that the Persians, or barbarians, durst not sail further west than Samos. Thus the winter passed.

While the Greek fleet was at Delos, the Samians sent three other ambassadors to entreat them to come to their relief. By a strange coincidence, the name of one of these ambassadors was Hegesistratus, which means "leader of the army," who was very insistent, and as-

sured Leotychides that the moment the Ionians saw the Greeks they would revolt from the Persians and that the barbarians could not withstand them, or if they did, the Greeks would not find booty anywhere half so rich. He reminded him also that the stake for which they were playing was not Samos alone, but the Greek islands in Asia Minor, north of Caria, and the cities of the Hellespont. He also reported that the Persian ships sailed badly, and were not fit to fight, after the injuries inflicted on them at Salamis. Finally, Leotychides said to the ambassador, "Friend, what is your name." The answer came like an inspiration, "Hegesistratus" (leader of the army). "I accept," said Leotychides, regarding the name as an omen of success and good fortune, "only pledge me your faith that the Samians will be our zealous allies." They immediately gave the pledge, and made oath of confederacy with the Greeks. Sacrifices were offered, the auguries were favorable, and the Greek fleet sailed east from Delos with all speed to Samos, and when they reached the island, took their station near a landing on which was erected a temple to Here (Juno). The Persians, at the approach of the Greeks, fearing a repetition of the disaster at Salamis, concluded that they would not risk a naval engagement but would fight on land. They permitted the Phœnicians to sail home, and then sailed to the headland of Mycale, on the continent, and put themselves under the protection of the land forces there, an army of 60,000 men under Triganes, who surpassed all the Persians in beauty and stature. Under the protection of this army, the commanders of the navy beached their ships and threw up a rampart of stone and wood. They cut down the fruit-trees, drove sharp stakes around the rampart and prepared to sustain a siege.

The Greeks, when they learned that the enemy declined to fight at sea, and had gone to Mycale to join the Persian land forces, sailed thither. Leotychides

employed the tactics used at Artemisium by Themistocles. He believed that the Greek allies in the Persian camp would turn against their oppressors, when assured of the support of their countrymen. He accordingly sailed as close as possible to the land, and then made loud proclamation in the Greek tongue, which the Persians, Herodotus tells us, could not understand. "Men of Ionia," he called out to his kinsmen on shore, "when we engage each of you remember first of all, Liberty, and next the watchword Hebe, and let him who does not hear this, learn it from those who do."

The Greeks then beached their vessels and formed in line of battle on the shore. The Persians were suspicious of the Samians. They knew that a warning of some kind had been given to them from the ships of the Greeks. The barbarians, by way of precaution, disarmed the Samians. The troops from Miletus, being originally Greek colonists, could not be trusted at this critical juncture any more than the Samians. They were sent from the field to guard the mountain passes, in the rear of the army, and to prevent surprises from that quarter.

The Persians were then drawn up in order of battle and brought their bucklers together to serve as a rampart and prepared to receive the advancing Greeks.

The tradition of the battle of Mycale has preserved the story that through the interposition of Heaven, in some mysterious manner, the Greeks, who were now advancing on the Persians in the afternoon of the 22d of September, learned that their countrymen had advanced against them at Platæa that very morning; that Mardonius had been killed and his broken and defeated army was even then flying before the victorious Greeks. This was the rumor they heard, as they advanced to meet the enemy on the headland of Mycale. They were told that a herald's staff was seen lying on the beach, through which this mysterious intelligence had been in

some way communicated. The rumor sent a thrill of triumph through the ranks, inspired the soldiers with greater courage, and made them eager to complete at Mycale in Asia, the discomfiture which Persia had suffered in Bœotia, while invading Greece across the Ægean, more than two hundred miles to the west.

The battle was stubborn and well contested for a time, but the barbarians were unable to withstand the fierce assaults made upon them by the Greeks. Their fortifications were taken, and they fled in disorder. The native Persians fought with great bravery, and were the last to retreat. Mardontes and Tigranes, with the pride of the old soldiers of Cyrus, refused to quit the field, and died fighting. The Samians revolted in the midst of the battle, and did all they could to aid their countrymen, doubtless arming themselves with weapons of their fallen oppressors. When the retreating barbarians attempted to escape, the Milesians, whom they had posted in the rear, in the passes and defiles of Mount Mycale, now in full sympathy with their kinsmen, led the Persians into false trails and ambuscades, and finally fell upon them and massacred the barbarians, while they were attempting to elude their pursuers. After the battle, the Greeks collected great quantities of booty and secured several chests of money, which they loaded on their vesesls, and having burned the ships and fortifications of the enemy, sailed away.

The direct results of the battle of Mycale was the formation of a bund or coalition, among the Greek islands in Asia Minor, Samos, Chios and Lesbos, who formed a Confederacy to stand together, and maintain their freedom and independence. This coalition was the beginning of the greater and more formidable alliance, brought about by Athens after the capture of Sestus and Byzantium, known as the Confederacy of Delos.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONQUEST OF THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE — XERXES THE AHASUERUS OF THE BOOK OF ESTHER — CRUELTY OF QUEEN AMESTRIS (VASHTI) — CRUCIFIXION OF THE PERSIAN GOVERNOR OF SESTUS

SESTUS — Ses-tus — [Σηστος]. A port on the Hellespont in the Thracian Chersonese (now the peninsula of Gallipolis), opposite Abydos in Asia. Sestus derives its celebrity from song and story. It was the home of Hero, the beautiful priestess of Aphrodite (Venus), the lover of Leander who dwelt in Abydos, across the channel, and nightly swam the Hellespont to woo her. Leander, the glory of Abydos, and Hero, the charm of Sestus, have been called the Romeo and Juliet of antiquity. Sestus and Abydos were the points in Europe and Asia where were constructed the termini of the bridge of Xerxes, over which he crossed with his immense multitudes on his expedition against Athens. Sestus was besieged and taken by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, B. C. 479 after his victory at Mycale.

AFTER their victory at Mycale, Leotychides and Xanthippus returned to Samos, and there received the Æolians, Hellespontians and Ionians, their confederates in war. A conference was held with these allies to consider as to the best manner in which to take advantage of their success. It was at the urgent solicitation of these Asiatic Greeks that their kinsmen in Europe were prevailed upon to sail from Delos to Samos; where off Mount Mycale they destroyed the remnant of the Persian fleet which had escaped from Salamis.

The enthusiasm inspired by that victory throughout the Greek cities in Ionia was instantaneous. Their patriotism was stimulated. They pleaded with their kinsmen from the mother country to make the fruits of

their success permanent. They urged the formation of a confederacy of Asiatic Greeks, believing that if their kinsmen in the west acted in harmony with them, they would be enabled to secure the independence they enjoyed before the Ionian War, and break forever the despotic power of Persia, which reduced them to bondage. They argued that by their united efforts the results of the Ionian War could be reversed, and the advantages gained by Darius at the battle of Lade, and the conquest of Miletus would be nullified.

At this conference the mother country was represented only by its two principal cities, Athens and Sparta. These city-states had always dominated the affairs of Greece. They had fought together at Artemisium and Salamis, at Platæa and Mycale. These victories, except the last named, if we may class Artemisium as a victory, had been won in Greece, and resulted in the expulsion of Persia from the shores of Hellas. Mycale was won on the continent of Asia, and resulted in the liberation of certain of the Ionian Greeks from the Persian yoke. The wars of liberation in Greece were over. The struggle for liberty in Asia Minor had just begun. The wars for the liberties of Greece were wars of expulsion, whereby the Persians were driven out. The war begun at Mycale must likewise be a war of expulsion. Persia must be deprived of her cities and fortified places in the eastern Ægean, in Æolus, Ionia and Caria, and their inhabitants restored to their political freedom, and permitted to again enjoy the blessings of peace under the guarantees of civil liberty. The despotism of Persia must be broken, and Grecian autonomy must be re-established if the fruits of Mycale were to be made permanent.

When and how was this result to be accomplished? Sparta and Athens must decide. On this occasion was prominently displayed that lack of harmony and spirit of jealousy between these two cities, which continued to

increase as the breach widened between them, till the friction became unbearable, broke up the unity of the Hellenic nation, and finally resulted in the Peloponnesian War, which ruined Greece.

After Mycale, therefore, the question was how to protect the Greek cities of Asia Minor from the tyranny of Persia. Leotychides did not favor a confederacy of Ionian cities supported by a European Greek navy. The Spartans were not enterprising. They were parsimonious in the extreme and did not seem to be desirous of securing the commercial advantages, which were sure to result from foreign conquests. Sparta was not a commercial city, but an armed camp. The state consisted of a military brotherhood, rather than a commonwealth of enterprising citizens seeking to increase their prosperity by commercial enterprises and to secure thereby the luxury and refinements which come with increasing wealth and business success.

Sparta suggested that the Asiatic Greeks should quit Ionia and Æolis and return to the land of their forefathers. They argued that those Greeks in Europe who had allied themselves with Persia should be expelled to make room for the Greeks who should return to the land of their ancestors. They urged that disloyal Greeks should no longer be permitted to dwell in Hellas. They should be attainted, their lands and cities forfeited to the state, and conferred upon those Asiatic Greeks, who should return to the country whence came their ancestors.

This proposition did not appeal either to the Ionians or to the Athenians. The idea was repugnant to their notions of dignity and propriety. The thought that the Greeks, after defeating the Persians, both at home and in their own empire, should suddenly abandon their kinsmen who had established themselves in Asia Minor, and desert their cause, was altogether distasteful to Xanthippus. Athens was an enterprising commercial

centre. It had planted numerous colonies about the frontiers of civilization. When this conference was held Athens lay in ruins, having been almost entirely destroyed by Xerxes and Mardonius, but with the expulsion of the Persian arms from the shores of Greece, the patriotism and enthusiasm of the Athenians, led by Themistocles and Aristides, was never more intense. Athens must at once be rebuilt. Her colonies must be protected. Her commercial greatness must be extended until Athens should become the mistress of the Ægean and the most powerful city in the world. Such were the dreams of her admirals and statesmen.

Xanthippus was an energetic and enterprising commander and appreciated the advantages gained at Mycale. The more he pondered on the situation the more he became convinced that the suggestions of Leotychides would be offensive to the Athenians. The proposition could not be entertained. To take the Asiatic Greeks away from the land where their ancestors had sustained prosperous cities for more than two centuries would be humiliating in the extreme. Xanthippus accordingly suggested to the Spartan admiral that they grant the request of the Asiatic Greeks, and assist them to throw off the yoke of Persia. Those from the Hellespont who had attended this conference at Samos, especially requested that the united fleet should sail thither, and drive the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese, and take Sestus the portal through which Xerxes entered Europe, over the bridge he had constructed from Abydos.

But the phlegmatic temperament of the Dorian was too dull to comprehend the great advantages to be secured by continuing the campaign in Asia. He was, however, curious to learn whether the bridge which Xerxes built remained intact, over which another army might be led into Europe. More than a year had elapsed since Xerxes fled with his fleet and army from

the shores of Greece. But there were in those days no means of swift communication, and we are told, the Greek admirals were ignorant as to whether the bridge across the Hellespont had been kept intact by the Persian King. Leotychides, therefore, consented to accompany Xanthippus to the Hellespont that he might ascertain and report the facts as to whether this bridge which constituted a military highway from Asia to Europe still remained intact. Stormy weather detained the fleet at the mouth of the Hellespont but it finally sailed to Abydos, and thence across the channel, immediately opposite Sestus. To the great relief of Leotychides, he learned that the bridge of Xerxes had been destroyed by the winds and tempests, but fragments of the huge cables of which it was in part constructed, were still to be seen on the shore, where they had been carried by the wind and tides. He secured pieces of these cables which he took aboard his ship to carry to Sparta as a memento of the memorable campaign of the previous year.

Before the fleet lay Sestus, a most important point. Its possession and occupation by the Greeks meant the control of the Thracian Chersonese and the Hellespont. Xanthippus urged Leotychides to tarry, and aid him in laying siege to the place. He pleaded his cause in vain. The Peloponnesians declined to take part in this ambitious and patriotic enterprise for the glory of Greece and humiliation of Persia, and the Spartan sailed home with his fleet.

The Athenian, however, saw the great advantages of securing the control of the Hellespont. He concluded with the aid of the Ionians, Hellespontians and Asiatic Greeks to conduct a siege for the capture of Sestus.

Xerxes was at Sardis when he learned of the death of Mardonius and the defeat and destruction of his army at Platæa. The news of these reverses seemed to mortify his pride, and extinguish whatever ambition he

may have had when he led into Europe the most formidable armament the world had ever seen. He became apparently indifferent to the success of his arms and devoted his entire time to the gratification of his lusts and passions. He devoted himself to the erotic pleasures of his court, and indulged in the ribald revelry which characterized his drunken feasts in order to drown the memories of the shame and humiliation occasioned by the failure of his expedition to Greece and the decisive reverses sustained by his arms in Europe and Asia.

In this connection Herodotus relates an incident in the life of Xerxes involving his illicit relations with his own kin. It was an amour tinged with a bloody tragedy resulting in the death of his brother Masistes, one of the Persian officers who survived the battle of Mycale. It exhibits also the cruel malignity and jealous hate of Xerxes' favorite wife, who in her blind fury, caused the wife of the unfortunate Masistes to be horribly mutilated although the victim of her vengeance was absolutely innocent, and entirely free from blame in the matter. The story is interesting because it gives us an opportunity to look back more than twenty-three centuries into the past, and get some idea of the absolute power of the Persian King over the lives of all of his subjects, including those who frequented his court, formed part of the royal household, embracing even the members of his own family.

It presents not only a vivid picture of the degrading morals of that age and the horrors of an eastern seraglio, but possesses added interest from the fact that many scholars believe that Xerxes and not Darius was the Ahasuerus of the Book of Esther, and that the cruel and malignant Amestris was Vashti, his favorite queen, whom he subsequently divorced. The story finds a parallel in the dramatic scene in the life of Herod the Great, who at his birthday feast granted the request

of Herodias, who at the instigation of her mother, demanded that the head of John the Baptist be delivered to her in a charger.

The incident took place after Xerxes had bestowed unusual honors upon Xenagoras and made him satrap of Cilicia, because he had saved the life of his brother Masistes, who was attacked by Artayntes, whom Masistes had upbraided for incompetency at the battle of Mycale.

His sister-in-law, the wife of his brother Masistes, resided in Sardis, during the sojourn of Xerxes in that city at the time of the disaster at Mycale, and was frequently invited to his court. The King conceived a strong passion for her, and pressed his attentions unceasingly. She, however, gave no heed to the many tender messages sent to her by the King, and steadfastly refused to yield to his solicitations. As she was the wife of his own brother, Xerxes hesitated to use violence, to accomplish his purpose. Instead, he conceived the idea of causing his own son by his queen Amestris to marry his niece, Artaynta, the daughter of the wife of Masistes. After the usual ceremonies of the betrothal, Xerxes, unmindful of the military operations which threatened his dominions in Ionia, took his departure for Susa. At the royal palace in his winter capital he received, with great pomp and ceremony, the bride of his son, the daughter of his brother's wife, with whom he was enamored. But at Susa a change came over him. He seemed to lose his admiration for the wife of Masistes, but conceived a passion for his son's bride, to whom he transferred his affections. Artaynta carried away by the arts and flatteries of Xerxes yielded to his desires and solicitations. Amestris, it seems, was desperately in love with her husband, and gave him a costly robe of many colors, which she had wrought with her own hands, like the coat that Jacob gave to his son Joseph, as a token of his love.

The King was much pleased with the robe, the gift of his favorite wife, and wore it frequently. On one occasion, he put it on, when he went to visit his daughter-in-law Artaynta. He was so pleased with his visit to her on that occasion that he requested Artaynta to make any request she pleased and swore that whatever it might be it would be granted. To his great surprise the girl asked him for the robe he wore, the costly garment his wife had woven with her own fingers. In vain Xerxes besought her to substitute for the robe whatever she wished, — cities, heaps of gold, an army which would obey no other commander. Though his power was absolute he seemed to dread the consequences of complying with her request. Amestris would surely detect his secret love for his daughter-in-law, which she already suspected. But Artaynta was steadfast and at last he reluctantly gave her the robe. She was very proud of the gift and often wore it. It was not long until the whole story came to the ears of Amestris.

The queen, strange to say, harbored no resentment against Artaynta, but determined to torture and kill her mother, the wife of the King's brother, for somehow she conceived the idea that the mother alone was the author of the intrigue with her husband. She waited till the annual banquet which Xerxes was accustomed to celebrate on his birthday. On that day the King made a great feast, to his lords high captains, chief officers and courtiers. It was an occasion worthy the powerful head of a great empire. The halls of the palace shone with the riches of his vast kingdom where were " white, green and blue hangings, fastened with cords of fine linen and purple to silver rings and pillars of marble; the beds were of gold and silver, upon a pavement of red, and blue and white and black marble." [1] Thus the

[1] Book of Esther, i, 6. The better opinion seems to be that Artaxerxes, son of Xerres, was the Ahasuerus of Esther.

feast of Ahasuerus is described in the Book of Esther. The wine was served in goblets of gold, the vessels being highly wrought and of diverse designs and patterns. On this great feast-day, but at no other time, the King soaps his head and delivers gifts to the Persians; for the law governing the feast declares that no one who craves a boon at the King's table on that day shall be denied his request.

Taking advantage of her opportunity his queen Amestris asked Xerxes to grant the boon she craved and said if he desired to please her he would bestow upon her as a gift the wife of his own brother Masistes to deal with as she chose. For a long time Xerxes refused to listen to this shocking and monstrous proposal, which required that he should put the life and happiness of his sister-in-law at the disposal of his queen. But the law of the feast was allowed to prevail. The King yielded and gave the unfortunate woman into the power of Amestris.

Xerxes then sent for his brother and bade him put away his wife and marry his niece, a daughter of Xerxes, whom he offered to give to him, instead of his present spouse. Masistes told his brother that it was indeed a great honor to be permitted to marry a daughter of the King. But he said he dearly loved his wife, who had borne him children to whom he was deeply attached. He begged Xerxes not to use force to compel him to obey his wishes, but pleaded to be permitted to live with his wife. In a rage Xerxes said that Masistes should neither marry his daughter nor live with his wife. Masistes, in great distress, went out from the presence of the King, saying, " Master, thou hast not yet taken my life." [1]

During this interview between Xerxes and his brother, Amestris sent for the spearmen of the royal

[1] Herod. ix, 3.

body-guard and commanded them to seize the wife of Masistes, and wound and lacerate her beyond recognition. The spearmen did as their queen had directed and at once proceeded with the butchery. They cut off her two breasts, her nose, ears and lips and cast them to the dogs. In order that she might never be able again to speak to her husband or children, they tore out her tongue by the roots, and thus bleeding and disfigured they sent her to her home.

Such were the morals and manners of the Persian court in the age of Xerxes.

When Masistes reached his house and saw the mutilated and ruined body of his wife, he took counsel with his children. He decided to make war on his brother. With his sons and a body of adherents he set out for Bactria, a people by whom he was greatly beloved, intending to stir up an insurrection in that country. But his plans having been betrayed, he was murdered by the King's emissaries, before he reached his destination. Thus Masistes failed in his purpose to visit condign punishment on the cowardly wicked and cruel Xerxes.

If this story of Masistes is correct, Xerxes was not at Sardis but at Susa when the Greek fleet sailed to the Hellespont and laid siege to Sestus.

The purpose of Xanthippus and his allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, after Leotychides had sailed away and abandoned the further prosecution of the campaign, was to take Sestus. It was the most important city on the Thracian Chersonese. That peninsula at the eastern extremity of Europe runs three days' journey, about sixty miles into the sea, and terminates in the promontory of Mastusia. It is washed on the west by the waters of the gulf of Melas and the sea of Thrace (the Ægean) and on the east by the narrow Hellespont, which separates it from the adjacent shores of Asia. This peninsula is the last frontier of Europe. Along its shores in that day were populous cities and towns, separated by stretches of woods interspersed by green pastures and arable lands. On the eastern shore were Pactye, Crithote, Gallipolis, Cœla, Sestus, Madytus, and far to the south, Elæus. On the west near the neck of the peninsula was Cardia founded by the uncle of the noted Miltiades long before the Scythian expedition of Darius, Alopeconnesos, Limnæ and Araplus. Sestus, however, was the principal port on the Hellespont and its possession would not only enable its captors to reduce the peninsula but would give them control of the Hellespont, and the carrying trade from Byzantium and the Euxine. Its importance appears from the language of Thucydides (viii, 62) who says it was "the post for the defense of the entire Hellespont."

When Xanthippus conducted his operations, Artayctes was in command of the Persian garrison at Sestus. He was not prepared to stand a siege, as the Greeks came upon him unexpectedly and he had not sufficient time to provide himself with provisions and other things necessary to enable him to make any considerable resistance. He was a wicked and cruel tyrant. He had incurred the hatred of the inhabitants of Elæus, a city at the southern extremity of the peninsula, where stood the temple dedicated to the memory of the hero Protesilaus. His name was hallowed because it was said he was the first Greek killed in the Trojan War. He commanded a squadron in the fleet of Agamemnon and was the first to leap from his vessel on the shores of Asia, and fell a victim of the spear of the noted Hector. His tomb was within the edifice at Elæus, surrounded by a sacred grove. There were accumulated sacred offerings and a great store of vases of gold and silver, works in brass, robes and richly embroidered garments. All this wealth had been obtained by the Persian Artayctes, with the consent of Xerxes,

when the latter crossed the Hellespont with his army. After the army of invasion had left the Chersonese, on its western march Artayctes took the treasures from the temple at Elæus and brought them to Sestus. Not satisfied with the wealth he had secured, he determined to insult the Greeks by destroying the sacred grove about the temple which he cut down and made these hallowed precincts, cornfields and pasture lands. His base instincts prompted him to still further outrage the feelings of the Hellenese on the Chersonese. He even polluted the sacred shrine, by harboring there his concubines, when he visited Elæus for pleasure or recreation. Now the day of retribution drew nigh. He was about to receive condign punishment at the hands of Xanthippus.

The Greeks vigorously prosecuted the siege. It was getting late in the autumn and those in the fleet began to murmur at being kept abroad so long. But the captains would not listen to their entreaties to return to Greece until they had taken Sestus or until their own countrymen ordered them to return.

It was not long until the Persian garrison began to suffer for want of provisions. Great numbers had flocked to Sestus from the neighboring towns, when they learned that that stronghold was being besieged and among them Œobazus, who had been stationed at Cardia. But these contingents required to be fed. The provisions of the garrison were soon exhausted. They were reduced to such extremity that they boiled the cords of their beds, which were made of thongs, cut in strips from the hides of animals, and ate them. When there was nothing left to eat, Artayctes and Œobazus, with the native Persians, made their escape by night, and fled having let themselves down from the wall at the back of the town, where there were stationed but few of the blockading forces. At dawn the citizens threw open the gates of their city. It was at once occupied

by the army of Xanthippus, who detached a strong body of troops to pursue the flying Persians. Œobazus fled to Thrace, where he was captured and he and his companions were put to death by the half civilized tribes of that region. Artayctes, who had been the last to quit his post, retreated northward, and was overtaken at Ægospotami, where that stream flows into the Hellespont, about ten miles north of Sestus, opposite Lampsacus, on the coast of Asia, the spot which seventy-five years later marked the closing scenes of the Peloponnesian War. And now unusual punishment was about to be meted out to the impious and cruel Persian commander, who had wantonly outraged the religious feelings of the Hellenese and whose temples he had defiled. All the prisoners taken at Ægospotami, including Artayctes and his son, were brought back to Sestus in chains.

The story is told of the premonition entertained by Artayctes concerning his fate. His keeper was broiling fish, when suddenly they squirmed and quivered in the pan, as if still alive. The soldier was at a loss how to interpret the phenomenon. Then his prisoner, Artayctes observed: "Fear not, Athenian stranger, because of this marvel. It has not appeared on thy account, but on mine. Protesilaus of Elæus has sent it to show me, that albeit he is dead and embalmed with salt, he has power from the gods to chastise his injurer." [1]

He then offered immense bribes to secure the liberty of himself and his son, and said he would give two hundred talents for the life of each. But the men from Elæus who wished to avenge the memory of their hero, Protesilaus, entreated Xanthippus to put him to death. Then the Athenian commander ordered that the impious Persian be led to execution. The place chosen for the purpose was the spot where the western ter-

[1] Herod. ix, 120.

minus of the bridge of Xerxes had stood, though according to another account, it was on a knoll above the town of Madytus. He was nailed to a plank which was hoisted aloft, securely planted in the earth, and left hanging there until death released him from his agony. To aggravate his punishment, his son was brought to the spot where the parent hung, and was stoned to death beneath the eyes of his dying father. Having reduced Sestus and secured control of the Hellespont which was garrisoned by his allies, the fleet of Xanthippus returned to Greece, laden with the rich spoils of this memorable campaign. He took with him also the remnants of the shore cables from the bridge of Xerxes, to be placed in their temples and dedicated as mementos of the deliverance of Hellas from the yoke of Persia.

At this point we must take leave of Herodotus, who closes his entertaining detailed and interesting history with the siege and capture of Sestus. This venerable author is in the main our only source of information as to the period of the Persian Wars, and posterity is indebted to him and to his successor Thucydides, for the knowledge we possess of the events constituting the early history of Greece.

CHAPTER XXIX

CYPRUS AND BYZANTIUM

CYPRUS — Si-prus — [Κυπρος]. An island off the coast of Phœnicia and Cilicia. It occupied a strong strategic position as a naval base, commanding Egypt and the Delta of the Nile, Phœnicia and the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, Cilicia, Pamphylia and Lycia, constituting the southern coast of Asia Minor, the island of Rhodes and the eastern entrance to the Ægean Sea. Partly reduced by a Peloponnesian and Athenian fleet under Pausanias, B. C. 478.

BYZANTIUM — Bi-zan-shi-um — [Βυζαντιον]. A city on the extreme verge of Europe, situated on a peninsula at the apex of the triangle facing Asia, formed by the Bosphorus on the east, the Golden Horn on the west, and the waters of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) on the south. It extends on both shores of the Golden Horn. On the peninsula proper the city is now designated Pera and Galata, and is connected with ancient Byzantium, now Stamboul, at two points by the Galata and Golden Horn bridges. The city in Bithynia in Asia across the Bosphorus, known to the ancients as Chalcedon (Χαλκηδων) is now Scutari. Byzantium A. D. 330 was designated Constantinople, so christened in honor of himself by the Emperor Constantine. Besieged and taken from the Persians by the Spartan admiral, Pausanias, B. C. 478.

OUR information as to the events which transpired in Greece covering the period of forty-eight years intermediate the fall of Sestus B. C. 479, and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War B. C. 431, is rather meagre. Herodotus concludes his interesting and entertaining history with a brief account of the expulsion of the Persian forces from the port city of Sestus, on the Hellespont [1] (q. v.). The civil and military affairs

[1] Chap. 28, *ante*.

which occurred intermediate that event and the surprise at Platæa B. C. 431, which was the first military operation in the long war between Sparta and Athens, has been sketched briefly by Thucydides in the chapter which constitutes his introduction to his noted history of that disastrous conflict. This authority is supplemented chiefly by the information which can be gleaned from the lives of the men of that period, written in such entertaining fashion by Plutarch of Bœotia and from the later history of Diodorus of Sicily.

The battle of Mycale in Asia Minor was fought on the same day that Pausanias defeated Mardonius at Platæa. No permanent confederacy had then been formed for the purpose of freeing the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. But immediately after the battle of Platæa, while the army was still encamped on the field, and while Leotychides and Xanthippus were absent, conducting their campaign in Asia Minor, a general assembly of representatives of all the Greeks was called, to supplement the first pan-Hellenic Greek Congress held on the Isthmus under the guidance of Themistocles, to make preparations to resist Xerxes. The purpose of this second conference was to devise ways and means to guard against any further invasion which might be undertaken by the barbarians for the subjugation of Hellas. At this assemblage a decree was proposed by Aristides, and adopted by the Assembly, that the Greek states should send representatives who should assemble annually at Platæa and should there celebrate every fifth year the Eleutherian games to commemorate their freedom. It was decreed further that a levy should be made upon all Greece for ten thousand spearmen, and one thousand cavalry, constituting the land force, and also a fleet of one hundred triremes. This was to be the standing army and navy to protect Hellas against the barbarians. But the Platæans, it was agreed, should be exempt, and were not to be called upon to furnish troops either for the land or naval forces.

When Leotychides returned to Sparta, after the successful campaign at Mycale, it was agreed that a fleet should be sent to the East to assist in the expulsion of the barbarians from Cyprus, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The squadron consisted of fifty ships, twenty furnished by the Peloponnesians and thirty by the Athenians. The chief command was given to Pausanias, the victor of Platæa. The Athenians were led by Aristides, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. We are not informed that Xanthippus accompanied the expedition, although his ability as a commander was evidenced by his victory at Sestus. It is highly probable that he was chosen strategus that year as Themistocles was. Their services doubtless were needed at Athens, as the city was then being rebuilt on a grand scale, within the new walls, which had been erected in spite of the protest of the Peloponnesians. This fleet was organized in the spring, B. C. 478, the year after the battle of Platæa, in conformity with resolutions passed while the Greeks were still encamped there. The Asiatic Greeks were in readiness to coöperate with them, and contributed a number of ships. We have no accurate information as to the number of triremes which joined Pausanias in the East, but Professor Curtius estimates that perhaps fifty vessels were added to the expedition making the fleet of Pausanias in the aggregate about one hundred triremes.

Pausanias conducted his squadron first to the island of Cyprus. The fact that this island was made the first objective of the Greek fleet, shows the extent of the ambitious schemes entertained by the Hellenes. Their country was now independent. The move upon Cyprus shows that the expedition sent out by authority of the pan-Hellenic council at Platæa was sent as

an army of invasion and conquest. The position of the island made its occupation extremely important as a military base. It was essential in connection with the island of Crete to the command of the Mediterranean. It formed the naval base for operations against Egypt, as it commanded the Delta of the Nile. It was at the gateway to the eastern Ægean, and lay in the path of vessels from the eastern Mediterranean to the islands on the western shores of Asia Minor. It commanded the coasts of Syria and Phœnicia, of Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia. We have no detailed information with regard to the operations of Pausanias at Cyprus. Thucydides in his introductory chapter to his history of the Peloponnesian War gives us what information we have in part of a sentence. He says (i, 94), "they (the Athenians and Peloponnesians) first made an expedition against Cyprus of which they subdued the greater part, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Persians, and was taken while he (Pausanias) was still in command." The commerce of Greece, however, was not dependent so much on the reduction of Cyprus, as upon the control of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, which commanded the trade of the Euxine and to a certain extent all of the Greek colonies in Thrace, and around the borders of the Propontis and the Euxine. Byzantium was perhaps the most important point in Europe so far as this trade was concerned. It was necessary also to drive the Persians from their strongholds at Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, and from Thasos and other islands in the northern Ægean, or Sea of Thrace.

Pausanias, therefore, concluded not to consume the entire season in the conquest and reduction of Cyprus, being content with having reduced the greater part of it, he determined to make an attack on Byzantium.

This ancient city on the Bosphorus which possessed

such great commercial advantages derived its early celebrity also from the poems of antiquity.

Prior to the seventh century B. C. the work of colonization had not begun in the regions about the Bosphorus, the Propontis and the southern shores of the Euxine. The early traditions of that locality beyond the records of authentic history belong to the shadowy domain of legend and fable. Before Agamemnon sailed from Aulis with the Greeks, in his hollow ships to invade the Kingdom of Priam, Jason and his companions, in the ship Argo, penetrated to the extreme confines of the world and sailed to Colchis in search of the Golden Fleece. His course took him through the Hellespont, the Propontis, the Bosphorus, past the site of Byzantium, and along the south coast of the Euxine to its eastern borders to the land of mystery, where Medea, the sister of Circe, exercised her sorcery and magic art to aid Jason in his quest.

Pindar, in the Fourth Pythian Ode, doubtless refers to the site where ancient Byzantium was afterwards built, when he relates how Jason offered sacrifices when he reached the Bosphorus at the mouth of the Euxine. Here is Cary's version of Pindar's lines:

> Conducted by the breezy south,
> They reached the stormy Euxine's mouth;
> There a shrine for Neptune reared;
> Of Thracian bulls, a crimson herd
> Were ready; and heav'n founded stone,
> Wide spread, to lay the altar on.

It was not until B. C. 656, that the navigator Byzos, a son of Neptune, sailed away with his companions, recruited in Argos and Megara, and founded Byzantium. Tacitus says they were directed thither by an oracle of the Pythian Apollo, who, when asked where they should build a city, replied, "that they should seek a situation opposite to the habitations of blind

men." The riddle had reference to the Chalcedonians, who first visited the locality, and saw the advantages of the site on the coast of Europe, yet blindly crossed to Asia and chose an inferior site on the opposite side of the strait. The work of colonization was extended by the Megarians and Milesians, who subsequently founded Selymbria on the north coast of the Propontis, opposite Cyzicus on the south coast, and Heraclea, Sinope and Trapezus on the south shore of the Euxine, and Sestus and Abydos on the Hellespont.

Byzantium, B. C. 478, was garrisoned by a large Persian force, commanded by kinsmen of Xerxes. The Greeks besieged it vigorously. Finally the garrison was forced to surrender and Pausanias became master of this most important stronghold at the mouth of the Euxine. We have no record concerning the details of the siege. Whether the enemy were reduced by famine, or opened their gates through treachery, we can only conjecture. All we know is that the Persians were driven from their most important stronghold in Europe. The conquest was completed by the reduction of Chalcedon, now Scutari, designated by the oracle, "The City of the Blind," situated on the opposite shore of the Bosphorus, in Bithynia, in Asia. With the reduction of these cities the Bosphorus passed from the control of Persia to the control of Greece. The reduction of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonese, the year before, by the fleet under Xanthippus, made the Hellenese masters of the Hellespont, and being now in possession of the Bosphorus they controlled unobstructed the great highway of commerce from the Euxine through the Propontis to the Ægean. These were the important advantages which resulted from the two successful campaigns in Asia Minor, and were the first fruits of the efforts of united Hellas to emancipate their countrymen in the east from the dominion of Persia.

The reduction of Byzantium was the last achievement of Pausanias. Soon after his occupation of that important port, about B. C. 478, he opened negotiations with Xerxes in which he sought to sell his sword to Persia, marry the daughter of the Great King, subjugate Greece, and make it an appendage to the Persian Empire. The capture of Byzantium, also, was the last triumph of united Greece. The arrogance, vanity and treachery of Pausanias rendered his conduct insufferable and by reason of his selfishness and tyranny, the captains and generals of the Greeks refused longer to serve under him. They came to Aristides, and requested him to be their general. When the reports of his conduct reached the Ephors at Sparta, he was recalled and relieved of his command. On his departure Aristides and Cimon were chosen commanders, and the officers and men thereafter refused to serve under Dorkis, who was sent by Sparta to command in Pausania's stead. At Byzantium, therefore, Greek unity ceased. Sparta withdrew from the allies, whose fleets and armies were operating in the Thracian Chersonese, and Athens assumed the hegemony in the affairs of Greece, which resulted in the upbuilding of the Athenian Empire.

In view of the fact that the Peloponnesians declined to coöperate any further with the Athenians and their allies, the latter, B. C. 478, set about to form a new confederacy with the Asiatic Greeks under the leadership of Aristides and Cimon, known as the Confederacy of Delos.

CHAPTER XXX

CONFEDERACY OF DELOS, B. C. 478

DELOS — dè-los — [Δήλος]. An island of the Cyclades in the Ægean Sea, sacred to the Greeks as the birthplace of the twin deities, Apollo and Artemis (Diana). It is about midway between the shores of the Peloponnesus and the east coast of Asia Minor, and was selected as the capital of the new confederacy from which the latter takes its name.

AFTER Pausanias was recalled by the Ephors of Sparta because the seamen and soldiers of the Greek fleet at Byzantium refused any longer to serve under him or to obey his orders, Sparta sent Dorkis, a new admiral, to take the place of the victor of Platæa. The captains and members of the expedition, however, had appealed to Aristides and Cimon to take command of the fleet, so that when Dorkis arrived it was too late for him to urge his claims as commander. Sparta declined to serve under an Athenian admiral, and Dorkis withdrew the Peloponnesian ships, abandoned the expedition and sailed back to Greece. This movement on the part of the Peloponnesians transferred from Athens to Sparta the leadership which the former had previously exercised. It became necessary, however, in order to prosecute the war for the expulsion of the Persian arms from the islands in the Sea of Thrace and to establish the independence of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, to procure funds and establish an alliance imposing upon its members the obligation to contribute money, men and ships necessary to support a fleet, requisite to the undertaking. This was the object sought to be attained by the formation of a new

confederacy. The alliance among the Greeks represented in the conference on the battle-field of Platæa was pan-Hellenic. Sparta, however, and her Peloponnesian allies having withdrawn from the expedition in the east after the recall of Pausanias, it became necessary that Athens should take the lead. The Confederacy of Delos, therefore, was essentially an Athenian enterprise.

The date of the formation of the Confederacy of Delos, which has been generally placed about B. C. 476, has now been definitely ascertained to have been B. C. 478. A few years ago Aristotle's treatise on the Constitution of Athens was discovered in Egypt. The author declares that after the discredit brought upon the Lacedæmonians by the misconduct and treachery of Pausanias, Aristides guided the public policy of Athens. "It was he," says Aristotle, "who arranged the tribute from the various allied states, which was first instituted two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes." [1]

This powerful league was the instrument which enabled Athens to build up an empire, and to become during the period of her supremacy, the most noted city in the world. The formation of that Confederacy is a conspicuous illustration of the power of unity. The alliance formed at Platæa was intended to be pan-Hellenic and was designed to bring about what might with propriety be termed the United States of Greece. The coalition, however, as has been observed was impaired by reason of the jealousy and indifference of the Lacedæmonians, who, after the recall of the Spartan admiral Pausanias, who had been its head, declined to longer remain a party to the alliance. Sparta, however, had no real sympathy with Athens, because the former never would countenance a democratic form of

[1] Aristotle's Athenian Constitution. Ch. 23.

government. Sparta was and had always been an oligarchy. Athens was a republic, an imperial republic, but nevertheless strongly attached to principles of democracy. Athens was Ionian, Sparta Dorian. The Athenians were active, ambitious, public-spirited, patriotic. The Spartans were narrow, tyrannical, phlegmatic and antagonistic to any form of popular government. This radical difference between the politics and temperament of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians was never reconciled, and finally resulted in the downfall of Greece, and the subjugation of her people. It was this radical difference, also, that enabled Athens, in spite of Sparta to use the powerful organization represented by the Confederacy of Delos and the wealth contributed to its Treasury, to prosecute the wars which expanded her power into an empire, and to use that wealth to beautify and adorn the capital of Attica. When Pericles succeeded on some plausible pretext in removing the treasury of the organization from Delos to Athens, and to expend its treasure raised and assessed for military purposes, for the personal aggrandizement of his native city, his enemies, as Plutarch observes, publicly berated the great statesman, and charged him with squandering the treasure which was contributed by Athens and her constituent allies, as a necessity for the war, and wantonly lavishing it upon the City "to gild her all over and adorn and set her forth as it were some vain woman, hung round with precious stones and figures and temples, which cost a world of money."

The organization of this military and political alliance was the result of apprehension on the part of the Hellenes of further inroads and invasions of Persia.

The defeat of the Persian army at Platæa, the death of Mardonius, and the destruction of the Persian fleet at Mycale on the coast of Asia Minor, and the reduction of Sestus and Byzantium, put an end to the designs of Xerxes for the subjugation of continental Hellas. The aspirations of the Hellenes took new life, after the great victory at Salamis, and the triumph over Persia at the battle of Platæa and restoration of the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks. It was obvious, however, that Persia, though its armies had evacuated Greece, was still a powerful enemy. Its occupation of many cities and ports in Macedonia and Thrace was a constant menace to Greek commerce in the Hellespont and the Euxine. The Greek colonists in Asia Minor and in the cities and islands of the eastern Ægean and in the Cyclades archipelago, not under the domination of Xerxes, were constantly in dread of the Persians, and their numerous allies, for her empire when Xerxes invaded Greece embraced the civilized world, save continental Hellas.

Just as the American colonies, after they had secured their independence of the mother country, found it essential in order to maintain their liberties to form a confederacy, and enter into an alliance offensive and defensive under Articles of Confederation, so Athens, in order to maintain her independence and commercial supremacy and to protect the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks, found it essential to form a pan-Hellenic Confederacy with all Greeks in Asia Minor, both Ionian and Dorian, and with the insular cities, and communities scattered through the Ægean Sea. Dread of Persian conquest and invasion was the centripetal force that gave cohesion to this political confederacy, which had its geographical centre or capital on the island of Delos, in the bosom of the Ægean.

The Confederacy had its genesis in an expedition fitted out B. C. 478 the next year after the battle of Platæa, under command of the Spartan Pausanias, which immediately went to the relief of the Greek cities in the island of Cyprus, then under the Persian yoke, and having liberated them, sailed north into the Helles-

pont and Bosphorus, and took the ports of Sestus and Byzantium (q. v.) thus securing uninterrupted communication for Greek fleets and Greek commerce from the Euxine to the Ægean. Although Athens contributed more ships to this expedition than did Sparta and the Peloponnese, the Athenians being under the immediate command of Aristides and Cimon, yet the Spartan Pausanias was commander-in-chief of the expedition, this honor, no doubt, being the result of his having achieved the highest distinction as the victor of Platæa.

After these achievements, while the fleet was in the Bosphorus, Pausanias, notwithstanding his great reputation as a successful and patriotic general, grew to be overbearing and cruel. Avarice became in him stronger than patriotism. He grew weary of the stern discipline and frugal customs of his country, and like a Sabyrite, sought the luxury and ease indulged in by the Lotus-eaters in the palaces at Sardis and Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana. He sought to sell his sword to Persia, one of the conditions being that the daughter of the Great King should be given him in marriage, Pausanias having agreed on his part to conquer Hellas for the Persian monarch. Before his treason could bring forth fruit, Pausanias was recalled and died in disgrace B. C. 496, while seeking refuge from condign punishment.

When Pausanias sailed home to the Peloponnese, he took his triremes with him, and the Athenians, Aristides and Cimon, were chosen admirals and at once took command of the fleet. The Spartan government sent out Dorkis to take the place of Pausanias, but when he arrived with his triremes, Athens was in control, having gained an advantage by reason of the cruelty and tyranny of Pausanias, which it refused to yield, and never relinquished for a period of seventy years.

After the retirement of Aristides, Cimon succeeded to the supreme command of the naval forces in the Ægean. Under this illustrious son of Miltiades, and his successor, Pericles, Athens achieved her highest renown. The hegemony of Athens under the Confederacy of Delos, culminated in the Athenian empire, Athens having finally secured the maritime control of eastern Europe and the Ægean sea.

After the recall of Pausanias, Sparta, always jealous of Athens, refused to coöperate in the plans of the Confederacy, and advocated a return of the Ionian and Doric Greek colonists to Hellas, rather than to police the Ægean, and protect them where they were. The plans of Sparta were not followed, and the latter refused to enter the Confederacy, but devoted her energies to establish Lacedæmonian dominion on land, while her rival Athens, was establishing her supremacy on the sea.

The constituent members of the new Confederacy willingly agreed to make contributions both of ship and money. Among them were the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, the Ægean islands of Thasos and Naxos, also cities on the continent of Asia Minor including Miletus. Byzantium, on the Hellespont, was also a member.

The island of Delos, from which this Confederacy derives its name, lies in the Ægean, midway the Peloponnese, and the west coast of Asia Minor, immediately between the islands of Syros and Myconos, and about ninety miles almost due west of Patmos, immortalized more than five centuries later, as the island to which St. John the Divine was banished (A. D. 96), where the apocalyptic vision was revealed, an account of which is contained in the New Testament scriptures, in the wonderful Book of Revelations.

The various municipalities and states which com-

posed the Confederacy of Delos, under the rules of the coalition sent their representatives to a Synod which met periodically in the temple of Apollo and Artemis, on the sacred island of Delos. Each member of the Confederacy agreed to contribute its quota in money, ships and men. The amount of the assessment was required to be ratified and approved by the Synod, in which all the members were represented.

After the treasury of the Confederacy had been removed from Delos to Athens, for the reason assigned by the Samians and others that there was danger in case it remained longer in that remote island, that it might fall into the hands of the barbarians, Athens, which was President of the league, became its sole disbursing agent. To insure protection to the constituent members of the Confederacy against Persian invasion, was the specific object and purpose for which the allies consented to tax themselves. They agreed to contribute each respectively its pro-rata share of the common fund, either in ships and men, or their equivalent in money. The amount of the annual assessment first adjusted by Aristides and approved by all as essentially just and fair, was $460,000 (460 talents). In the time of Pericles the annual tribute had been increased and was then $600,000 (600 talents [1]).

[1] The monetary table in use at the time consisted of drachmas, sheckels and talents, as follows:

100 drachmas	.....	1 sheckel
60 sheckels	.....	1 mina
60 minas	.....	1 talent

The money value of a talent in use in Syria, Palestine and Phœnicia is variously estimated approximately from $1,700 to $2,000. The Attic talent contained 60 minas or 6,000 Attic drachmas, equal to 56 pounds and 14 ounces. As a denomination of silver money, it was equal to about $1,000. — *Century Dictionary.*

The Athenian empire had reached the period of its greatest prosperity when Pericles was in control of affairs. It is interesting in this connection to note the conduct of the great statesman with respect to the use of this war fund paid into the treasury of the Confederacy. He appropriated a large part of it, not in the prosecution of military operations conducted for the purpose of protecting the constituent members of the Confederacy from Persian invasion, but to maintain and extend the Athenian empire, and to wage war, not of Greek against Persian, but of Greek against Greek, to punish, keep in subjection and subdue refractory members of the league, and to beautify and adorn the capital of Attica, which under the guiding genius of Pericles became the most attractive and ornate city in Europe.

Fear of Persian invasion, the cause which made a common war fund necessary for the protection of Hellas had long ceased to exist. The Athenian arms under the illustrious Cimon and Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, had completely humbled the power of Persia. After her crushing defeat on land and sea at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia (B. C. 466), what further need was there to continue the annual tax, imposed upon themselves by the members of the Confederacy, save only to police the Ægean to suppress marauding pirates, who infested its waters. After the Peace of Cimon, Persia abandoned the idea of further conquests in Europe or of the Islands of the Ægean, or the re-conquest of the continental Greek cities of Asia Minor. The arms of Persia had been not only driven to the coast-line. They had been driven inland so that not even a letter carrier, or single horseman or courier was seen to approach within four hundred furlongs of the sea. What need then to continue the tax, much less increase the burden from four hundred and sixty to six hundred talents.

Mr. Grote observes that this increase may have been more apparent than real. His argument is based on the assumption that many members of the Confederacy, from time to time, elected, instead of contributions of men and ships, to pay over their equivalent in money, under the rules and regulations of the league. For this reason, the money tribute showed an increase. Just prior to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, the tax aggregated six hundred talents. Before the end of the war, the amount was thirteen hundred talents, more than a million and a quarter of dollars.

Be this as it may, it would seem that the conduct of Athens, in appropriating the moneys of the league to its own aggrandizement, after the object for which the tax originated, no longer existed, was unfair and unjust, to the other members of the Confederacy. Discontent arose and caused Naxos, first (B. C. 466) and then Thasos (B. C. 465) to revolt. They were kept in subjection by the Confederacy and were taxed to support the armament which subdued them.

The argument of Pericles by which he sought to justify his course, in appropriating the money from the treasury of the Confederacy, will not bear judicial scrutiny. He argued that Athens was not obliged to account to its allies for moneys paid into the coffers of the league, so long as Athens defended her allies, and prevented the barbarians from attacking them. Many of the allies, he contended, did not supply one horse, or man, or ship, but money only, "which money," he said, "is not theirs that give it, but theirs that receive it, if so be, they perform the conditions upon which they receive it." He argued also, that he used only the surplus over and above what was actually necessary for military purposes, to improve and adorn the capital of the Confederacy so as to reflect eternal honor and credit upon all.

Aristides would, doubtless, had he lived, have characterized this argument as showing a course of conduct of extreme selfishness, as to Athens, and as most unjust and unfair to every other member of the Confederacy. It is morally certain that the members of the league would never have voluntarily consented to tax themselves to build temples and public buildings in Athens. When the fear of Persian invasion ceased, the right to levy and collect the tax ceased also.

But, as has been observed, the formation of the Confederacy of Delos, was the nucleus of the Athenian empire. Athens, as the head, and as the strongest and most influential member of the league, used the organization to furnish the means of extending and strengthening that empire, and compelling its weaker members to contribute annually to that object. Athens argued also that in its strength, the weakest ally found its sure protection, and its constant defense.

It is true that Pericles was ambitious; that he used the moneys contributed by the allies for purposes other than that for which they were contributed. But Pericles, in addition to his ambition, possessed also high and ardent patriotism, and used his best endeavors to make the Confederacy not an Athenian league merely, but to have it become universal throughout Greece, and as far as possible pan-Hellenic in character. He knew, perhaps, better than any man of his time, that the struggle between Athens and the Lacedæmonians was bound to come. He did all in his power to postpone the evil day. In order, if possible, to prevent so great a calamity to his country, he sought a remedy by attempting to unite Greece. To this end, the assembly, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree to summon to Athens, representatives of all Greeks, whether in Europe or Asia, to a general assembly to consult and advise as to the welfare of Greece, and to devise ways and means concerning commercial intercourse, and the navigation of the sea, that

every Greek, no matter from what part of the world, might pass to and fro, and trade securely, and be at peace among themselves. Commissioners were sent out, pursuant to this decree among the Ionians and Dorians in Asia Minor, among the islands on its western shores, including Lesbos and Rhodes; into Thrace, along the Hellespont, and to Byzantium, into Bœotia and Phocis, into the Peloponnese and Thessaly, and into Acarnania and Ambracia. These commissioners were deputized to induce and persuade the Greeks they visited to send representatives to Athens to take part in the great convention called to settle the peace and regulate the affairs of Greece.

It was a patriotic and highly laudable undertaking, worthy of the genius of Pericles. Had success crowned his efforts, there would have been no Peloponnesian war, and united Greece would have stood against the world in condition to anticipate the enterprises of Alexander, and the subsequent dominion of the Roman empire. The enterprise, however, was thwarted, by the envy and jealousy, which the oligarchical Lacedæmonians always entertained towards its democratic rival in Attica. Sparta secretly worked against Athens, and conspired to destroy any prospect of Greek unity, determined never to follow where its rival led. In this jealous rivalry we have the secret of the downfall of Athens, and the ultimate ruin of Greece. The Confederacy of Delos never became pan-Hellenic as originally designed. It remained Athenian, and enabled Athens to contend with the Lacedæmonians for supremacy for twenty-seven years, until exhausted financially, and debauched and corrupted with Persian gold.

During the first ten years of the Confederacy, its principal achievements, aside from its efforts to rid the Ægean and the coasts of Hellas and Asia Minor of the pirates, which preyed on the commerce of Europe and Asia, were the siege and capture of Eion on

the river Strymon in Thrace, B. C. 471 (q. v.), the reduction and conquest of the island of Scyros, B. C. 470, and the reduction of Carystus, on the southern extremity of the island of Eubœa, B. C. 468 (q. v.). Athens, during these years, had dominated the Confederacy, controlled its naval forces and established a maritime empire. In B. C. 466, the Persians were defeated on land and sea, at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and the danger to Greece and its insular possessions from Persian invasion was at an end.

The contest with Sparta, for the hegemony on land, which followed, are known as the Hellenic wars, which were finally concluded after the Athenian defeat at Coronæa (q. v.). After this disaster Pericles concluded the treaty known as the "Thirty Years' Peace," B. C. 445 (q. v.), which postponed the Peloponnesian War for fifteen years. The "Thirty Years' Peace," however, was finally broken at Sybota, B. C. 432 (q. v.), and this engagement was immediately followed by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war at Platæa, B. C. 431.

CHAPTER XXXI

ARISTIDES

THE two conspicuous figures in the Persian Wars, after Miltiades, were Themistocles and Aristides. They fought together at Marathon, and in the naval engagement at Salamis. Aristides led the Athenians at Platæa, and in conjunction with Pausanias who commanded the Lacedæmonians and their allies in that battle, accomplished the signal defeat of Mardonius, and drove the last of the Persian invaders from the shores of Hellas.

These distinguished men were playmates in youth, and political rivals through life. They were the leading figures in the stirring scenes enacted after the defeat of Mardonius at Platæa. But in the administration of civil affairs, the patriotism, purity and sterling integrity of Aristides, is in striking contrast with the avarice, dishonesty and treasonable conduct of his contemporary. Every patriot in the Athenian commonwealth applauded the rectitude which characterized the public services of Aristides. He was universally regarded as the most upright and unselfish man in public life. He was designated by his fellow citizens, and is known to posterity, as Aristides the just.

The most valuable service rendered by him, as a civil magistrate, was rendered after the Lacedæmonians had retired from the active prosecution of the war to expel the Persians from Asia Minor and the islands of the Ægean sea. After the defeat of the enemy at Mycale,

the Lacedæmonians took no further part in the campaign and returned to the Peloponnesus. The Athenians, under the command of Xanthippus, however, continued the war of expulsion, and formed a league or a confederacy with the Ionians and those in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and not many months after the victory at Mycale defeated the Persians and took the city of Sestus in the Hellespont. This league, known as the Delian Confederacy, marked a new era in the political history of Athens and formed the basis of conditions which subsequently developed in the upbuilding of the Athenian empire. This Confederacy was designed to protect the cities in the Ægean and the coasts of Asia Minor, which had been rescued from the oppression of the Persian monarch from falling again under the dominion of the Great King. Its treasury was established on the sacred island of Delos, and is known in history as the Confederacy of Delos. The purpose of the Confederacy was to equip a fleet to be used at all times to police the Ægean and protect every member of the league from foreign invasion. The agreement was that each member of the combination should contribute its *pro rata* share of ships and men to carry out the purposes for which it was formed. Some of the smaller cities were so poor that they could contribute only part of the expenses of fitting out a single galley. It was accordingly agreed that those who were unable to furnish ships or crews should contribute an annual sum or stipend into the common treasury. The delicate task of fixing the proportionate amount to be contributed by each City or State either in ships, crews, equipment or money, was by common consent delegated to Aristides, who was universally commended for his justice and impartiality. In the execution of his great task he assessed the valuation of the wealth of the various members of the league, and the amount each should contribute. His

decision was regarded as eminently just and fair, was accepted by all parties in interest and thereafter continued in force for half a century.

The envious and jealous disposition of his countrymen as distinguished from their patriotic devotion, when threatened with foreign invasion, is shown by their conduct towards Aristides who was ostracized about 483 B. C., three years before the battle of Salamis. Others had been banished for political activity by reason of which it was asserted they might become dangerous to the State. Aristides was ostracized chiefly at the instigation of Themistocles, his political rival, and one of the most unscrupulous men in public life. Unfortunately, Aristides, while performing his duties as magistrate, frequently heard causes in private. The custom was exceedingly pernicious, because while practised by one of unsullied reputation and strict probity, the custom, if it became universal, was likely to lead to grave abuses, because of the opportunities it afforded to an unscrupulous judge to enrich himself and corrupt the fountain of justice. Such a thing as a private Court cannot exist in a free State. In a later age the Court of Star Chamber cost Charles I his head. Themistocles, one of the leaders of the popular democratic party, declared that this practice was resorted to by Aristides to destroy the Courts of judicature and pave the way for a monarchy in his own person. He stirred up such a feeling of resentment against his rival that some even declared they were weary of hearing him extolled for his virtues, and called "the just." Following the lead of Themistocles the electorate based their action against Aristides, ostensibly upon the ground that the latter sought to displace the democracy and establish in its stead a monarchical form of government.

The principal service rendered by Aristides at the battle of Salamis was on the islet of Psyttalea, which

lies between the Piræus and the eastern extremity of the island of Salamis. It is low and rocky, clothed with shrubs, and is about a mile in length, and not more than two or three hundred yards broad.[1] By a clever piece of strategy, Themistocles sent his slave Sicinnus to the enemy's fleet as a pretended spy. He informed the Persian admiral that the Greeks were disheartened and intended to escape from the straits at dawn on the following morning, and if Xerxes would block both ends of the channel with his fleet, the Greeks, who were greatly discouraged would surrender rather than risk a fight, as their ships were outnumbered more than two to one. Xerxes accordingly landed a large body of troops on Psyttalea, and then about an hour before midnight the Persians advanced their western wing towards Salamis (Herod. vii, 76). Those who had been stationed on this rocky bar at the extremity of Salamis, consisted of a select body of the bravest of the native Persians among whom, Plutarch says, were men of high rank, including three nephews of Xerxes, the sons of his sister Sandauce. Near the close of the engagement, in order that none of the enemy marooned at Psyttalea might escape, Aristides took a body of heavy armed Athenians who had been stationed along the shore of Salamis, and made a descent on the little island and slew all the Persians who occupied it (Herod. viii, 95). The attack by Aristides began late in the day, and the slaughter continued

"Till all, 'neath eye of swarthy night was lost."

The massacre of those near and dear to him took place under the eye of Xerxes himself, who witnessed it from his golden throne on the heights of Attica, and caused him to weep and tear his garments in rage and despair. This assault by Aristides at Psyttalea is

[1] Leake, Demi of Attica, p. 267.

thus graphically described by Æschylus in his poem entitled "The Persians." It will be remembered that the poet himself took part in the battle, and was an eye-witness to what he describes.

The drama opens with a chorus reciting the Persian conquests, while awaiting the tidings from Xerxes' fleet and army. Atossa, the Queen-mother, enters, and recites her dreams and dismal forebodings for the safety of her son. A messenger approaches as the chorus sings:

> "For here a courier speedeth, whose gait proclaimeth him
> Persian, and he will bring us clear news of weal or woe."

The messenger enters and proceeds to recite the misfortune that befell his countrymen. He declares:

> "Corpses of men ill-fated choke the coasts
> Of Salamis, and all the region near."

He then proceeds to give an account of the engagement. As to the number of vessels the messenger, addressing Atossa, thus proceeds:

> "Had conquest waited upon numbers, queen,
> Then Persia's ships were victor, for the fleet
> Of Hellas counted but three hundred ships,
> And other ten selected, in reserve.
> But Xerxes, this I know led fifty score,
> While those for swiftness most preëminent
> Two hundred were and seven."

He then gives a detailed description of the battle, including an account of the stratagem of Themistocles in sending Sicinnus, a pretended spy, to the Persian fleet.

The attack on the islet of Psyttalea, which was led by Aristides, he thus describes to queen Atossa:

> An isle there is that fronteth Salamis,
> Small, with bad anchorage, whose sea-washed beach
> Dance-loving Pan doth haunt; thither the King
> Sendeth these chiefs, that, when the worsted foe
> Should in the isle seek safety, Persia's sons
> Might slay the host of Hellas, easy prey,
> And from the briny channels save their friends,
> Ill-guessing the to-come; for when the god
> The Hellenes crowned with glory of the fight,
> On that same day, with shields of well-wrought brass
> Fencing their bodies, from their ships they leapt,
> And the whole isle encompassed; so our men
> Knew not which way to turn; oft-time by stones
> Pelted from foeman's hand, while arrows keen,
> Thick raining from the bow-string, smote them down;
> Rushing at last with simultaneous shout,
> The Hellenes hacked and carved the victims' limbs,
> Till they, poor wretches, all of life were reaved.
> But Xerxes groaned, seeing the depth of ills;
> For on a lofty height, hard by the sea,
> His seat he held, o'erlooking all the host.
> His garments rending, a shrill cry he raised,
> To his land troops forthwith dispatch'd command,
> And sped in flight disordered. Thine it is
> To wail this sorrow added to the first.

The character of the Lacedæmonians, who were exceedingly jealous and envious, as contrasted with the staunch patriotism and sterling integrity of Aristides, and the Athenians, whom he was chosen to represent, is illustrated by an incident which occurred shortly before the battle of Platæa under the following circumstances.

Xerxes, after his defeat at Salamis, became panic-stricken. His brother, Ariabignes, who commanded his fleet, was killed in that engagement, and others of his royal house, including three of his nephews, were slain or taken prisoners on the islet of Psyttalea. He became solicitous about his personal safety, for, after all, Xerxes was a coward. Notwithstanding the fact that his land forces, now stationed in Attica, constituted the most formidable body of troops ever assembled, had not been engaged at all at Salamis; notwithstanding the fact that not more than a third of his great fleet

had been disabled in the sea-fight with Themistocles; notwithstanding all this, fear seized upon the heart of Xerxes. He thought only of his personal safety, for what if the cunning and crafty Hellenes, in their swift ships should speed to the Hellespont, and destroy the bridge of boats over which his countless myriads had poured for seven days and seven nights from the shores of Asia to the shores of Europe. Once his father Darius, with a great army, had crossed the Ister (Danube), on a bridge of boats, and after a fruitless campaign in Scythia hurried back to the river, and made good his retreat over the bridge, which had been guarded in his absence, to his own dominions. His consternation, however, he concealed from the Greeks and from his own people (Her. viii, 97). Mardonius, who commanded his land forces was a man of spirit and personal courage. He perceived that Xerxes took his defeat greatly to heart, and suspecting that he intended to return to Asia, and fearing lest he might be punished for having persuaded the King to undertake the war, he concluded to either conquer Greece or perish gloriously in aspiring to such a noble achievement. He conferred with Xerxes, and suggested the further prosecution of the war, but if the King desired to return to Asia, with the main body of his troops, he asked to be permitted to choose 300,000 men to remain, and avenge Salamis, and conquer Greece. This plan was adopted and Xerxes, late in September, or early in October, B. C. 480, departed for his own dominions.

In this connection it is interesting to note the account given by Herodotus of the conduct of Xerxes, who, before acting on the suggestion of Mardonius, that he return to Asia, sought the advice of a woman. Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, was the only one of his commanders who advised against the engagement at Salamis. He was secretly overjoyed at the prospect of abandoning the campaign, but for appearance-sake

conferred with his commanders, and to Artemisia, he gave a private audience. She told him that under the circumstances it would be proper for him to withdraw from the field of operations and return to Susa. That he should defer to the wishes of Mardonius, who requested permission to remain and prosecute the war. If he succeeded, well. If he failed, it was no great loss, so long as the King's person was safe. She continued with this amazing declaration, which serves to indicate the manners of the age, and the power of the Great King over the lives of his most distinguished subjects and illustrious generals, who were but slaves and chattels. "If Mardonius fall," she continued, "it matters nothing — they will have gained but a poor triumph — a victory over one of thy slaves! Remember, also, thou goest home having gained the purpose of thy expedition, for thou hast burnt Athens." (Herod. viii, 102.)

To Aristides, also, was due the sage advice which probably saved Greece after the battle of Salamis. Themistocles conferred with Aristides and advised that the Athenians proceed with expedition and destroy the bridge of boats over the Hellespont, before the arrival of Xerxes, and make Asia a prisoner within the confines of Europe. Aristides, however, saw danger in the plan. He reminded Themistocles that the Greeks had fought an enemy, who regarded his expedition as a holiday excursion, and cared for nothing but pleasure and luxury. If the Greeks should close the gateway leading from Europe, the enemy would be driven by necessity. "Xerxes," he said, "was master of such great forces that he will no longer sit quietly with an umbrella of gold over his head, looking upon the fight for his pleasure. In such a strait he will attempt almost anything. He will be resolute and appear himself in person upon all occasions. He will correct his errors and supply what he has formerly omitted through remissness and will be better advised in all things. It is

not to our interest, therefore, to take away the bridge, that is already made, but rather to build another if it were possible that he might make his retreat with the more expedition." Themistocles deferred to the better judgment of Aristides, and devised a plan to get rid of Xerxes at the earliest possible moment. He resorted again to strategy, and found among his captives one of the King's eunuchs, whom he sent to inform his master that the Greeks intended to sail with all dispatch and destroy the bridge of boats over the Hellespont. He bade the messenger declare further to Xerxes, that Themistocles was secretly concerned for his safety, and for that reason had urged the eunuch to tell his master to make haste, and pass over into his own dominions, and in the meantime Themistocles would do all in his power to delay or hinder his countrymen from pursuing him.

In the spring, 479 B. C., Mardonius, before he advanced his army from Thessaly, sent Alexander of Macedon, as his ambassador to bring about an alliance between the Persians and Athenians whereby the latter should remain a free State, and stipulated further that the temples which Xerxes had burned should be restored. When the Lacedæmonians learned that Mardonius sought such an alliance, they became alarmed and sent representatives to Athens, to seek to defeat the plans of Mardonius. After hearing both Alexander and the Spartan ambassadors, the Athenians resolved to reject the overtures of Mardonius, and Aristides was chosen to prepare the decree, and declare the decision. He told Alexander, that the Athenians well knew the power of the Medes, and it was not necessary to have that fact paraded and cast in their teeth. Their love of liberty was so great that they would offer whatever resistance they could to the armies of Persia. That all efforts to dissuade the Athenians from their firm resolution would be worse than useless. "Go tell

Mardonius," he said, "that this is the answer of the Athenians. So long as the sun keeps on his present course, we will never form an alliance with Xerxes. On the contrary, we will oppose him unceasingly, trusting in the aid of the gods and heroes, whom he has lightly esteemed, and whose images and temples he has burnt with fire. Come among us no more, therefore, to seek to persuade us to unholy actions. You, Alexander, are our guest, and friend of our nation, and no harm shall befall you at our hands." (Herod. viii, 143.)

Then addressing the Lacedæmonians Aristides observed that the fear they entertained that the Athenians might make terms with the barbarians was a base fear. "Not all the gold that earth contains," he said, "not the fairest and most fertile of all lands, would bribe us to take part with the Medes, and help them to enslave our countrymen. While one Athenian remains alive, we will never form an alliance with Xerxes." (Herod. viii, 144.)

Alexander afterwards remembered the kind words of Aristides and rendered him valuable service by disclosing to him important information at the battle of Platæa. After one of the preliminary skirmishes, in which the Persian cavalry commander Masistius lost his life, and the days of mourning for that gallant officer were over, Mardonius determined to bring on an engagement. The soothsayers, consulting the sacrifices foretold victory both to Greeks and Persians, provided they stood upon the defensive, but disaster if they made the initial assault. But the Persians had now only a scant supply of provisions. After consulting his officers, Mardonius resolved to cross the Asopus at daybreak the next morning, and make an unexpected attack on the enemy. About midnight, Alexander of Macedon stole into the Greek camp, and desired the guard to send for Aristides, the Athenian, to whom he disclosed the enemy's plans. "I arrived here," he said

to Aristides, "through the greatest dangers in the world for the good-will I bear you lest you should be dismayed by a sudden onset of the enemy. To-morrow Mardonius will give you battle, urged, not by any hope of success, but by want of victuals. The prophets prohibit him the battle, the sacrifices and oracles being unfavorable, the army is in despondency and consternation; but necessity forces him to try his fortune, or sit still and endure the last extremity of want." (Plutarch—Aristides.) Thus warned the Greeks gave orders to the captains, and the army was put in position to resist the assault Mardonius had planned, at daybreak on the following morning. The battle was joined as expected and the result was the utter defeat and rout of the Persians. Mardonius was killed while leading a charge at the head of a select body of cavalry. Thus were the liberties of Greece preserved at Platæa.

Aristides was the son of Lysimachus of the tribe of Antiochis. We have no precise data from which to determine accurately the year of his birth, or the date or place of his death. Plutarch tells us that, according to some, he died in Pontus in Asia, while on public business; others that he died in Athens of old age. He was a friend of Clisthenes and supported him in the revolution which resulted in the overthrow of the Alcmæonidæ, the abolition of the constitution of Solon, and the establishment of the ten tribes. These changes occurred about twenty years before the battle of Marathon. He must have been a very young man at that time, perhaps not more than twenty-one. If this assumption is correct he was born about 531 B. C., and consequently he was forty-one, when he held the office of strategus, and led his tribe at Marathon. Plutarch says his monument in his day was to be seen at Phalerum. It was erected by the city, he having left no property, not even sufficient to defray his funeral expenses. He was survived by two daughters, who it is

said were endowed from the public treasury by a grateful people. These details, however, are based largely on conjecture. We have no authentic or positive information on which to base a detailed account of his declining years, the circumstances of his death or the fortune of his descendants.

CHAPTER XXXII

ATHENS, UNDER CIMON, BECOMES A MARITIME POWER

THE Confederacy of Delos, sketched in a preceding chapter, was organized under the guidance of Aristides. His superior wisdom, impartiality, and absolute integrity enabled him to win the confidence and respect of all parties to the alliance. It was Aristides who adjusted the quota which each member should contribute to the Confederacy. We have no knowledge as to the length of time required to perfect the organization of this alliance among the Greek states. Although the league was projected B. C. 478, it was seven years before anything definite was accomplished, if we assume the siege of Eion was the first achievement under it, as that event occurred about B. C. 471. The formation of this league was the last great service rendered by Aristides in behalf of his countrymen. At his solicitation he was succeeded as admiral by Cimon, the son of Miltiades.

Next to Themistocles, Cimon was the most distinguished admiral in Hellenic annals. Supported by the resources of Athens, and her allies under the Confederacy of Delos, Cimon succeeded not only in expelling the Persians from Thrace and Macedonia and the islands of the Ægean sea, but the success of his arms at the Eurymedon, enabled Athens also to become master of the western coast of Asia Minor. Under Cimon the Ægean became a closed sea, under the jurisdiction of the Attic commonwealth.

Our knowledge of the chronology of the events which occurred from the reduction of Byzantium, B. C. 478, and the battle of the Eurymedon, B. C. 466, is rather vague and unsatisfactory. The information we have is derived chiefly from Thucydides (i, 98), who mentions briefly the achievements of Cimon, in the following order. The first victory he says was the reduction of Eion, on the Strymon, which was in possession of the Medes which was taken after a siege. This was probably B. C. 471. Then the island of Scyros was taken from the Dolopian pirates and colonized by Athenian kleruchs. This event was supposed to have occurred B. C. 470. Then war was waged against the Carystians on the island of Eubœa, who surrendered, reserving certain conditions B. C. 468. Naxos then revolted from the Delian Confederacy and was subjugated B. C. 466, the year in which Cimon achieved his double victory on the Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon then took the island of Thasos, the second member of the Confederacy to secede B. C. 465. The occupation of this island led to the colonization of the mainland in Thrace near Thasos.

A review of these achievements in their order will show the successive steps by which the power and influence of Athens was attained. First as to Eion, a Persian stronghold in Thrace, at the mouth of the Strymon, on the Gulf of Strymon, in the upper Ægean, or Sea of Thrace. The objective point of Xerxes when he invaded Greece was Athens. The Persian monarch assumed that when he had reduced that city and conquered the Peloponnesians, his task would be accomplished, because Athens and Sparta were practically the only cities in Hellas which refused to recognize his authority. Nearly all the other states in Greece had acknowledged his sovereignty. Many cities sent heralds to the Persian ambassadors, bearing earth and water, symbols of obedience and loyalty to the Great

King. Not only were there Persian sympathizers and allies on the Hellenic peninsula, but in Thrace on the Hellespont, and in a number of the islands of the Ægean, the Medes had established themselves.

In this connection Herodotus (viii, 106, 107) observes, "Before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace, and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks, after that invasion, with the single exception of Mascames, governor of Doriscus, who could never be taken, though many attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defense sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Boges, governor of Eion."

Herodotus tells us that Xerxes never ceased to praise Boges, because that commander might have capitulated, surrendered Eion, and marched out unharmed and returned to Asia, but he would not, lest the King should think he saved his life through cowardice.

The fate of Boges was weird and dramatic. When all provisions were exhausted and there was nothing left to eat, Boges deliberately raised a great pile, which he set on fire. Next he slew his children, his wife, his concubines and his servants and threw their bodies in the fire. He then threw all the gold and silver in the tower from the fort into the Strymon. Boges then cast himself into the flames and was consumed. Thus perished Boges in the flames at Eion, as did Sardanapalus at Nineveh, nearly a century and a half earlier.

Plutarch, in his life of Cimon, says that the latter not only took Eion, but also conquered the neighboring country. First he defeated the Persians in battle and shut them up within the walls of their town. He then fell upon the Thracians in the country beyond the Strymon, which furnished food to the town, drove out the inhabitants and took possession as conqueror. Having cut off all supplies, Eion was reduced to starvation. Afterwards in this territory, Athens built the City of Amphipolis, on the site of the Thracian town called the Nine Ways.

Athens appreciated the valuable services rendered by Cimon in conquering Eion, and the adjacent territory which contained among its valuable resources, rich mines of gold and silver. In commemoration of this victory, the people permitted a stone to be erected and to have inscribed thereon these lines in honor of the men who fought there:

> Of bold and patient spirit, too, were those,
> Who, where the Strymon under Eion flows,
> With famine and the sword, to utmost need
> Reduced at last the children of the Mede.

The next recorded achievement of Cimon was the reduction of the island of Scyros, supposed to have taken place the following year, B. C. 470. It occupied an isolated position in the Ægean about fifty miles east of the northerly point of Eubœa and one hundred and twenty miles south of the island of Thasos. It is about fifteen miles long, and from two to five miles wide.

It is not probable that a battle took place when Scyros was reduced, because the inhabitants had invoked the aid of Cimon, whom they invited to succor them from the judgment and fine pronounced against them by the Amphictyonic Synod on conviction for piracy. The inhabitants of Scyros were Dolopians, a barbarous and cruel people, who neglected all husbandry and devoted themselves to piracy, which they had carried on for generations. Some merchants from Thessaly had come to the shores near the harbor of Ctesium. They were set upon and robbed of their goods, and contrary to the usual rules of piracy, in those days, were also imprisoned. Having escaped from the island, these Thessalians appealed to the Amphictyonic council of which not only the Thessalians

but the Dolopes themselves were members. The Dolopian pirates were directed to make public restitution of the plunder. Rather than abide by the decree, fearing doubtless personal violence, the Dolopians appealed to Cimon to succor them with his fleet; and to secure their own safety, declared themselves ready to deliver their town into his hands.

The Ægean sea, at this time, was guarded by the fleet collected by the Confederacy of Delos, under the leadership of Athens, whose generals were in command. Hence this period, between the expulsion of Xerxes and the Peloponnesian War, is designated as the period of the Athenian hegemony, and later, the Athenian Empire, as her power and influence increased from time to time. Her efforts to augment her supremacy is shown in the instance of Scyros, for Cimon, when he took possession of the island, expelled the barbarous and piratical Dolopians, and it was immediately colonized and inhabited by Athenian kleruchs, or out-citizens.

Scyros now belonged to Athens. Its possession was associated with sacred memories, because within its rocky bosom reposed the ashes of Theseus, the most famous of Attic Kings, the mythical hero of Attic legend, the champion of liberty and friend of the oppressed. He it was who killed the flame-spitting bull of Marathon; and, with the aid of Ariadne, slew the Minotaur, the monster King Minos had confined in the labyrinth of Crete, and relieved Athens of her mournful tribute of daring youths and blushing maidens. The memory of Theseus furnished the inspiration for Athenian valor. When the fate of Greece hung in the balance on that memorable day at Marathon, the Athenians thought they saw an apparition and beheld Theseus in full armor, charging at their head against the Persians.

B. C. 476, the Athenians were commanded by the oracle at Delphi to bring home the bones of Theseus

from Scyros. It was extremely difficult to recover the relics, or find the spot where his ashes reposed, on account of the inhospitable and savage temper of the barbarous people who inhabited the island. When Cimon took Scyros, his first ambition was to find the remains of the hero. Plutarch says, that in his search for the tomb he was aided by an eagle, which he saw upon rising ground pecking with her beak, and tearing up the earth with her talons. Believing this to be by divine direction to aid him in his search, Cimon dug up the spot indicated by the eagle, and found "a coffin of a man of more than ordinary size, a brazen spear head, and a sword lying by it." These he took to Athens, and the remains were received with splendid processions, and sacrifices as if it were Theseus returning alive to the city. His tomb is in the temple of Theseus which still stands near the ancient agora, one of the most memorable monuments of antiquity.

Cimon then chastised the inhabitants of Carystus for some delinquency concerning which we have no detailed information. Nor do we know the precise date of this event. In that day Carystus was one of the four principal cities on the island of Eubœa, and was situated at its southern extremity at the head of a deep bay. The city farthest north was the ancient Histiæotis, near the headland of Artemisia. Eretria was on the west coast, a short distance north of the bay of Marathon. Chalcis was at the Euripus on the west coast, the narrowest part of the Eubœan channel. All we know about the attack of Cimon on Carystus is what Thucydides tells us, namely, that they surrendered on conditions. What these conditions were we are not informed.

About the time when Athens added the island of Scyros to her dominions, discontent arose among the allies under the Confederacy of Delos. The island of Naxos seceded from the league B. C. 466. How long this discontent existed, prior to the rebellion of Naxos,

we have no means of knowing. Perhaps the allies saw that the Confederacy was being used by Athens for her own aggrandizement in order that she might build up an empire, at their expense. Why should the cost of the expedition that reduced Scyros be paid out of the treasury of the Confederacy? The Athenians doubtless had a plausible answer to the objections raised. They could say to the Naxians that the object and purpose of the league was not only to drive out the Persians from the Islands of the Ægean, but to expel the pirates who infested its waters. There was, however, a valid reason for the continued existence of the Confederacy. The Persians were at that time preparing to make one more final effort to secure their prestige and expel the Greeks from her insular possessions on the western shores of Asia Minor. Perhaps some of her ambitious admirals even contemplated a third invasion of Hellas. A new expedition was then being fitted out in Pamphylia at the mouth of the river Eurymedon. Orders had been given to assemble a fleet and army at that place from which military operations were to be conducted against the Asiatic Greeks. Cimon, after the reduction of Naxos, defeated this expedition, an account of which will be given presently.

Naxos was famous for its wines. It was one of the largest of the Cyclades situated about ninety miles southeast of Cape Sunium, the southern extremity of Attica and twenty miles southeast of the Island of Delos. It extends about twenty miles from north to south. Its greatest width is fifteen miles. Twelve years had elapsed since the Confederacy was organized and Naxos was the first member of the alliance to rebel. B. C. 466 the Naxians refused longer to comply with the rules and regulations of the league and declined to contribute to its treasury or to furnish its quota of men and ships, in conformity with the assessment levied

upon it. They declared that the league was a voluntary confederation from which they had the right to retire of their own volition. Athens, as the head of the Confederacy, asserted that the allegiance of its constituent members, though voluntarily assumed, became obligatory and binding so long as a majority desired that it should be maintained. That Naxos could not be relieved of its obligations without the consent of the other members. The Naxians declined to pay their share of the tribute money, and a fleet was sent to conquer them, and make them subject allies of Athens. This armament was under the command of Cimon. Naxos, being weak, was not able to hold out long against the strong fleet of the Confederacy commanded by the most skilful admiral since Themistocles. The island was reduced after a siege, and was the first of the allies under the Confederacy to be subjugated, as Thucydides says, contrary to the agreement. He observes that the Athenians were offensive in their demands by using compulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work.

From this, we may infer, that where a poor weak ally could not raise the full quota of tax in money, Athens compelled them to send men, taking them away from their flocks, their vineyards, and their farms, and compelling them to perform onerous tasks and duties as seamen in the fleet. He observes further in this connection (i, 99) that Athens was no longer popular in the league, "and while the Athenians did not join the service on an equal footing, it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted. For this, the allies had themselves to blame; for owing to their aversions for expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money, instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they them-

selves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war."

Thus Naxos lost her liberty and became subject to the authority of Athens. The next member of the league to be subjugated was Thasos, B. C. 465, an account of which will be given presently.

The next important event in the order of time was the defeat of the Persian arms at the mouth of the Eurymedon, a river in Asia Minor which rises in Pisidia and flows south through Pamphylia into the Mediterranean known to the ancients in that locality as the Sea of Lycium. The mouth of the Eurymedon is 130 miles northeast of the northern shore of the island of Cyprus. Cimon, B. C. 466, the same year in which he reduced the island of Naxos, with a fleet consisting of 250 Athenian triremes augmented by a squadron of 100 ships furnished by the allies of the Confederacy of Delos, attacked and destroyed a Persian fleet composed mostly of Phœnician vessels aggregating about two hundred ships, which was followed on the same day by a land engagement in which the Athenians attacked and routed the Persian army, which was assembled on shore to protect the fleet.

While Cimon was operating against Naxos, he received intelligence that the Persians were assembling with the aid of the Phœnicians, and again threatened military operations and incursions among the Greek colonies and cities in Asia Minor, and the islands off the coast of Ionia and Caria. As soon as Naxos surrendered, Cimon sailed across the Ægean one hundred and fifty miles and expelled the Persians from several towns on the coast of Caria and Lycia. The enemy then determined to make a stand in Pamphylia at the mouth of the Eurymedon, where they had assembled a large fleet and army. The former mustered two hundred vessels, and eighty more were expected daily from the island of Cyprus to reinforce them, under Tithraustes and Pherendates. When Cimon learned that the reinforcements were hourly expected, he determined to strike the enemy before their arrival. The Persians manœuvred for delay desiring to postpone an engagement until their allies came. For the same reason Cimon was anxious to begin hostilities. He made a vigorous attack. The Persians were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Athenians, retreated to the shore and sought the protection of their land forces at the mouth of the Eurymedon. Cimon destroyed the fleet which was driven on the beach. Then he determined to destroy the Persian army as the sun was still high, and crowd into a single day, his victory on sea and land. This great feat he accomplished. He disembarked his men and followed up his naval battle with a vigorous attack on the land forces. The engagement was spirited and well contested, but Cimon succeeded in defeating the enemy which was completely routed, and quit the field in terror, leaving a large number of prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

Then with a display of energy, which caused the wonder and admiration of his countrymen, Cimon sailed to the island of Cyprus, to intercept the Phœnician reinforcements before they could learn of the defeat of their allies. He overtook them off the coast of that island, and in a vigorous naval engagement defeated them, and destroyed their entire armament.

Such was the battle of the Eurymedon, and the wonderful triple victory of Cimon, which was commemorated on the tripod dedicated to Apollo, as one of the most glorious exploits in Grecian annals. Plutarch observes, referring to this engagement, that Cimon in one day carried off two victories, wherein he surpassed that of Salamis by sea, and that of Platæa by land. After these achievements of the Athenians, aided and supported by the Confederacy of Delos, her authority on the sea became supreme. It is said that when tidings

from the Eurymedon reached Susa, the chagrin and mortification of Xerxes was such as to impair his health. He took to his bed and never recovered. The following year, B. C. 465, not very long after defeat of Persia at the Eurymedon, which was in the fall, B. C. 466, Xerxes was assassinated while he slept, by the captain of the guard and the chief eunuch of the palace. He was succeeded by his son Artaxerxes I.

The success of Cimon at the Eurymedon was followed by the celebrated peace, known as the Peace of Cimon, whereby the Persians stipulated that their armies should not approach the shores of the Ægean within a horse's course, and that their vessels of war should not appear off the coast of Lycia. Others claim these stipulations were not embodied in the treaty, but that through fear the Persians acted as if they were so bound by a treaty.

Cimon next drove the Persians from the Chersonese, then subdued the native Thracians and then besieged the island of Thasos which he conquered after a siege of two years.

The reduction of Thasos by the fleet of Cimon was in direct violation of the protection which Athens professed to afford to every member of the Delian Confederacy. Thasos was taken by the Athenians not because that island refused to contribute its quota of ships and money as required by the articles of the Confederation; on the contrary Athens deliberately destroyed its own ally for the purpose of robbing its inhabitants of the mines which they had discovered near the coast of Thrace. Her conduct on this occasion showed that that city no longer pretended to be the president of the Confederacy of Delos, but had absorbed that organization and used its resources for its own benefit. The Athenian empire was established and Athens was supreme.

Thasos is in the northern Ægean, five miles off the

southern shore of Thrace and about forty miles east of Eion and Amphipolis on the river Strymon. It is about eighteen miles long from north to south and about fifteen miles in width. B. C. 465, Cimon, after his victory at the mouth of the Eurymedon the previous year, was sent with a powerful fleet to blockade the ports of Thasos. Like Naxos, Thasos was a member of the Confederacy of Delos.

The reasons assigned by Athens to bolster up its pretext for sending a squadron to subjugate the island, however, did not arise from any disposition on the part of Thasos to repudiate its obligations to the Confederacy. The quarrel arose respecting territory in Thrace, which had been occupied by colonists and citizens of Thasos, and the development of rich mines of gold and silver, which were being worked by the Thasians, possession of which they refused to yield to citizens and colonists from Athens. After the capture of Eion, six years previously (B. C. 471), Athenian prospectors frequently visited the country in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Strymon, which was but forty miles from Thasos. The Thasians, whose home was in the immediate vicinity, their island being located but five miles from the shore of the continent, had become possessed of considerable territory in these near-by regions. Disputes between the Athenians and Thasians, as to the right to the possession of mines and lands, were frequent.

After the Persians had been driven from Eion the Athenians attempted to found a settlement at a place called Ennea Hodoi, the Nine Ways, on the Strymon, three miles above Eion. The attempt was a failure, owing to the hostility of the fierce and barbarous natives known as the Edonian Thracians, who made successful raids on the settlers, and prospectors, in the absence of sufficient military protection, which was withdrawn, Cimon having departed after the reduction

of Eion. The Athenians, however, had discovered gold in Mount Pangæus, a few miles east of the Strymon, and in the vicinity of Ennea Hodoi, where they afterwards founded the city of Amphipolis. In the strife which arose we have no record of any attempt on the part of Athens to submit these controversies to arbitration. The Athenians had the power of a giant, and they used it like a giant, and crushed their weaker allies by force of arms. Cimon, with a strong fleet, was sent to reduce the island of Thasos. While the blockade was in force, Athens sent a colony of ten thousand citizens to form a settlement, and build a city on the site of Ennea Hodoi. Disaster overtook this colony, which we might be justified in saying was a visitation of retributive justice for their unjust course towards the Thasians. The new colonists were surprised and attacked by the Thracians, and almost the entire contingent was massacred. The Athenians, however, did not raise the blockade at Thasos, by reason of this misfortune.

The Thasians were hard pressed by a superior force. They were unwilling to abandon what they claimed they were clearly entitled to. They believed that they should have been protected in their rights by Athens, which was their ally, and the head of their Confederacy, instead of being driven by force not only to give up their lands and mines in Thrace, but to surrender their island home, and become subjects and practically slaves of Athens. Under the circumstances, they could do nothing but appeal secretly to the Lacedæmonians for succor. The latter heard their appeal, and were anxious to lend them substantial aid, and make war against Athens.

The hand of Providence interposed. A calamity befell Sparta, which it was impossible to foresee, and which no human power could possibly avert. An earthquake swallowed up the city of Sparta (B. C. 464). The capital of Laconia, on the banks of the Eurotas, lay in ruins, and during the great convulsion of nature which caused the buildings and temples to topple and fall, and more than 20,000 of its citizens perished. Sparta, however, had been an oppressor, as well as Athens. For years they had sought to enslave the Messenians, and the Helots, their neighbors on the west. The military operations against these people are known as the Messenian Wars. The oppressed Helots, taking advantage of the calamity which had befallen their enemy, immediately revolted and marched against Sparta, which had been almost annihilated by the earthquake. They were repulsed, and aided by the Messenians, fortified themselves in Mount Ithome, near Messene, the capital of Messenia. These hostilities which continued for some years are known as the Third Messenian war.

It was unfortunate for Thasos that these events which were absolutely unavoidable, intervened at this particular time. The Lacedæmonians were absolutely powerless to aid her, and the Thasians, after a gallant defense of more than two years, were forced to surrender. Their fortifications were razed. The Athenians took their fleet, and confiscated all their possessions in Thrace. They were also compelled to pay the costs of the war and a large annual tribute into the treasury of Athens.

Thus, one by one, the weaker members of the Confederacy of Delos began to lose their independence, and the power of Athens in the Ægean became supreme.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE — ATHENS SUBJUGATES HER ALLIES AND ATTAINS IMPERIAL SUPREMACY — HER HEGEMONY BECOMES AN EMPIRE AND ATHENS AN IMPERIAL CITY

THE term empire, in connection with the political history of Athens, seems altogether inappropriate, and somewhat confusing. To associate the idea of imperialism with the first city in Hellas seems repugnant to the traditions of her people and the reputation she attained as the champion of popular government. From an early period the Attic commonwealth seems to have been the foe of despotism and the foremost advocate of political liberty. Under the constitution of Solon, it was a republican oligarchy; it became a republic under the constitution of Clisthenes, and under the guidance of Themistocles, Pericles and Ephialtes, it developed into an absolute democracy. When, therefore, Thucydides speaks of the Athenian empire, it becomes necessary to analyze the facts in relation to the political conditions of that day in order to comprehend his meaning. The necessity of Hellenic unity grew out of the dangers of the Persian invasion, and the efforts of Darius and Xerxes to enslave Greece. United effort was essential also to expel the Persians not only from the shores of continental Hellas, but from the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia Minor, in order to restore the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks, originally established in the east as colonies of the mother country.

The first Congress of Hellenic States was held in the old temple of Poseidon, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and was brought about through the efforts of Themistocles in anticipation of the invasion of Hellas by the expedition headed by Xerxes in person. The second Pan-Hellenic coalition was composed of representatives who met on the battlefield of Platæa, after that memorable engagement. These organizations, doubtless, were designed to be permanent. It was intended that the various states of Greece should send representatives, who should meet annually to suggest measures and devise means to secure the welfare and prosperity of the entire community. There were but two cities, and only two of commanding influence and power capable of forming alliances with neighboring states, since every coalition after the Persian Wars and prior to the Theban supremacy, acknowledged the hegemony of either one or the other of these cities, namely Sparta and Athens. Unfortunately for Hellas, these cities were not only bitter rivals, but acknowledged entirely different systems of government. Sparta was an oligarchy, Athens a republic. The domination of Sparta extended not only over a great part of the peninsula south of the Gulf of Corinth, but on the Isthmus and with those states in central and northern Greece, who were jealous of the prosperity of Athens. This inordinate jealousy and political rivalry prevented the unity of Hellas. Athens, for patriotic reasons, permitted Sparta to take the lead until the conduct of Pausanias, after the reduction of Byzantium, B. C. 478, became so offensive and tyrannical, that the soldiers and seamen in the fleet absolutely refused to serve under him. He was recalled by the Ephors of Sparta, who commissioned Dorcis to serve in his stead. But the command, long before the arrival of Dorcis, had passed to Aristides and Cimon, and Athens instead of Sparta became the leader of united Greece.

Sparta refused to follow in any enterprise where Athens led. The Peloponnesians were recalled, and declined to serve longer in the common cause against Persia. This was the beginning of Hellenic disunion. It created a breach between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians which was never healed. Under the circumstances, the league formed on the Isthmus, and later reorganized at Platæa, ceased to exist. The United States of Greece was a dream never to be realized. Athens then determined to fight Persia without the aid of the states in the Peloponnesus. Nothing remained for her except to form a new combination with the Asiatic Greeks. This alliance is known as the Confederacy of Delos, and is treated in a former chapter.

Unfortunately, we have no information as to the nature and character of the charter or constitution which bound the Confederacy together, in which the relative duties and obligations of the respective parties to the compact were set forth. We may assume, however, that it was an agreement which imposed mutual obligations whereby the states consented to send representatives annually to Delos. They were to meet in the temple of Apollo-Artemis. All were to retain their independence and all were placed on a footing of absolute equality, each member having an equal vote. The Treasury of the league was to be at Delos, and that city was to be the capital of the Confederacy. The union was voluntary, and the amount assessed upon each state was to be levied with its consent. We are not informed as to whether the Articles of Confederation contained any provision as to the rights of the majority, or any guarantee to protect the liberties and independence of the respective members. It was an alliance offensive and defensive dictated by necessity, with the strong state of Athens as its president. Obviously the union was sought to secure objects similar to those embraced in the Constitution of the American Union,

namely, " to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty."

Statesmanship in that age was unequal to the task of securing these results, by reason of the rivalry and jealousy which existed among the free States of Hellas. It was found to be impossible, for these reasons, to bring about a union of States under a common Constitution, to form a distinct and greater political unit and create a nation in its nature perpetual and indissoluble. The Constitution of the United States secured to the American people " an indestructible union, composed of indestructible States," a result which the primitive Articles of Confederation improvised after the final struggle with England failed to accomplish. The Statesmen of Hellas did not possess that sterling political integrity which recognizes the fundamental political truth, that every form of popular government as distinguished from monarchical institutions, must rest upon the fundamental principle, that the government derives its powers from the consent of the governed.

Athens formed a coalition with weaker states, and promised to protect them from foreign invasion and to help them to establish and maintain their independence. It induced them to contribute with their consent to the expenses of the Confederacy. They were told that they should all be entitled to representation on terms of equality and that all should be entitled to vote on every measure for the common defense. In other words they were assured that they should have the right to vote as to the amount of the tax they should be required to contribute into the common treasury. The Confederacy was established upon the assumption that the taxes they should be called upon to pay should be war taxes, which were to be devoted only to military purposes. The members of the coalition evidently supposed that

when the necessities of war ceased, their taxes should be proportionately decreased.

The weak and inexperienced cities and states which joined the Confederacy were not capable of discerning the importance of keeping the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government separate and distinct, but permitted Athens, the President of the Confederacy, and more powerful than the other members to exercise both executive and judicial functions. The Athenians insisted that all disputes which might arise should be litigated in Athens and adjusted pursuant to Athenian law. The result was fatal to the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks. On their political ruin and with the resources they were compelled to contribute, Athens built up an empire. For some years, the Athenians presided over the affairs of the Confederacy, ruling with justice and equity in a manner that seemed to give entire satisfaction, but gradually dissatisfaction arose among the allies. About the time that Naxos seceded from the league, B. C. 466, some of the allies complained that the Athenians were using the resources of the Confederacy, not only to keep the Persians from oppressing them, but to promote her own ends, and extend and increase her political power to build up an empire. Naxos, though the largest of the Cyclades, was unable to regain her independence, but was conquered by the power exercised by Athens as president of the Confederacy, and instead of remaining an independent State, holding membership in the league, it became a subject ally, compelled to pay tribute against her will.

But the Athenians grew more tyrannical and despotic in the case of Thasos. That island revolted, B. C. 465, not because it was unwilling to pay its *pro rata* share into the common treasury. It seems that Naxos had in all things complied with the rules and regulations of the league, and was guilty of no delinquency, or disregard of any of the obligations imposed upon it. But the Thasians extended their operations in Thrace on the mainland, near their island home. There they discovered valuable mines of gold and silver. The Athenians coveted these mines, and Athens, in her official capacity, as president of the Confederacy, and in violation of every principle of justice and honor, confiscated the mines. This dishonorable act was accomplished with the aid which was afforded by the ample resources of the league, and the mines of Thrace were taken from the Thasians and turned over to the Athenians. Their property was confiscated and they had no redress. Incensed at the wrong and exasperated by the indefensible conduct and high-handed usurpation of Athens, the Thasians revolted. For two years the island was besieged by Cimon, with a fleet supported from the revenues of the Confederacy. The Thasians appealed to the Spartans for succor, but that city, before it could respond to the appeal, was destroyed by an earthquake, and Thasos, unable to secure assistance from any other source, was conquered and reduced to slavery. The power of Athens was irresistible. The Athenians had absorbed the Confederacy of Delos, planted her colonies everywhere, until her jurisdiction extended over an empire.

More than thirty years after this event, when war was impending, and the Peloponnesians threatened to invade Attica, because they claimed that Athens had violated the treaty known as the Thirty Years' Peace, an embassy was sent to Sparta to avert, if possible, the threatened calamity. The ambassadors sought to convince the Peloponnesians that they had not broken the treaty, and that her conduct had always been just not only to Sparta, but to her own allies in the Confederacy of Delos. They attempted to justify the establishment of the Athenian Empire, and argued that the reason why the Peloponnesians were not included in the enterprise was because they voluntarily abandoned it

and refused to remain with the Athenians in order to assist them in destroying the power of Persia. The ambassadors urged the Ephors and the assembly to consider that the Athenian Empire was not acquired by force, but that the allies of their own accord urged Athens to be their leader.

Thucydides (i, 75) has preserved the address supposed to have been delivered on that occasion, B. C. 432, the year before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

"Consider, Lacedæmonians," said the Athenian ambassador, "the energy and sagacity which we then displayed. Do we deserve to be so bitterly hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an empire? That empire was not acquired by force. But you would not stay and make an end of the barbarians, and the allies came of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders. The subsequent developments of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances. Fear was our first motive; afterwards ambition; and then interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies, when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated and you were no longer the friends to us, which you had once been, but were suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we, without great risk, relax our hold? For the cities, as they fell away from us, would have gone over to you. And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible advantage when the danger is so great.

. . . . . .

"An empire was offered to us; can you wonder, that acting as human nature always will, we accepted it, and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, ambition, fear, interest. We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; and there

was a time when you thought so too. But now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could? Men, who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve credit, if they are in any degree more careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took our place. Indeed, our very moderation which should be our glory has been unjustly converted into a reproach."

From this argument it would seem that the political doctrine of the Athenians, at least so far as her weaker neighbors and allies were concerned, was that might makes right. That justice consists in the right of the strong to oppress the weak, for as the Athenian ambassador puts it, "the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger." They seemed to have no idea of justice, and no conception of the divine attribute of mercy. "Did justice," the Athenian asks, "ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could?" This political maxim would justify piracy and murder. It was claimed also that these qualities which permitted the strong to oppress the weak are inherent in human nature. And yet they declared that Athens did not acquire their empire "by force."

A strong light is thrown on the conduct pursued by Athens in subjugating her allies and the motives which actuated her in an address delivered by one of the envoys sent from Mitylene. The occasion when this address was delivered, was at an audience, at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian War, B. C. 428. The Lesbians sought to persuade the Peloponnesians to permit an alliance with Lesbos, to be made with them against Athens. The island of Lesbos was one of the members of the Confederacy of Delos. Athens had from time to time reduced all of her allies to slavery except Chios and Lesbos. These remaining members

of the Confederacy were in constant dread that they would likewise be subjugated by the imperial head of the Confederacy. The Lesbians took advantage of the war waged by the Peloponnesians against Athens to revolt from the Confederacy of Delos, and throw off her allegiance to Athens. They were told to come to Olympia. After the games and festivals were over, they met in the temple, with the council and the speaker in behalf of the envoys, urged his appeal. In his argument he showed how Athens had treated her allies, and how she had subjugated them one after another until she had established an empire, on the ruins of the Confederacy. Thucydides (iii, 11) gives a full report of the address delivered on that occasion. The part of the speech showing how Athens acquired her supremacy is as follows:

"Now our alliance with the Athenians first began when you ceased to take part in the Persian War, and they remained to complete the work. But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design of subjugating Hellas. We were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persians. And while in the exercise of their command they claimed no supremacy, we were very ready to follow them. But our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing their efforts against the Persians, and imposing the yoke of their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite and defend themselves, for their interests were too various. And so they were all enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians. We, forsooth, were independent allies, freemen — that was the word — who fought at their side. But judging from previous examples, how could we any longer have confidence in our leaders? For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with ourselves, their faith was pledged. And how could we, who survived, expect to be spared if ever they had the power to destroy us.

"Had all the allies retained their independence," continued the envoy, "we should have had better assurance that they would leave us as we were; but when the majority had been subjugated by them, they might naturally be expected to take offense at our footing of equality. They would contrast us, who alone maintained this equality, with the majority who had submitted to them. They would observe, also, that in proportion as their strength was increasing, our isolation was also increasing. Mutual fear is the only basis of an alliance, because he who would break faith, is deterred from aggression by the consciousness of inferiority. And why did they permit us to be left independent? Only because they thought that to gain an empire, they must use fair words and win their way by policy and not by violence. On the one hand, our position was a witness to their character. Because, we having an equal vote with them, we could not be supposed to have fought in their wars against our will, but those whom they attacked must have been in the wrong.

"On the other hand they were thus enabled to use the powerful against the weak. We were to be left until the last, because when the weaker states were removed, the stronger would fall, an easier prey. If, however, they had begun with us while the power of the allies was still intact, and we might have afforded a rallying point, they would not so easily have mastered them. . . . What trust, then, could we repose in such a friendship or such an alliance as this? The civility which we showed to one another was at variance with our real feelings. They courted us in time of war, because they were afraid of us, and we, in time of peace, paid like attention to them. The faith, which is generally assured by mutual good-will, had, with us, no other bond than mutual fear. We were constrained to remain allies from fear, not from love, and whichever of us

first thought they could safely venture, would assuredly have been the first to break it."

Thus, as suppliants, standing in the temple of Olympian Zeus the envoys from Lesbos besought the aid of the Spartan oligarchy to enable them to be released from bondage imposed by the Athenian republic. The argument advanced shows the purpose and design of Athens, in subjugating her weaker allies, with the co-operation of the stronger. The republic had expanded into an empire, but in doing so, their conduct, as Mr. Grote observes, contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind — the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control.

CHAPTER XXXIV

INTERNECINE WARS — THE STRUGGLE FOR A LAND EMPIRE IN HELLAS — TANAGRA, ŒNOPHYTA AND CORONEA

IT has been shown how Athens established a maritime empire, through the instrumentality of the Delian Confederacy. She had without the aid of the Peloponnesians expelled the Persians not only from Thrace and their insular possessions in the Ægean, but from Cyprus and the shores of Asia Minor. After the "Peace of Cimon," Athens was supreme on the seas.

The prosperous career of the Athenians excited the envy and jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies. Ægina and Corinth were unable to compete with their Attic rival to secure commercial advantage on the seas. Athens had also been able not only to build up and wall in her city; she had also protected her harbors and port cities on the Piræus and at Phalerum, by building her walls about them, which were extended inland to connect with the walls of Athens. The Peloponnesians were unable to arrest her growth and prosperity, or to prevent her from becoming the first city in Europe.

The reason that Sparta was not in position to arrest the progress of her rival was because she was fully occupied in seeking to repress the formidable revolt of the Helots and their allies the Messenians, who had taken refuge in their strong fortifications on Mount Ithome, from which it seemed impossible to dislodge them. This rebellion, which occurred B. C. 464, is known as the Third Messenian War. It lasted nine

years until B. C. 455. The situation of Sparta must have been critical, indeed, when she twice invoked the aid of her old rivals, the Athenians, in the Messenian War. This request for aid was extended because the Athenians were reputed to be skilful in siege operations. The last suggestion to apply to Athens for assistance may have originated with Cimon, whose friendship for the Lacedæmonians was proverbial. Cimon was the leader of the oligarchical party. His political rival was the illustrious Pericles. Cimon was popular, notwithstanding the unpopularity of his party, and he prevailed upon his countrymen to send an army to Laconia to aid the Spartans against the Helots and Messenians, B. C. 461. When the Athenians arrived before Ithome, and displayed their superior tactics in the mode of storming fortified places in which species of warfare the Lacedæmonians were deficient, the latter became uneasy at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians. Thucydides says that the Lacedæmonians reflected that the Athenians were aliens in race, and feared that if they were permitted to remain they might be tempted by the Helots to change sides. They concluded, therefore, that it might be wise to dispense with their services. Accordingly they told Cimon that they could conduct the war without assistance from the Athenians and dismissed them. This treatment was regarded by the latter as an insult, and attributed to some secret suspicion which had arisen in the minds of the Lacedæmonians. On their return the nominal alliance which had till then existed with the Lacedæmonians against the Persians was abandoned. Indeed public feeling ran so high that Cimon himself felt the displeasure of the majority of his countrymen and he was sent into exile.

At this time (B. C. 459-457) the affairs of Athens were influenced and controlled largely, if not entirely, by Pericles. Aristides slept with his fathers, having

died about B. C. 468. Themistocles died in exile in the dominions of Artaxerxes, about B. C. 464. Ephialtes had been assassinated by a Theban in the pay of the leaders of the oligarchical party. Cimon was in exile, the decree of ostracism having been passed about B. C. 460. Pericles, the powerful leader of the Athenian democracy, had now become the foremost man in Greece. He clearly foresaw that sooner or later the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would be engaged in a deadly struggle, in which one or the other must inevitably perish, as a political power in Hellas. Greece was not big enough for both. In order to strengthen Attica, in preparation for the evil day, Pericles entered upon a foreign policy which attested his abilities as a statesman and diplomat.

The Messenian War still occupied the time and energies of the Lacedæmonians, and the Athenian leader seized the opportunity to make allies in the Peloponnesus. Argos was extremely jealous of Sparta, because the latter sought the leadership in the peninsula to the exclusion of the Argives, who prided themselves on their mythical renown and the fame accorded their heroes in the Iliad of Homer. While the Spartans were seeking to dislodge the Helots from their strongholds at Ithome, Argos reduced Mycenæ, Tiryns and some neighboring cities in Argolis. Pericles, then, about B. C. 458, formed an alliance with Argos against Sparta. This was followed by a clever stroke of policy, whereby the Thessalians also were induced to become a member of the alliance. He then made successful overtures to Megara, and succeeded in inducing that important state, whose territory embraced the Isthmus of Corinth, to join the Confederacy. This gave the Athenians and their allies control of the gateway to the Peloponnese, and the passes of Mount Geraneia, through which an invading army must pass to reach Central Greece. It gave them also a strategic naval

base at Nisæa on the Saronic gulf, that being the port town of Megara on the south. From this port naval operations could be advantageously conducted against the island of Ægina, which lay about fifteen miles south of Nisæa. The importance of Megara was still further augmented by the fact that Athens thereby secured through this alliance the important city and harbor of Pegæ on the Crisæan, or Corinthian gulf. These alliances, negotiated by the superior diplomacy and statesmanship of Pericles, gave Athens an immense advantage. Through her allies she practically controlled Hellas. The Isthmus gave her command of the gulf of Corinth, the Saronic Gulf, and consequently free access to the Ionian and Ægean seas, and the shores and port towns of the entire Peloponnese. She could menace Bœotia on the north and the island of Ægina on the south. The passes of the Geraneian Mountains which stretched as a bar across the Isthmus extended from the Saronic Gulf to the Gulf of Corinth. These defiles formed the gateway through which hostile armies were obliged to pass from the south to invade Attica, and from Bœotia on the north to join her allies at Corinth. The political wisdom and foresight of Pericles, in negotiating these foreign treaties, is obvious, in view of the threatening attitude of the Lacedæmonians. After the Athenian defeat at Tanagra, to which reference will be made presently, these alliances with neighboring contiguous states possibly saved Athens.

After Pericles had concluded these various treaties he turned his attention to Ægina. The thrifty and enterprising people of that island and the merchants and tradesmen of Epidaurus and Corinth made these states the principal commercial rivals of Athens. They became alarmed at the growing power of their rival especially in view of her new allies. Impelled by necessity, therefore, Epidaurus and Corinth formed

an alliance to protect Ægina, to prevent the island from falling under the dominion of Athens. These allies fitted out a strong fleet. But the fame of the Athenian navy, and the superior training of her seamen, made her invincible. A naval engagement (B. C. 458) occurred off the island, which resulted in the destruction of the Peloponnesian squadron. Seventy ships were captured by the Athenians. They then debarked a strong land force under the command of Leocrates, and laid siege to the city of Ægina, the capital of the island.

Corinth now sought to relieve Ægina, by making an attack upon Megara, upon the assumption that the Athenians would be unable to assist the Megarians, by reason of the fact that they had a large force absent not only in Ægina but also in Egypt, whither they had gone to the assistance of Inaros, a Libyan King, who had undertaken to aid the Egyptians to overthrow the Persian yoke in the land of the Pharaohs. They believed, also, that if the Athenians went to the assistance of Megara they would of necessity be obliged to raise the siege of Ægina. But the resources of Athens were not exhausted as long as there were boys and old men in the city capable of bearing arms. These youthful and aged warriors were mustered under Myronides, who led them to the Isthmus. The Corinthians had seized the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent with their allies into the Megarian territory. An engagement took place between the Corinthians and the old men and boys sent from Athens under Myronides. The victory was claimed by both sides, but finally the Corinthians retired and the Athenians erected a trophy. When the troops reached Corinth they were derided and taunted for having fled from an army of boys and aged men, and unable to endure their shame and mortification, after twelve days preparation, again returned to the field of battle, and claiming to have prevailed

over their enemies, erected a trophy. Then Myronides, with his unique contingent, returned to aid the Megarians, and those who had erected the trophy were slain. He then made an assault and charged and routed the enemy. The Corinthians retreated, but a large number missed their way and got into a private enclosure, surrounded by a ditch, from which there was no exit. The Athenians took advantage of their plight and closed the entrance with heavy armed troops. The light troops were thrown about the enclosure and stoned those within, all of whom perished.

In view of these alliances which Pericles had made with neighboring states, and the reverses which the Peloponnesians had sustained, the Lacedæmonians became alarmed. They had every reason to be disturbed at the growing power of Athens, and fearing that she might acquire a land empire, in addition to her maritime supremacy, they were exceedingly anxious to form an alliance with Thebes, to prevent her rival from extending her influence in Bœotia. The invasion of Doris by the Phocians and the capture of Delphi, which city the Phocians had taken from the Delphians, in what was known as the Holy War, afforded them the opportunity they sought.

The four states which border the northern shores of the gulf of Corinth, in their order from east to west, are Bœotia, Phocis, Locris and Ætolia. The states of Phocis and Locris form the southern boundary of the little state of Doris, whose territory is about as extensive as the District of Columbia. Its inhabitants were Dorians, and kinsmen as well as allies of Sparta. The town of Delphi in which stands the temple of Apollo, is situated in Phocis. Over its sacred precincts the Phocians claimed jurisdiction. The Delphians, however, asserted that the limitations of the holy territory, where the temple stood, were not confined to the adjoining precincts and grounds about the edifice, but

were coterminus with the city of Delphi. In this contention they were bitterly opposed by the Phocians. The Delphians had the sympathy and support of the Dorians and in order to maintain the supremacy of their city, they sought also the aid of Sparta and the Peloponnesians. The latter had always been liberal in support of the temple and were able to secure favorable responses from the Pythian, when it became necessary to consult the oracle. They enjoyed this high privilege to such an extent that the Alcmæonidæ, whose family had been banished from Athens by Hippias, were obliged to bribe the priestess in order to secure favorable responses, when occasion arose, in which the Spartans were concerned, because the Pisistratidæ were encouraged and aided by the Spartans in their usurpations against the popular party in Athens.

Sparta, at the time of the affair at Tanagra, B. C. 457, was still involved in the Messenian War, and engaged in the siege of Ithome. But the Dorians having attempted to aid the Delphians against the Phocians, the latter sent an army into Doris to punish the inhabitats for their interference. This gave Sparta a pretext for sending an army into Bœotia ostensibly to aid the Dorians. The real object was not only to take the city of Delphi from the Phocians, but to form an alliance with the Bœotians against Athens. The Spartans were able to spare fifteen hundred hoplites from the operations at Ithome, and these were reinforced by ten thousand Peloponnesian allies. This army of eleven thousand five hundred men under command of Nicomodes marched to the state of Doris, but upon their approach the Phocians retired. Delphi was restored to the Delphians, and the Lacedæmonians were free to carry out their plans to prevent the Athenians from gaining an ascendancy in Bœotia. Thebes, after the battle of Platæa, had lost her power and influence, because she took part with the Medes against Hellas.

But the question with the Lacedæmonians was whether Athens or Sparta would be able to establish supremacy in Bœotia. In order to form an alliance with the Thebans, the Lacedæmonian army repaired to Thebes. That city was then engaged in restoring her fortifications, and seeking to regain her lost power. Thebes was an oligarchy. The Lacedæmonians were supporters of oligarchical government. Pericles had beaten Cimon and the oligarchical party in Athens, which had attempted to defeat the democrats, and establish an oligarchy in Attica. Some of the wealthy men, who had sought to overthrow democracy at home, now repaired to Thebes to secure the influence of its citizens, and to urge them to form an alliance with the Lacedæmonians, in order that when the opportunity offered, they might be able, with the aid of the forces from the Peloponnesus, to coöperate and overthrow the democratic party headed by Pericles, and establish an oligarchy in Attica. The aristocrats were particularly incensed because Pericles, with the efficient aid of Ephialtes, passed a law which made any citizen, without regard to his property qualifications, eligible to the Archonship. They also succeeded in stripping the ancient council of the Areopagus of much of its power. The battle between oligarchy and democracy was being fought bitterly, and the oligarchical party was at its wit's end. The democrats feared an attempt on the part of traitors in Athens to seek the aid of the Lacedæmonians, whose army was in Bœotia.

Thucydides mentions another reason why the Lacedæmonians might have been anxious to have the support of the oligarchical party in Athens. The wisdom of Pericles in forming alliances with the neighboring state of Megara now became apparent. The return of the Lacedæmonian army from Phocis presented difficulties. If they went by sea, across the Gulf of Corinth, they would certainly have been intercepted and attacked

by an Athenian fleet. If they marched through Bœotia into Megara they would be obliged to pass over and through the defiles and passes of Mount Geraneia, and the Athenians were in Megara, and held the port of Pegæ, on the Corinthian gulf. They concluded, therefore, to remain at Thebes, and determine how they might return with the least risk and danger to themselves. They encouraged the malcontents in Athens to join them against Pericles. The Athenians were aware of the embarrassment of the army in Thebes and suspected treachery at Athens. It became necessary, therefore, to act promptly and prevent if possible the escape of the enemy from Bœotia. They mustered fourteen thousand men, which included a thousand Argives, and contingents from other allies, and among them a body of Thessalian cavalry, as Thessaly at this time was an ally of Athens.

Tanagra is a small town on the Asopus, in Bœotia, close to the northern frontier of Attica about fifteen miles east of Thebes, and five miles south west of Delium. It is about thirty miles almost due north of Athens. Here the Lacedæmonians encamped on their march from Bœotia. The fact that they did not take the risk of returning over the Thebes road to the west of Tanagra, which runs through or near Platæa, and thence into Megara, sustained the belief in Athens, that the Lacedæmonians expected to coöperate with the oligarchical party who had planned a revolt against the adherents of Pericles.

A bloody engagement took place at Tanagra, B. C. 457. The object of the contestants was to secure supremacy in Bœotia. It was the first spear thrust, the first open clash, directly between the forces of Sparta and Athens, after the recall of Pausanias, B. C. 478, and the domination of Athens as President of the Confederacy of Delos. The struggle resulted in the temporary defeat of the Athenians. This was said to have

been occasioned by the treachery of the Thessalian cavalry, who suddenly in the midst of the fight deserted to the enemy. But the engagement was not decisive, and no effort was made by the Lacedæmonians to follow up their victory by seeking to reduce Athens. But their success enabled them to proceed unmolested through northern Attica, and through the passes of the Geraneian mountains to Corinth and the Peloponnese.

Pericles was of the tribe of Acamantis and led his tribesmen at Tanagra. Cimon, who had been banished because it was claimed he had secretly espoused the cause of the Lacedæmonians, and as leader of the oligarchical party was not to be trusted, wished to blot out forever this slander against his good name. He wanted to prove his patriotic devotion to his country's cause, by joining the Athenians in their efforts to defeat the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra. He was of the tribe of Œneis. He put on his armor, ranged himself among his own tribe and begged Pericles to permit him to fight with the rest against the Spartans. But the council of Five Hundred would not trust him, and believed that his presence in the army was to aid the enemy rather than to promote the cause of Athens. He then besought about one hundred of his followers to show to their countrymen by their valor and fortitude their absolute innocence of the insinuations as to their loyalty. As an incentive to deeds of patriotic devotion, he stripped off his armor, the armor he had worn at the memorable battle of the Eurymedon, and set it up among his devoted followers, who rallied round it in the heat of the engagement. Bearing the arms of Cimon, they went into the conflict and displayed unusual courage. Nearly all of them perished at Tanagra, in defense of Athens. The Athenians were convinced by this conduct on the part of Cimon that the decree of banishment against him was unjust. It was reversed, and the vote in the assembly was taken on the

motion of Pericles, who introduced the resolution to rescind the ostracism against his political rival, which he himself had procured. The aristocratic party at Athens gained nothing by the Lacedæmonian victory at Tanagra, and took no measures to ally themselves with the Thebans or Spartans. But the advantages lost by the Athenians in that engagement were recovered sixty-two days later at Œnophyta, where they gained a decisive victory over Theban and Bœotian forces, which gave to Pericles and his party supremacy in central Hellas, and enabled Athens to establish her land empire.

When Cimon was recalled after the battle of Tanagra, he became reconciled with Pericles, and the conspiracy against democracy died. Athens, united, planned an attack on Thebes, the ally of Sparta, not only to wipe out the stain of her defeat at Tanagra, but to acquire supremacy in Bœotia, which was essential in order to enable her to establish a land empire.

Œnophyta is on the border between Bœotia and Attica, about three miles south of Tanagra, where the Athenians had defeated the Thebans, B. C. 456.

The former, under the leadership of Myronides, says Thucydides (i, 108) on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, marched against the Bœotians, and having defeated them in an engagement at Œnophyta, made themselves masters of the country of Bœotia and Phocis and demolished the walls of the Tanagreans. They took as hostages one hundred of the richest men in Locris, and finished their long walls."

The walls here referred to connected Athens with her two harbors or port towns in the Saronic Gulf, Phalerum and the Piræus. The walls about the city were finished about B. C. 478, the year after the defeat of the Persians at Platæa. It was after the Athenian victory at Œnophyta, that the walls extending to the sea were finished, one to the harbor of Phalerum, the

other to the Piræus. These were known as the "long walls," as distinguished from the city walls proper. The wall extending to Phalerum connecting the outer city wall with that about the port was about four miles long, and the wall to the Piræus about four and a half miles in length.

Soon after, Œnophyta, the city of Ægina, was forced to capitulate. The Athenians became masters of the island. The Æginitans were obliged to dismantle their walls, surrender their ships and pay a forced tribute into the treasury at Athens.

The victory at Œnophyta made Athens master of northern and central Greece. Her supremacy was established on land and sea, and she reached the height of her power and glory. She was mistress of the Ægean, of Cyprus and of the west coast of Asia Minor. She had reduced Ægina to slavery, and her alliances at home made her master of the territory of northeastern Argolis, Megara, Phocis, Locris, Bœotia and Thessaly. The exploits of Tolmides and Pericles, which will now be referred to, extended her dominions to Achaia, also to Acarnania, and Ætolia, so that her jurisdiction extended to the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Corinth.

B. C. 455, the year after the victory at Œnophyta, the Athenian admiral Tolmides was assigned to the command of an Athenian fleet, and sent on an expedition to burn and plunder the coasts of the Lacedæmonians. He circumnavigated the Peloponnesian peninsula, destroyed several port towns and sailing north into the Ionian Sea, proceeded into the Gulf of Corinth, making conquests in Achaia, and Acarnania, Ætolia and Locris. He reduced Naupactus at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, took the Corinthian town of Chalcis in Ætolia, and made a descent on the city of Sicyon, and defeated its army in the field. About this time the Third Messenian War ended, the Helots

and their allies, after nearly ten years of hostilities, surrendered on condition that they might be permitted to depart with their wives and families, and under the protection of Tolmides, were conducted to Naupactus, where they settled and became allies of the Athenians.

The achievements of Tolmides, B. C. 455, were supplemented the following year by extensive operations conducted by Pericles. With a fleet of one hundred galleys he sailed out of the harbor of Pegæ, or The Fountains, on the northern coast of Megara, in the gulf of Corinth. His first objective was the city of Sicyon in the State of Corinth, whose arms had suffered defeat the previous year at the hands of Tolmides. He landed with one thousand hoplites. An engagement took place, in which the Athenians were successful, in that they drove the enemy from the field, but were unable to take their city. Pericles did not deem it expedient to interrupt his raid in the enemy's country by a prolonged siege of a walled city. He sailed to the shores of Acarnania, and after ravaging her coasts, in the localities occupied by Corinthian and Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, returned to Attica.

While Athens thus strengthened her influence and extended her power in Greece, her arms were defeated in Egypt, whither they had been assigned to aid Inarus, the Libyan King, in his rebellion against the Persians. In that disastrous war, in the valley of the Nile, the Athenian forces and the Libyan insurgents were driven out of Memphis, and were practically annihilated, after a series of campaigns in the land of the Pharaohs, covering a period of about six years.

An attempt was made, B. C. 455, on the part of Athens, at the request of her Thessalian allies to restore Orestes, the exiled son of the Thessalian King, but in this, though aided by a force of Bœotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, the Thessalian cavalry, by

their superior tact and destructive raids, forced the Athenians and their allies to retire. Pericles then, B. C. 454, sailed on a second expedition from Pegæ, and coasted as far as Sicyon and again defeated their army. But as Pericles was merely on a marauding expedition, he made no attempt to besiege the city, quitted Sicyon, crossed the gulf of Corinth to the shores of Acarnania, and besieged and attacked Œniadæ, but failing to reduce it, returned home.

The Lacedæmonians were exhausted with ten years of intestine war, occasioned by the revolt of the Helots and their Messenian allies, and were weakened by the great calamity which had befallen their city which was practically destroyed by an earthquake, just before the outbreak of the revolution in Messenia. For three years after the close of the Third Messenian War, they remained inactive and then, B. C. 452, concluded a five years' truce with Athens. They doubtless welcomed this respite in order that they might prepare for the final struggle for the supremacy of Greece. Athens, being now at peace, planned an expedition against Cyprus, B. C. 452. The Athenians sent out a powerful fleet of two hundred ships under Cimon, to subdue the island. While the great admiral was engaged in this campaign conducting operations against Citium, B. C. 449, he died, before his ambitious designs were accomplished.

For nine years Athens had been supreme on land and sea. She did not retain her supremacy in Hellas, by maintaining garrisons in the various cities and towns within her dominions and subject territory. She did not rely upon military occupation to secure the retention of her power, but sought to maintain her supremacy, by establishing everywhere republics instead of oligarchies. This policy was based upon the assumption that the masses loved liberty, rather than semi-slavery which was the condition which prevailed under

an oligiarchy. Accordingly, a democracy was established at Thebes, and in the other cities and towns throughout the allied territory, because Pericles believed that the expulsion of the oligarchical party, where such parties had formerly prevailed, and the substitution of a popular party, would suffice to hold the towns and cities in their allegiance to Athens. This hypothesis proved to be a delusion.

After the battle of Œnophyta (B. C. 457), and after democracy had been substituted for oligarchy in Central Greece, the leaders of the oligarchical party in Bœotia, Locris, Eubœa, Ægina, and elsewhere, became exiles. They were, in a sense, expatriated, and continually plotted with the enemies of Athens, ready to rise and attack the Athenians when dissensions and discords, which they continually fomented, afforded an opportunity of success. Although the Five Years' Peace had not yet expired, and the insurgents and revolutionists for that reason were unable to secure aid from the Lacedæmonians, they nevertheless continued to stir up strife and disorder, and aroused a spirit of rebellion in the frontier towns of Bœotia. Complaints were made continually by those who supported the democracy in these localities, and the Athenians determined to put down this incipient rebellion.

Tolmides was anxious to undertake an expedition to the frontiers of Bœotia, to restore peace and tranquillity, among the inhabitants who looked to Athens to maintain their supremacy against the oligarchical party. He had won fame and distinction on his expedition around the shores of the Peloponnese, having circumnavigated the peninsula, ravaged the sea and plundered the coasts of the enemy, he had taken Naupactus, and displayed marked ability as a naval and military commander. His success in the past made him rash and over-confident. This rashness contributed to his defeat at Coronea, where he lost his life, a disaster which

cost Athens the ascendancy she had acquired in Hellas, and the loss of her land empire.

Coronea is a town near the western frontier of Bœotia, about ten miles southeast of Chæronea, the birthplace of the illustrious Plutarch, and five miles west of the southern shore and marshes of Lake Copais. These towns, and others on the frontier, had fallen into the hands of the oligarchical exiles, from the various Bœotian towns, and were hostile to the republicans.

Tolmides, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, recruited largely from the first families in Athens with a body of auxiliary troops, hastened to the relief of the border towns in Bœotia. Pericles advised caution and admonished Tolmides to wait until he could muster a larger force. The young bloods of Athens, however, were ambitious and ready to follow their renowned comamnder. In their enthusiasm they disregarded the sage advice of the cautious and prudent Pericles. Tolmides also was impatient to advance; the people sided with him, and he was ordered to the frontiers of Bœotia. He directed his march to Chæronea and Orchomenus, which were then in possession of the insurgents. He was successful in driving the enemy from these places. He stationed a garrison in Chæronea, to protect the inhabitants from future disturbances, and marched south to Coronea, where the enemy had secretly assembled in force. When he reached that town, he was surprised, and in the bloody engagement which followed, B. C. 447, the valiant Tolmides was killed; his forces were overwhelmingly defeated, and many Athenians were made prisoners.

The result of the disaster at Coronea was far-reaching, and its consequences led to the disintegration of the land empire of Athens. By reason of the fact that many of the Athenian prisoners attached to the army of Tolmides were of distinguished families, Pericles, in

order to secure their release, was obliged to submit to the most disgraceful and humiliating terms, just as Sparta twenty years later, B. C. 425, after the defeat at Pylus and Sphacteria, where Brasidas was wounded and many of the noble Dorian families were made prisoners, was forced to conclude a treaty of peace with Nicias, on terms involving the disgrace of Sparta.

In order to enable the Athenians to secure the release of their prominent and influential citizens, after the battle of Coronea, they were compelled to evacuate Bœotia. The relinquishment by Athens of this important State, the closest neighbor of Attica on the north, was the beginning of the end of her land empire. The allied exiles, elated by their great success, became active in Phocis, Locris and Eubœa, overthrew their republics, reestablished in the two states first named oligarchical government, and dissolved their allegiance to Athens.

The victory of Athens at Œnophyta and her defeat at Coronea marked the rise and fall of her land empire, for what she gained at Œnophyta she lost at Coronea.

But while Sparta was successful on land, she was unable to defeat her rival as a maritime power. Athens was still mistress of the seas. The duel between these noted cities was finally fought to a finish, in the Peloponnesian War, a struggle which continued for a period of twenty-seven years. That conflict was postponed through the diplomacy of Pericles, who was successful soon afterwards in negotiating a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, which is known as the Thirty Years' Peace.

CHAPTER XXXV

CIMON

CIMON, the only son of Miltiades, was of the tribe of Œneis. His services to his country were equally as important as those rendered by his illustrious father. He expelled the Persians from Europe, the Ægean sea, and the coasts of Asia Minor, and as commander-in-chief of the Athenian navy established the Athenian Empire.

We can but conjecture as to his age. The ancient writers do not mention the year of his birth. He died, B. C. 449, while conducting naval operations against the island of Cyprus. He participated in the battle of Salamis, B. C. 480, having acquitted himself with honor, and rendered material assistance to Themistocles, at that critical period of his country's history. Plutarch says that at that time he was very young, and his years were not strengthened by experience. If we assume that "very young" means that he was twenty-three, when that engagement took place, he must have been born B. C. 503. Consequently he was but fourteen years of age at the time of his father's death, B. C. 489, the year after the battle of Marathon; and attained the age of fifty-four, at the time of his death, B. C. 449. Cimon possessed all the abilities of his father, coupled with the shrewdness of Themistocles and the integrity of his compatriot Aristides. Plutarch says "he was as daring as Miltiades, and not inferior to Themistocles in judgment and incomparably more just and honest than either of them." In him were united the qualities

which peculiarly fitted him to lead the armament gathered through the instrumentality of the Confederacy of Delos, and enabled him to build up the Athenian Empire, with Athens as the greatest commercial mart in Europe, and the most powerful city of the world.

Owing to the injustice of Attic Law, Cimon became the victim of his father's delinquencies. Miltiades was prosecuted by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, for "deceiving the people" in connection with his ill-fated expedition to the island of Paros. He was convicted, but in view of the great services he had rendered his country, his judges refused to inflict the death penalty, but imposed a fine upon him of fifty talents, equivalent to more than $50,000. He was unable to discharge the obligation, and died in prison, according to some authorities, shortly after his trial. Cimon was greatly attached to his father, and such was his devotion, that when Miltiades died, Cimon, according to Diodorus,[1] in order to secure his corpse for burial, willingly surrendered himself, and took his father's place in prison.

Under the law of Athens, Cimon, his heir, became responsible for the fine which had been imposed upon his father, and in addition lost his civil rights, which could not be restored until the obligation against the estate was discharged. Had not a fortunate chain of circumstances relieved Cimon of the disabilities in which he was placed by reason of his poverty, the avenues of opportunity would have been forever closed to him, and Athens would have lost the benefit of the distinguished services, which he subsequently rendered to his country.

Under Attic Law, the heir inherited the estate of his ancestor, but he took the inheritance *cum onere*, that is, subject to the payment of the debts of the ancestor.

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[1] Diodorus, Frag. 51.

[2] See Gardner and Jevons Manual of Greek Antiquities; Attic Law, p. 548.

The injustice of the law was embraced in the provision, that these debts were not only a lien upon all the property of which the ancestor died seized and possessed, but became also personal obligations of the heir, which the latter was bound to pay. If the property of the decedent was not sufficient to discharge them, the heir was nevertheless bound to pay them from his own means, or from property which he had acquired by his own efforts, or from whatever source. If Cimon had not received from his brother-in-law, Callias, the money with which to pay his father's fine, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, would have had no political rival in Cimon the son of Miltiades; because until all the obligations of the ancestor had been discharged, his heir was disfranchised, and not eligible to public office.

The law with regard to imprisonment for debt established by the cultivated and enlightened Athenians at this period was unduly severe. It lacked the humane provisions contained in the laws of the Babylonians enacted nearly two thousand years earlier. In 1913 there was discovered in the valley of the Euphrates a tablet containing many of the missing laws from the Code of Hamurabi, who ruled in Babylon, 2100 to 2300 B. C., nearly two thousand years before the time of Cimon. These laws in many respects are similar to the laws of Moses. Among the Normans and Anglo-Saxons to the time of the Norman conquest, the creditor was permitted to seize the debtor and sell him as a slave. It seems that under the Code of Hamurabi, which has recently been unearthed, the debtor, when he had stripped himself of his property, was permitted to take a receipt for his goods and estate which he had surrendered, in the presence of two witnesses, and was then entitled to his discharge, just as a debtor under our bankrupt act is entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy. This Babylonian statute was doubtless confined to ordinary debts, recoverable in a civil action. Whether

it applied to a debt imposed as a penalty for crime, we are not informed.

Although Miltiades left but one son, he was survived also by a daughter, Elpinice, who after their father's death continued to reside with her brother Cimon. Elpinice was an exceptionally attractive and accomplished woman. She was a favorite with the artist Polygnotus, whose paintings adorned the portico of the Propylea on the Acropolis. The artistic eye of the eminent painter was attracted by her perfect figure, pleasing countenance, fair complexion, and the wealth of golden hair that crowned her temples. Indeed, Pericles, the rival of Cimon, greatly admired her charms and accomplishments, and was numbered among her suitors. As both Cimon and his sister were without means, it is said the law did not take notice of the illicit relations which it was whispered existed between them. These stories, however, we may safely assume were without foundation and originated with political enemies of Cimon. This belief is justified by the fact that among the distinguished men, in her circle of acquaintances, was Callias, the son of Hipponicus, one of the wealthiest men in Athens, noted for his munificence, and generosity. He became enamored of Elpinice and sought her hand in marriage. It would seem that under Attic Law, in order to marry her, Callias was obliged to first secure the consent of her brother, Cimon. However this may be, the consent was obtained, and Cimon gave his sister to her wealthy suitor. Whether there was any legal obligation on the part of Callias to pay the debt of her father or her brother, before he could lawfully wed Elpinice, we are not informed, but when the ceremony was performed, the fine imposed on Miltiades and for which Cimon became personally liable, was paid. This act, whether prompted by the love Callias bore his wife, and the esteem he entertained for her brother, removed all social and political barriers from the path

of Cimon, and he became eligible to the honors which his countrymen subsequently conferred upon him.

When Themistocles, after the battle of Thermopylæ, advised the Athenians to forsake their city and the shores of Attica, carry their arms on ship board, and fight Xerxes, in the straits of Salamis, while many deemed it rash and almost madness, Cimon gathered about him a large number of the young men of Athens, and forming them into a procession, marched at their head to the citadel carrying in his hand a bridle, to offer to the goddess as an indication that the salvation of Athens was not with cavalry, upon the land on the back of the war steed, to await the assailing horse and foot, but upon the sea, where horse and bridle were of no avail. He then offered the bridle in his devotions to the goddess, took from the walls of the temple a buckler, proceeded thence to the port, with his companions, and went aboard the fleet. Thus Cimon "gave confidence to many of the citizens."

What we know of his life consists practically in the record of his naval campaigns. The name of Themistocles is immortal, because he alone is entitled to credit for the engagement at Salamis, which was fought at the most critical time in the history of Greece. Salamis was the turning point of the Persian War, and made success at Platæa, the following year, comparatively easy, by reason of the great reputation won by the Greeks at Marathon and Salamis.

But the numerous and continued successes of Cimon added to the glory of Greece and the aggrandizement of Athens. He not only compelled the Persians to evacuate Europe, but drove them back from the shores of Asia Minor, so that not so much as a letter carrier, or a single horseman was ever seen to come within four hundred furlongs of the sea.

After the treason of Pausanias, when the Grecian fleet refused longer to obey him, they petitioned Aristides and Cimon to take command. Aristides was an enemy and rival of Themistocles. They differed politically. Aristides believed in a moderate aristocracy. Themistocles was the great champion of democracy. Themistocles was bold and ingenious, and interfered with the plans of his rival Aristides. The latter, however, was very popular and reputed the most just man in Athens. He loved Cimon, used all his influence to promote his fortunes, and urged his appointment as admiral. So great was the popularity of the latter that at Byzantium, when the fleet rebelled against the selfish, vain, arrogant and treasonable Pausanias, the former was sent out as admiral with Aristides.

His first success was on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Strymon, B. C. 471. He invaded the interior, cut off the base of supplies from Eion and Amphipolis, took Eion (q. v.) and put Thrace and the region about the river Strymon in possession of the Athenians. This country was rich in timber, adapted to agriculture, and contained rich mines of gold and silver.

After Eion, Cimon led an expedition against the piratical island of Scyros (B. C. 470), from which he expelled the Dolopian pirates and annexed it as Athenian territory. He fought the Carystians who dwelt on the island of Eubœa, and quelled the revolt which they had instigated, and prevented hostilities from spreading over the island. He was sent B. C. 467 to the island of Naxos, a member of the Confederacy of Delos (q. v.), and the first among the allies to revolt from that alliance, and reduced its inhabitants to submission.

His greatest military achievement was his double victory at the mouth of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, B. C. 466. The Persians were collecting their forces preparatory to a fresh attempt to subjugate Greece. A fleet and a land force was on the Eurymedon await-

ing the arrival of a contingent of eighty Phœnician vessels. Cimon attacked and defeated the fleet, and then as the army drew towards the sea, paused as if in doubt whether to attack, his men being wearied by the slaughter in the first engagement. But seeing the men grow enthusiastic, as if eager to finish on land, the work they had begun on the sea, they disembarked and set upon the Persians, who withstood with firmness the shock of the first impact. The Athenians finally routed the barbarians, put them to flight, and plundered their tents and pavillions. "Cimon," says Plutarch, "like a skilled athlete at the games, having in one day carried off two victories, wherein he surpassed that of Salamis by sea, and that of Platæa by land, was encouraged to try for yet another success." Accordingly, Cimon set off to engage the fleet of eighty Phœnician sail which had come in sight at Hydrum, and having overtaken the enemy destroyed them before they had learned of the defeat of their allies in Pamphylia. Then the King of Persia made peace and engaged that his armies should come no nearer the sea than the length of a horse's course.

Cimon's fame increased and his public career ran smoothly until B. C. 465, when he was sent with a fleet to the northern Ægean or sea of Thrace, to reduce the island of Thasos. It is situated about five miles off the mainland, and about forty miles east of Eion and Amphipolis, on the river Strymon. The island is eighteen miles long from north to south, and some fifteen miles across. Like Naxos, Thasos was a member of the Confederacy of Delos. The former was the first of the allies to renounce its allegiance to the league. But the reasons assigned by Athens to bolster up its pretext for sending a squadron to subjugate Thasos, did not arise from any disposition on the part of the Thasians to repudiate their obligations to the Confederacy. Their quarrel with Athens was with regard to certain

territory on the mainland in Thrace, and the right to participate in the revenues of certain gold mines at or near Mount Pangæus, which were being worked by the Thracians, from which the Thasians received the profits. After Cimon had reduced Eion on the Strymon, six years before (B. C. 471), as narrated above, the value of these mines aroused the cupidity of the Athenians, who sent a colony of ten thousand into the country inhabited by the Edoni, in the vicinity of the Nine Ways, which afterwards became the site of Amphipolis. They then advanced into the interior. The Thracians, whose country was threatened by the newcomers, united with the Edonians. A battle ensued at Drabescus in Edonia, which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the colonists, who were massacred almost to a man. The inroads of the Athenians interfered materially with the interests of the Thasians, who had formed a sort of commercial partnership with the Thracians who worked the mines. It was believed at Athens that the Thasians secretly aided the Thracians in the affair at Drabescus, and this it is believed was the cause of the war. The former had become possessed of considerable territory on the mainland in these nearby regions. Their island was only forty miles distant from the mouth of the Styrmon, but half a day's sail from Eion. We have no detailed account of the quarrel between the Athenians and the Thasians at this time. There is no record of any attempt on the part of Athens to submit to arbitration her differences with her ally. The Athenians had the power of a giant, and used it like a giant. Cimon was ordered to Thasos with a strong fleet, with instructions to reduce the island to subjection. He defeated the Thasians in a sea fight, and blockaded their ports. It was the battle of the strong against the weak. The Thasians believed they were in the right, and that they should have been protected in their rights by Athens, who was their

ally, and the head of their confederacy, instead of being forced not only to give up their lands and mines in Trace, but commanded to surrender their island home, and become subjects and practically slaves of Athens. In view of the unfair conduct of the Athenians, perhaps the slaughter of their colonists may be regarded as an act of retributive justice, visited upon them by divine providence. The Thasians, notwithstanding they were besieged by a fleet under the command of the invincible Cimon, determined to resist to the last. Liberty was sweet, and the Thasians, as a last resort, appealed secretly to the Lacedæmonians for succor. The latter heard their appeal and prepared to furnish them substantial aid, and make war upon Athens.

The hand of providence interposed. Just as the Lacedæmonians were about to send an army to invade Attica, an earthquake shook the valley of the Eurotas and destroyed the city of Sparta, B. C. 464, and more than 20,000 of its inhabitants perished. Sparta, however, had been an oppressor as well as Athens. For years they had warred to enslave the Messenians and the Helots, their neighbors on the west, and keep them in bondage. The military operations against these people are known as the third Messenian War.

When the earthquake demolished Sparta, and destroyed thousands of her people, the downtrodden and oppressed Helots took advantage of the calamity to secure their freedom. They immediately revolted and marched into the valley of the Eurotas. They were repulsed and driven into Messenia, and with the aid of the Messenians, fortified themselves in the mountains, and occupied the inaccessible heights of Mount Ithome, not far from the city of Messene. The struggle to subjugate these people continued for a period of nearly ten years.

By reason of the earthquake, and the war which ensued, the Spartans were unable to keep their promise to aid the Thasians, by sending an army secretly to invade Attica. On the contrary, they were obliged to seek the assistance of the Athenians to enable them to dislodge their enemies from Mount Ithome. This peculiar combination of circumstances involved Cimon, whose love for the Lacedæmonians prompted him to come to their aid. He used all his influence to persuade his countrymen to send an army to Messenia, at the behest of Sparta. The Democratic party in Athens, led by Ephialtes and Pericles, opposed Cimon. They did what they could to persuade the Public Assembly to deny his request. They argued that the latter was more friendly to the Spartans than was consistent with loyalty to the Athenians. That the former were the secret foes of Athens and would destroy her supremacy if they could, and that Cimon, in seeking to befriend them was guilty of disloyalty. They insisted that as soon as the island of Thasos had been subjugated, he should forthwith proceed to the mainland and invade Macedonia and Thrace, and make her territory part of the Athenian Empire.

As has been observed, the island of Thasos was but half a day's sail from the mouth of the Strymon, and after the reduction of Thasos the way was open to invade Macedonia. But Cimon chose rather to devote his energies to aid the Lacedæmonians in their struggle with the Helots, than to gain new conquests on the shores of Thrace. At all events, after the surrender of the Thasians, he did not land his troops on the mainland, nor make any attempt to march against the armies of Alexander of Macedon.

His conduct, in this regard, brought upon him the severe criticism of his enemies. He was openly charged with having been bribed by Alexander, because he neglected the opportunity to invade his kingdom and was accused also of treason for failure to act upon the

demand that he conquer the territory of the enemies of Athens. Charges were preferred against him, and he was put on trial for his life.

Then, as has been observed, history repeated itself. Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was tried by Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, as Miltiades, the father of Cimon, years before had been tried for his life by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles. But so great was the popularity of Cimon, and so valuable and extensive were the services he had rendered to his country, and the riches he had secured to the public treasury of Athens, that Pericles became mild and perfunctory in his prosecution, and Cimon was acquitted. Whether the influence of Elpinice, sister of Cimon, who at the time was the beautiful wife of Callias, whose charms, prior to her marriage had attracted the attention of Pericles, influenced his conduct on this occasion we are not informed.

The struggle of the common people for popular rights continued at Athens. After the death of Aristides, who was a leader of the conservative party, and the banishment of the great democratic champion, Themistocles, the conservatives sought the influence of Cimon, whose popularity made him one of the first citizens in the State, and he became the leader of the conservatives or aristocratic party.

He was a distinguished general, a genial, open-handed, big-hearted sailor, fond of the good things of this life, to an extent, which gave credence to reports that when off duty, he was inclined to indulge sometimes to excess in convivial pleasures. As a diplomat and politician he was no match for Pericles, who succeeded Themistocles, as leader of the democrats and at this time was prominent in politics, sharing public honors with Ephialtes, the incorruptible. While Cimon was in Athens his influence in public affairs seems to have prevented the leaders of the democracy from securing

legislation in the interest of the masses. But when Cimon went to sea, prosecuting his campaigns against the Persians, the popular party in Athens led by Ephialtes, supported by Pericles and other leaders succeeded in remodelling the constitution of Solon, as modified by Clisthenes, so as to throw open the office of Archon to any citizen who desired to become a candidate for that position. Formerly, no one could be a candidate unless he possessed a requisite amount of property to the end that none but the wealthy should be eligible. It is true that suffrage was universal, but the power of the common people was nullified, because they were not permitted to choose their candidates. The office of Archon was most important, and although elected annually, yet when an Archon served honorably, he became, when his term of office expired, ex-officio, a member of the powerful and dignified council of the Areopagus.

This body, composed of ex-archons, was one of the oldest and most influential among the Athenians. It continued long after the Roman conquest, and retained its ancient jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to religion and morals during the first century of the Christian era. When Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, stood upon Mars Hill (Hill of Ares), in the city of Athens (A. D. 53), they took him before this ancient court, the Areopagus, and before that tribunal, he delivered his great address on the worship of the unknown God, and there declared the sublime doctrine of the resurrection!

The new laws, passed by the party of Ephialtes and Pericles in Cimon's absence, embraced these fundamentals; first, the office of the archon was open to all citizens; second, archons were elected by ballot, and the right of suffrage was universal; third, the Areopagus was stripped of practically all of its powers and duties, except the cases involving questions of re-

ligion and morals, and certain cases of homicide. The jurisdiction and functions taken from the Court or Council of the Areopagus were conferred upon the dikasts, who were chosen from the entire body of citizens and who sitting as jurors, decided all questions of law and fact in the cases tried before them. So Athens became a pure democracy.

When Cimon returned from his campaigns, he did what he could to bring back the old order of things, and restore the aristocracy, as it had flourished in the time of Clisthenes. His efforts were bitterly contested and brought upon him and his party most violent attacks of the democrats. Old slanders against him were revived, among others, the charge that he was intimate with his sister Elpinice, prior to her marriage with the wealthy Callias. He was charged also as being closely allied to the Lacedæmonians. Plutarch has a verse of the poet Eupolis reflecting on Cimon as follows:

> "He was as good as others that one sees,
> But he was fond of drinking and of ease;
> And would at nights to Sparta often roam,
> Leaving his sister desolate at home."

At the time Cimon was tried for his life and acquitted as above narrated, public opinion favored him to such an extent that the Public Assembly granted his request that an army be sent to aid the Lacedæmonians, who were fighting to suppress the revolt of the Helots, and Cimon was honored with supreme command.

The Athenians, however, had not been long in Messenia, acting as allies of Sparta, when suddenly the Lacedæmonians concluded that it was bad policy for them to accept the aid of their rivals. Notwithstanding their unbounded confidence in Cimon, and the love and esteem they bore him, they notified the Athenians that their services were no longer required. When they returned home their countrymen expressed freely their indignation at this insult and the humiliation put upon them by Sparta. Every Athenian, among the conservatives, who had expressed friendship and partiality for Sparta, felt the displeasure of the people, which was strongly manifested in speech and action. The most conspicuous object of their displeasure was their leader, the genial aristocrat, and distinguished Cimon. The democrats put all the blame on him. His party was beaten and its leader was ostracized for a period of ten years.

At heart, Cimon was loyal to Athens, and, while still an exile, proved his loyalty by offering his services to his countrymen to fight the Spartans at Tanagra (B. C. 457), q. v. The latter unable to prevent Athens from building her long walls about the Piræus, determined to organize an alliance, and to enlist Thebes as an ally to check the operations of Athens in Bœotia. It was at this time that the Lacedæmonians, on pretext of lending aid to her Dorian kinsmen, who had been attacked by the Phocians, sent an army to their relief, and succored the Dorians. On its return, the army stopped at Thebes, in Bœotia, to strengthen the bond of allegiance between that city and Sparta. The Athenians sought to prevent the return of the Lacedæmonians, and encamped at Tanagra on the borders of Bœotia, where an engagement took place (q. v.), which resulted in the defeat of the Athenians. Cimon, who under the decree of ostracism, was then in retirement in Bœotia, went to the Athenian camp, and besought his countrymen to permit him to fight for Athens, but his request was refused. Then Cimon, determined to silence forever all suspicion as to his loyalty, organized some volunteers under Euthippus, who had also been censured because they were suspected of being too friendly to Sparta, and advised them to take part in the battle, in which he was forbidden to participate.

They fought with such conspicuous bravery that neither their loyalty nor that of Cimon was longer doubted. Shortly after Cimon was recalled by a decree which was drawn and presented to the Assembly by Pericles himself, the great democratic leader, and rival and the enemy of Cimon.

The facts and circumstances, in connection with the recall of Cimon, led to the conclusion that Pericles in view of the force of public opinion in Cimon's favor, so arranged matters, that the latter should be put in command of a fleet sent out of Greece and kept abroad as much as possible. He doubtless argued that while at sea, Cimon might augment the glory of Athens; and while abroad he could not influence the Athenians in such a way as to interfere with the political aims and ambition of its first citizen. The political rival of Pericles at that time was Thucydides. We have no authentic account as to what part Cimon took in political affairs after his return from exile. On account of his friendship for the Lacedæmonians, Pericles induced him to use his influence to secure a treaty of peace with Sparta, which service he accomplished B. C. 452, and negotiated what is known as the Five Years' Truce.

It was after he had secured this treaty that Cimon was asigned to duty abroad. He was put in command of a fleet of two hundred galleys, with instructions to proceed to Cyprus and from that point conduct operations not only to reduce that important island, but also to assist the Egyptians who had revolted against the rule of Artaxerxes, under the leadership of Inaros, King of the Libyans. After his death, the rebels continued the war under Anyratens, in the fens of the Nile. Cimon dispatched a squadron of sixty ships which sailed to Egypt, and with the remainder he proceeded to blockade Citium.

This was his last campaign. About the time he embarked he was admonished by the soothsayers and

diviners, that dire portents had manifested themselves, which these worthies advised presaged his death.

These warnings, we are told, were revealed to Cimon in a dream, in which he heard the furious barking of dogs mingled with human voices, which echoed the refrain which Plutarch quotes:

> Come on, for thou shalt shortly be
> A pleasure to my whelps and me.

We are told that Astyphilus, a friend of Cimon, skilled in divination, interpreted the dream as a premonition of the death of the great admiral. His reading of the vision was to the effect that a dog is the enemy of him he barks at, and always rejoices when his enemy is dead. The human voices mingled with the barking signified the Medes, for in their armies were found both Greeks and barbarians.

But Cimon loved his country. He loved adventure and excitement, and notwithstanding the doleful predictions of soothsayers and diviners, set out on his last expedition to win fresh glory for Athens, and humiliate and defeat his enemies. His aim was the ruin of the Persian Empire. Doubtless, had he lived, he might have carried his arms into Asia, and anticipated Alexander in the conquest of the East. He deputed sixty triremes to sail to Egypt, and with the remainder of his fleet sought to dislodge the Persians and their allies, the Sicilians and Phœnicians, from the island of Cyprus.

It was off the harbor of New Salamis, on the southern coast of the island that Cimon fought his last battle. The City of Citium was the scene of his last siege. Seventeen years had passed since the Athenian admiral, at the mouth of Eurymedon, on the coast of Pamphylia, won his greatest victory, the results of which emancipated Europe and Asia Minor from the dominion of Persia. The fates had decreed that he should end his

labors on the coast of Cyprus less than two hundred miles southeast of the scene of his greatest victory. His forces had been suffering from famine, and for this reason alone, they were obliged to retire from Citium. Cimon, who had been ill and confined to his bed, died, before the Phœnician fleet, then on its way to relieve the beleaguered city had arrived. When his end was approaching he gave orders that his officers should conceal the news of his death.

"Now twilight lets her curtain down,
And pins it with a star."

"There is darkness on the mountain,
There is darkness on the main,
And the stars between the breaking clouds
Are hanging like a chain,
A chain of golden glittering gems
Let down into the sea."

In the solemn hush of a summer's evening the soul of the great admiral passed. His race was run; his career was finished. But the spirit of the great commander still lived. In the engagement which followed, shortly after his death, although the voice of Cimon was stilled forever, the glorious memories of his achievements inspired his countrymen. When the enemy's fleet arrived they were attacked and overwhelmingly defeated. The Athenians then disembarked, and vanquished the land forces, who opposed them, and thus accomplished a feat at Cyprus, similar to that which, at the Eurymedon, rendered imperishable the fame of Cimon.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE, KNOWN AS THE PEACE OF PERICLES — CONTEMPORANEOUS EVENTS

PERICLES, B. C. 445, negotiated a treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta and her allies. The events which followed the defeat of the Athenians at Coronea (B. C. 447), referred to in a preceding chapter, made it imperative for Athens to seek peace with the Lacedæmonians. Had Pericles failed to negotiate the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, the battle of Coronea (B. C. 447), and not the surprise at Platæa (B. C. 431), would have marked the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

As to the details of this important treaty we know very little. Thucydides is our informant. He refers to the incident briefly [1] as follows: "Pericles, having returned from Eubœa, not long after [he had subdued the revolt in that island] made a truce with the Lacedæmonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisæa, Pegæ, Trozen and Achaia, places in the Peloponnese, of which the Athenians were in possession." It appears also in another connection (Thuc. i, 78), that the treaty contained a provision that all disputes or differences which might arise between the contracting parties should be settled by arbitration; and that neither should assume to entertain the complaints

[1] Thucyd. i, 115.

brought by the allies of the other; but that all such controversies should be adjusted by the heads of the respective alliances.

We know the principal features of the treaty from this record of Thucydides, namely, that Athens was required to abandon all the acquisitions which she had secured in the Peloponnesus and agreed to permit Megara, which was in control of the Isthmus of Corinth, the gateway to Attica, to remain as a member of the Spartan alliance. Pericles deemed these sacrifices, great as they were, necessary in order to avert war, and to enable her to retain intact her maritime empire. His experience and prudent foresight made him sensible of the fact that war with the Lacedæmonians was inevitable. He seems to have anticipated it for years. Plutarch tells us that among the few recorded sayings of this great statesman was that "he saw already war moving on its way towards them out of the Peloponnesus."

He doubtless concluded, when he lent his influence to secure the Thirty Years' Peace, that Athens must elect either to engage in a destructive war, the results of which were altogether uncertain, in order to build up again her land empire, or to abandon it entirely, in order that the integrity of her maritime power might continue. A most important feature of the treaty was, that for war, arbitration should be substituted. Had this provision been lived up to, the treaty might have lasted the entire period of its limitation. To appreciate the importance of this compact, it will be profitable to review briefly the events which led up to it, some of which are set forth in the preceding chapter.

Athens had been able to build up her land empire, chiefly by reason of the fact that at that particular time, the Lacedæmonians were in no condition to undertake a war against her, having suffered from the earthquake (B. C. 464), which destroyed their city in the

valley of the Eurotas. In addition to that calamity they were obliged to prosecute the Third Messenian War, waged against their authority by the revolting Helots, a contest which occupied a period of nearly ten years (464-455). Their resources, on this account, were exhausted to such an extent that they remained inactive for three years after that event, and then, B. C. 552, they concluded a Five Years' Truce with Athens. Thus, while the Lacedæmonians were not in a position to interfere with the ambitious designs of Pericles, Athens, under the leadership of that remarkable man, accomplished her ambitious designs to secure supremacy in northern and central Greece, as she had already, through the instrumentality of the Delian Confederacy, acquired supremacy on the seas. The events by which Athens built up her land empire are sketched in a preceding chapter. After the victory at Œnophyta, the Athenians finished their long walls, connecting the capital of Attica with the Piræus. A powerful fleet was assigned to Tolmides (B. C. 456), who circumnavigated the Peloponnese, burned the arsenals of the Lacedæmonians (the Five Years' Truce not then having been made), took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians in Ætolia, and defeated the Sicyonians in a battle during a descent on their lands in Argolis, near the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and secured control of Achaia. The island of Ægina was reduced to slavery, which gave the Athenians control of the Saronic Gulf. In the following year, Pericles repeated the plundering expedition which had been previously made by Tolmides. He sailed with one hundred galleys from the harbor of The Fountains, known also as Pegæ, in Megara (B. C. 455) along the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and descended on the territory of the Sicyonians, and further reduced Achaia. He then ravaged the coasts of Acarnania. In order to secure a brief period of further repose, after the long

and tedious Messenian War, the Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Cimon, who contemplated a campaign against Cyprus, were persuaded to negotiate the Five Years' Truce, B. C. 452-450. This treaty enabled the Athenians to fit out a formidable fleet of two hundred sail, which was sent to Cyprus under Cimon, and from that strategic base were enabled to undertake the invasion of Egypt, as allies of the Libyan King, Inaros, to further weaken the power of Persia. The absence of Cimon, on this expedition, left Pericles supreme in Athens. He died the following year, B. C. 449, while engaged in the siege of Citium. The Athenians had also made alliances which gave them supremacy in Bœotia, on the Isthmus, and in Achaia. Thus the alliances of Athens included the countries along the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Corinth, and her land empire was established.

At Coronea, B. C. 447, the success of Athens was reversed. The immediate results of that engagement was the loss of Bœotia. The Five Years' Truce was about to expire, and the Lacedæmonians would then be free, and in a position to concentrate all the enemies of Attica in northern and central Greece, into an alliance, including the Megarians, whose territory embraced the Isthmus.

When the Bœotians gained their independence, they instigated the Eubœans to revolt, and throw off their allegiance to Athens. Colonies of Athenian kleruchs had been established on that island, to whom had been given the lands of the Eubœans, and the latter were ready to join the revolution to regain control of their estates, and establish their independence. The importance of Eubœa to Attica is obvious. The hostile state of Argolis lay directly to the west, separated from Attica by the Saronic Gulf. The island of Eubœa lay directly east, separated from her only by the straits of Eubœa. The narrow island extends north, immediately

east of Bœotia. At the Euripus, the coasts of Bœotia and Eubœa almost touch, the channel at that point being less than a mile wide. Her four principal cities were Histiæ on the extreme north, not far from the headland of Artemisia; Carystus on the extreme south; Eretria about midway the island, on the western shore, and Chalcis on the Euripus, a few miles north of Eretria.

Pericles saw that the revolt in Eubœa must be subdued at the earliest moment. He mustered a strong force and began a campaign against the rebels. He was not permitted to prosecute the war. Scarcely had he begun operations when he received news of the most alarming import. Corinth, Sicyon and Epidaurus had formed an alliance and persuaded the Megarians to join them, to enable her to throw off her allegiance to Athens. The troops of the allied forces had been admitted to the City of Megara. The Athenian garrison was massacred, except a small remnant who made their escape to Nisæa. Thus while Pericles was absent in Eubœa, the Peloponnesians had secured control of the Isthmus and the mountain passes of Geraneia. By reason of the efforts of the united exiles, who had triumphed in Bœotia, the revolt spread into Phocis and Locris. All Central Greece was in revolt. What made matters still more serious for Athens was the fact that the Five Years' Truce, which had protected Athens from the direct attacks of the Lacedæmonians, had now expired. The mountain passes across the Isthmus were in control of her allies, so that a Peloponnesian army could march unmolested from the southern peninsula, directly into Attica. The time had come for the Lacedæmonians to strike her rival a decisive blow. Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, the King of Sparta at this time, was a mere youth. The Ephors, therefore, as a matter of extra precaution, attached to his person, Cleandrides, to aid him by his superior wisdom and

prudent counsel. This Cleandrides was the father of Gylippus, who afterwards overpowered the Athenians at Syracuse. An army of Lacedæmonians, with their Peloponnesian allies, was dispatched under Pleistoanax to invade Attica.

It was a dark hour for Athens. She was threatened with invasion by the united forces of the southern peninsula, and Pericles, the ablest man in Greece, absent in Eubœa with an Athenian army, sent there to quell a revolt which had spread throughout that island.

The Public Assembly acted promptly. Pericles was recalled, and proceeded at once at the head of his forces to meet the army of invasion which was then encamped on the plain of Eleusis almost within sight of Athens. Pericles determined, under no circumstances, to hazard a battle on Attic soil, if he could avoid doing so. What if his arms were defeated. It meant the irretrievable ruin of his country. In this critical situation, Pericles relied, not on the strength of his arms, but on the weakness of human nature. He argued that bribes might be used to accomplish that which he might not be able to accomplish in any other way.

Avarice was one of the besetting sins of the Hellenic race. It had ruined Themistocles. It had ruined Pausanias, the father of Pleistoanax. It was destined, also, to ruin Gylippus, the son of Cleandrides, and as the sequel shows it ruined Cleandrides himself on the occasion of his campaign in Attica, with his King, on the present occasion.

Indeed, Plutarch, in his life of Pericles, observes in this connection, as to the corruption of Cleandrides, that this covetousness was an hereditary disease, transmitted from father to son. Eurybiades took a bribe from Themistocles, in order to induce him to remain at Artemisium, when Leonidas, his King, was in peril at Thermopylæ. Even the Pythian priestess in the temple at Delphi could not resist the blandishments of those

who desired oracles, published from her sacred tripod, suited to accomplish their personal or political ends. These prophecies were in fact procured to enable Pleistoanax to obtain pardon for the crime of bribery, charged on this occasion. Athens was rich. In the temple of Athene, on the Acropolis, were the chests filled with the golden tribute paid into its treasury by the constituent members of the Confederacy of Delos. Pericles had gold at his command. Gold, he concluded, afforded a solution of the difficult problem with which he was confronted. Pleistoanax was very young. Cleandrides was susceptible. Negotiations were had with the enemy, and as a result of these conferences, the Peloponnesian army took its departure from Attica, and returned to the valley of the Eurotas. The inference was irresistible, that the Spartan King and his prudent adviser were bribed by the diplomatic Athenian statesman.

Mr. Grote hesitates to give entire credence to the assumption that the peaceful return of the Peloponnesians to their country after they had entered the plains of Attica, without striking a blow, was the result of the corruption of the Spartan King and his associate. He argues that we may well doubt whether the Peloponnesian forces were strong enough to undertake the risk of attacking Athens, now completely walled and protected from the Acropolis to the sea. He refers to the deliberation and caution, observed by Archidamus, during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, at the head of a more commanding force. It may be observed, also, in addition to what Mr. Grote has said, that Pericles was on that occasion attended by a strong force, probably eight, perhaps ten thousand hoplites. He returned afterwards to Eubœa with an army of eight thousand heavy armed. If this force was augmented on his return from that island by auxiliaries from Athens when he marched thence to Eleusis to

meet the invading forces of the enemy, we are justified in assuming that these auxiliaries numbered at least two thousand. We have no record as to the number of troops in the army of Pleistoanax, so that we cannot judge as to the numerical strength of the respective forces. It is not possible, therefore, to measure the risk Pericles must have assumed, had he determined to engage the invaders on the plain of Eleusis.

However, this may be, it seems certain that the Spartans believed that their King, and his associate had been bribed. On that charge they were tried, on their return to Sparta, and convicted. Both were banished. It is a singular coincidence that Pleistoanax, who was long a penitent in the sacred precincts near the temple of Athene in Tegea, in Arcadia, procured his restoration by bribing the Pythoness, and through her influence, somehow, the Spartan King was permitted to return to his dominions. Cleandrides died in exile, sentence of death having been passed upon him during his absence.

This charge of bribery seems to be further corroborated by the fact that when Pericles rendered an account of his expenditures, shortly afterwards, he stated a disbursement of ten talents, as laid out upon fit occasion. The item was not investigated, but the assembly allowed it without question. Indeed, some affirm that every year Pericles sent privately to Sparta the sum of ten talents, with which he compensated those in office to keep off the war, not to purchase peace, but to gain time in which to be better able to prepare for hostilities. This then seemed to be the primary object of the Thirty Years' Peace, namely, to gain time to prepare for war.

After the last file of hoplites in the army of Pleistoanax had disappeared beyond the borders of Attica, Pericles lost no time in returning to Eubœa to complete

the task of suppressing the revolt in that island, an undertaking which had been suddenly interrupted by the appearance of a Peloponnesian army within the borders of Attica. He left Athens with an army of eight thousand heavy armed, and was accompanied also by a fleet of fifty ships. He reduced the city of Chalcis on the Euripus, and drove out all the wealthy inhabitants who favored an oligarchy, and the city became a tribute ally of Athens. He then proceeded to the extreme north of the island, and attacked the ancient city of Histiæa. It was situated near the sea, and its inhabitants had attacked an Athenian vessel, which they plundered, and then massacred the crew. For this offense, Pericles depopulated the city, changed its name to Oreus, and turned it over to a colony of Athenian kleruchs. In a short time he had reduced the whole island, secured its allegiance, and settled it by agreement. The suppression of this revolt, in the territory adjoining the channel on the east of Attica was absolutely essential to the peace and safety of Athens.

The task had been accomplished in Eubœa. But the reconquest of that island could not secure to Athens enduring peace. Pericles knew that the respite he had secured when he induced Pleistoanax to retire with his army from Attica was but temporary. The war cloud hung heavy over the Peloponnese. It was only a matter of time when it would advance over Attica, and all Hellas would be involved in a destructive war. The shame and mortification occasioned by the ignominious conduct of Sparta's King, who after invading Attica at the head of an army of Spartans and Spartan allies, returned to the valley of the Eurotas without striking a blow, kindled the wrath of his countrymen. Even the dread of the Athenian navy, which had plundered the seas, and ravaged the coasts of the Peloponnese, could not deter nor long delay the cherished ambition of Sparta to destroy Athens. Although the Athenians

had lost their allies in Bœotia, in Phocis, in Locris, and in Megara, they still retained Achaia, and Trozen, Nisæa and Pegæ. Pericles knew that Athens could not hold these states; that she was not in position to defend them permanently, and that she must temporarily at least abandon the Peloponnese. Then why not make a virtue of necessity, and trade these places to purchase peace, and the repose which Athens sorely needed? Her fleets and armies had been actively engaged in military operations for more than a generation. Since the battle of Salamis, Athens had warred against Persia, driven her from Europe, expelled her from the sea and compelled her to retire from the coast of Asia Minor, and confined her activities to the limitations of her ancient dominions. Not content with this she sent fleets and armies to Egypt to aid the revolution of Inaros, the Libyan monarch, to destroy her power in the land of the Nile. She had waged domestic war also and built up a land empire, which she was obliged to relinquish after her defeat at Coronea.

Pericles was moved by these considerations to secure for his countrymen a long respite. Peace under the circumstances became at this critical juncture more acceptable than war, and the great warrior statesman of Attica, who commanded her fleets and armies, now bent all his energies to purchase peace, while Athens had yet something to give to placate the jealousy and envy of the Peloponnesians. Trozen, Nisæa, Pegæ and Achaia — the surrender of these places indicated her willingness to abandon the southern peninsula of Hellas, the Isthmus and the control of the Gulf of Corinth. But Pericles was willing to make the great sacrifice in order that Athens might retain the integrity of her maritime empire, and enter upon a period of repose, an era which was destined to make Athens the centre of art, literature, and philosophy in the ancient world, and render her fame immortal.

He concluded, therefore, a treaty of peace with Sparta, by which the contracting parties bound themselves to refrain from hostilities and cease war for a period of thirty years.

CHAPTER XXXVII

ATHENS AT PEACE

THE causes which led to the Peace of Pericles, referred to in the previous chapter, may be summarized as follows:

For more than a generation prior to the Thirty Years' Peace (B. C. 445), Athens had been engaged in war. Since the battle of Salamis and the destruction of the city by Xerxes (B. C. 480), her fleets and armies had been constantly employed against Persia. In the Ægean and in Asia Minor Cimon had destroyed the dominion of Darius and Xerxes, and in its stead had planted the Athenian Empire. The death of that great admiral (B. C. 449) opened the way for peace with Persia. The defeat of the Athenians at Coronea, made it imperative that they should seek peace with the Lacedæmonians. The alliances which Pericles had negotiated in northern and central Greece, after the battle of Œnophyta, had been dissolved. Eubœa had revolted. A Spartan King at the head of an invading army had entered the borders of Attica. Bribery had been resorted to, to prevent a war with the Peloponnesians. Pericles then wisely concluded that Athens, at this time, was not prepared to engage with Sparta, in a struggle for her existence. The best interests of Athens required peace. To preserve the integrity of her maritime empire, peace was absolutely essential. The diplomacy of Pericles brought about the desired result, and the Thirty Years'

Peace was concluded B. C. 445. An account of this treaty and the causes which led to it are sketched in the last chapter.

As a result Athens secured repose. She had no land empire, but was the head of the greatest maritime empire in the world. She was also the richest city. Her revenues, with the exception only of the Persian empire, exceeded the revenues of any other country. The source of her wealth was the annual assessment paid into her treasury by her tribute allies. The number of these tributary cities is said to have been not less than one thousand. Some years before the Thirty Years' Peace, presumably about B. C. 460, the treasury of the Delian league which was originally in the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos, was removed to the temple of Athene, on the Acropolis at Athens. Mr. Grote says that it is impossible to state the precise time when the character of this great Confederacy was changed from a body of armed and active warriors, under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute payers, defended by the military force of Athens — from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute and awaiting Athenian orders. At the time of the Peace of Pericles, B. C. 445, it was no longer an independent Confederacy of independent allies, or independent states, represented in a general Congress, or Synod, which met annually in the temple at Delos, but formed part of an imperial empire, under the jurisdiction of Athens. With the exception of Chios, Samos and Lesbos, every member of the Confederacy was obliged to pay into the treasury at Athens its annual tribute, the amount of which was levied by the Athenians. The three islands above referred to were still permitted to remain independent allies of Athens. Each was allowed to retain its armed force, ships, and fortifications, the sole obligation being to furnish military and naval

aid when required, but they were under no obligation to pay tribute.

The amount of revenue derived from the subject allies in the Delian Confederacy, in the time of Pericles, was not less than six hundred talents annually, equal to considerably more than half a million dollars. The annual assessment in the time of Aristides, when war was actively carried on against Persia, was four hundred and sixty talents. Yet after peace had been concluded with Persia, the annual tribute had increased to six hundred talents. From the tribute cities of Athens, in her outlying colonies in Italy, Magna Græcia, in Thrace, and elsewhere, her annual income aggregated at least four hundred talents, nearly half a million dollars. So that the Athenians received into their treasury every year an income of at least one million talents, equal to more than one million dollars, which, in that age, was regarded as a princely revenue.

Athens now became not only a great commercial city, a centre of wealth and influence, carrying on extensive mercantile relations with every country, but also the centre of philosophy, literature and art. War had ceased with Persia, but the great war fund originally contributed by the allies of Athens to fight Persia, was still exacted, but instead of being used to carry on war, it was used to adorn and beautify Athens, which became noted as the most beautiful of cities; the remains of whose ancient glory and faded splendor still attracts the wonder and admiration of mankind. This era in the history of Athens from the Thirty Years' Peace, B. C. 445, to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, B. C. 431, is known in history as the Golden Age of Pericles.

The period of repose, which gave Athens the opportunity to establish enduring fame in philosophy, in literature and art, was interrupted by two wars. The first arose on account of a quarrel between the island

of Samos and the city of Miletus, both allies of Athens, over the government of Priene, a city in Ionia, known as the Samian War, and an armed conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, with regard to their allies in Epidamnus (called Dyrrhachium by the Romans) in Illyria, on the coast of the Adriatic, and Potidea, in the Chalcidian peninsula in Thrace. In this latter war, Corcyra was accepted by Athens as her ally, and the aid which the Athenians gave her at the battle of Sybota, B. C. 432, enabled her to defeat the Corinthian fleet. On this account Corinth and Megara, the ships of the latter having been forbidden to trade in Athenian ports, made common cause, and finally being allies of Sparta, induced the latter to adjudge, that Athens had broken the treaty — the Thirty Years' Peace. The result was the Peloponnesian War, which resulted in the ruin of Athens, and the destruction of her empire.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE SAMIAN WAR

SAMOS – Sa-mos — [Σαμος]. An island in the Ægean Sea, off the promontory of Mount Mycale in Ionia. It is situated about twenty-five miles northwest of Miletus and forty-five miles southwest of Smyrna. The island is twenty-eight miles long. Its greatest breadth is twelve miles.

IN B. C. 440, the fifth year of the Thirty Years' Peace, the island of Samos revolted from the authority of Athens. Pericles, with whom was associated the poet Sophocles, in command of an Athenian fleet, besieged and blockaded Samos, and after a war which continued for a period of nine months reduced the island to subjection. These military operations are known as the Samian War, and their successful termination added to the fame and influence of Pericles, who was at that time the most conspicuous figure in Greece.

In B. C. 440, Chios, Lesbos and Samos were the only members of the Confederacy of Delos who were independent allies of Athens. The others were subject allies. They were not permitted to retain their own navies or fortifications, but were compelled to pay their annual tribute into the treasury of the Confederacy, and in consideration of such payment were entitled at all times to its protection. After the disastrous defeat of Tolmides at Coronea (B. C. 447), Athens lost her supremacy in central Greece. The Peloponnesians, as a result of that victory, having destroyed the Athenian hegemony on land, endeavored also to accomplish the defeat of her supremacy on the sea. Revolts were in-

stigated in Eubœa and elsewhere, and in view of the threatening power of her enemies, Athens, acting upon the sagacious and prudent counsel of Pericles, sought peace with the Lacedæmonians. After negotiations, which continued for two years, a treaty was negotiated (B. C. 445), known as the Thirty Years' Peace (q. v.).

During the interval of comparative repose, which resulted from this treaty, Pericles beautified and adorned Athens, with elaborate temples and costly public buildings, which made it the envy of all Greece. The members of the Confederacy chafed under the oppression to which they were subjected in being compelled to pay tribute into the treasury of the league, which was used for the aggrandizement and splendor of the capital of Attica. Athens, also, as the head of the Confederacy, drew to herself jurisdiction of all criminal cases, and it is believed of civil controversies as well. Her decision was binding also, in all disputes as to municipal affairs among her independent and subject allies.

The immediate cause of the Samian war grew out of a quarrel between Samos and Miletus, with regard to the possession of Priene. The latter was situated in Ionia, on the south coast of the promontory of Mycale, immediately north of Miletus, on the opposite peninsula, the gulf which separates them being about nine miles wide. Priene is about twenty miles east of Samos. In this struggle Miletus was defeated. Samos took the city of Priene, and established there an oligarchical form of government. Again we have the old bone of contention between democracy and oligarchy, which kept Greece in a constant state of unrest. As a last resort, Miletus probably relying on the influence of Pericles, the great democratic leader, endeavored to persuade the Samians to submit the question as to the possession of Priene to Athens, as sole arbitrator of the dispute between them. In this Miletus was sup-

ported also by the democratic party in Samos, who were bitterly opposed to the oligarchy, which had been set up in Priene. Samos, however, declined to submit to arbitration, and insisted on her right to govern Priene, as she saw fit.

In this connection history touches the love romance in the life of Pericles, and reveals his association with his mistress, Aspasia, the most distinguished courtesan of her time. Renowned for her beauty, her wit and her intellectual attainments, Aspasia was a conspicuous figure among the public men, the philosophers, and poets whose names have made the fame of Greece immortal. She was born in Miletus, and obtained her introduction to men of prominence and power in emulation of Thargelia, whom Plutarch declares was a courtesan of the old Ionian times "a great beauty, extremely charming, and at the same time sagacious. She had numerous suitors among the Greeks, and brought all who had to do with her over to the Persian interests." It is said she had fourteen husbands. Aspasia was courted and caressed by Pericles, it is said, not only on account of her personal beauty, her wit, and charming manners, but on account of her knowledge and skill in politics. We are told that Socrates used to visit her with some of his acquaintances, and even those who frequented her company, took with them their wives to listen to her discourses.

The Milesians, having been defeated by the Samians, now desired that the powerful arm of Athens might intervene to protect her and punish her rival. They appealed to Aspasia, their country-woman, who, by reason of her influence with Pericles, was regarded as a powerful factor among statesmen and politicians at Athens to intercede with her lover in their behalf. They did not appeal in vain. Pericles proposed to the Assembly that a decree be enacted, declaring war upon Samos, in favor of the Milesians, because the Samians

refused to lay down their arms and have the controversy with Miletus decided by arbitration before the Athenians. And war was declared. It has been said that this controversy was brought about by Pericles to please Aspasia. In view of the fact that Pericles was the greatest democrat of his time after Themistocles, and that the democratic party in Athens, was strong enough to overthrow the oligarchical adherents under the leadership of one so powerful as Cimon, there seems to be no foundation for the assumption that the influence of Aspasia was the cause which induced the Athenians to interpose in behalf of Miletus against Samos as to the government of Priene. The conduct of Pericles, and the strength of the democratic party in Athens, would seem to indicate beyond question that the latter would welcome the opportunity to intervene on behalf of Miletus in order to establish democracy not only in Priene but in Samos.

Pericles was placed at the head of a fleet of forty vessels. He sailed to Samos, broke up the oligarchical governments they had established, and having taken a number of hostages, sent them to the island of Lemnos, in charge of an Athenian garrison. Under existing conditions, there were but two sources to which Samos could appeal for relief; namely, to the Lacedæmonians, the old enemies of Athens, or to the Persians. The former were prevented by the Thirty Years' Peace from lending aid to the oligarchy in Samos, but Persia lent a willing ear. Pissuthæs, satrap of Sardis, interposed on behalf of the Samians, and sought to bribe Pericles, offering him large sums of gold to excuse Samos, and release the hostages. Pericles declined to interfere and returned to Athens. No sooner had the Athenians departed than the oligarchical party in Samos, with the aid of the satrap of Sardis, and with allies from Byzantium, which also revolted, secretly set out in the night and proceeded to the island of

Lemnos. The Athenian garrison there was overpowered, and the hostages released. With the aid of Byzantium, and the assistance of the Persian satrap, Samos again revolted and defied the power of Athens.

Pericles was again placed in command of a fleet of sixty vessels and sailed to Samos. A Phœnician fleet, at the instigation of Persia, was then off the coast of Caria, intending to coöperate with the Samians, and part of the squadron of Pericles sailed to meet them. The remainder of the Athenian fleet engaged the Samians off Tragia, a small island twelve miles south of Samos, and though the Samians mustered seventy ships, Pericles, who was in command in person, after a severe contest defeated the enemy. He was then reinforced by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. With this superior force, Pericles landed on Samos, invested the city with three walls and established a blockade of the island. With fifty ships he then sailed to the coast of Caria to engage the Phœnician fleet, sent to aid the Samians. In the absence of Pericles from Samos, the blockade was broken, the Athenians were defeated, and for a period of two weeks the latter were absolute masters of the sea and adjacent coasts. On the return of Pericles, the blockade was again reestablished. Reinforcements also began to arrive. Seventy vessels joined the blockading squadron; twenty with Thucydides (not the historian), Hagnon and Phormus; twenty with Tleptolemus and Anticles, from Athens; and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. With these forces the Samian War was fought to a finish, and after a campaign of nine months the Samians surrendered to Athens, and Byzantium returned to her allegiance.

The terms of peace exacted by Athens required the Samians to demolish their walls and fortifications, surrender their fleet, furnish hostages as a guarantee against further rebellion and pay to their conquerors

the entire expenses of the war, aggregating more than $1,000,000 (a thousand talents).

After this the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and advanced themselves to a great pitch of power. The Lacedæmonians watched the advance of her rival and saw it rise to a dangerous height. They considered it no longer endurable and were eager to find some pretext to make war upon her. The opportunity presented itself when Athens lent aid to Corcyra at the battle of Sybota. (B. C. 432) q. v.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE CORCYRIAN WAR — EPIDAMNUS — ACTIUM — SYBOTA

CORCYRA — Kor-si-ra — [Κορκυρα] — (now Corfu). A mountainous island in the Ionian Sea, about 150 miles north of the gulf of Corinth, opposite the coast of Epirus (now Albania). It is indented by a crescent-shaped bay, giving the island in contour the shape of a sickle. The channel which separates Corcyra from the mainland varies in width. It is but two miles wide at the north. Along the centre it varies from twelve to fourteen miles; opposite Cape Leucimme, on the south, its width is from four to five miles. It occupies a strategic position commanding the entrance to the Adriatic, and afforded a naval base for operations against the islands Cephallenia and Zacynthus, commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth.

EPIDAMNUS — Epi-dam-nus — [Επιδαμνος]. A city on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula, in the Adriatic, on the coast of Illyria about 120 miles north of the City of Corcyra, designated by the Romans Dyrrhachium. It was founded in the seventh century (627 B. C.) by Corcyra, with the aid of emigrants from Corinth, the mother city. Phalius, the leader of the colony, claimed direct descent from Hercules.

ACTIUM — Ak-shi-um — [Ακτιον]. A promontory in Acarnania, at the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf which separates Epirus from Acarnania. It forms the northern extremity of Acarnania and is distant about forty-five miles southeast of Cape Leucimme, on the southern promontory of Corcyra.

SYBOTA — Sib-o-ta — [Σιβοτα]. An island in the Ionian Sea, in the channel between the southern extremity of Corcyra and the coast, but a short distance from the shores of Epirus.

THE quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth, known as the Corcyrian War, was the immediate precursor of the Peloponnesian War, and was instrumental in precipitating that disastrous conflict. It was provoked by the interference of Corinth in the affairs of Epidamnus, which sought aid from Corcyra, and this being denied

the Epidamnians appealed to Corinth. The navies of the contending parties met in the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, off Cape Actium. Corinth suffered overwhelming defeat. Corcyra, having no alliance either with the Athenians or Peloponnesians, sought to make a treaty with the former, which was secured against the emphatic protest of the Corinthians. It was the interference of Athens, the new ally of Corcyra at the battle of Sybota, which prevented the Corinthians from conquering the Corcyrians. This act on the part of the Athenians was regarded as a breach of the Thirty Years' Truce, and led directly to the Peloponnesian War.

The Corcyrian War was a naval contest. Corinth was the oldest sea power in Hellas. Knowledge of navigation was possessed by the ancients long before the Trojan War. The Egyptians and Phœnicians built up a merchant marine, carried on commerce and established colonies on the remote frontiers of the world before the time of Moses. David, King of Israel, established commercial dealings with Hiram, King of Tyre, and his son Solomon entered into a trade agreement with him, and married his daughter. The navies of Hiram and of Solomon made protracted voyages the length of the Mediterranean, through the straits of Gibraltar to Tartessus (Tarshish) in Spain. Evidence is not lacking to sustain the assertion that at least two centuries before the Trojan War, Seti First, King of Egypt, constructed a canal through the isthmus of Suez from the Red Sea to the eastern waters of the Nile Delta, and thence to the Mediterranean. Indeed, there is proof to sustain the further assumption that the merchants of that remote age circumnavigated the continent of Africa.

However this may be, navigation did not become general in Hellas until wealth began to accumulate and cities were built on the seashore and fortified in order

to protect themselves against piracy which long prevailed. The Hellenese, owing to their weakness and isolation in remote antiquity, never united in any great enterprise before the Trojan War. The expedition led by Agamemnon with an armament of 1200 ships and 100,000 men was undertaken after the Greeks had gained considerable experience at sea. The fleet which sailed from Aulis in Bœotia to the plains of Troy was composed of war galleys, primitive biremes, without decks, except across the bow and stern, and were not adapted for commercial purposes. For several generations after the Trojan War, the Hellenese engaged in military enterprises on land occasioned by the quarrels which arose after the return of the heroes from Troy, in nearly every city. Those who were expelled from their homes in these intestine wars founded other cities and established colonies. As the Hellenese began to acquire wealth, and the revenues of their cities increased, they began to build navies, and make the sea their element. The Corinthians lived on the sea-coast on the isthmus and are said to have first adopted the better style of ships. Thucydides says that the oldest Hellenic triremes were constructed at Corinth. Four of these vessels were built there by the shipbuilder, Ameinocles, for the Samians, about 704 B. C. The Corinthians established a colony, and built the city of Corcyra B. C. 734, about the same time that she established a colony in Sicily. In less than a century after its establishment Corcyra had also become a formidable sea power and rebelled against the mother city. It was during this war that the fleets of Corinth and Corcyra engaged in battle, B. C. 664. This is said to have been the earliest naval engagement recorded in history.

At the outbreak of the war with Corinth, Corcyra had the most powerful navy in Hellas, except Athens. Corinth ranked next after Corcyra as a naval power. As has been observed Corcyra had been a commercial

rival of the mother city for more than two centuries before the outbreak of this war. In order to open new marts, and to give employment to her growing merchant marine, she planted numerous colonies in Illyria, Thrace, Macedonia and elsewhere. Among these was Epidamnus on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. The colony prospered and increased in wealth and population. The usual controversy arose among the Epidamnians, between those who favored an oligarchy, and those who advocated a democratic form of government. Finally the contending elements resorted to force. The oligarchical party sought to overthrow the democracy which had been established. Owing to its location among the wild Illyrian tribes, it was frequently the object of attack by these outlying hordes, who periodically made incursions to Epidamnus in search of plunder. Thus strife prevailed within and without the unfortunate colony.

In the struggle between the oligarchical party and the democracy the latter finally prevailed, and drove the aristocrats into exile. These malcontents having been expelled from the city allied themselves with the Illyrians, and made war on the Epidamnians. They attacked the city both by land and sea. In their extremity, the Epidamnians sought aid from Corcyra, the mother city. Although the latter enjoyed a democratic form of government, yet there was within its walls, a strong oligarchical party who sympathized with the defeated exiles, and finally succeeded in inducing the Corcyrians not to extend aid to its colony at Epidamnus. The latter, now driven to desperation, after consulting the Delphic oracle, applied to Corinth for succor, agreeing to transfer to it its allegiance. Corinth deemed it proper to aid Epidamnus, since they regarded it as a colony, established jointly by Corinth and Corcyra, it being also the metropolis, or mother city of the latter. They organized an expedition for its relief, and, in

order to avoid the fleets of Corcyra, marched forces by land through Epirus, as far north as Apolonia, in Illyria, within forty miles of their destination, and thence by sea to Epidamnus. The oligarchical exiles, with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, then made a counter movement and sailed to Corcyra, to aid the latter against the Corinthians. The former had a formidable fleet of one hundred and twenty sail. They dispatched a squadron of forty vessels to Epidamnus, and demanded of the latter that they should restore the exiles, and dismiss their Corinthian allies. The demand was refused. The Corcyrians then blockaded the city, and menaced it with a land force of Illyrians. Corinth then fitted out a second expedition to raise the blockade, consisting of thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, augmented by allies from other Peloponnesian states, in all seventy vessels.

When news of this expedition reached Corcyra, the latter sent ambassadors to Corinth, requesting it to withdraw its forces from Epidamnus, and agreed that if it made any claim to the city, the Corcyrians were willing to submit the controversy to arbitration, under the common public law, a sort of law of nations among the Hellenic states, to which they held themselves amenable, and agreed to abide by the decision of such Peloponnesian cities as should be agreed upon as arbitrators. They were willing also to submit the case to the oracle of Delphi. The Corinthians answered that if Corcyra would withdraw its blockade and land forces from Epidamnus, it would consider the proposal. Corcyra replied that if Corinth would withdraw its forces they would withdraw theirs; or they would consent that matters should remain as they were, and establish a truce till the issues should be decided by arbitration. Corinth refused to listen to these pacific proposals.

War was now the only alternative. Corinth began

to assemble an armament consisting of seventy-five war ships and two thousand hoplites with which to give battle to the Corcyrians. The latter deprecated war. Although they had the second largest navy in Hellas, they had formed no alliance either with Athens or with the Lacedæmonians. They notified the Corinthians that if war was forced upon them, they would be compelled to seek an alliance with the Athenians.

The Corinthians disregarded every plea, and hastened their preparation for war. Three admirals, Aristeas, Callicrates and Timanor were placed in command of the fleet and Archetimus and Isarchidas were given command of the land forces. The expedition set sail for Epidamnus and sent a herald before them to declare war (B. C. 435 or 434).

The Corcyrians sailed out to meet them with a squadron of eighty vessels fully manned. When the Corinthians arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stood, the Corcyrians sent a herald to them in a small boat forbidding them to advance further. The warning of the herald was not heeded, and when he brought back no peaceable answer, the Corcyrian fleet formed in line of battle, and engaged the Corinthians off Cape Actium, destroyed fifteen of their ships, and gained a complete victory over the Corinthians. On the same day the forces shut up in Epidamnus capitulated, and surrendered the place to the Corcyrians. All the prisoners, except the Corinthians, were sold into slavery. The latter were cast into prison to await the issues of the war.

Thus the Corcyrian War began off the historic cape in Acarnania. Four centuries later, on these waters where the Greeks contended, infatuated Mark Antony and his Egyptian queen fought with Octavius Cæsar and lost an empire (September 21, B. C. 31). In that memorable engagement " worlds were staked for ladies'

eyes." Lord Byron reminds us that the blue waters of the Ambracian gulf off Actium marks,

> The Azure grave of many a Roman,
> Where stern ambition once forsook
> His wavering crown to follow woman.
> Through cloudless skies, in silvery sheen,
> Full beams the moon on Actium's coast,
> And on these waves, for Egypt's queen,
> The ancient world was won and lost.

The victory of the Corcyrians at Actium made them masters of the Ionian Sea. They followed up the advantage they had gained in that engagement by seeking to punish the allies of Corinth wherever they could. They sailed first to the island Leucas at the mouth of the gulf of Patras, which forms the entrance to the gulf of Corinth, attacked Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and devastated the country of the Leucadians. They then sailed south to the coast of Elis, and burnt the port of Cyllene where the Elians had established their docks and ship-yards, because the Elians had supplied the Corinthians with money and ships in their campaign against the Corcyrians. During the remainder of the summer season, their fleet was occupied in roving the seas in the vicinity and plundering the allies of Corinth.

The Corinthians, meantime, did all in their power to protect their allies, who suffered from the attacks of the Corcyrians. Their object was to increase the strength of their navy, so as to be able to retrieve the disaster they had suffered at Actium. Before the end of the summer, they assembled a fleet off the cape, the scene of their recent defeat, and established a camp and strong land forces on the shore to protect by their presence their allies on the island of Leucas and elsewhere in adjacent territory. To guard themselves from the incursions of the Corinthians, assembled at Actium, the Corcyrians assembled their forces at Cape Leucimme, on the southern extremity of their island, distant less than fifty miles from Cape Actium, where the enemy was in force. Neither of the contending forces cared to risk a general engagement. The season advanced. Both parties remained inactive during the remainder of the fall, and when the winter set in, returned to their homes.

The Corinthians, after their defeat at Actium, began to build ships. They determined to assemble a great navy and conquer Corcyra. These preparations continued for the space of two years during which time the Corinthians augmented their forces and recruited soldiers and sailors from all parts of Hellas. These extensive preparations alarmed the Corcyrians, who realized that they could not contend alone with the growing power of Corinth and her Peloponnesian allies. They determined therefore to strengthen themselves by negotiating an alliance offensive and defensive with the Athenians. To this end they sent ambassadors to Athens. The Corinthians, when they learned that representatives from Corcyra were to appear before the Athenians to negotiate a treaty with them, sent ambassadors to Athens to prevent the alliance. The Athenians agreed to give both a patient hearing. The assembly met on the hill of the Pnyx and listened to the arguments presented.

The advocate of Corcyra spoke first. He urged that to grant their request would be expedient for the Athenians and would greatly inure to their benefit. He called attention to the fact that never before had the Corcyrians sought an alliance with any state in Hellas. But now, while engaged in war with the Corinthians, they found themselves isolated, and were suddenly made aware of the mistake they had made in not seeking an alliance. Their lonely position in the world demonstrated that their policy had been not wisdom, but folly. At Actium they had defeated the Corin-

thians single-handed, but now their enemy was gathering a powerful armament, from the Peloponnesus and all parts of Hellas, with which to attack them. They were not able to resist them successfully, and were compelled to ask the assistance of a powerful ally.

The next point advanced was the glorious opportunity that such an alliance would afford the Athenians. They were reminded that they would aid the oppressed, not the oppressor, and by negotiating a treaty they would win the lasting gratitude of Corcyra, and would secure the aid of the largest navy in Hellas, next to their own, than which nothing could be more annoying to their enemies. Athens would incur no danger and no expense by this voluntary accession of power, which would place at the disposal of Athens a navy larger than that of Corinth.

The Corcyrian envoy then predicted the speedy advent of the Peloponnesian War, which he declared was imminent. This telling point was urged as follows:

"If any one thinks that the war in which our services may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedæmonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the Corinthians are all-powerful with them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, that we may not stand united against them in the bond of a common enmity. They will not miss the chance of weakening us and strengthening themselves. And it is our business to strike first, we offering and you accepting our alliance, and thus forestall their designs instead of waiting to counteract them."

In answer to the point that they were a colony of Corinth their reply was that all colonies honor their mother city when she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice. That they had offered to arbitrate in the matter of Epidamnus, but Corinth refused to listen to or consent to a legal trial.

The next point urged was that Athens, by entering into the alliance, would not thereby violate the Thirty Years' Truce. In support of this proposition, the speaker quoted from the treaty the following clause: "Any Hellenic city which is the ally of no one, may join whichever league he pleases." It was, therefore, absurd to say that the Corinthians could man their fleet with recruits, not only from their own confederacy, but even from among Athenians, and then argue that the Corcyrians should be debarred from seeking an ally, and denounce as a crime the act of Athens in negotiating such an alliance. By so doing the Athenians were reminded that they would be thrusting away the Corcyrians, who are not their enemies, and instead of restraining the enemy and the aggressor, would permit him to gather fresh forces out of their own dominions. "Our enemies," said the speaker, "are your enemies, and this is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally." It was pointed out also that the proposed alliance was not with an inland power, but with a maritime power, which it would be indeed a serious matter to refuse. Whoever is the strongest at sea, it is your interest to make him your friend. The Athenians were then reminded of the strategic position of Corcyra, located between the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily. It stands in the way also of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. In conclusion, the ambassador observed, "Hellas has only three navies; there is ours, there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own, ranged at your side in the impending conflict."

In answer to this powerful plea of the advocate for Corcyra, the Ambassador, chosen to represent the interests of Corinth, arose and addressed the Assembly. He began by pointing out that the boasted neutrality of Corcyra was simply a cloak to conceal their crimes. They did not want an ally, who might publish their misdeeds to the world. They oppress the weak and perpetrate fraud whenever in their judgment circumstances will prevent detection.

The speaker then showed that Corcyra was the daughter city of Corinth, and as such she was entitled to the love and respect of her own colony. "If it should seem strange to you Athenians," he said, "that we have made war on our daughter city, you should remember always that they are fighting against us, on the plea that they were not sent out to be ill used. Surely you must recognize the fact that we did not establish them, and build them up in order that we might be injured and insulted by them. It is their duty to recognize the mother city as their leader and accord to us proper respect. If it seems extraordinary that we should go to war with them, our answer is that the injury they are doing us is unexampled.

"Epidamnus is our colony. Corcyra would not render aid to it when in distress, but when we came to her rescue, they seized it, and are now holding it by force, and their pretense that they offered arbitration is a hollow mockery and a sham because no such offer was made until they had recourse to arms, and they now fear our vengeance. And," continued the speaker, "as if the wrong which they have themselves done at Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and would have you receive them when they are at enmity with us."

It was then pointed out that the Athenians never derived any benefit from the power of Corcyra, but the

latter would be benefited by an Athenian alliance. "If the alliance is made," the speaker said, "although the Athenians would be innocent of the crimes committed by Corcyra, they will be held responsible for them by the Corinthians."

The ambassador then argued that Athens had no legal right to enter into an alliance with Corcyra, because such an agreement would constitute, so far as Athens was concerned, a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. Admitting that the treaty permits any neutral city to join any league it pleases, this provision, it was urged, had no application to those who have in view positive injury to others, who are members or parties to the instrument. The argument was advanced that the language of the treaty should be construed, only to include those who are actually in need of protection, and can have no application to a city which has forsaken its allegiance to the mother city and which will bring to those who treat with them war instead of peace. Then followed this threat on the part of the speaker. "War the Corcyrians will bring to you if you will listen to them and not to us."

The advocate then appealed to the gratitude which the Athenians owed to Corinth. The former were admonished that if they must make an alliance to make it with Corinth, not with Corcyra, and were reminded of the Samian War, when Samos revolted from Athens in violation of the constitution of the Delian Confederacy. At that time the Peloponnesians were divided in opinion as to giving aid to the Samian rebels, the speaker said, and reminded his hearers that it was the Corinthians who voted in favor of Athens, and advocated the wholesome doctrine, which it now invoked, "that every one should be allowed to chastise his own allies." This proposition, it was asserted, was fully sustained by Hellenic law. Thus, by preventing the Peloponnesians from aiding Samos, the Athenians were enabled to chas-

tise her rebellious allies on that island. But it was urged further that when Athens was at war with Ægina before the Persian War, and was in need of ships, the Corinthians loaned them twenty vessels which enabled the Athenians to punish the Ægenitans. (There was no suggestion that at the time referred to Corinth[1] and Ægina were rivals and deadly enemies.)

Referring to the threatened Peloponnesian War, which the Corcyrians brought forward as a reason why Athens should join forces with them, the speaker suggested it might never come and for that reason the argument had no force. The speaker further begged the Athenians not to be influenced by the offer of a strong naval alliance, because by making the treaty Athens would do wrong, and to do right was better than to secure a maritime combination, to injure a state, that was seeking only to punish its daughter city. In conclusion the speaker said:

"We are now ourselves in the same situation in which you were placed, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies. We now claim to receive at your hands the same treatment we then accorded to you. You profited by our vote on that occasion. We should not now be injured by yours. Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our time of need, in which a man's best friend is he who does him a service, and he who opposes him is his worst enemy. Do not receive into alliance the Corcyrians in spite of us. Do not uphold them in injustice. Consult your own best interests by acting justly."

The Assembly after having listened patiently to the very able arguments, advanced by the respective parties, took under advisement the important question as to whether the alliance asked for by Corcyra should be granted or denied. We are told that two sessions were

[1] Herod. vi, 89.

held. In the first, opinion seemed to favor the request of Corinth, that Athens should deny the petition of Corcyra. At the second session, however, there was a change, wrought in all probability by the influence of Pericles. This assumption is justified in view of the character of the alliance agreed upon. Pericles never would consent, so far as his voice, and vote were concerned, to yield to the arbitrary demands of Sparta or her allies. This appears from his speech delivered a year later to the Spartan envoys, declining to consent to revoke the decree denying to Megara entry to her ports, or to withdraw her squadrons and land forces from Potidæa at the behest of the Lacedæmonians. It is obvious, also, that the principal fact which influenced their final action was their belief that the Peloponnesian War was at hand.

The Athenians guided by Pericles, were past masters in the art of diplomacy. They concluded, therefore, not to make an alliance with Corcyra, both offensive and defensive, because such a treaty would impose an obligation on the part of the Athenians to declare war against Corinth. Such an agreement would be clearly a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. They, therefore, entered into a defensive alliance, which obliged them only to protect each other when attacked, and claimed that by so doing they were not guilty of any breach of the Truce. The Athenians believed that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, and they determined not to permit Corcyra and her formidable navy to fall into the hands of Corinth. They knew that hostilities between Corinth and Corcyra would weaken the naval strength of the former. They desired also to have Corcyra as an ally by reason of its position in the Ionian Sea, which was advantageous in case an expedition was fitted out against Italy or Sicily. Bitterly disappointed, the Corinthians sailed away, to renew the war with Corcyra.

Athens immediately dispatched a squadron of ten ships to Corcyra, with instructions not to attack the Corinthians unless they sailed against the Corcyrians or any place belonging to her. In case their ally, the Corcyrians was attacked, the Athenians were ordered to protect her to the utmost.

The Corinthians assembled a fleet of 150 ships, made up as follows:

Corinthian vessels	90
Elean	10
Megarian	12
Leucadian	10
Ambraciots	27
Anactorium	1
Total Fleet	150

The squadron sailed against Corcyra from the island of Leucas, and anchored off the mainland opposite Corcyra. The Corcyrian fleet consisted of 110 ships. They were accompanied by 10 Athenian vessels. The land forces encamped on the promontory of Leucimme. A thosuand hoplites from Zacynthus volunteered to aid the army of Corcyra. The island of Sybota in the Corcyrian channel lay between the contending forces. Both fleets were numerous and covered a wide space of the sea. When preparations were completed the Corinthians took with them three days' provisions, and put off by night intending to give battle. At daybreak they discerned the Corcyrian fleet approaching to meet them. The squadrons were then drawn up in line of battle, and the engagement which followed is known in history as the battle of Sybota, fought probably in the month of June, B. C. 432.

When the engagement began, both sides had many heavy armed on the decks and many bowmen and dartmen. Thucydides, in his account of the fight, says that the battle was well contested, not so much in point of skill, but like a land fight, because they trusted to the heavy armed who fought on the decks when the vessels ran along side of each other and remained stationary. "They fought with fierceness and strength more than with science." Brute force and rage made up for want of tactics. Never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in battle. On all sides was much confusion. Early in the day, the right wing of the Corinthians was worsted. They were routed by twenty ships of the enemy, who pursued them as they were in a scattered condition to the shores of Epirus, sailed up to their encampment, went ashore and burned and plundered their deserted camp. On the other wing, where all were Corinthian ships, the latter won a decisive victory, as twenty ships of the Corcyrians were absent, their crews being engaged in plundering the enemy's tents on shore. It was at this critical moment, that the ten Athenian vessels, no longer remained neutral, but took an active part in the engagement. The victorious Corinthians on the left wing pursued the enemy to the island of Sybota, and took thither their wrecks and most of their dead. Although it was now quite late, the Corinthians were about to renew the engagement. When the Pæan had been sung for them to advance, they observed twenty fresh Athenian ships, which had not yet been engaged, sailing towards them. They had been sent out and followed close after to reinforce the ten ships, which had been dispatched with the Corcyrians. Night coming on, hostilities ceased.

The next morning the Athenians and the Corcyrians, who had gone in camp the previous night at Leucimme, on the southern extremity of Corcyra, sailed over to the island of Sybota, to know if the Corinthians intended to further engage in battle, but the latter declined on account of the fresh contingent of Athenian ships which had come to the relief of the Corcyrians. As Corinth was not at war with Athens, they charged

the latter with violating the Thirty Years' Truce, in aiding the Corcyrians in battle against them. The Athenians answered the herald sent by the Corinthians to the effect that Athens was not commencing war and had not violated the Thirty Years' Truce. They assured the Corinthians that they would not hinder or molest them, unless they sailed against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to it, and in that case only would they assist the Corcyrians, who were allies of Athens. Thus Athens snatched victory from Corinth, in her attempt to conquer Corcyra.

Both sides erected trophies at Sybota, and on the continent as both sides claimed the victory; the Corinthians because they had secured the greater number of wrecks and dead bodies; the Corcyrians based their claim on the ground that the Corinthians, when they saw the fresh squadron of Athenian ships, rowed astern and did not renew the engagement. The Corinthians took not less than one thousand prisoners, and disabled about seventy of the enemy's ships. The Corcyrians destroyed about thirty ships of the Corinthian fleet. The number of killed and wounded is not recorded. The Corinthians then sailed homeward, and by means of treachery took the city of Anactorium (q. v.) in Acarnania, a short distance east of Actium. Thus the Corcyrian War was concluded. As was anticipated and clearly predicted, the Peloponnesian War began in the following spring after the battle of Sybota (March 31, B. C. 431), by the surprise at Platæa.

CHAPTER XL

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR AND ITS CAUSES

THE Peloponnesian War was the culmination of constant bickering and jealousy prompted by local pride and commercial rivalry, which interrupted Hellenic unity, and finally destroyed Greece. This spirit of disunion and selfishness was born in the Peloponnesus, where Sparta could brook no rival. Argos long held superior claims to leadership on the peninsula. That city traced its claims to political supremacy to the age of legend and fable, to Diomede, king of Argos, the friend Agamemnon, king of Mycenæ, and his ally in the Trojan War. Argos also became the mother city of the Doric kingdoms of Epidaurus, Troezen, Scycion and Corinth. The Lacedæmonians would not recognize the claims of Argos, and sought to become the dominant power in the peninsula.

Very early in the fifth century B. C. about the time of the siege of Miletus by Darius, B. C. 496, Argos was humbled by the Spartan king, Cleomenes. In an engagement at Sepia, near Tiryns, the latter at the head of a numerous army slew six thousand Argives and deprived Argos of her ancient supremacy. A few years later, when Xerxes threatened the destruction of Hellas, Argos was asked to ally herself with the Greeks, to fight the invaders. She promised compliance, provided Sparta would consent to a thirty years' truce, and give her an equal share of the command of the allied forces. Sparta refused upon the specious pretext, that its form

of government forbade. Under the diarchy Sparta had two kings while Argos had but one, and it was not possible they said, to deprive either sovereign of his command. The king of Argos was informed, however, that if he desired he would be conceded an equal vote with these two. The offer was declined. Thus Sparta deprived Greece of the aid of Argos in the second Persian War.

Thebes refused also to aid her countrymen, because of her jealousy and hatred of Athens, for the reason that the latter would not permit the Thebans to subjugate the neighboring city of Platæa, across the Asopus, on the borders of Bœotia and Attica.

Sparta also tried to humiliate Athens in the sixth century B. C. When the latter was subject to political revolutions in the time of Pisistratus and his sons, Cleomenes sent a herald from Sparta, at the behest of Isagoras, directing that Clisthenes, who instituted the ten tribes, and founded the democracy of Attica, should be expelled and driven from Athens. His orders were backed by a Spartan army which invaded Attica, and banished seven hundred Athenian families. This was the fourth time that the Dorians had invaded Athens. After the recall of Clisthenes, the warlike demonstrations became so threatening that Athenian ambassadors visted Sardis, for the purpose of inviting aid from Persia to make war against the Lacedæmonians. This plan, however, was never consummated, and was speedily abandoned. Then Cleomenes, because the Athenians refused to restore Isagoras, took it upon himself to assemble an army of Lacedæmonians to attack them. He made an alliance in the north, with the Bœotians and Chalcidians in Eubœa, who attacked and ravaged the borders of Attica, while the Spartan was preparing to march on Athens. When Cleomenes reached Eleusis, Demaratus, his reigning associate, when the object of the expedition was disclosed to him,

refused to participate in the enterprise, and the Lacedæmonians returned to their homes. Then the Athenians sought to punish their enemies in the north and attacked and defeated the Bœotians and Chalcidians, for the part they had taken in the affair.

But these minor intestine wars and jealous rivalries were not, of themselves, sufficient to provoke the great Peloponnesian War, a contest which was to divide the country into two hostile camps, whose contending armies struggled for nearly a generation, and which finally resulted in the overthrow of the Athenian empire, and the destruction of Hellas.

After the quarrels and military disturbances above referred to, came the Persian Wars, which compelled Greece to forego her domestic hostilities, and unite her resources to repel a foreign foe. Then followed the wars for the expulsion of Persia from the Ægean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor. These supplemental wars may as well have been designated wars for Attic expansion, as for Persian expulsion. While these campaigns were conducted primarily to drive the Persian arms from Europe, they were incidentally the direct means of building up the Athenian Empire, which was established by the aid of the Delian confederacy. Sparta dropped out of these enterprises, when her admiral, Pausanias, was deposed as commander-in-chief, and when the Hellenic fleet refused to obey the admiral sent by the Spartan Ephors to take his place, and continued their allegiance to the Athenian commanders, Aristides and Cimon. The Lacedæmonians, when they could no longer lead, withdrew, and abandoned to Athens, the conduct of the war. Later, that city built her long walls to the sea, in spite of Sparta, and against her solemn protest, and the latter became her principal rival and pronounced enemy.

These wars for Athenian expansion resulted in the establishment of new Athenian colonies throughout the

western world. Protected by her powerful navy, these numerous trading ports increased, and poured their commercial wealth into the treasury of Athens, the mother city, which rapidly became the richest municipality in the world. Athens increased but Corinth decreased. It soon became apparent that if Athens was permitted to continue to absorb the world's commerce, Corinth, the most powerful ally of Sparta, would ultimately lose her colonies and her commerce, and sink into insignificance as a maritime power. Her trade in the Ægean and Asia Minor had dwindled. Potidea, an important colony in the Chalcidian peninsula, had abandoned her and sought alliance with Athens. Pericles had taken the island of Ægina and established ports in Megara on both sides of the isthmus of Corinth, established himself in Achaia, had entered Argolis also, and taken Troezen, an important port on the gulf of Argolis. When Sparta, at the close of the third Messenian War, permitted their enemies, the Messenians and Helots, to depart, after the fall of Ithome, Pericles established them as an Athenian colony at Naupactus (now Lepanto) in Locris, at the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. From this point they made war on all settlements established by Corinth in Ætolia, Acarnania, and Epirus, because Corinth was an ally of Sparta, and Sparta was the life long enemy of Messenia.

Thus Athens, reaching out for empire, planted her colonies on both shores of the Corinthian gulf, invaded the commercial territory of Corinth, and threatened her with financial ruin.

Of course Pericles in negotiating the Thirty Years' Peace was obliged to give up Achaia, Troezen in Argolis, and Nisæ and Pegea in Megara, but she later found occasion to make an alliance with Corcyra, a naval power commanding the Ionian Sea. It was originally a daughter city of Corinth, but revolted, gained

her independence and established her own colonies on the coasts of Illyria and elsewhere. Corcyra planted the flourishing city of Epidamnus on the Adriatic, about seventy-five miles north of the borders of Epirus. Corinth joined Epidamnus in her efforts to throw off her allegiance to Corcyra. This conduct on the part of Corinth was resented, and in retaliation for the interference of the mother city, Corcyra attempted to seize Corinthian ports in Acarnania and Achaia. These quarrels, which lasted for three years, are known as the Corcyrian War. (q. v.)

The power of Athens was shown at the battle of Sybota, B. C. 432 (q. v.), when the Corcyrian fleet was saved from the Corinthian navy by an Athenian squadron, and victory snatched from the Corinthians, after they had defeated their enemy in that memorable conflict off the coast of Epirus.

During this war the advantages gained by Corcyra by reason of the influence of her Athenian allies, was such that Corinth found herself involved in a life and death struggle to maintain her independence. Her salvation depended on her power to retain her supremacy. Athens must be humbled and driven out of the west, and from the Corinthian Gulf, or Corinth would cease to be a maritime power. She was the most powerful ally of Sparta. The time had now arrived when the latter must assist Corinth, and enable her to throw off the yoke of Athens. War, therefore, was inevitable, and the war came.

The conduct of the Athenians at Sybota was regarded by the Corinthians as a direct violation of the treaty known as the Thirty Years' Truce. As soon as the battle had ceased the Corinthians sent a messenger to the Athenian commander, who complained that Athens had no right to prevent the Corinthians from chastising their enemies, the Corcyrians. That if they wished to break the treaty, they should attack the

Corinthians first, and deal directly with them as enemies. The Athenians replied that they had not violated the treaty, but had only given aid to the Corcyrians, because the latter were allies of Athens. They declared further that they did not intend to harm the Corinthians, and that they would strictly observe all the terms and conditions of the treaty of peace. The answer, of course, failed to soothe the ire of the Corinthians.

Another cause of complaint against Athens arose from the fact, as has been observed, that Potidea occupied by a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison was being besieged and blockaded on land and sea by an Athenian fleet and army. But Athens, when charged with violating the treaty, on this account, used the same plausible excuse which was urged at Sybota, namely, that Potidea, though a Corinthian colony, had become an ally of Athens, and that the latter had a right to protect her allies.

Corinth was now thoroughly alarmed. The interference of Athens had become intolerable. Her troops were shut up within the walls of Potidea which was being besieged by an Athenian army under Phormio, while an Athenian fleet prevented supplies being carried to the beleaguered town. Corinth demanded that the Lacedæmonians must act. The allies were summoned, and sent their representatives to Sparta. They set forth at length, before the assembly, their many grievances against Athens, and contended that the latter had broken the Thirty Years' Truce, and were continuing to violate that compact. Megara complained that her ships had been excluded from every Athenian port, and from the Athenian markets in violation of the treaty. Those from Ægina claimed that they had been robbed of their independence contrary to the express terms of the treaty. Then the Corinthian ambassador, whose city had suffered most of all,

made a powerful plea, and urged Sparta to declare war against Athens. His argument has been preserved by Thucydides. "Who among you," said the envoy, "has a better right to speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neglected by you. [Lacedæmonians] . . . What need of many words. Some of us, as you see, have been already enslaved. They are at this moment intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours. Long ago they had made preparations in expectation of war. Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which they still hold in defiance of us; and why are they blockading Potidea, the latter a most advantageous post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval power, which might have assisted the Peloponnesians. . . . We ought not now to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, he is advancing."

At the time this matter was brought before the assembly, an Athenian embassy happened to be in Sparta on other business, and having heard the indictment launched against their city by the Corinthians, they asked permission to lay before the assembly some explanations to prevent the Spartans from being misled. The request was granted. The ambassador then recounted to the assembly the glories which Athens had achieved in the Persian Wars, and how their army and navy had saved Hellas from Darius and Xerxes. He reminded them also that the Athenian empire was not acquired by force, and finally suggested that the Lacedæmonians should not be induced to enter into a protracted tedious and expensive war at the instigation of those who were not themselves Lacedæmonians.

Archidamus, the Spartan King, thought that the Lacedæmonians should not be too hasty in the matter,

but should first complete their preparations to enable them to wage the war successfully. When Archidamus had finished his address, one of the Spartan Ephors, Sthenelaidas, arose to reply to the Athenian. He confessed, he said, that he did not know what the long speeches of the Athenians meant, but declared that if they behaved well in the Persian Wars, and were now behaving badly, they ought to be punished twice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. A vote was then taken, and the Spartans determined to stand by their allies. They accordingly voted that the treaty had been violated.

An embassy was sent to Athens, and the latter were informed that it was the judgment of the Lacedæmonians and their allies that the treaty had been violated. They were further notified that if they would avert war, they must raise the siege of Potidea, a colony of Corcyra; they must restore to Ægina her independence; and lastly, that they must at once rescind the decree whereby the Megarians were excluded from the markets of Athens, and the harbors of the Athenian empire.

To these demands the Athenians refused to listen. One of the reasons assigned for the refusal of Athens to rescind her decree involved the misconduct of the Megarians. The charge against them was that they had tilled the holy ground and the neutral borderland, and had received and protected the runaway slaves, who had escaped from their Athenian masters and fled to Megara. So the ambassadors departed.

A second embassy was sent to Athens some time after. They wanted to know whether Athens desired peace or war, and declared the conditions on which peace could be had. The message was as follows: "The Lacedæmonians desire to maintain peace, and peace there may be if you will restore independence to the Hellenese."

The time had now come for decisive action. The

Public Assembly convened on the hill of the Pnyx and discussed the issues of peace and war. Some favored war. Others declared that the decree excluding Megara from the markets of Athens should be rescinded and not be permitted to stand in the way of peace. Then Pericles arose to address the Assembly. He was the most conspicuous man in Hellas, the greatest orator of his age, and the most influential man in Athens. The words which fell from his lips on that occasion were to decide the destiny of his country. In his speech were bound up the issues of life and death, of war and peace. All seemed to realize as Pericles stood before them that when he descended from the bema and resumed his seat, the fate of Athens would have been decided.

All were eager to hear the first words of the address of this distinguished man. He began with great deliberation. "Athenians," he said, "I say, as I have always said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with the change of fortune. . . . The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation."[1]

These were the opening sentences in the great speech of Pericles, that lit the spark of the Peloponnesian War, a conflict which was to continue for a quarter of a century, after the speaker has passed from the scenes of earth. He made a great argument on the merits of the controversy. His first point seems to be conclusive that Sparta was in the wrong. "The treaty says," he argued, "that when differences arise, the two parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the meantime

[1] Thucyd. ii., 7.

both are to retain what they have. But for arbitration they never ask; and when it is offered by us they refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by argument, and now they come to us using the language, no longer of expostulation, but of command." With regard to the demands made on Athens, as to Potidea, and the Megarian decree, Pericles said that "if you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals. . . . Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal when there has been *no legal award*, can mean nothing but slavery."

Finally Pericles suggested the answer to be given by the Athenians to the demands of the ambassadors. "Tell them," he said, "that we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. Tell them that we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedæmonians allow their subject states to be governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lacedæmon, but for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. Tell them finally that we do not want to begin war, but if attacked, we intend to defend ourselves."

This answer, he said, was just and would comport with the dignity of Athens. The peroration of the great orator and statesman, advocating armed resistance to her enemies is as follows: "All must be aware, however, that war will come. The more willing we are to accept it, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands on us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the greatest honors are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such empire as we have. What little they had, they forsook. They repelled the barbarian and raised us to our present height of greatness, not by good fortune, but by wisdom; not by power, but by courage. Let us be worthy of them, emulate their example, and resist our enemies with all our might, that we may hand down our empire to posterity unimpaired."

The influence of Pericles was irresistible. The Assembly voted as he had suggested, and adopted and approved in detail his answer to the Lacedæmonians. Having received the answer of the Athenians, the ambassadors departed and came no more. It is clear, therefore, that the affair at Epidamnus, the conduct of the Athenians at Potidea, and their interference at the battle of Sybota, in the Corcyrian War, were the direct and immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War. Hostilities, however, did not begin until after the surprise at Platæa, at the end of March, B. C. 431, the year following the departure of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens.

This protracted intestine struggle which destroyed the liberties and independence of Greece, covered a period of twenty-seven years, which may be divided into three periods. First, from the surprise at Platæa, B. C. 431 to the Peace of Nicias, B. C. 421. Strictly speaking this period includes the Peloponnesian War proper, because it was fought directly between Sparta and Athens, and their respective allies. Second, the Sicilian War, B. C. 415-413. This period embraces the expedition sent out by Athens to take Syracuse, and subjugate Sicily and the West. It was a foreign war for the aggrandizement of Athens and the extension of her empire. Sparta lent aid to Sicily and at the instigation of Alcibiades, who had been banished by the Athenians, sent to Syracuse Gillypus, her ablest general,

equal in skill and energy to Brasidas, under whose able leadership the Athenians were overwhelmingly defeated. Third, the Decelean War, B. C. 413-404, so called because Sparta established a permanent fortress at Decelea in Attica, about fifteen miles north of Athens. This period extends from the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse to the capture of her squadrons in the Hellespont at Ægospotami, B. C. 405, and the surrender of Athens to Lysander, the Spartan, B. C. 404.

After the defeat and destruction of the Athenian expedition at Syracuse, in which Athens was opposed by Sparta, with the aid of Persia and Sicily, Sparta, as has been observed, at the instigation of Alcibiades, practically carried the war into Attica by building a strong fortress at Deceleia. The empire which Athens sought to extend by conquests in the west, she was now called upon to maintain against the combined forces of Europe and Asia. The contest was confined chiefly to a naval war, because the dominion of Athens which she now strove to maintain embraced her insular empire, including practically the islands of the Ægean sea, and the coast cities of Asia Minor, Thrace, and the Hellespont. It was the final struggle for the integrity of the maritime empire of Athens, and resulted in its overthrow, and the supremacy of Sparta.

The war was declared by Sparta, as has been shown, on the part of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens, and its allies, chiefly through the influence of Corinth and Megara. The former complained that Athens in violation of the Thirty Years' Peace made after the reduction of Eubœa as a result of the battle of Œnophyta (q. v.), had furnished assistance to the island of Corcyra in its war against Corinth, the mother city, in the naval battle of Sybota (q. v.). The latter claimed that Megarian ships were forbidden

Athenian ports, and its commerce excluded from the markets of Attica.

The real cause of the war, generally speaking, was jealousy aroused among contiguous cities and states, by the growing power of Athens. The motive which finally induced Sparta to enlist with the Peloponnesian States in a Confederacy against Athens was her envy and hatred of Athens, now the head of the Confederacy of Delos, through which she had become the foremost commercial and maritime power in the world. After the retirement of the Medes and Persians from Europe, which resulted from their disastrous defeats at Marathon, Platæa, Mycale, and on the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, Athens began to plant new colonies in Thrace, Asia Minor, and the islands of the Ægean to increase her navy, and wall in her city. She was the better able to do this after Sparta dropped out and declined after the recall of Pausanias to coöperate in the Confederacy of Delos (q. v.). Thucydides tells us that the Lacedæmonians voted that the truce (the Thirty Years' Peace) had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they had been convinced by the arguments of the allies, but because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that many parts of Greece were already tributary to her. After the battle of Œnophyta, before the Thirty Years' Peace had been negotiated, Athens, through its supremacy in the Confederacy of Delos, had achieved dominion on the sea, and Sparta feared she would also achieve supremacy on land, and build up a land empire which would make her supreme, both on land and sea.

Thucydides has carefully catalogued the allies of Athens and Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War. When the names of the independent Cities and States are reviewed, the student can form a correct idea of the character and extent of the internal disputes which rent

Greece for years, and cost her her independence and her liberties. The roster of the allies of Athens and Sparta are stated by Thucydides,[1] as follows:

"Each party had the following states in alliance when they set to the war. The allies of the Lacedæmonians were these: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans (these were in friendship with both parties; and the Pellenians were the only people of the Achæans that joined in the war at first, though afterward all of them did). Without the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the states which furnished a navy were the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots and Leucadians. Those that supplied cavalry were the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The rest of them sent infantry. This then was the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

"That of the Athenians comprehended the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians at Naupactus, the greater part of the Acarnanians, the Corcyrians, the Zacynthians; also some other states which were tributary among the following nations; as the maritime parts of Caria, and Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Greek towns (Thraceward); the islands, which were situated between the Peloponnese and Crete, toward the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyrians furnished a naval force, the rest of them infantry and money. Such was the confederacy on each side, and their resources for the war."

The principal events in this momentous struggle are embraced in the military annals of the time and may be traced in chronological order. The first period begins with the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, B. C. 431.

[1] Thucyd. ii, 9.

This affair occurred before war was declared, while the states were enjoying peaceful intercourse visiting without a herald. Then follows the fall of Mitylene B. C. 427; capture of Platæa by the Spartans B. C. 427; capture of Sphacteria by the Athenians B. C. 425; defeat of Athens at Amphipolis B. C. 422. Second Period. Argive league defeated by Spartans at Mantinea B. C. 418; Melian Massacre (B. C. 416); Athenian defeat at Syracuse B. C. 413. Third Period. Callicrates, the Spartan admiral, defeated by the Athenians off the southern promontory of Lesbos near the island of Arginusæ, B. C. 406; capture of the Athenian fleet by Lysander at Ægospotami B. C. 405.

CHAPTER XLI

PERICLES — ANCESTRY — EDUCATION — EARLY PUBLIC CAREER

PERICLES was of royal lineage on both sides of his house. He could trace his ancestors to Theseus, mythical hero of Hellas and first king of Athens. From his father Xanthippus, victor at Mycale and hero of Sestus, he inherited the blood of Pisistratus, a direct lineal descendant of Pisistratus, son of Nestor, king of Pylus — the Nestor renowned for his wisdom and sagacity, whom Homer describes as one of the wisest heads among the Greeks who accompanied Agamemnon on his expedition to Asia.

From his mother Agarista, and granddaughter of Megacles, and also of the great Clisthenes who established the ten Attic tribes, defeated the followers of Pisistratus, and established the Athenian democracy, he inherited the blood of Alcmæon, the last perpetual archon, and direct lineal descendant of Codrus, the last King of Athens. He was of the tribe of Acamantis and of the deme of Cholargus.

Thus in the ancestors of Pericles were represented the Alcmæonidæ and the Pisistratidæ, two of the wealthiest and most influential families of the Athenian Eupatridæ, whose names from the time of Solon to the expulsion of Hippias were conspicuous in the struggle for power in Athens. But to the advantage of noble birth often attach the disadvantages which arise from political intrigue, which not infrequently

result in murder and intestine war. The Alcmæonidæ, when Megacles was the head of his house and archon of Athens, suffered for their perfidy in the affair of Cylon, during a political insurrection late in the seventh century (B. C. 612) and were detested as accursed, having received tokens of the divine displeasure, visited upon them for their acts of perfidy and impiety for the slaughter of their enemies whom they induced to leave their place of refuge in the sacred temples on promise of immunity. This stain upon his house was revived against Pericles, by his enemies and by those who sought to avert war with the Peloponnesians, nearly two centuries after the curse was pronounced, and had been forgotten. So strong were the hatreds and superstitious prejudices, even in the golden age of Pericles, that it required all the abilities and superior intelligence of the great orator and statesman to prevent the memory of the old curse upon his ancestors from causing his political downfall, and wresting from him the reins of power.

The precise date of the birth of Pericles is uncertain. The probabilities are that he was born B. C. 499. He died in the autumn B. C. 429, two years and six months after the surprise at Platæa, which event occurred about March 31, B. C. 432. It is said that he lived to be seventy years old. If this conjecture as to his age is correct, he must have been born B. C. 499, nine years before the battle of Marathon. There was very little difference between the ages of Cimon and Pericles, his great rival. It is probable that Cimon was the eldest by perhaps three years, he having been born presumably B. C. 503. The assumption that the great statesman was born B. C. 499 rests wholly upon the conjecture that he was seventy years of age when he died. Some authorities fix the date of his birth four or five years later, B. C. 494 or 493. These dates are predicated upon the assumption that at the time of his

death Pericles was not more than sixty-four or sixty-five. But as there is no clear statement by any authority showing his age, the exact date of his birth must rest on conjecture.

By reason of the wealth and social position of his family, Pericles received all the advantages of the schools. He was instructed in every department of knowledge. He was trained in science and philosophy, in the arts, became proficient in music and excelled in polite learning and in all the accomplishments of his age. According to Plutarch he was taught natural philosophy by Zeno, who came to Athens from Elea, in Italy, with his preceptor Parmenides. The latter taught that being, or animate existence, was birthless and deathless, a phase of the doctrine of immortality. Zeno advanced the theory of the inconceivability of motion, and declared that it was an illusion of the senses, as well as the real existence of the phenomenal world. Zeno was greatly admired by Pericles by reason of his skill as a dialectician. Aristotle refers to him as the father of logic. In public debate, those who contended with Zeno, presently found themselves confronted by the horns of a dilemma from which it was often impossible to escape. Pericles was instructed in music by Damon. His teachings, however, included a wider scope than that of a mere musician. He taught political philosophy, and Plutarch says that he trained Pericles for his political contests "as a trainer prepares an athlete for the games." Another of his preceptors was an Ionian Greek, Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, a city not far from Smyrna, who lived many years in Athens. He must have attended the lectures of Anaxagoras during early manhood, as preceptor and pupil were nearly of the same age, assuming that Anaxagoras was born at the end of the sixth century, about 500 B. C. How much Anaxagoras may have imbibed of the teachings of the great Pythagoras of

Samos we do not know. Nor have we any means of finding out to what extent he taught the doctrine of the transmigration of souls advanced by this illustrious man. Pythagoras died about seven years before the battle of Marathon B. C. 497, when Anaxagoras was but three years of age. It will be profitable, in this connection, to inquire as to the state of learning, and the development of philosophy and science in the time of Pericles, especially in view of the fact that Anaxagoras was persecuted by the enemies of the former and because he was guilty of no crime known to the law so far as his accusers could discover, he was indicted at the instigation of Diopithes who, at the time officiated in the temple of Erechtheus, and was charged with impiety and disregard for the polytheistic religion taught by the priests. This charge of infidelity probably suggested itself, in view of the fact that polytheism was altogether repugnant to the idea, that the origin of the universe, was the conception of one supreme intellect, a doctrine, it is said, which was first advanced by Anaxagoras. His views in this regard are in some respects in harmony with the doctrine of monotheism taught by the Israelites, although we have no evidence that Anaxagoras had any knowledge whatever of the pentateuch, or the early books of the old testament.

Pythagoras imbibed his inspiration from Thales of Miletus, one of the seven sages of Greece (B. C. 640-546), and from his pupil Anaximander. Thales was one of the pioneers in scientific investigation and it is said that he foretold the eclipse of the sun which occurred a year after it was predicted, and which interrupted the battle of the Halys fought about B. C. 603, in the time of Nebuchadnezzar between the Medes and Lydians, who at high noon, seeing night suddenly succeeding day, desisted from fighting.

Pythagoras, in his investigations, sought for the

causes governing the laws of nature, and the results of natural phenomena. He conceived a scientific theory as to eclipses, as to meteors and rainbows, and the movement of the heavenly bodies. His notion in regard to the sun was that inasmuch as he regarded it as the source of heat, it was composed of a mass of blazing metal. Indeed it is claimed that Pythagoras and his disciples worked out the theory of the rotundity of the earth, and taught that is was a globe which hung self-balanced in space, and that it moved in harmony with other planets round a central luminary. Copernicus, it is said, evolved his heliocentric theory from the suggestions which he gleaned from the speculations of Pythagoras and his disciples, although the Pythagoreans did not distinctly teach the doctrine that the sun was the centre of our planetary system.

Anaxagoras taught that the heavenly bodies originally formed part of the earth, but were torn from it by some extraordinary convulsion of nature, and thrown into space. He accounted for their appearance in the heavens on the theory that they became globes of fire, being ignited in consequence of their rapid motion. Plutarch, however, does not hint that Anaxagoras taught the mystical doctrine of metempsychosis, or the transmigration, and the immortality of the soul taught by Pythagoras. This belief has been associated with the idea of the kinship of all living beings.

Anaxagoras must have learned from what Pythagoras taught, in connection with the study of mathematics and astronomy, the theory of numbers, and their correlation, as for example that two is but the relation of one to one. The Samian philosopher taught numerical symbolism, and declared that in the original one, all numbers are contained. This teaching forms the basis to-day of the modern atomic theory, that all matter is composed of ultra-microscopic particles, as developed by the electron hypothesis which originated with the study of electric discharges through highly rarified gases. Modern science declares that atoms of matter are composed of electrons, a doctrine too abstruse, to be comprehended by ordinary mortals. The measure of an electron is almost inconceivable. As compared with an atom, an electron is like a pin's head beside the dome of the national capitol. From the teaching of Pythagoras, Anaxagoras doubtless became familiar with the idea of the harmony of numbers, as applied to the harmony which prevails throughout the universe — laws assisting laws which are inter-dependent — whereby perfection results — perfection as the antithesis of chaos, which eliminates chance, the offspring of confusion. This sublime doctrine of Pythagoras has been poetically described as the rhythm of the universe, the music of the spheres. This conception leads to the conclusion that chaos is impossible because anarchy cannot exist, where law is supreme.

While Anaxagoras in some respects may not be considered so remarkable a man as Pythagoras, he was a great thinker, and was held in the highest esteem on account of his extraordinary gifts, and the advance he made in solving some of the mysteries of natural laws. Indeed, it is said he was the first to discard boldly every vestige of superstition with regard to the origin of matter and the creation of the universe. He denied that the world came into existence by chance, or by force or necessity. He believed that

> "No atoms, casually together hurled,
> Could ere produce so beautiful a world."

He taught that there was a first great cause, a supreme, sublime intelligence, which caused all existing matter to spring into being, and ordered the law of creation.

Herodotus tells a story in connection with Anaxago-

ras which serves to illustrate the difference in that age between the philosopher, seeking for causes and the sorcerers, the soothsayers, the magicians, and the seers who claimed to be able to interpret dreams and visions, and to foretell the significance of portents and omens and read the mysteries attendant upon abnormal conditions. A ram was discovered which had but one horn, which projected from its forehead. The animal was sent as a present to Pericles, who consulted Lampon, a soothsayer, as to what in his judgment this phenomenon indicated. At the time there were two parties seeking supremacy in Athens, the oligarchs, led by Thucydides and the democrats led by Ephialtes, with whom Pericles shared political honors. Lampon concluded that as Pericles had come into possession of the ram with but a single horn, this indicated that the two political parties would become united, and that democracy would become dominant. When Anaxagoras was consulted he requested permission to open the ram's skull, in order to demonstrate the hidden cause of the animal's deformity. He discovered that the brain was not fully developed, but was congested in the centre of the skull, from which the horn grew. The scientific methods employed by Anaxagoras gained distinction for him, but when in the course of time the oligarchs were defeated and Thucydides was ostracised, and Pericles became the leader of the democracy, and the head of the state, great praise was accorded to Lampon as a man wonderfully endowed with pre-science.

In that age the soothsayer and the prophet rather than the scientist and philosopher were consulted by the rulers of the earth to interpret visions and portents. Daniel read to Nebuchadnezzar the interpretation of his dream, foretold his humiliation and how he should become bereft of reason and transformed into a beast of the field. He read also to Belshazzar the mural inscription written by an invisible hand on the walls of

his palace. At a later period, Daniel saw a vision in which there came up out of the river a ram, which had two horns. Then there was revealed to the prophet the spectacle of a he goat which came out of the west which had but one horn projecting from between his eyes, and he saw the impact between the ram and the he goat and witnessed the destruction of the ram. When the goat waxed very great Daniel saw that its horn was broken, and four horns came from it, towards the south and the east and towards the pleasant land. Thus from this vision of the ram and the he goat was foretold the destruction of the kingdom of the Medes and the Persians and the conquest of the world by Alexander the Great, whom the best authorities agree was personified in Daniel's prophetic vision as the goat which came out from the west.

The teachings of Anaxagoras, whom Pericles admired and loved, exerted the greatest influence upon his character, filled his mind with lofty and sublime thoughts, which colored his life and conduct, and were reflected in the deliberate action and the calm and dignified bearing of his pupil, who became a most successful general, an accomplished diplomat and statesman, and one of the great orators of antiquity.

In his youth, Pericles, on account of his remarkable resemblance to Pisistratus, which was a subject of common remark, stood in fear of the people, lest in case he entered public life, his enemies might use this argument to secure his banishment, and vote for a decree authorizing his ostracism under the law. For this reason it is said he first devoted himself to military matters. It was not until after the death of Aristides, and after Themistocles had gone into exile, that he sought political advancement.

Early in his public career, he became active in connection with Ephialtes, one of the leaders of the democratic party in Athens. At this time Cimon, the hero

of the Eurymedon, was the idol of the people. His military fame filled the world. His naval victories had enriched Athens, broadened her empire, and made her the most powerful city of the age. If Pericles would achieve political distinction, he must defeat Cimon and destroy him in public esteem. Political events bring about singular historical coincidents. As Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, had ruined Miltiades, the father of Cimon in order to satisfy his ambition, the son of Xanthippus must ruin the son of Miltiades. Both could not succeed in Athenian politics. Although Cimon was popular with the masses, and was prodigal of his hospitality, and his gifts to the poor, he had no sympathy with those who sought to advance popular government. Politically he was an aristocrat and the leader of the oligarchical party. He believed in privilege and the supremacy of the wealthy classes in public affairs. He was the friend and apologist of the Lacedæmonians, who were the bitter enemies of his own city. He admired the Spartan system of government, and openly advocated the Spartan oligarchy which he seemed to regard as more desirable than Athenian democracy, as established by Clisthenes, and strengthened and enlarged by Themistocles.

From what has been said by Plutarch, we might be justified in assuming that there was practically no difference between the political faith of Pericles and of Cimon. The writer of the "lives" seems to infer that although Pericles was nominally a democrat and the advocate of popular government, yet at heart he was an imperialist, and had no real sympathy with the democrats. Circumstances, however, obliged him to choose at the outset of his career, whether he would follow his convictions, and join with the oligarchical party led by Cimon, or advocate the cause of the democracy and lead the party of Ephialtes. His proud and imperious nature would not permit him to follow

where Cimon led. He opposed the great authority of Cimon, and thereby became the advocate and leader of the democracy.

Pericles inherited an ample fortune. Part of his patrimony consisted of a country place just outside the city walls, on which were erected his suburban residence and other buildings attached to his estates. Archidamus, king of Sparta, and Pericles, before the commencement of hostilities, had been personal friends, who had frequently partaken of each other's hospitality. When the former approached the Attic plain, with an army of 60,000 men at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, after the inhabitants had deserted their farms and country places and flocked within the walls of the city, Pericles, in order to allay prejudice against himself, when the Lacedæmonians had advised the Athenians to expel him as a descendant of a polluted family, made an address in the Public Assembly in which he declared that while Archidamus had been his personal friend, such friendship should not operate to the injury of his countrymen; and that if, by reason of that fact, the enemy spared his lands and buildings while the property of others was destroyed, he would take pleasure in making a present of them to the Athenians. He therefore urged that the people should not harbor distrust or suspicion against him on that account.

Another instance from which some idea may be derived as to the extent of his fortune, occurred when Thucydides and his party charged Pericles with wasteful extravagance of the public moneys, which they said he squandered on temples and public buildings. In answer to the charge, at a public meeting, he asked the Assembly if in their opinion they thought he had laid out too much money in these costly edifices. According to Plutarch they answered that he was spending a great deal too much. If that is the case, an-

swered Pericles, "let the cost be charged to me personally, and let the inscriptions upon the buildings stand in my name." Then we are told that the fickle assembly whether out of surprise at the liberality and public spirit of the man, or out of emulation for the glory of the works, cried out bidding him spend on, and lay out what he thought fit from the public purse, and to spare no cost until all was finished.

Pericles was very painstaking and methodical and exercised great prudence in the care of his property and the management of his estates. The supervision of his private affairs was entrusted to a slave by the name of Evangelus whom it is said was either naturally gifted, or was instructed by Pericles, so as to excel every one in the art of domestic economy. He so managed that nothing was wasted. The crops and the entire yield of his fields were sold, when gathered, and everything necessary to supply his table was purchased in the open market. It is said that his methodical business habits were not pleasing to his sons, and that the female contingent in the houeshold complained with regard to his method of housekeeping because every purchase that was made of articles for use in the home had to be accounted for daily with the greatest exactness. All receipts and disbursements were required to be itemized and to show the measure, the number of items and the price of the divers commodities purchased. This thrift, which might almost be termed parsimony, on the part of the great statesman, may account in a measure for the unfilial conduct and the outward disrespect of his son Xanthippus, who rebelled against his father's authority and frequently abused and maligned him in public.

Another matter which indicated the shrewdness and foresight of Pericles in public affairs, after he came into power was his scheme of colonization. In order to give employment and to furnish means to many citizens, he procured the passage of a law providing that every year at least sixty triremes manned by Athenian citizens under pay, should be sent on cruises abroad extending over a period of eight months. In order to still further thin out the population, and to prevent the city from becoming overcrowded, and filled with groups of idle and mischievous meddlers, he devised a system, whereby property in foreign territories should be given to the individual colonists, who were designated out-citizens or "cleruchs" or as the word indicates, "lot owners." The law provided that these colonists, while residing abroad should not lose their rights of citizenship, but should continue to be, no matter where they settled, Athenian citizens and part of the Athenian electorate. They were pledged at all times, whether at home or abroad, to support the interests of the Athenian empire. Such colonies were planted in Eubœa, Ægina, Naxos, and elsewhere in the Ægean sea, in Chalcis, in Thrace, on the southern coast of the Euxine, in the Thracian Chersonese, at Thurii, and elsewhere on the eastern shores of Italy. The latter colony, however, was Pan-Hellenic. After the destruction of Sybaris, settlers from all parts of Greece were invited to locate there. On its site a new colony was founded, with a mixed population, called New Sybaris, which was afterward named Thurii, whither many distinguished Athenians migrated, among them the historian Herodotus. The colony on the Thracian Chersonese was conducted thither by Pericles in person about B. C. 453. He took with him one thousand colonists to reinforce and protect the Greeks who had previously settled in that fertile region. This was necessary because the barbarous Thracians were accustomed from time to time to make inroads from the north entering the peninsula across the narrow neck of land which joins it to the continent inflicting grievous injury and damage to the settlers by making

continued war upon them. On his arrival with the new colonists Pericles constructed a wall from sea to sea across this neck of land at its narrowest point, which did not exceed five miles in width from the Propontis to the Gulf of Melas, in the neighborhood of the cities of Cardia on the west coast and Pactya on the east. He constructed forts along this bulwark and thereby shut out the Thracians who lay all about the Chersonese and as Plutarch observes, " closed the door against a continual and grievous war " and rescued the Greek settlers from the evils of a predatory population both upon and within its borders.

Before the decere of ostracism against Cimon had been revoked and before the latter returned to Athens, Ephialtes, the incorruptible and fearless leader of the democracy, the advocate of political equality before the law, was assassinated one night while he slept. The oligarchical party had been defeated in their efforts to maintain the integrity of the Areopagus; they had been unable to check the reforms of the progressive element. The advocates of class privileges hated Ephialtes whom they could not control, and were unable to bribe. They blamed him as the author of their political misfortunes, and regarded him as the chief instrument by which their loss of power had been accomplished. They determined to rid Athens of this popular leader and in order to accomplish their wicked designs, they did not hesitate to employ the dagger of an assassin. The conspirators had no difficulty in finding in Bœotia a miscreant ready to do murder, and secured the services of Aristodicus of Tanagra, who assassinated Ephialtes in his bed.

The attempt by the oligarchical party to blame Pericles for the murder, alleging that he was moved by jealousy, and envy of the great reputation of his rival, failed utterly. The real assassin was known and the charges being palpably false, served to react on

those who made them, and Pericles became the most popular man in Athens and the chosen leader of the democracy. He exerted such an influence that the people elected him strategus annually, as long as he lived. Pericles practically on his assumption of leadership became the State. He had reached the commanding position attained in modern times by Louis XIV, when he declared *l'etat, l'etat c'est moi.*

The conduct of the Lacedæmonians, in dismissing their Athenian allies, sent at the instigation of Cimon, to aid in suppressing the revolt of the Helots, after the earthquake at Sparta, B. C. 464, caused the first open quarrel between Sparta and Athens. The Athenians believed that the true reason for the dismissal was lack of confidence in the loyalty of Athens, especially in view of the fact that it became known in some quarters that just before the earthquake, the Lacedæmonians had secretly planned to invade Attica to aid the Thasians in their struggle for independence. It cost Cimon also his popularity, and as has been observed resulted in his banishment. It also gave Pericles the opportunity he sought to supercede the great admiral in public esteem and confidence.

POSITION OF ATHENS WHEN PERICLES CAME INTO POWER

Athens, at the time Pericles came into power, was mistress of the sea. The victorious fleets of Cimon had enlarged her conquests and extended her jurisdiction until the Attic commonwealth became in fact a maritime empire. The great statesman who had succeeded Ephialtes, now bent his energies to establish the supremacy of Athens on land. His purpose was to humiliate and completely overshadow the Lacedæmonians, who were enlisting allies to destroy the power of her Attic rival, and defeat her ambition for supremacy in Hellas, and in the western world. Hostile

public sentiment occasioned by the treatment which had been accorded the Athenian allies, who, at the behest of Cimon had been sent to Messenia to assist the reduction of Mount Ithome, gave Pericles the opportunity which he sought and which he turned to his advantage to further advance his foreign policy. His first move was to induce the Public Assembly to rescind the anti-Persian alliance which had existed since the battle of Platæa, and to enter into an alliance with Argos, the open enemy of the Lacedæmonians. Athens and Argos then made an alliance with Thessaly in the north, from which military operations could be conducted against the Bœotians, who were allies of the Lacedæmonians. The Corinthians at this time were at war with the Megarians. The contest involved a dispute as to the boundaries of their frontiers. Pericles had no difficulty in making an alliance with Megara, in view of the fact that the Megarians were hard pressed by their enemies, the Corinthians. This arrangement was of the utmost importance to the Athenians, because it gave them control of the isthmus, the gateway into the Peloponnesus, and a naval base at Nisea and Pegæ, on the Saronic gulf and the gulf of Corinth respectively. From the former city their allies built two parallel walls connecting the port town directly with the sea. These walls were of great strategic advantage in operations against the island Ægina. The Athenians then made war on the Æginitans. In this contest the latter and their Peloponnesian allies were defeated with a loss of seventy ships and the victorious Athenians, under the command of Leocrates, landed their forces on the island. The Corinthians then undertook a counter-movement against the Megarians, hoping that the Athenians would thereby be obliged to raise the siege of Ægina. They sought to take advantage of the fact that there were no available troops in Athens at this time of military age. The troops not engaged in Ægina were absent in Egypt to assist Inaros in his revolt against Artaxerxes. They did not consider it possible that the old men and boys who remained in the city would leave their homes to undertake military operations or attempt an aggressive campaign in Megara. In this they were mistaken. Those under military age and those past the time when they could be expected to perform military service became enthusiastic. They volunteered to march into Megara to assist their allies to drive out the Corinthians and were led to battle under the command of Myronides. This novel campaign resulted in the defeat of the Corinthians, and Megara was again rid of her enemies.

The object of these alliances negotiated through the influence of Pericles was obvious. If the Athenians could effectually guard the isthmus, and command the waters that washed its shores, they could sail round the Peolponnesus at pleasure, and effectually obstruct the paths and defiles in the Geranea Mountains through which the Lacedæmonians were obliged to enter Attica. The Lacedæmonians soon became aware of the disadvantage at which they were placed by the Athenian-Megarian alliance. Prior to this alliance the Phocians undertook a campaign against Doris, and seized Citium, a Dorian city close to the western border of Locris. The Dorians appealed to their kinsmen in the Peloponnesus to protect them, and redress the wrong committed by the Phocians. The Spartans, from their forces, engaged in the siege of Ithome, sent fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies into Phocis, under the command of Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, to compel the Phocians to relinquish their conquest and restore the city they had taken from the Dorians. When this task was accomplished and the Lacedæmonians were returning through the friendly territory of Bœotia, they learned that

Megara was no longer their ally, and that the passes through the Geranea Mountains were strongly guarded. Under the circumstances the Lacedæmonians deemed it wise to tarry in Bœotia. They encamped in the territory of Tanagra, in the valley of the Asopus, close to the borders of Attica. They had another motive also in assembling their forces so close to the border. They were privately urged by the leaders of the oligarchical party in Athens to coöperate with the conspirators, and overthrow the power of the democracy, and put an end to the building of the long walls, being constructed to connect the port towns at the Piræus and Phalerum, with the walls of Athens.

The Athenians, suspecting treachery and fearing an attack from the combined forces of the Peloponnesians and Bœotians, sent an army under Pericles, who had been elected a strategus to engage the enemy. The result was the battle of Tanagra, where Pericles, though he fought bravely and displayed extraordinary courage in the field, suffered defeat and the Lacedæmonians managed to return through Megara to their own country. This engagement proved but a temporary obstacle to the policy of Pericles to establish the supremacy of Athens in central and northern Greece. To regain the prestige they had lost temporarily at Tanagra, the Athenians, two months after that engagement, sent an army across the Asopus under command of Myronides and engaged and defeated the Bœotians at Œnophyta. The contest was decisive and the victory complete. The oligarchical party in Bœotia were driven into exile and Locris, Bœotia and Phocis became subject to the jurisdiction of Athens. The Athenians took hostages also from the Opuntian Locrians on the gulf of Malis and northern straits of Eubœa. In view of the Thessalian alliance, Athens was now supreme in northern and central Greece. Her jurisdiction extended from the Gulf of Corinth to the vale

of Tempe, the Thermaic gulf and the borders of Macedonia.

Pericles used his power to harass and punish the Peloponnesians and Tolmides was assigned to circumnavigate the peninusla. His marauding squadron was everywhere successful. He ravaged the coasts of Argolis, Laconia, Elis, and Achaia, plundered the towns within convenient reach and did what damage he could.

Two years after Tolmides achieved his naval success in the Peloponnesus, Pericles sailed with a squadron from the port of Pegæ with one thousand Athenians, and ravaged the coasts of Argolis and Achaia. He also attacked Œniadæ in Acarnania. On this expedition he defeated an army sent from Sicyon, to meet him when he landed near the city. This expedition strengthened his influence and added to his fame as a military commander.

As has been observed, the loyalty shown by Cimon and his followers at Tanagra caused a change in public sentiment with respect to the illustrious exile. His return to Athens was being discussed. Pericles saw the inevitable and planned that on the return of his rival, his own popularity should not suffer. By a master-stroke of diplomacy, the affair was arranged in such a way as to obviate the possibility that the return of the popular admiral would weaken the power of the democracy, or hinder the ambition of Pericles. It is probable that the great statesman may have used the influence of Elpinice, the artful and engaging sister of Cimon to further his designs. She undoubtedly appealed to Pericles to lend his influence to secure the revocation of the decree of ostracism against her brother, especially in view of the fact that Pericles was instrumental in having the decree passed. She had appealed to him before, when her brother was tried for his life, and Pericles was assigned as one of the

committee to prosecute the charges against him. Elpinice, by reason of her social position, the wealth of her husband and her brother, and the exalted position she occupied, and as leader of the oligarchical party, came constantly in contact with the eminent men of Athens, and was conversant with the political intrigues of her day. There is, therefore, nothing improbable in the assumption that she used her arts of persuasion, at this time, to secure his good will, especially in view of the fact that now Pericles was the leader of his party and the most influential man in Athens. Cimon had achieved his fame as a naval commander. It was altogether fitting and proper, therefore, that on his return, he should be honored by giving him command of the naval forces. He could be assigned to duty in foreign parts, and given the opportunity to win fresh laurels on the sea. His absence would relieve Pericles from any apprehension as to his political influence, an influence which might be formidable if he were in Athens, but which he could not well exercise while abroad. Elpinice would have her way in seeing her brother restored to the honors and dignities of his high station; and in minimizing his influence in political affairs at home, Pericles would reap the advantage he sought.

There is reason to believe, also, that the restoration of Cimon was the result of a compromise of some sort by which the prejudices and passions aroused by party feeling were, through his mediation, mollified and assuaged. He acted the part of peace-maker, and three years after the close of the second Messenian War, B. C. 452, he negotiated with the Lacedæmonians the Five Years' Truce. We are not informed what naval operations were carried on by Cimon prior to the time when he sailed to Cyprus with a squadron of two hundred ships. This expedition was sent out after the Five Years' Truce had been concluded with the Lacedæmonians, and was the last undertaking of the Athenian admiral, who died at Cyprus, B. C. 449.

ATHENS LOSES LAND SUPREMACY — EXPANSION OF HER MARITIME EMPIRE

The land supremacy established by Athens at Œnophyta, B. C. 456, lasted ten years. The defeat of Tolmides at Coronea, B. C. 447, which marked the end of Athenian power in Central Greece, beyond the confines of Attica, was analogous, in many respects, to the defeat of the Spartans at Sphacteria, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War. Tolmides undertook his campaign in Bœotia, contrary to the advice of Pericles, who counselled caution, and advocated delay until a stronger army could be sent against the Bœotian oligarchs. His advice was disregarded. Many of the young men then in Athens belonged to old and illustrious families. They joined in the movement and volunteered their services. They believed that a thousand Athenians led by the renowned Tolmides would be more than a match for any army their enemies could muster, especially in view of the fact that the Bœotians were unable to secure the aid of the Lacedæmonians by reason of the Five Years' Truce which was still in force. Tolmides was killed at Coronea and some of the prisoners taken by the enemy were of the best blood in Athens. At Sphacteria many of the Spartans who had been made prisoners by the Athenians belonged to the most prominent families of the Lacedæmonians. As the Spartans were obliged to make peace after their defeat to save their most influential citizens, so Athens, after the defeat at Coronea was obliged to relinquish her supremacy in continental Hellas to save the lives of some of her most estimable citizens. The leaders of the oligarchical party, who had been in exile since their defeat at Œnophyta returned. The democracies

which the Athenians had instituted were abolished and oligarchies were once more established in their stead.

The oligarchical party now became active not only in Bœotia, but in Phocis, Locris, Megara and Eubœa. As a result of their influence, the island of Eubœa rebelled, and refused allegiance to Athens. Megara also was induced to revolt. This disloyalty of the Eubœans of itself was a trivial affair. Pericles would have had no difficulty in suppressing it, but the fact that the Five Years' Truce with the Lacedæmonians had now expired, caused some apprehension. The elimination of this treaty released the latter from any further obligation to keep the peace, and refrain from molesting her ambitious rival. The situation demanded all the skill and diplomacy possessed by Pericles in order to save Attica from invasion, and secure the repose of Athens. The oligarchical party, after the expatriation of Cimon, was led by Thucydides (not the historian), a relative also of Cimon, and a man of great ability. His party was opposed to war with the Lacedæmonians and the further expansion of the Athenian Empire, at the risk of incurring the hostility of other states of Greece. But the war had actually begun, while Pericles was absent with an army to suppress the insurrection in Eubœa. Pleistoanax, the young King of Sparta, who shared the crown with Archidamus, was placed in command of an army with instructions to invade Attica. When Pericles learned that the Peloponnesians were advancing through Megara, he was compelled to abandon, temporarily, operations in Eubœa. He hastened to Attica, and arrived after the Spartans had crossed the border and were encamped on the plain of Eleusis. Athens was not ready for war with Sparta. Pericles was resourceful. He knew the power of money. Pleistoanax was young. Cleandrides, his coadjutor, who had been sent with the king to advise and give him the benefit of his mature judgment,

was susceptible. Pericles bribed them both. The Spartans evacuated Attica and returned to their own country. He then returned with five thousand hoplites and reduced Eubœa to subjection.

Pericles was now called upon to decide whether he would be content to relinquish Megara, Ægina, Trœzen in Argolis, and territory in Achaia, for the sake of peace, or whether he would go to war with the Peloponnesians. He considered that the integrity of his maritime empire with peace was more to his own interests and the interest of his countrymen than war with the Peloponnesians. He accordingly negotiated a treaty of peace with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, B. C. 445, which by its terms was limited to a period of thirty years. This pact may be regarded as the crowning act of diplomacy of the great statesman. It gave Athens repose for fifteen years, and is known as the Thirty Years' Truce. During this period Athens attained unparalleled prosperity and reached the height of her fame as the most renowned city of antiquity. It embraces the era which bears the impress of his genius and the genius of the distinguished men of the time, and is known as the golden age of Pericles.

The main obstacle now in the way of the ambition of the leader of the Athenian democracy, was the influence of the oligarchical party led by Thucydides. The policy of the oligarchs and their campaign cry was united Hellas. They advocated the establishment of amicable relations with all the cities and states in Greece. This idea was repugnant to the policy of the Athenian democracy. How was it possible to unite Hellas without creating either a pan-Hellenic oligarchy or a universal democracy. A house divided against itself cannot stand. Hellas could not exist half oligarchic and half democratic. It must be all oligarchic or all democratic. The Lacedæmonians and their allies would not surrender their autonomy, and their form of

government for the sake of Hellenic unity. The Athenians would not consent to Hellenic unity if the price was to be the abolition of their democratic constitution, as perfected by Ephialtes, and supported by Pericles. The difficulty was insurmountable and politically impossible. But there was involved another issue, relating to the disposition of the moneys contributed annually by the Athenian allies, who constituted the membership of the Confederacy of Delos.

This Confederacy was formed B. C. 478, when Cimon entered on his wars of expulsion to drive the Persians from Europe and the eastern shores of Asia. The members of the Confederacy, besides Athens, were the States and Municipalities situated on the islands of the Ægean Sea, and the Hellenic coast cities of Asia Minor. The object and purpose of the Confederacy was to secure a fund and supply ships and men to prosecute these wars of expulsion, and protect the members of the league from Persian invasion. The amount to be contributed by each member was adjusted by mutual consent. Athens was chosen as president of the league, and its treasury was to remain in the temple of Apollo on the sacred island of Delos. Each member paid into it a fixed tax or contribution or furnished its quota of ships and men. Long after the Persians had been driven from the Ægean sea, Athens continued to exact this war tax, which amounted to a sum equivalent to more than $600,000 annually. After the lapse of about eighteen years, presumably about B. C. 460, Pericles exerted his influence to secure the removal of the treasury of the League from the island of Delos to the city of Athens, on the pretext that the funds would be safer in Attica than in the midst of the Ægean. The treasury was accordingly taken to Athens. It was no longer necessary to exact this tax, because the Persian wars, so far as the safety of the members of the Confederacy was concerned, had long since ceased. As

the tax was levied by consent, for a specific purpose, its exaction for any other purpose than that for which it was contributed was wholly unauthorized and illegal. Pericles, about the time the Thirty Years' Truce was concluded, without the consent of the league, began to use a large part of these war funds to beautify and adorn the city of Athens.

The allies protested. Why should these municipalities and states continue to contribute their substance and the fruits of their toil in order that the Athenians might lavish it to guild her city all over, "and to adorn and set her forth, as it were, some vain woman, hung round with precious stones, and figures and temples which cost a world of money." The members of the Confederacy complained at the injustice and objected to being forced to pay. Pericles, at the head of the Athenian democracy, the president of the league, overruled these objections, took the money by force and reduced to subjection those members of the league who refused to submit. His course was sustained by the Public Assembly over the protest of Thucydides and the oligarchical party, who contended not that the tax should be reduced, but that the money should be used solely to prosecute war against Persia in Egypt, Cyprus and distant parts of the world remote from the Ægean.

The argument of Pericles to support this great injustice with respect to diverting this war fund, is without merit. He claimed that the Athenians were not bound to account for the moneys received from their allies, if they maintained at all times their defense and prevented the barbarians from molesting them. He argued that the tax belonged not to those who paid it, but to those who received it. He entirely ignored the fact that whenever the tax was in excess of the amount necessary to police the Ægean, it should be reduced proportionately. On the contrary he con-

tended that if the amount of the revenues derived from the members of the league was more than sufficient for the purposes for which it was levied that, nevertheless, the Athenians had a right to expend the surplus, to adorn and beautify Athens, the head of the Confederacy, the pride of Hellas, and the most renowned city in the world. He argued that the works of art and magnificent temples and structures which made Athens great, also augmented her power and influence, and reflected the courage and patriotism of its citizens so as to command not only the respect and admiration of other states, but gave Athens a prestige that deterred those who might otherwise have been inclined to assail or humiliate the allies, whom Athens had sworn to defend.

When we consider the circumstances under which the money was contributed, it will be impossible to sustain the plausible argument of Pericles on any sound moral principle. It must rest solely on the plea of expediency or on the false theory often invoked by benevolent despots, that might makes right, or that the end justifies the means. We cannot ignore the fact that the money was given to Athens as President of the Confederacy in trust, for the uses and purposes agreed upon by all the members. Upon sound principles of equity, therefore, the trustee was bound to apply the money to those uses exclusively, unless by consent of the constituent members of the league it was made applicable to a different purpose.

Party spirit ran high and caused unusual excitement among the advocates who severally supported Thucydides on the one side and Pericles on the other. Thucydides finally concluded to appeal directly to the people for a vote of confidence. This course involved the alternative of ostracism. If the confidence was voted to his adversary, Pericles, and withheld from Thucydides, a decree of ostracism would follow against

the unsuccessful candidate. In other words the people were called upon to decide which of the two leaders should be ostracised. The result necessarily involved the political fate of the rivals who contended for political supremacy. Pericles defeated his antagonist. The majority in his favor was decisive and overwhelming, and resulted in largely disintegrating the combination that had been formed against him. All formidable opposition in the city practically ceased. Pericles secured control. The vast resources of his countrymen were at his command, "their tributes, their armies, and their galleys, the islands, the sea, and their wide extent of power, partly over other Greeks, and partly over barbarians, and all that empire which they possessed."

After this personal triumph, Pericles, according to Plutarch, was not the same man he was before. Athens became thenceforth an empire which went under the name of a democracy, and was controlled by the will of one man. Pericles was for all practical purposes the State.

There were no longer any obstacles to hinder the Athenian protagonist from carrying out his ambitious designs. The funds contributed by the Delian Confederacy were available, and he determined to make Athens the most renowned city in the world. Landor puts a speech into the mouth of Pericles, supposed to have been delivered when Archidamus was approaching Attica with an army of 60,000 men. "Impelled by the breath of Xerxes," he said, "the locusts of Asia consumed your harvests; your habitations crumbled away as they swarmed along; the temples of the gods lay prostrate; the gods themselves bowed and fell; the men of Athens rose higher than ever." Pericles now determined to restore the temples and images burned by the Persians, and make his city greater than any. His designs were successfully ac-

complished. The faded splendors of Athens, after more than twenty-three centuries, still attract the admiration of mankind. Posterity has not surpassed the artistic architectural beauty, the graceful images and statues produced in the age of Pericles. Modern scholars and lovers of the beautiful continue to wonder at the development which characterized Athenian art at that period of the world's history. To-day we love to dwell upon the achievements of the city of the violet crown, which has been characterized by Mahaffy as "the tomb of ancient glory — the home of ancient wisdom; the mother of science, of art, of philosophy, of politics — the champion of liberty, the envy of the Persian and the Roman — the teacher even still of the modern civilized world."

There can be little doubt, however, that the principal issue in the campaign between Pericles and Thucydides was not whether Athens was justified in using the funds of the Delian Confederacy to beautify and adorn the city and the hill of the Acropolis, but whether the democratic form of government then established should give way to an oligarchy. There can be no question either that during the campaign Pericles promised Hellenic unity, provided it could be brought about without imperiling democratic government at least in Attica. In furtherance of this design, according to the account given by Plutarch, the Public Assembly, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree authorizing a pan-Hellenic Congress, to assemble in Athens, composed of delegates from every Greek city in Europe and Asia. The object of this assembly was to confer as to the best mode of securing and devising ways and means to restore the Greek temples, which had been burned and destroyed by the armies of Persia, to fulfill the vows that had been made by the Hellenese for the safety of their land from the sword of the invader, and more important still to establish a maritime code or

proper laws and ordinances regulating the navigation of the seas to promote commercial prosperity and secure peace among the Hellenese. Twenty delegates were commissioned to execute the decree. Five were dispatched to Asia to summon the Ionians and Dorians and the islanders as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five to Thrace and the Hellespont as far as Byzantium; five to Bœotia, Phocis and the Peloponnesus, to the Locrians and over the continent to the Ambracian Gulf; the other five were sent to the gulf of Malis and beyond into Thessaly, as far as the confines of Macedonia.

This patriotic movement worthy of the genius of the Athenian statesman was thwarted through the envy and jealousy of the narrow and prejudiced Lacedæmonians and their allies, who secretly defeated the project and settled for all time the destinies of Greece which they preferred should remain divided, unless they themselves could control the enterprise, and become the official head of United Hellas.

CORCYRIAN AND CORINTHIAN WARS

The military operations, which disturbed the repose of Greece, after the Samian War, are known as the Corcyrian Wars, waged by Corinth, the mother city, against Corcyra (Corfu), her daughter city, in which the former sought to discipline the latter. Both states had been active in establishing colonies. Corcyra founded several on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. The most flourishing of these was Epidamnus in Illyria. About five years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Epidamnians were attacked by the barbarous Illyrian tribes dwelling in the contiguous territory and were reduced to extremity. In their distress they appealed to their mother city Corcyra for

succor. Their entreaties were disregarded and the Epidamnians, after consulting the oracles at the temple of Apollo at Delphi, appealed to Corinth and delivered their city to them. The Corinthians at once sent troops and colonies to Epidamnus. This prompt intervention kindled the anger of the Corcyrians. A fleet was sent to Epidamnus with instructions to demand that the latter expel the Corinthians who had hastened to relieve them. The request was refused. The Corcyrians then invested the city and called in as allies the barbarous Illyrian tribes. War was declared by Corinth against Corcyra. The former dispatched a fleet to Epidamnus which was intercepted by a Corcyrian squadron off the promontory of Actium in Acarnania at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. There, in sight of the temple of Apollo, visible from the decks of the hostile fleets, a great naval battle was fought in which the Corinthians were overwhelmingly defeated. As a result Epidamnus was forced to surrender and the unfortunate city came again into the possession of Corcyra. Both sides then appealed to Athens. Corcyra sought to form an alliance with the Athenians. This was strongly opposed by the ambassadors sent by Corinth. Pericles finally advised that the Athenians enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra, and declined to accede to the petition of the Corinthians, praying that Athens remain neutral and permit them to discipline their daughter city, as Athens had disciplined their allies in Samos. The fruits of this defensive alliance resulted in the defeat of the Corinthian fleet off the island of Sybota, near the coast of Epirus, B. C. 432. When the Corcyrians were hard pressed, and disaster seemed inevitable, an Athenian fleet appeared and saved the day. Victory was plucked from the jaws of defeat. The Corinthians were forced to retire. The latter urged that this intervention was a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce. Her Peloponnesian allies so decided, and all Greece was shortly afterwards involved in civil war.

Pericles is blamed in some quarters with being solely responisble for bringing on the Peloponnesian War. This conclusion is not justified by the facts. In his great war speech, the last address made by Pericles in the Public Assembly which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, he did advocate war. But this advice was also predicated on the assumption that the enemy would finally reject all overtures of peace. Pericles declared to the Assembly that Athens must not be the aggressor; that if war ensued the Lacedæmonians and their allies, not the Athenians, must be the aggressors. Thucydides, in all probability, was in the Assembly and heard the speech delivered. He has reported it fully, and preserved it for the perusal of posterity. When the arguments of Pericles are analyzed, there seems to be no room for doubt that Pericles did not urge Athens to make war. The address begins with this statement: "I say, Athenians, as I have always said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians." He then observed that when differences should arise, the treaty required that they should be submitted to arbitration. That the Peloponnesians had never asked for arbitration, and when the Athenians offered it they declined. He then reminded his audience that the Lacedæmonians required the Athenians "To quit Potidea, to leave Ægina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megarians." He observed further that if the Athenians yielded, their adversaries would think that they did so through fear and would immediately dictate more oppressive conditions. That the Athenians must either give way before the commencement of hostilities or, if they determined to go to war, which course Pericles advocated, then they must yield nothing. He then made this forcible observation: "Any claim, the smallest as well as the

greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal when there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery." He then set forth the resources of the Athenian empire and contrasted it with that of the Lacedæmonians.

In answer to those who declare that this address was tantamount to an open declaration of war, it is sufficient to refer to the answer which Pericles recommended in his speech should be sent to the ambassadors, who were about to return to Sparta. "Let us say to them," said Pericles, "that we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta, for the treaty no more forbids one than the other. That we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedæmonians allow their subject states to be governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lacedæmon, but for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. That we do not want to begin war, but intend to defend ourselves if attacked."

The war speech of Pericles, therefore, after setting out the facts, constitutes an offer on the part of the Athenians to conform to the terms and conditions of the treaty (the Thirty Years' Truce) and submit all their differences to arbitration.

Diodorus, in the Twelfth Book of his history, gives his version of the immediate cause of the Peloponnesian War. He says that it was brought about by Pericles, in order to avoid being called to account for the moneys of the Delian League for which as treasurer of Athens, President of the League, he was accountable. The Athenians, Diodorus says, sought to secure dominion of the sea. He declares that Pericles had expended a great part of these public funds in connection with his

private affairs. Having been called to render an account of his stewardship he fell sick. During his illness his nephew, Alcibiades, not then of full age, called to see him, and having inquired as to the cause of his uncle's indisposition was advised as to his perplexity with regard to the public funds which were entrusted to his custody. Alcibiades suggested that instead of considering how he should account, it would be far better for him to devise some way to avoid giving any account at all. Pericles then began to consider how he might involve the Athenians in some great war. It happened at this time, according to Diodorus, that Phidias, at the behest of the enemies of Pericles, had been accused. It was charged that with the connivance and help of Pericles, he had embezzled large sums belonging to the goddess Athene, whose statue of ivory and gold had been carved by Phidias, and placed in the Parthenon. The charge was both for embezzlement and sacrilege. In this charge Anaxagoras, the philosopher and friend of Pericles, was involved also. Pericles was a good judge of human nature and believed it to be advantageous for him if possible to involve Athens in the war and make use of men engaged in idle gossip actuated by envy and jealousy, in order that amidst the excitement of war, they would be deaf to the accusations against him, and would have neither time nor leisure to call him to account. The Athenians had recently made a decree that the citizens of Megara should be cut off from all commercial relations with them, both by sea and land. The Megarians then petitioned the Spartans to aid them, to secure a rescission of this decree against Megara. Pericles, according to this account, saw his opportunity. He opposed the revocation of the decree, and advised recourse to arms. And the war came. Thus Diodorus, on the authority of Ephorus, the Greek historian, attributes to the alleged peculations of Pericles, the true cause

of the Peloponnesian War. Plutarch, however, who wrote probably a century after Diodorus, does not credit this version as to the genesis of the war, which destroyed the glory of Athens, and declares that the truth as to the accusation is uncertain. Moreover, he has passed the highest encomium on the character of Pericles, and comparing him with Fabius, declares that no man " had ever greater opportunities to enrich himself having had presents offered him from so many kings and princes and allies, yet no man was ever more free from corruption."

Thucydides, also, the illustrious contemporary of the Athenian statesman, does not attribute the Dorian War to this charge of peculation, nor to the Megarian decree, but claims that it was brought on by the blow struck at Potidea, arising out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra.

The beginning of this war was an important date in Hellenic annals. It marked an epoch in the history of Greece. Herodotus had then attained the age of 53; Thucydides the historian was 40; Pericles was 68. In this year also the tragedy of Medea, by Euripides, was first produced. Its author at the time was 48 years old. Fleets and armies were mobilized, the contending forces which were destined to bring destruction upon Hellas aligned themselves, and active preparations were made for the titanic struggle, destinued to continue for more than a quarter of a century.

Archidamus, at the last moment, still hoped for peace. When his forces reached the borders of Attica, he dispatched as his envoy Melanippus, in the hope that an amicable adjustment might still be reached, and war averted. But Pericles forbade. He secured the adoption of a resolution by the Public Assembly to receive neither envoy nor herald, and Melanippus was sent back across the border before sunset on the day

he sought to reach Athens, and was not permitted even to disclose the nature of his message.

About the middle of June, B. C. 431, Archidamus began his work of destruction. He devastated Attica and laid waste its fertile demes, burning and destroying the harvests, the vineyards, the orchards. He remained in Attica less than forty days, and then his supplies having become exhausted late in July, he evacuated the country and returned through the friendly state of Bœotia.

Pericles now took up the sword, to retaliate upon the enemy for the injury that his countrymen had sustained at their hands. Late in September, at the head of an army of 13,000 hoplites, he entered the Megarid and laid waste the country with fire and sword, and carried his destructive warfare to the very gates of the city of Megara. These invasions and counter invasions embraced the operations in the first year of this memorable struggle. It was in the winter, 431 B. C., that Pericles was chosen to deliver the funeral oration, in memory of those who had fallen in the campaign.

In the spring of the following year, B. C. 430, Archidamus repeated the operations of the previous summer, and again invaded Attica. It was during this campaign that the scourge of pestilence more deadly than that of war, filled Athens with desolation and indescribable horrors. " Death was whetting his arrows, and the graves were open." The Athenians murmured and repeated the old adage that the Dorian War would come and a plague with it. Pericles became the object of their bitter attacks. He was blamed for the war and for the pestilence. His enemies and vicious and jealous rivals now gave full rein to their passions and prejudices, and bent their energies to discredit and ruin the great statesman, and drag him from power. Plots and conspiracies had already manifested themselves in efforts to strike down the close friends of Pericles.

Among his traducers was the notorious tanner Cleon, the idol of the lower classes. He was conspicuous for his brutal denunciation and vituperation. In the absence of proper libel laws, no reputation, however chaste, no character, however noble, escaped the assaults of this vulgar demagogue. He lacked the refinement and intellectual qualities of Aristophanes and the scholarly attainments of the satirists and comic poets of the day. But his coarse, vulgar wit, and picturesque and spectacular harangues caught the fancy of the masses and won the applause of the illiterate. Phidias, the greatest sculptor of any age; Anaxagoras, the renowned scholar and philosopher; the gifted and beautiful Milesian Aspasia, the wife of Pericles, all were marked for destruction. The integrity of Pericles himself was finally assailed and he was obliged to pay an unjust fine. Phidias died in prison; Anaxagoras became an exile; Aspasia was acquitted after a vigorous defense conducted by Pericles in person.

Bowed down by the terrible afflictions visited upon them by the ravages of pestilence, the citizens of Athens sought to blame Pericles and even sought to hold him responsible for the fatal scourge which had been imposed in the dispensation of divine providence. In his defense to these charges and accusations, Pericles, in the course of his speech, observed: "By this time your empire has become a tyranny, which, in the opinion of mankind, you may have unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered." In other words, he advised that the Athenians having built up the most flourishing empire in the world, no matter whether the means by which it was acquired were just or unjust, yet they could not now afford to lose it, at the behest of timorous or discontented citizens and substitute their glorious sovereignty for a condition which must result in political dissolution, disintegration and slavery.

In this connection we must remember, also, that the Lacedæmonians and their allies blamed their misfortunes on Pericles personally. All their shafts were hurled at the great statesman, whose influence dominated the Athenians, whose superior intelligence and clever diplomacy prevented them from securing commercial or political advantages, and whose successful foreign policy opened foreign markets to Athenian ports, oftentimes to the exclusion of her rivals in the Peloponnesus. They concentrated their efforts to persuade the Athenians to rid themselves of their protagonist, who in point of ability and political sagacity was easily the greatest man of his age. They resorted to religious prejudices, by reminding the Athenians that the "curse" of the goddess was visited upon the Alcmæonidæ, in the affair of Cylon, and that this pollution was inherited by Pericles, the son of Xanthippus. They were reminded how his ancestor, Megacles, the head of the Alcmæonidæ, had pursued Cylon, who took refuge at the altar where he was under the divine protection; how he was induced to quit the temple, on the promise that his life would be spared; and having relied on the false promise, was butchered by the Alcmæonidæ. The murderers and their descendants were accursed by the goddess. The Lacedæmonians tried to persuade the Athenians to drive out the "curse," in the hope that even if they failed to persuade the people to banish Pericles, they might discredit him, by inducing them to believe that if war ensued it would result as a consequence of the pollution that rested on the first citizen of the empire.

The attempt not only failed, but was met by a counter demand that the Spartans drive out the "curse" of Tenaras, referring to the murder of certain Helots, who had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon, at Tenaras, and who were taken thence, led away and slain. This act the Lacedæmonians them-

selves believed was marked by divine displeasure, evidenced by the earthquake which destroyed Sparta and resulted in the outbreak of the Helots and the Third Messenian War.

Although the Lacedæmonians failed in their attempts to discredit Pericles, the peace party in Athens, adherents of the oligarchical party of Cimon and Thucydides, and blatant demagogues and radicals led by Cleon, united their efforts and resorted to every means to bring Pericles into disfavor. They were aided by a contingent of malcontents among the democrats who were envious and jealous of the great statesman. The plan was to strike down first the friends of Pericles, and then to accuse the great statesman himself and bring him before the court on some pretext, which would entail disgrace and ignominy.

In order to carry out these plans, the conspirators enlisted the aid of a venal and corrupt priesthood, who sought to create religious prejudices. During the absence of Pericles, Diopithes, the priest of the temple of Erechtheus, became the sponsor of a law against heresy which was introduced and passed by the Public Assembly. Under this statute the philosophers, the most conspicuous of whom was Anaxagoras, friend and preceptor of Pericles, whose teachings it was asserted were opposed to belief in the gods as conceived by the theogeny taught by the priests in the sacred temples, became a capital offense. This legislation was aimed at Anaxagoras who was universally esteemed for his knowledge and attainments, and his discoveries in mathematics and astronomy. He taught that the physical universe was the work of design and did not come by chance. These teachings brought him into disfavor with the superstitious and ignorant and gave the enemies of Pericles a powerful weapon.

Before the conspirators could secure an indictment against this distinguished man, Pericles succeeded in

persuading him to escape and seek a refuge in the shores of the Hellespont at Lampsacus, in Mysia.

These malcontents then attacked Phidias who built the Parthenon. He was charged with peculation for having embezzled the gold entrusted to him with which to adorn the statues and works of art in the Parthenon. Pericles demonstrated the falsity of these accusations by taking off the gold plates from the marble, bronze and ivory image of Athene, the most imposing piece of sculpture in Greece. He weighed the gold in the presence of his accusers and it was found to be of the requisite weight and fineness.

But not content with the failure to sustain the charge of embezzlement, the great sculptor was accused of impiety for having traced in a group of figures wrought upon the shield of the goddess the lineaments of human faces, said to represent Phidias and Pericles. He died in prison awaiting trial. Aristophanes refers to this incident in the "Peace," a comedy produced in Athens, thus:

"Phidias was the first beginning; his indictment and undoing
First alarmed his friend and patron for his own approaching ruin."

Next came the blow that struck nearest the heart of Pericles. A charge of heresy was brought against his wife, Aspasia, who might have suffered the fate which subsequently overtook Socrates, upon a similar accusation, had not Pericles, in person, pleaded her cause before the judges who presided at her trial. The indictment charged this beautiful and gifted woman as guilty of the crime of not acknowledging the gods of the country, as having spoken irreverently of the sacred customs of the Athenians, and the mysteries of Eleusis, with having joined in the debates of the philosophers who denied the gods, coupled with malicious charges of immodesty and immorality. The punishment of death

was invoked under the statute. Hermippus a comic poet, and friend of Aristophanes, who had in his plays libelled not only Aspasia, but Pericles as well, was chosen to prosecute the indictment, with the assistance and moral support of Diopithes, priest of the temple of Erechtheus.

Under the constitution as it then existed, it seems that the trial was conducted not in the court of the Areopagus, but before the Archon Basilous and his associate archons, and a panel of dikasts. Pericles could trust no one but himself with the conduct of the defense. The fate of the accused was to him dearer than life, and he determined to sacrifice himself, and if necessary, to share her fate. After the evidence was all in, and Hermippus had concluded his bitter arraignment, Pericles, pale and anxious, arose and addressed the magistrates and the dikasts. His argument before that tribunal has not been preserved but we may be justified in the assumption that he dwelt first on the element of intent. He contended for acquittal upon the ground that there could be no conviction in the absence of criminal intent, and that the essence of every crime was a guilty mind. The conduct of the accused must be viewed in the light of what she sought to accomplish. The purpose of philosophical discussion was not intended to treat the deity with disrespect or to malign the gods, but to enlighten and broaden the intellect and apply the test of reason in the discussion of the mysteries involved in the manifestations of nature, and the solution of the problems which relate to the supernatural.

If the prisoner was guilty of the charge of impiety, he declared, then he was guilty also of the same offense and reminded the court that if they should convict his wife, they must also convict her husband as her accomplice. Every word he uttered came from his heart, prompted by the tenderest feelings of affection. He

was unable to control his emotions and it is said the great orator and dignified statesman wept.

> "Now is that noble vessel full of grief,
> That it runs over, even at his eyes."

He reminded his accusers, as Hammerling observes, that he had erected the superb temples that adorned their city, and through his influence the sacred images on the Acropolis and within the sacred precincts of Eleusis were carved and adorned with infinite pains. Did these superb masterpieces indicate impiety? He had fought the battles of the republic, destroyed the power of the oligarchy, established a democracy and secured the liberties of the people. The result of a life of patriotic devotion tended to lessen rather than increase the growth of contentment and morality, and to inculcate a love of the refined and beautiful. In all his work for the public weal and general welfare of the citizens of Athens, his wife, the intellectual and gifted woman now on trial for her life, was his enthusiastic helpmate, and much of what had been accomplished was due to her.. In view of these facts it would be inhuman and monstrous to tear from the breast of Pericles his lawfully wedded wife, and drag her to destruction before his eyes, at the behest of Hermippus, who had rendered no service to the state and nothing that would reflect credit upon him as a public man.

His impassioned address kindled enthusiasm among his hearers, when they reflected on the public services conferred upon the electorate by the son of Xanthippus. His illustrious ancestor they remembered was the hero of Sestus and Mycale, the final military achievements of the Persian Wars, undertaken by Darius and Xerxes. His pleadings went to the hearts of his countrymen, and when the pebbles which the jurymen had cast in delivering their verdict were taken from the urns, the white, which indicated life, far outnumbered

the black, which were indicative of death. Pericles had secured the acquittal of his wife, and achieved the greatest triumph in his long and successful career. His persecutors were confounded and chagrined, but were determined to ruin their enemy.

THE SAMIAN WAR — PERICLES AND ASPASIA

The sound of the sea, the sway of the song, the swing of the oar!
Out of the darkness, over the naked seas,
Our galley is come,
With a shiver and leap,
As the blade bites deep
To the sway of back and the bend of knees,
As she drives for home
Out of the darkness, over the naked seas,
To the sound of the sea, and the sway of song, and the sweep of oar.[1]

Pericles now, B. C. 440, had attained his sixty-first year and reached the zenith of his fame. It was at this time that a quarrel arose between Miletus and the island of Samos, as to which should govern Priene, a city in Ionia on the northern shore of the gulf of Lade, directly opposite the city of Miletus on the south shore. The Samians claimed the right by reason of their ownership of territory on the mainland adjacent to Priene. It was of no particular consequence to the people of Athens whether Samos or Miletus governed the destinies of this Ionian city. But a political question was involved. If the Samians prevailed, then the government of Priene would be democratic. If Miletus succeeded, then it would be oligarchic. Priene, of course, was not permitted to choose, so that the quarrel involved only Samos and Miletus. They were both members of the Delian Confederacy. Neither would yield and a new war ensued in which the Milesians were

[1] The Greek Galley. — Lodge.

worsted. The latter then, notwithstanding she had appealed to the sword and lost, now appealed to Athens to decide the quarrel, upon the plea that under the articles of the Delian League, the latter had jurisdiction and authority to hear and decide the controversy. The democrats in Samos joined the democrats in Miletus to invoke the aid of Athens, to settle the dispute. The Samians, on the other hand, claimed that Miletus had elected to appeal to arms, and was bound by its election, and that it was now too late for Athens to intervene to reverse the arbitrament of war. For this reason they urged that the provisions of the constitution of the Confederacy of Delos were no longer applicable. They therefore refused to arbitrate with Athens as umpire. The Athenians decided that their authority had been challenged and in order to sustain their power and dignity declared that the failure of the Samians to submit to their jurisdiction was a violation of their treaty relations, and made war against Samos. There were some who declared that Pericles induced the Public Assembly to declare war to please Aspasia, the beautiful Milesian, with whom he sustained marital relations, although by the laws of Athens he was forbidden to marry her, by reason of the fact of her foreign birth.

The war with Samos, therefore, became memorable, because it throws light on the morals of the age and reveals not only incidents in the private life of Pericles, but discloses also the character of Athenian jurisprudence as it existed at that period, with respect to the laws of marriage and divorce. It demonstrates, also, the power exercised by Pericles, who was able to secure the election of his friend and intimate, Sophocles, one of the great poets of antiquity as strategus to assist in the prosecution of the war. Pericles desired the company of this gifted man, while engaged in the enterprise. At his suggestion, the Public Assembly

elected to a high military office of great responsibility, this man of genius, although there seems to be nothing to show that he was or claimed to be proficient in the art of war. Nevertheless, history relates that he discharged the duties of his office with great ability and contributed to the success of the war.

The laws of Athens were strict as to the proprieties governing the conduct of Athenian women, wives and daughters of Athenian citizens. They were compelled to live in practical seclusion, both before and after marriage. Marriages were arranged and negotiated by the near male relatives of the bride. The wife's activities, as a rule, were confined to the management of the household. They did not receive the mental training to fit them for literary pursuits, and to enable them to enjoy the advantages of polite learning. They were not so engaging and attractive in polite society, as to hold the attentions of men of culture and refinement of that age, when philosophy, literature and art were cultivated as in no other country.

If the married state became irksome, the law permitted the dissolution of the marriage contract by mutual consent, upon such terms and conditions as might be agreed upon by the male relatives of the respective parties.

The manners of the age, however, permitted and encouraged a class of free women in Athens to relieve the monotony of rigid social conditions, composed chiefly of foreigners; that is, those who did not possess the good fortune to have been born within the limited confines of Attica. These women, known generally as courtesans, came from the luxurious cities of Ionia, attracted by the wealth and prosperity of commercial Athens. In this class were frequently found women famed for their beauty and accomplishments, who found it not difficult to win the attentions, and gain the affections of eminent men, and were enabled thereby to

obtain a subtle and dangerous influence in state affairs and the political intrigues of the day. During the Persian Wars the beautiful and accomplished Targelia of Miletus was noted for the part she played in aid of the Persian cause.

In the time of Pericles, Aspasia, above referred to, also a Milesian, won the heart of that distinguished man, and occupied the chief place in his affections. His devotion was constant until death dissolved the golden chains with which Cupid bound them.

It was at the country seat of Sophocles, situated about a mile from Athens on the banks of the Cephissus, in the peaceful valley watered by that sylvan stream surrounded by olive groves, climbing vines and shady walks, interspersed with fragrant bowers and parterres of roses, that Pericles wooed the only woman he ever loved. Their constancy and devotion, it is said, inspired the poet when he wrote Antigone, a tragedy in which he describes in immortal lines the power of love.

Mighty power, all powers above!
Great, unconquerable Love.
Thou who liest in dimple sleek,
On the tender virgin's cheek.

Venus wills it from above.
Great, unconquerable Love.

All, thy maddening influence know,
Gods above, and men below,
All thy powers resistless prove,
Great, unconquerable Love.

Aspasia was universally conceded to be the most gifted woman of her age, renowned not only for her beauty, but for her rare intellectual accomplishments and literary attainments. The artists and poets, the philosophers and statesmen of that brilliant age, the most illustrious in history, were attracted by her genius and eagerly sought her society. They attended her

receptions and entertainments to listen to her discourses on subjects which received the attention of Socrates and Anaxagoras, of Polignotus and Phidias, of Pericles and Sophocles, and others of the circle of the eminent men of her time. We may judge somewhat of her unusual intellectual power, when we reflect that such men were attracted by her genius, and while she was but the female companion of Pericles and lived with him, nevertheless they attended with their wives and families, and listened with pleasure and wonder to her lectures and discussions on philosophy, literature and art.

Sophocles, the author of Antigone, above referred to, whose dramatic poems continue to delight men of refinement and culture; Phidias, the greatest sculptor of antiquity; Socrates, whose fame as a philosopher, after the lapse of more than twenty centuries remains undimmed, and other great men whose talents gave enduring renown to the age of Pericles, acknowledged the superior gifts of this remarkable woman. Her fame is linked with theirs. The slanders heaped upon her by the political enemies of her husband are entirely discredited, when we reflect that if she was admired solely by reason of her personal charms, her name and fame with nothing better upon which to rest would not have survived her own generation.

Pericles, though fortunate in his public career, was most unhappy in his marriage. His wife, Teliseppe, was nearly related to him. Before her marriage to Pericles, she had been the wife of Hipponicus, one of the wealthiest men in Athens from whom she was divorced, and her subsequent marriage to Pericles had been arranged according to custom and convenience, and was governed by family considerations. Love was not a factor in the affair. Teliseppe bore him two sons, the elder was named Xanthippus for his paternal grandfather. Paralus was the name of the younger.

Aspasia also bore him a son, to whom his father gave his own name. This son became distinguished as a military man. He was one of the strategi in command of the fleet at Arginusæ, and after defeating the Peloponnesians was subsequently, with other of his fellow generals, unjustly put to death by his ungrateful countrymen.

It is a strange coincidence that Pericles himself erected the barrier that operated as a bar to his domestic happiness. When he was at the height of his power, having two legitimate sons living, prompted by vanity and arrogance, he proposed a law defining citizenship. The statute declared that no one should be reputed a true citizen of Athens unless he could prove that both his parents were Athenians; that is to say, born within the confines of Attica. There is one phase of this statute which ill comports with the manners of that enlightened age. It was tested on an occasion when the king of Egypt sent some forty thousand bushels of wheat to be distributed pro-rata among the Athenians. The courts at once became congested with litigation involving the question of citizenship or legitimacy under the statute. Many suffered by reason of false accusations. Plutarch says that a little less than five thousand persons were convicted, unable to make a case in conformity with the required test as to parentage. He declares that these unfortunate litigants were sold into slavery. Certainly this severe punishment could not attach under the statute to any person by reason of the accident of birth. It is inconceivable that any civilized legislative body would enact a law of that character, whereby a man could be declared guilty of a crime simply for being born. The punishment referred to by Plutarch, which required that the guilty party be sold into slavery, must have resulted by reason of some act involving false accusations, or wilful and corrupt perjury, committed in order to enable the party

to share in benefits to which he knew he was not entitled.

However this may be, certain it is that under the law Pericles was forbidden to marry Aspasia, who was not an Athenian, after his divorce from Teliseppe, and that his youngest son Pericles was illegitimate for the same reason. When the plague was at its height Pericles lost both of his legitimate sons, whereby he was left childless in his old age. But when the great statesman, in the last year of his life, was acquitted of the charges preferred against him by his enemies, and was induced to accept again the office of strategus, he asked the Public Assembly to repeal the law defining citizenship, which he himself caused to be enacted. He also asked that his son Pericles should be enrolled as a citizen of Athens with full rights and privileges, and that his union with Aspasia should be legalized. These requests were granted by the Public Assembly, who were eager once more to secure the advice, guidance and leadership of this remarkable man.

Pericles conducted the war against Samos with unfailing energy and in the incredibly short space of nine months had succeeded in reducing the Samians to complete subjection. The war involved a formidable task, and threatened to become a serious menace to the power of Athens. Byzantium rebelled. The Persian monarch opened his treasury and sent a Phœnician fleet to aid the Samians. But the skill, vigilance and superior abilities of Pericles were more than a match for Greeks, Phœnicians and Persians. The Thirty Years' Peace held the Lacedæmonians in check, although there seemed to be considerable difference of opinion among the Peloponnesians as to whether Athens had the right to discipline her independent allies. In this discussion Corinth sustained the authority of Athens and aided her materially in inducing the Lacedæmonians to remain neutral. Subsequently the

Corinthians complained bitterly of Pericles, and charged him with ingratitude because he advocated the cause of Corcyra, a daughter city of Corinth, whom the latter sought to discipline, and because the Athenians aided the Corcyrians at the battle of Sybota.

The Samian War was regarded as the greatest military achievement of Pericles, and added materially to his great reputation. He was wont to observe that Agamemnon consumed ten years in taking a barbarous city, but in nine months he had conquered the Samians, the greatest and most powerful of the Ionians.

It has been claimed by some authorities that Pericles brought about the war to please Aspasia. There seems to be no ground for this assumption; but we are justified in the belief that Pericles was delighted that the opportunity was afforded him to make war, not only because he regarded it an imperative duty to sustain the dignity and authority of the Athenian empire, but also because it gave him an opportunity to show his devotion and love for Aspasia, who doubtless enjoyed the keenest satisfaction in seeing Pericles at the head of an undertaking that would give prestige and reflect glory upon her native city. We may assume, also, that Aspasia used all her influence to aid the cause of Miletus. It is highly probable that that ancient city, famed for its scholars and philosophers, and its achievements in art and literature, celebrated also as the home of Thales, one of the seven sages of antiquity, was quick to take advantage of the position occupied by their countrywoman, who had won the love and esteem of the most powerful man in Athens. It is altogether probable, too, that the members of the embassy from Miletus, who were sent to Athens to invoke its aid in her behalf, first held a secret conference with Aspasia. The object of this visit was not only to induce Aspasia to use her influence with Pericles to advocate the interests of Miletus,

but also to ascertain the real views of the popular statesman on a subject so important.

The eminent scholar, Walter Savage Landor, has written suppositive correspondence, which presumably passed between Aspasia, then in Athens, and Cleone, the friend of her youth and companion of her childhood in Miletus. These fascinating letters present pictures full of light and color, and illustrate how the Samian War and topics of public interest were regarded by Aspasia and her friend in Miletus. In one of her letters Aspasia refers to the Samian expedition, at the time the Athenian fleet was about to sail from the Piræus. She writes (Epistle CXII):

"Pericles goes in person to command the expedition against Samos. He promises me it will soon be ready to sail, and tells me to expect him back again within a few months. Artemon is preparing machines of great magnitude for the attack of the city. He teaches me that the Samians are brave and wealthy, and that no city is capable of such a resistance. Certainly never were such preparations. I hope, at least, that the report of them will detain your enemies at home, and at all events that, before they land, you will leave Miletus and come to me. The war is very popular at Athens; I dare say it is equally so at Samos, equally so at Miletus. Nothing pleases men like renewing their ancient alliance with the brutes, and breaking off the more recent one with their fellow-creatures.

"War, is it, O grave heads! that ye
With stern and stately pomp decree?
Inviting all the gods from far
To join you in the game of war!"

At the close of the war, we have a letter from Miletus written by Cleone in which she tells Aspasia the glorious news that the Samians had been vanquished, and that Miletus, with the aid of Athens, had triumphed. She writes (Epistle CXVII):

"Samos has fallen. Pericles will have given you this information long before my letter can reach you, and perhaps the joy of the light-hearted Athenians will be over ere then. So soon dies away the satisfaction of great exploits, even of such as have swept a generation from before us, have changed the fortunes of a thousand more, and indeed have shaken the last link in the remotest. We hear, but perhaps the estimate is exaggerated, that the walls of Miletus, of Ephesus, of Priene, are in comparison to Samos as the fences of a farm-yard are to them. Certain it is that the vanquished fleet was more formidable than the united navies of Corinth and of Carthage, which are rated as next in force to the Athenian."

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR — LAST DAYS OF PERICLES

Thus Pericles recovered from his misfortunes and rose superior to the malice and cunning of his enemies. He pushed vigorously his plans for offensive operations against the Lacedæmonians, in order thereby not to divert the popular mind, but to retaliate for the miseries his countrymen endured from the double scourge of war and pestilence. A fleet was fitted out which he commanded in person, with which he made a descent upon the Peloponnesus.

A notable fact in this connection is exhibited by the energy and determination displayed by Pericles in planning his last campaign. He was in his sixty-ninth year, but he pushed forward his military preparations with his old time ardor and enthusiasm. Archidamus, at the head of a marauding army, was in Attica. The plague which had raged in Athens for months was at its height. Nothing daunted by these misfortunes, Pericles decided that as soon as the enemy returned to the Peloponnesus, he would follow close in their wake, and burn and destroy their coast towns, and inflict

upon the Lacedæmonians all the damage possible. To this end he fitted out an expedition comprising a fleet of one hundred triremes, having on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse transports, constructed for the first time by the Athenians out of their old ships. The expedition was joined by fifty ships from Chios and Lesbos and a multitude of allied troops.

No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power. The expedition dispatched by the Athenians to Syracuse fifteen years later was not superior. The year before, Pericles, at the head of an army of 13,000 hoplites devastated the Megarid. Now, as admiral, with a formidable fleet, he was about to descend upon the Peloponnesus. Just as soon as the forces of Archidamus reached their own country, Pericles set sail, directing his course southwest, across the Saronic Gulf. He sailed about forty miles and made a descent on Epidaurus, on the eastern coast of Argolis. He devastated the adjacent country and attacked the city, but did not succeed in taking it. From thence he proceeded south and attacked the cities Trœzen, Halieis and Hermione, all in the State of Argolis. He sailed thence and attacked Prasiæ, in the State of Laconia. The season being now far advanced he returned to Attica. During his absence his enemies tried to discredit him, by sending envoys to Sparta to sue for peace, but owing to the vigorous and destructive campaign then being prosecuted by Pericles, the Lacedæmonians dismissed these envoys, as Pericles had formerly dismissed Melanippus, the envoy sent to Athens by Archidamus, at the beginning of the war.

On his return from this campaign, the last he was destined to conduct, he found that public feeling had been wrought to the highest pitch of excitement against

He convened the Public Assembly and made a vigorous defense of his conduct and policy and mercilessly attacked his rivals.[1] His superior intellectual gifts easily gave him the victory. The Assembly were carried away by the eloquence and remarkable courage displayed by Pericles. He was restored to favor, and was again elected strategus and regained his old time influence and popularity.

These matters occupied Pericles during the winter months. He was vexed by a suit for an accounting instigated by his enemies. This litigation took place that winter or in the following spring, B. C. 429. The season advanced, summer came, but Pericles, owing to the charges and accusations he was called upon to meet, was unable to take up the sword in defense of his country.

During this third summer of the struggle between Sparta and Athens, and their respective allies, the theatre of war shifted. Military operations were extended over a vast expanse of territory in localities extremely remote. Archidamus, doubtless fearing that his troops might become infected by the pestilence raging in Athens, refrained from invading Attica. He led his army into Bœotia at the behest of his allies in Thebes, and began the siege of Platæa, in territory which since the defeat of Mardonius, half a century earlier, was consecrated by Hellas as hallowed ground, in memory of that event. Phormio, whose services were no longer required in the Chalcidice, after the surrender of Potidea, was stationed at Naupactus with an Athenian fleet, to guard the entrance to the gulf of Corinth. Here he performed services and won victories as a naval commander, which made for him a reputation, whereby his name was thought worthy to be associated with Themistocles and Cimon. He de-

[1] Thucyd. ii, 60.

feated the Ambraciots, assisted by the barbarous tribes from Epirus, and their Peloponnesian allies, led by Brasidas, in their campaign to reduce Acarnania, in the hope to secure control also of the important islands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia, which commanded the entrance to the Corinthian gulf.

In the north Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues, was in command of the Athenian forces conducting operation against Spartolus, in Bottice in the Chalcidian peninsula. He was subsequently assigned to conduct a campaign in Macedonia, in conjunction with the Thracian prince Sitalces, to humiliate and defeat Perdiccas, who, in consequence of the aid he had given the Potideans incurred the displeasure of the Athenians.

Pericles, for the reasons stated above, was unable to take any active part in these campaigns. After his successful expedition the previous autumn in Argolis, in which he made a descent upon Epidaurus and towns in the Peloponnesus, his enemies, jealous of his achievements, as has been observed, sued him for an accounting as to the moneys expended by him in these military operations, and he was forced to pay a fine of some fifty talents ($50,000) in consequence of the unjust and malicious accusations of his enemies led by the notorious Cleon.

But the people led away by the false clamor of demagogues soon repented of their rash conduct and unjust treatment of Pericles. Before the end of the summer they realized their mistake and hastened to make amends by again electing him to the office of strategus, and conferred upon him even greater authority than had formerly been accorded him. Pericles responded to this tardy act of justice on the part of his countrymen, and again entered upon the duties of his office.

The summer was now spent, and the glorious September days had come. The pestilence had almost run its course. Many were recovering from its effects. It was no longer epidemic. Pericles had now reached the age of three score and ten; had made his last campaign, and fought his last battle. He had recently suffered bereavement in the loss of his sister and his two sons, Paralus, who loved him, and Xanthippus, who loved him not. Many close friends, who had aided him politically and upon whose friendship and loyalty he could rely, had passed from the scenes of earth. Many friends and admirers, it is true, still remained, but, save for his wife, and little Pericles, the son Aspasia bore him, his home was indeed desolate. The nervous strain, occasioned by the exciting scenes through which he passed and the trials brought on by the ingratitude and scandalous behavior of the idle and vicious, led by schemers and demagogues, undermined his strength. He became ill. The distemper from which he suffered was not accompanied by violent symptoms and raging fever, which were characteristic of the plague. The disease from which he suffered slowly consumed his strength and energy, and in the autumn, B. C. 429, he passed away surrounded by friends and admirers. Aspasia was with him, nursed him through his illness, and proved her constancy and devotion by the tender and loving care she bestowed upon the sufferer. He lived long enough to learn of the great success achieved by Phormio at Naupactus. Doubtless the war news, brought to his sick chamber from time to time, conveyed tidings of his victories over Brasidas, and the defeat of the expedition to reduce Acarnania. These glorious messages gladdened the last days of the great statesman and patriot under whose wise administration Athens became the most renowned city in the world. When Pericles passed from the stage of action, the glory of Athens began to decline, and it was destined never to regain

the pround eminence which it attained through the genius of this remarkable man.

We get a closer view of the personality and kindly disposition of the illustrious statesman from an incident Plutarch relates of him, during his last illness. We give it as Landor interprets it. One day a friend who visited him noticed, as he raised his head from the pillow, that he wore a charm suspended from a cord about his neck. Seeing the interest manifested by his companion, Pericles smiled faintly, and said, "I need not warn you against superstition; it was never among my weaknesses. Do not wonder at these amulets; above all do not order them to be removed. The kind old nurses, who have been carefully watching over me day and night, are persuaded that these will save my life. After the good patient creatures have found, as they must soon, all their traditional charms unavailing, they will surely grieve enough and perhaps find some other motive than their fallibility in science. Inflict not a fresh wound upon their grief by throwing aside the tokens of their affection."

Landor, in a supposed letter of Pericles, written to his wife when he was about to die, gives a brief survey of his career, naming the eminent men with whom he came in contact, whose attainments contributed to the illustrious age, which bore his name. In this letter he observes what might be taken as his belief in immortality, that the happy never say, and never hear said, farewell. He refers to the fact that Damon, who was his preceptor in music, called him to the window to look at Aristides on his way to exile. He remembered how his father Xanthippus, as he was walking along one day, pressed the lad's wrist, and whispered in his ear, "Walk quickly by; gaze cautiously; it is there Miltiades is in prison." When he was a child Pindar took him in his arms when he brought to the house the dirge he had composed for the funeral of his

grandfather. He embraced the neck of Æschylus, when the latter was about to depart for Sicily. He had argued on eloquence with Sophocles, and with Euripides on poetry and ethics. He was an inquirer and sought to be instructed by Protagoras and Democritus, with Anaxagoras and Meton. He had listened to Herodotus, read his history, and heard Thucydides discuss the merits of the works of that eminent historian. He enjoyed the esteem also of the great sculptor, Phidias, who built the Parthenon and placed within it in ivory and gold the tutelary deity of Hellas. Under the portico of Death he formed the acquaintance of Acron and Hippocrates, the most skilful physicians of his age, who warred to overcome Pestilence and Death. Landor thus concludes this interesting letter:

"And now, at the close of my day, when every light is dim, and every guest departed, let me own that these wane before me, remembering as I do, in the pride and fullness of my heart, that Athens confided her glory, and Aspasia her happiness, to me.

"Have I been a faithful guardian? Do I resign them to the custody of the gods undiminished and unimpaired? Welcome, then, welcome my last hour. After enjoying for so great a number of years, in my public and my private life, what I believe has never been the lot of any other, I now extend my hand to the urn, and take without reluctance or hesitation what is the lot of all."

The death of Pericles marked an epoch in the history of Greece. Since the Persian Wars, when Darius and Xerxes attempted to conquer Hellas, nearly two generations has passed. Prior to these invasions, which exhibited the might of Persia, the Hellenese had enjoyed a community of language, customs and traditions, which constituted a sort of national unity based on sentiment alone; but the hostile pressure of foreign fleets and armies, sent out to enslave them, created a

necessity and generated a spirit of patriotism which produced a power of cohesion among the Greeks, who became united for the purpose of self-preservation. The result was an anti-Persian alliance, and Athens and Sparta fought together side by side, at Platæa and Mycale. During this period of Hellenic unity were produced the distinguished men prominent in public affairs whose fame will live forever, Miltiades and Themistocles, Æschylus and Xanthippus, Aristides and Cimon, Ephialtes and Pericles. The flower of that great age perished, when Pericles, the sole survivor of those named, closed his eyes on the scenes of earth and the last in the line of these illustrious men was borne to the tomb.

CHARACTER OF PERICLES

In order to form a just estimate of the character of this eminent man, it will be necessary not only to examine his political acts in the light of his public conduct, but to discern, as far as possible, the motives by which he was actuated in conducting the affairs of state, especially during the closing years of his administration. A wide diversity of opinion exists among the able men who have contributed to the subject. On the one hand he is blamed and severely criticized by those who have reached the conclusion that he plunged his country into a needless and destructive war, for which they seek to throw upon him alone all the responsibility. These critics view the facts from the standpoint of the oligarchical party. They display considerable hostility toward the son of Xanthippus for the part he took with Ephialtes in establishing a pure democracy in Athens, and in compassing the humiliation and defeat of the great authority of Cimon.

On the other hand eminent authors, and among them

Grote and Curtius, assert that Pericles was not responsible for the Peloponnesian war, and was not able to avert it without acceding to the most humiliating and disgraceful terms. They contend also that the course he took in the matter was wholly justified. That he did right in applying the revenues of the Delian Confederacy, after the wars of Persian Expulsion had ceased, to adorn and beautify Athens.

The solution of the interesting questions presented by this discussion requires knowledge of the causes which influenced the conduct of Pericles. Were his actions prompted by personal ambition and selfish aims? Was he actuated by a desire to secure for himself political advancement, and finally supreme control in the state? Did he, solely for his own glory, open the way for himself to secure power and influence to the exclusion of his political rivals, that he might be enabled to do as his fancy dictated, within well defined limitations? Did he advocate a policy which was apparently in harmony with an ideal republic or popular democracy, for selfish ends, as Plutarch seems to intimate, or did he labor, like Aristides, with an eye single to the welfare of the people, to secure for their benefit, "a government of the people, by the people and for the people," best suited to advance their welfare and happiness? Was Pericles a benevolent despot? Was his boasted patriotism prompted by selfishness, or was he in fact, as well as in name, an altruistic philosopher, a statesman, devoted solely to the interests of the masses, a friend of liberty, and a foe of privilege? Was he a political demagogue seeking power by supporting a cause because it was popular without regard to whether it was right, or was he a sincere patriot like Ephialtes, supporting a cause because he believed it was right?

The answer to these inquiries, at least as to his advocacy of democracy, must depend upon what Per-

icles sincerely believed to be the best form of government to secure the integrity of a free state. If he did not believe in a democracy, but considered that form of government best, in which the few were permitted to govern the many, then his leadership of the people, whereby he weakened and destroyed the rule of the aristocracy, threw open the archonship and the ancient tribunal of the Areopagus, so as to make any citizen eligible to membership therein; whereby he founded in Attica an absolute democracy and gave the masses "such a copious and potent draft of liberty" that they became almost unmanageable, was absolutely inconsistent with his convictions.

From the limited knowledge we possess concerning the details of political conditions in the age of Pericles, it is impossible to give a satisfactory answer to these inquiries. On the one hand there are circumstances which give color to the theory that Pericles was at heart an imperialist. That he took the popular side in politics, and fought the battles of the people against privilege, and to secure their liberties, not because he was a democrat, not because he believed in popular government, but solely because Cimon, the great apostle of privilege and the leader of the aristocracy, at the time Pericles sought public honors, was the most powerful and influential man in Greece. Cimon stood in his path, as an obstacle to his political advancement. Pericles believed, therefore, that it was good politics to oppose whatever Cimon advocated, and for that reason he became the great advocate of democracy. Cimon won distinction with the sword. His unparalleled success in war, his achievement in driving the Persians from Europe, from the islands of the Ægean sea, and from the coasts of Asia Minor, made him a popular idol.

The notion that Pericles was not a democrat was supported also by the love he displayed to secure imperial power and dominion, and his work in rearing a maritime empire, a system obviously repugnant to the idea of a democracy, and which was consummated at the expense of the liberties of the constituent allies within the jurisdiction of imperial Athens.

On the other hand it is clear that Pericles guaranteed to every state and municipality within the jurisdiction of the Athenian empire a republican form of government. This course we have reason to believe was prompted by a sincere conviction on the part of Pericles that a democracy was more conducive to the public welfare than an oligarchy. It might be argued that when Athens built up her land empire after the battle of Œnophyta, she might have retained it by permitting oligarchies to continue, as they had previously existed in Bœotia, Phocis, Locris and other states. In answer to this theory it might be urged that if Tolmides had been successful at Coronea, the power of Athens in Central and Northern Greece would not have been broken. The retort could be urged, that had oligarchies been permitted instead of democracies, the battle of Coronea would never have been fought. This phase of the subject, therefore, must continue a matter of conjecture. But the fact remains that Pericles established democracies everywhere. He made war on the island of Samos, it is said, by some authorities, to secure a democratic form of government to the city of Priene, on the mainland, after Miletus had attempted to overthrow the oligarchy which the Samians had established there. These facts would seem to indicate that Pericles at heart was a democrat, and not an imperialist.

The death of Aristides and the absence of Themistocles who had been driven into exile, left the field open to Cimon with no political party sufficiently powerful to successfully dispute his authority. His portion of the spoils of war made him the wealthiest man in

Athens. To gain the esteem of the masses he did not advocate popular government, but was beloved by reason of his generosity and prodigality, whereby he made the poor the objects of his bounty and frequently invited the plain people to sit at his table and partake of his hospitality. But Cimon was an imperialist. He was the head of the party of privilege; the advocate of oligarchy, rather than democracy. He held the Lacedæmonians, the jealous rivals of the Athenians, in such high esteem that the partiality he showed for them was used by the political enemies of Cimon as a basis for the charge of disloyalty, a charge which was later skilfully used by Pericles to bring about his banishment under a decree of ostracism.

If these facts are correct, then the conclusion is justified that Pericles merely took advantage of circumstances and seized the opportunity which presented itself to enable him to reach the goal of his political ambition. He did not sail under false colors when he espoused the cause of the democracy and opposed Cimon, because he was the leader of the opposition. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was necessary to defeat the great admiral, the champion of privilege and head of the conservative party in order not only to win the applause of the people, and to secure for himself the supreme power in the state, but to establish free government for the Athenians.

In this connection it may be observed that the popular notion with respect to organized society implies that the first duty of the state is to advance the moral and material interests of every member of the commonwealth. That government was designed primarily for man in the concrete, not in the abstract, and that the power of the state should not be exploited for the benefit of the few. In that regard the idea of a democracy was distinguished from the idea of an oligarchy. In other words, the popular notion as to what constituted civil liberty, as embodied in a democracy, was altogether repugnant to the idea which prevailed in an oligarchy, that in order to secure privileges for the few, government must be privately owned. But Pericles seemed to regard the power of the state as of more importance than the prosperity of the individual. He believed that the material advancement and dignity of the commonwealth was the first object of government, upon the theory that the individual citizen was benefited most as a constituent member of a strong government. But he also believed that every citizen should have a voice as to the conduct of public affairs. To that extent he was a democrat.

In this connection we may note that the economic conditions which existed in his day were different in many respects from those which exist with us in the twentieth century of the Christian era. Since Jefferson acquired the western confines of the North American continent, and since Secretary Seward was instrumental in acquiring Alaska, we are not so much concerned in questions involving territorial expansion, in questions of empire and of imperialism. The problems which confront us relate to the development of our material resources and manufactures in such a way as to create wealth, enlarge the field of employment so as to stimulate the growth of our commercial industries, and multiply opportunities to accumulate wealth. We are called upon to solve problems with respect to the control and growth of great combinations of capital which threaten to destroy equality of opportunity; with questions relating to a protective tariff, whereby excessive duties might be imposed on articles of commerce with the design to keep foreign commodities out of the country and thus by preventing imports from abroad to create monopolies at home.

It may be observed, however, so far as foreign commerce was concerned, that while the Athenians did not

resort to a protective tariff in order to increase their commercial advantage, Pericles, as an act of retaliation for the conduct of Corinth, in assisting the revolt at Potidea, secured a decree from the Public Assembly putting an embargo upon certain foreign vessels and excluding the ships of Megara, an ally of Corinth, from Athenian ports.

In considering the character of Pericles, we may regard as altogether trustworthy what was said of him by his great contemporary, the eminent historian Thucydides. His observations are exceedingly brief, but in that regard they constitute the only contemporaneous account of any writer, whose works have reached posterity. In this connection we must remember also that five centuries intervened from the time Thucydides wrote his history and the period when Plutarch wrote the "lives." "During the peace, while Pericles was at the head of affairs," says Thucydides, "he ruled with prudence. Under his guidance Athens was safe, and reached the height of her greatness in his time. When the Peloponnesian war began, he showed that here too he had formed a true estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; and, after his death, his foresight was even better appreciated than during his life. For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private interest, they adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in respect both of themselves and of their allies. Their measures, had they been successful, would only have brought honor and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled

the city in the conduct of the war. The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit. He led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen. But his successors were more on an equality with one another and each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people."

From this estimate of his character it would seem that Pericles was in truth a benevolent despot, a counterpart in many respects of his ancestor, Pisistratus, whom he so much resembled. The latter ruled Athens when it was a sort of semi-aristocratic republic under the constitution and laws established by Solon. The former was in control of public affairs when Athens was a pure democracy, under the constitution of Clisthenes, amplified by the reforms introduced by Themistocles, Ephialtes and by Pericles himself. Pisistratus professed the highest reverence for the laws and constitution of Solon, but his sway was absolute, and his will was the supreme law. His mild reign was tempered to suit the whims and fancy of the masses. He managed by the art of diplomacy to please the people and although he usurped much of the power he exercised, yet his tact and shrewdness made him popular as long as he lived. Indeed the memory of the Pisistratidæ was execrated by posterity, not so much for what Pisis-

tratus, the ancestor had done, but by reason of the tyranny exercised by his son Hippias, after the death of his brother Hipparchus by the hand of an assassin.

Pericles, also, not only professed the greatest reverence for popular government, but bent all his energies to destroy the party of privilege, and carried out many reforms, which theoretically enabled the masses to control the state. In theory Athens enjoyed a government of the people, but in fact public opinion was largely moulded by Pericles, whose influence was potent in the state. His superior gifts and unusual abilities enabled him personally to govern the people. While at the head of affairs, owing to his great influence, "he ruled with prudence," and under his leadership Athens reached the height of her greatness. His remarkable talents were universally acknowledged, and not until the last year of his life, was his integrity ever questioned. By reason of these qualities he was able, as long as he was in power, to control the multitude in a free spirit. He was trusted and admired because of the strength of his character.

"Thus," Thucydides observes, "Athens although still a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen." Pisistratus was a patron of art and letters, and to him posterity is indebted for the preservation in their persent form of the Iliad and the Odyssey, which were edited by men of letters who came to Athens to grace the court established by Pisistratus. He erected public buildings also, and began the work of embellishing the Attic capital. Pericles also was a patron of art and letters. He invited the great poets, philosophers, men of letters, artists, sculptors and architects to Athens. He managed the public moneys in such a way as to use what was necessary to rebuild the temples which the Persians had destroyed; to erect on the Acropolis the Parthenon, and re-erect the temple of Erechtheus, and the temple of Victory, and to construct on its northern slope the marble portals known as the Propylea, adorned by the wonderful paintings of Polygnotus, and to build at its base the music hall, known as the Odeon, and the theatre of Dionysus, although the Propylea and the Theatre were not completed until after his death.

Plutarch corroborates, in some respects, the estimate placed by Thucydides upon the character of Pericles. He says that after the death of Aristides, after Themistocles had been driven out and Cimon, for the most part, was kept abroad by his expeditions out of Greece, Pericles took advantage of conditions existing in Athens, and came forward and allied himself "not with the rich and few, but with the many and poor *contrary to his natural bent* which was far from democratical." Plutarch assumes that the motives of Pericles in making this choice was a fear that he might be accused "of aiming at arbitrary power, and seeing Cimon on the side of the aristocracy, and much beloved by the better and more distinguished people, he joined the party of the people with a view at once both to secure himself and procure means against Cimon."

But his great rival at this time was very wealthy, and while Pericles was also a rich man, his fortune did not compare with that of Cimon, who used his money lavishly among the people, and by his invitation many guests from the poorer classes sat daily at his table. Plutarch observes further that at first Pericles did caress the people, but finding himself come short of his competitor in wealth and money, he resorted to a device whereby he used the public moneys by securing legislation, authorizing sums to be used for shows and exhibitions whereby such entertainments were made free to the public. He also secured the passage of a law, authorizing the dikasts, that is the five or six thousand citizens who were empaneled to serve on juries from time to time, to be paid a fixed sum *per diem* for

their services. A panel of dikasts consisted of five hundred jurymen. In some very important cases three panels or fifteen hundred dikasts were summoned to sit, hear the evidence and the addresses of the respective advocates, and render their decision by ballot, a majority vote being sufficient to constitute a verdict.

"Thus the common citizens," Plutarch says, "were changed from a sober thrifty people that maintained themselves by their own labors, to lovers of expense, intemperance and license. Pericles made his policy subservient to their pleasure, contriving continually to have some great public show or solemnity, some banquet, or some procession or other in the town to please them, coaxing his countrymen like children with such delights and pleasures, as were not however unedifying." Besides, he sent out every year sixty galleys for an eight months' cruise, manned by a number of citizens under pay, who were thereby drilled and practised the art of seamanship.

Plutarch says also that after Pericles secured the power of the state absolutely in his own hands, he did not so readily yield to the whims of the public, nor comply with the desires of the multitude, but turned his mild and indulgent authority "to the austerity of aristocratical and regal rule."

There is one phase of the character of Pericles concerning which Thucydides and Plutarch are absolutely in accord. Both commend highly his personal honesty. Thucydides, in this connection, speaks of Pericles as "a man of transparent integrity." Plutarch quotes from the historian on this point and observes that the strength of his character lay in his reputation for honesty and the confidence felt in his character and his manifest freedom from every kind of corruption, and his superiority to all considerations of money. Notwithstanding the tremendous sums paid out during his administration to adorn and beautify Athens "he

did not make the patrimony his father left him greater than it was by one drachma." Through all his public career he preserved his integrity unspotted. He further observes, in comparing his life with the Roman Fabius, that no man had ever greater opportunities to enrich himself having had presents offered him from so many kings and princes and allies, "yet no man was ever more free from corruption."

The conclusion, therefore, is justified that Pericles, although a benevolent despot, was endowed with lofty patriotism and unimpeachable integrity. He loved Athens, and devoted all his energies to make it the most renowned city of antiquity. He loved power, and built up an empire to add to the fame and importance of Athens, and while he established an imperial state, he was careful to guarantee to every city within its confines a republican form of government. His love of power, however, led him to disregard the rights of the tribute allies of Athens, in the Confederacy of Delos, when they became, against their will, constituent members of the Athenian empire, and he did not scruple to tax them without their consent, solely to enhance the dignity and glory of Athens.

The situation presents a paradox, for we observe how the great democrat, who imbibed the political teachings of Themistocles and Ephialtes, established a tyranny, "which," he himself said, "in the opinion of mankind might have been unjustly gained, but which could not be safely surrendered." [1]

The ability of Pericles as a statesman is shown by the results of his administration, as evidenced by the condition of Athens, when he came into power about the time of the battle of Tanagra (B. C. 457), and its extent and influence at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 431). In this connection we must

[1] Thucyd. ii, 63.

remember that the foundation for the greatness of Athens was laid by Cimon, and resulted from his victories in the waters of the Ægean and in Asia Minor, whereby he swept the power of Persia from the seas, and defeated her armies at the Eurymedon and in Cyprus. Cimon made Athens a maritime power, opened up the remote shores of the ancient world for her colonies, and with the aid of Aristides established the Delian Confederacy, thus securing political unity with which to prevent the aggressions of Persian power.

But it was Pericles who converted the Confederacy of Delos into the Athenian empire. Prior to the removal of the treasury of the League from the sacred island of Delos to the city of Athens, the latter was merely the President of the Confederacy. Under the guiding hand of Pericles it became the head of a maritime empire, and the members of the League, instead of remaining independent constituents of a confederacy, taxed with their consent to contribute a war fund to police the Ægean, became tribute allies and subsequently subject allies within the jurisdiction of the most powerful state in the western world.

Pericles used the money of the Confederacy to embellish and adorn Athens until it became the most beautiful city in the world. Its ruins, after more than twenty-three centuries, still attract the interest and admiration of mankind. He planted colonies everywhere on the frontiers of civilization, on the shores of the Euxine, in Thrace, in Macedonia, in Italy and Sicily, and in Asia Minor. Thus he extended the commercial interests of Athens until the commerce of her rivals in Megara, in Corinth and elsewhere, in the Peloponnesus became insignificant in comparison. When the Dorian War began Athens was the richest city in Europe, and numbered among its subject and tributary allies more than a thousand cities and states from each of which it derived an annual income. This extensive

empire expanded and grew under the leadership of Pericles. In his last speech, replying to the final attack of his enemies, in the third year of the Peloponnesian War, he magnifies the glory of this vast empire, and while he admits it may have been unjustly acquired, told his countrymen that it was indeed worth fighting for. He reminded them that they were absolute masters of the sea, and had the power to extend their dominion wherever they pleased. "Neither the Great King, nor any nation on earth," he said, "can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. . . . You are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city, in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil. . . . For by this time your empire has become a tyranny, which, in the opinion of mankind, you may have unjustly gained, but which cannot safely be surrendered." [1]

Opinions differ as to the responsibility of Pericles for the Peloponnesian War. We must not lose sight of the fact that that disastrous conflict was waged to uphold Corinth, and avenge her wrongs. The Lacedæmonians had no special grievance. Indeed, during the fourteen years of peace under the treaty, the Lacedæmonians seem to have grown weary of war. Pericles became the warm personal friend of Archidamus, the Spartan King, who was not particularly eager for the conflict. But Corinth was in a bad way. Her commercial importance was gradually diminishing. Megara had been forbidden to enter Athenian ports. Corcyra had defeated her in her efforts to secure control of Epidamnus, and Potidea, her daughter city, had become a tribute ally of Athens. The Lacedæmonians must protect her against the power of the Athenians, or she would lose her importance as a commercial city,

[1] Thucyd. ii, 62, 63.

and her supremacy in the Corinthian gulf. The war, therefore, was fought mainly to preserve the commercial interests of Corinth.

If, therefore, we credit the facts as presented by Pericles in his War Speech, the Athenians were not to blame for bringing on the war. His argument as to the rectitude of the intention of the Athenians in the stand they took is unanswerable. He argued:

1. That the treaty provided that when differences arose between the contracting parties, they should be referred to arbitration.

2. That the Lacedæmonians never once asked to arbitrate any of the questions at issue.

3. That when the Athenians offered to submit the alleged grievances to arbitration, the Lacedæmonians refused to arbitrate.

4. That there should be a legal settlement of the questions at issue. That any claim imposed "on a neighbor and an equal, when there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery."

Then Pericles proposes to settle the differences between the contracting parties by yielding to the demands of the Spartans, if the latter would do likewise as follows:

1. That Athens will not exclude the Megarians from their markets, if the Lacedæmonians will not exclude foreigners, i. e., Athens or her allies, from Sparta, "for the treaty no more forbids one than the other."

2. That independence would be conceded to the cities that were independent when the treaty was made, just as soon as the Lacedæmonians would permit their subject states to be governed as they chose, and in their own interest.

3. That Athens would arbitrate all questions at issue.

4. That Athens would not begin war, but if attacked, will defend herself.

Upon what theory, then, can it be said that Pericles plunged his country into war? If the Peloponnesians had desired peace, and had offered to submit their differences to arbitration, it is fair to assume that an amicable settlement might have been reached and that the war might possibly have been averted. Although the Lacedæmonians made certain arbitrary demands upon the Athenians, we find no warrant in history for the assumption that the offer of the Athenians to arbitrate was even considered by the Lacedæmonians. Such offer certainly was never accepted. It would be unjust, therefore, in view of all the facts, to charge that Pericles made no effort to conciliate the Lacedæmonians. He offered to submit all questions in dispute to arbitration. What more could he do under the circumstances, and retain his dignity and self-respect?

Nor can it be successfully argued that Pericles was responsible for the war, because he sent back the herald sent at the last moment by Archidamus, without even hearing what the envoy had to say. The herald was sent by the Spartan King, when he was at the head of an invading army of 60,000 men, marching northward, having reached the borders of Attica. The herald sought Pericles when the enemy was at his door with arms in their hands. The war was actually begun. Pericles, therefore, was justified in believing that the motives of the enemy in sending the messenger were insincere, and that further parley would be fruitless.

Indeed, it is an open question whether the war would have begun at all, at that time, had not the selfish unpatriotic city of Thebes, the city that stood by the Persians when Hellas fought for independence, the city that furnished a friendly shelter for Mardonius, just before his overwhelming defeat at Platæa; had not Thebes planned a treacherous attack in the dead of night on that devoted city, solely because it was an ally of Athens.

PERICLES AS AN ORATOR

From the history of Thucydides, the only contemporary authority we have respecting the life and character of Pericles, the conclusion is justified that this gifted man, in addition to his many accomplishments, was also one of the great orators of antiquity. Thucydides has reported three speeches of Pericles. Doubtless, he heard all of them delivered, namely, the War Speech, made in the Public Assembly shortly before the commencement of the Peloponnesian War; the Funeral Oration, in memory of the dead, who had fallen during the first year of that memorable conflict, and his defense, in answer to the vicious and unfounded charges and accusations, which he deemed it prudent to answer, on his return from an expedition to the Peloponnesus and his attack on Epidaurus, in the second year of the war. Reference has already been made to the War Speech, and the argument presented on that occasion has been analyzed in discussing the question as to his responsibility for the Dorian War. That address, therefore, needs no further elaboration. His defense of his own conduct which resulted in his reinstatement to office, and his reelection as strategus has also been fully discussed. The Funeral Oration, his crowning effort, deserves more than a passing notice.

In point of excellence as an address suited to the dignity and solemnity of the occasion, it has never been surpassed, except by the immortal words of the great American, Abraham Lincoln, who spoke for five minutes at the memorial and dedicatory services on the historic field of Gettysburg.

An account of the heroism of the Greeks on the plains of Troy, and their adventures in distant lands, after the destruction of Priam's kingdom, as reflected in the fancy of Homer, and embalmed in the Iliad and

Odyssey, never failed to kindle the military ardor of Hellas, and for centuries furnished the canon of distinction among the descendants of those early heroes. The memory of their deeds inspired the courage of the men, who destroyed the might of Persia at Marathon and Thermopylæ, at Salamis and Platæa. The emulation of the example of Achilles inspired Alexander to conquer the world.

Pericles spoke nearly half a century after the Persian Wars of liberation. A fitting reference to the deeds of valor displayed by their ancestors, in those memorable contests was effective to stir the blood and arouse the patriotic ardor of his countrymen, awaken their interest and fix their attention.

In discharging the public duty conferred upon him in recognition of his great ability and intellectual attainments, Pericles, after referring to the law establishing the custom which required an oration at a public funeral, paid a graceful tribute to the achievements of his ancestors, without burdening his discourse with specific details. He then pronounced a eulogy on the laws and customs established under the Athenian constitution, and spoke of the glory of the Athenian Empire. He next referred to the virtues of the men who had given their lives for their country whose remains were being consigned to the tomb. Pericles then spoke comforting words to the parents of the dead who, he said, were to be comforted rather than pitied, and in praise of the sons and brothers of the departed. Referring to those in the assembly past middle life, the speaker expressed this graceful sentiment:

"To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honor alone is ever young, and not riches,

as some say, but honor is the delight of men when they are old and useless." [1]

It will be profitable to quote from the address of Pericles, in order to form a just estimate of his ability as an orator. The extracts given are from Jowett's admirable translation: [2]

"I will speak first of our ancestors," said Pericles, "for it is right and becoming that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valor they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigor of life, have chiefly done the work of improvement, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them."

After referring to the laws and constitution of his country and the greatness of Athens, which he said was the school of Hellas, he observed: "We have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valor and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for which these men nobly fought and died. They could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive would gladly toil on her behalf."

[1] Thucyd. ii, 44.
[2] Thucyd. ii, 36.

It was fitting to pay this tribute to Athens, and the men who fell in her defense. "For," said he, "in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them, whose virtues made her glorious." He then continued:

"I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonor always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present to her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres — I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone, but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not slight too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no

hope of a change for the better, has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death, striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope."

After the lapse of twenty-three centuries posterity will be able to judge somewhat of the character and attainments of this eminent man by the lofty thoughts and sentiments expressed in this address, spoken at the sepulchre of his countrymen who fell in battle. In the same way we may judge of the intense patriotism of Lincoln, who spoke to his countrymen when he took the oath at his first inauguration as President of the United States. He sought to arouse the patriotism of his countrymen and to persuade them not to make war. Like Pericles, he referred feelingly to the achievements of our ancestors:

"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, are the momentous issues of civil war. . . . We are not enemies but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break the bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriotic grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely as they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

Lincoln's Gettysburg address it is not necessary to quote. The nation knows it by heart. It will be sufficient to refer to the two closing sentences, containing the highest expression of patriotism to be found in literature, that they may be read in connection with the lofty thoughts of the Athenian statesman.

"It is rather for us, the living to be dedicated here,

to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that the Government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

The eminent American statesman and distinguished orator, Daniel Webster, says, that eloquence in the true sense of the word is born of circumstances. "It must exist, in the man, in the subject, and in the occasion. . . . It comes, if it comes at all, like the outbreaking of a fountain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires, with spontaneous original native force." In this connection we note that the circumstances under which Pericles and Lincoln spoke on the occasions referred to were in one respect wholly dissimilar. Lincoln could appeal to that patriotic sentiment, which had its genesis in the great struggle for independence, in which the names of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, of Bennington and Saratoga and Yorktown, suggested hallowed memories, which resulted in the birth of a great nation. He could appeal to "the mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land."

Pericles could not conjure with the mystic memories of united Hellas. It is true he sought to attain that lofty ideal when commissioners at his instigation were sent to every city and state in the Greek world to bring about political unity and cultivate Hellenic patriotism. But his efforts in that regard were defeated by the very men who disregarding the sacred ties of consanguinity, had taken up arms to destroy Athens. The

only concerted action among those of his race was born of necessity. It was brought about by Themistocles, who persuaded some of his countrymen to assemble in the temple of Poseidon, at Corinth, to devise ways and means to present a united front to repel the hosts of Xerxes which threatened the destruction of Greece. In this Themistocles was only partially successful. After the tide of Persian invasion was turned back at Salamis and Platæa, the various Greek states instead of forming a political union retained their autonomy and individuality with even greater tenacity, and refused to yield cohesion to a form of government which might have preserved their liberties in spite of Philip and Alexander.

There was no time during the administration of Pericles when he could appeal to a united country. When finally Sparta and her allies made war against Athens and her allies, Pericles was powerless to avert the disaster, and at the same time maintain the dignity and self-respect of the Athenians. When selfish interest threatened to disrupt and disintegrate the American union, it was still possible for Lincoln, the chosen head of the nation, to appeal to a common patriotism, and hallowed traditions. When people were excited and disturbed by visible preparation for the approaching conflict, it was yet possible for him to say when he took his oath as president of the United States, "in your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine are the momentous issues of civil war. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies." He could still appeal to the chords of memory, and the bonds of affection, and the better angels of our nature for three generations had not passed since the war for American independence was won.

When Pericles was called upon to address the survivors of those who had fallen in battle, in the great civil war in which his people were then engaged, there

were no facts or traditions, which a great patriotic orator could use to appeal to the warring factions, that could touch the tender chords of memory so as to cause a patriotic response, strong enough to heal the wounds opened by the sword. The selfish commercial interests of the cities and states of Hellas created jealousy and rivalry among them, which extinguished patriotism and made the political unity of Greece impossible.

CHAPTER XLII

ADVANCE IN LEARNING SINCE THE AGE OF PERICLES, A RETROSPECT — THEORY OF THE CREATION — DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY AMONG THE ANCIENTS — CONTINUITY AS VIEWED BY MODERN SCIENCE

THE ideas of the Greek poets and philosophers, in the age of Pericles, as to the creation, and the beginning of things, were exceedingly vague. The mysteries as to how man came upon this planet, as to his destiny, and as to how the earth itself came into existence, were taught to the initiated by the seers of Egypt in dreamy legends.

It is interesting to note the similarity in the story of the creation as narrated in the Hebrew Scriptures and the account given by Ovid, the Latin poet who flourished in the last century B. C., and early in the first century of our era. The account in Genesis declares: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. . . . And God said let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters. . . . And God said, let the waters under the heaven be gathered unto one place, and let the dry land appear."

Referring to the advent of man, that is, intellectual man, Moses, assuming he wrote the book of Genesis, says: "And God said let us make man in our image

after our likeness. . . . And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." This is equivalent to saying that the man thus created was an intellectual being, as distinguished from prehistoric man, who used fire, and made pictures on the rocks.

There is no evidence that Ovid ever read Genesis, yet the similarity in the description of the creation by Moses, and that written by Ovid in the Metamorphoses is, in some respects, marked. Thus Ovid writes:

"In the beginning, the sea, the earth, and the heaven which covers all was but one face of nature through the whole universe; which they called chaos; a rude and indigested mass; nor anything but a lifeless lump, and the disagreeing seeds of jarring elements confusedly jumbled together in the same heap. . . . The light fiery element of vaulted ethereal heaven shone out and mounted to the highest region. To this the air succeeds in lightness and place. The earth, still heavier, drew along with it the more ponderous elements, and was pressed together by its own weight. The circling waters sunk to the lowest place *and begirt the solid orb.*

"When thus he, whoever he was of the gods, had divided the mass, and by that division formed it into distinct members; first of all, that no inequality might be found in either side, he rolled up the earth into the figure of a *spacious globe.* He then commanded the seas to flow round and swell with raging winds; and to mark out shores upon the encompassed earth. He added also springs and immense standing pools and lakes, and bounded the running rivers by winding banks. These different in different places, are swallowed up by the earth itself; others carrying their waters to the sea, are there received into the plains of

the ample ocean, and beat the shores in place of banks." [1]

Ovid proceeds with a further description of the creation and then refers to the creation of man. "A more noble animal and capable of still higher faculties, formed for empire, and fit to rule over the rest, was yet wanting. . . . Man is born, fashioned after the image of the gods, who rule over all." [2]

We now approach a topic of absorbing interest. What knowledge had the ancients as to the foremost question discussed among men, since the morning of time — if a man die shall he live again? Where are the dead? Is the soul immortal? Phases of this sublime theme were discussed by Anaxagoras, who was honored by the friendship of Pericles, and who exercised great influence over the life and conduct of the Athenian statesmen.

Socrates, in his dialogue with Phædrus, refers directly to Pericles. "All the higher arts," says Socrates, "require much discussion and lofty contemplation of nature. This is the source of sublimity and perfect comprehensive power. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his happening to know Anaxagoras. He was imbued with the higher philosophy, and

[1] Ante mare et tellus, et quod tegit omnia, coelum,
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos; rudis indigestaque moles;
Nec quicquam, nisi pondus iners; congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.
. . . . . .
Circumfluus humor,
Ultima possedit, solidumque coercuit orbem.
Sic ubi disposidam, quisquis fuit ille Deorum,
Congeriem secuit, sectamque in membra redegit;
Principio terram, ne non æqualis ab omni
Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis.

[2] Natus homo est, ...
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

attained to the knowledge of mind and matter, which was the favorite theme of Anaxagoras, and hence he drew what was applicable to his art."

Pericles was familiar with the doctrine of immortality taught by Pythagoras, the Samian. The Egyptians believed themselves to be the most ancient of mankind, and Herodotus (ii, 123) declares that they were the first to advance the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. They believed "that when the body perishes, the soul enters into some other animal, constantly springing into existence, and when it has passed through the different kinds of terrestrial, marine and aerial beings, it again enters into the body of man," and that this transmigration from man to man again, is made in three thousand years. This belief is known as the doctrine of metempsychosis.

Diodorus, in his introduction to the Eighteenth Book of his history, declares that Pythagoras, and some others of the ancient philosophers, taught this doctrine, and held that men were able to foretell future events when the soul was parting from the body. On this point he cites Homer who declares that Hector when he was dying foretold the death of Achilles. Diodorus says also that Pythagoras learned his mysterious and sacred expressions, the art of geometry, arithmetic, and the "Transmigration of Souls" in Egypt.

Socrates was forty years old when Pericles passed from scenes of earth, but as he did not discourse upon the subject of immortality until late in life, it may be regarded as certain, that Pericles never heard the views expressed by Socrates on this important subject. The dialogue with Meno is said to contain the first expression of Socrates on this absorbing topic. He discusses it also with Phædrus. Both of these discussions took place before he was tried and condemned for heresy. His most impressive discourses, however, were after

that event, and his talk with Phædo was on the last day of his life, B. C. 399, immediately before his demise. In view of the fact that Socrates refers to the expressions of poets and philosophers, Pindar among others, whose teachings and writings were known to Pericles, it may be profitable to refer briefly to some of his teachings, which have been preserved to posterity in the works of Plato, his most distinguished pupil, who listened to his discourses under the palm trees on the banks of the Ilissus, and also in the prison, where Socrates awaited his execution. Among his disciples, also, was Xenophon, the distinguished soldier, who led the Greeks out of Asia, after the death of the younger Cyrus at Cunaxa, and who wrote the memoirs of his illustrious preceptor.

In his talk with Meno, Socrates observed that there have been poets, such as Pindar, and other inspired men, who spoke of things divine, and who say that the soul of man is immortal. "The soul, then, being immortal," he said, "and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in this world, or in the world below, has knowledge of them all. It is, therefore, no wonder that the soul should be able to call to remembrance all that it ever knew about virtues and about everything. For as all nature is akin, and as the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in the soul eliciting, or as men say, learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous and does not faint. For all inquiry and learning is but memory or recollection."

In his dialogue with Phædrus, Socrates states in somewhat modified form, the doctrine of metempsychosis: "Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from whence it came. For it cannot grow its wings in less. Only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true; or the soul of a lover, who is not without philosophy, may acquire wings in

the third recurring period of a thousand years. And if they choose this life three times in succession, then they have their wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished. Others to some place in heaven, whither they are lightly borne by justice. There they live in a manner worthy of the life they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years, the good souls, and also the evil souls both come and cast lots, and choose their second life, and they may take any that they like. And then the soul of the man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast again into the man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For man ought to have intelligence, as they say, according to the species, proceeding from many particulars of sense, to one conception of reason. And this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with God — when looking down from above on that which we now call being, and upwards towards the true being. And, therefore, the mind of the philosopher alone has wings. And this is just. For according to the measure of his abilities, he always clings in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what he is. He who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries, and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests, and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; for they do not see that he is inspired."

In the dialogue with Phædo on the last day of his life, he thus discourses on death and immortality. "All experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul

in herself must behold all things in themselves. Then, I suppose, that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom; not while we live, but after death as the argument shows. For if while in company with the body the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of the two things seems to follow, either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. In this present life I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge, when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure, and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure."

In his Apology, delivered after his conviction, shortly before he drank the fatal hemlock, he says: "Either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. . . . Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. . . .

"But if death is the journey to another place, as there as men say all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If, indeed, when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Ehadamanthus and Æacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous

in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Museaus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment. And there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; I shall find out who is wise and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O Judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women, too! What infinnite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true."

The teachings which were instilled into the mind of Xenophon by his illustrious preceptor are set forth in the words which Xenophon puts in the mouth of Cyrus the Great when he is about to die. "I can never be persuaded," said the Persian monarch, "that the soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal body, and that it dies on its separation, for I see that the soul communicates vigor and motion to mortal bodies during its continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded that the soul is divested of intelligence on its separation from this gross senseless body. But it is possible that when the soul is separated, it becomes pure and entire, and then is more intelligent. It is evident that, on man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the soul. That

alone is invisible, both during its presence here, and at its departure."

Whoever would believe, in the resurrection of the dead, must walk by faith and not by sight. The solution of this riddle has baffled and continues to baffle scientific investigation. The latest utterance on the subject from a purely scientific standpoint is set forth in an address delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge, at Birmingham, England, before the most distinguished body of scientists in the world.[1]

In the language of science the doctrine of immortality is embraced in the idea of continuity. "Occurrences now regarded as occult," said Sir Oliver, "can be examined and reduced to order by the methods of science, carefully and persistently applied. . . . Already the facts so examined have convinced me that memory and affection are not limited to that association with matter, by which alone they can manifest themselves here and now, and that personality persists beyond bodily death.

"The evidence, to my mind," he declared, "goes to prove that discarnate intelligence under certain conditions may interact with us on the material side . . . and we may hope to attain some understanding of the nature of a larger, perhaps ethereal existence, and of the conditions regulating intercourse across the chasm. . . . I cannot imagine the exertion of mechanical force across empty space, no matter how minute; a continuous medium seems to me essential. I cannot admit discontinuity in either space or time, nor can I imagine any sort of experiment which would justify such a hypothesis. For surely we must realize that we know nothing experimental of either space or time, we cannot modify them in any way."

[1] This most interesting contribution as to scientific research, was delivered September 10, 1913. The above extracts are from the report in the New York *Herald* of September 11, 1913.

He declares that it is impossible to account for all things by rules of applied science. Science cannot account for many things in the realm of metaphysics — in the dominion of the supernatural. "They account for things up to a point," he observed. "They account in part for the color of a sunset, for the majesty of a mountain peak, for the glory of animate existence. But do they account for everything completely? Do they account for our own feeling of joy and exaltation, for our sense of beauty, for the manifest beauty existing throughout nature? Do not these things suggest something higher and nobler and more joyous, something for the sake of which all the struggle for existence goes on?

"Surely there must be a deeper meaning involved in natural objects. Orthodox explanations are only partial, though true as far as they go. When we examine each parti-colored pinnule in a peacock's tail, or hair in a zebra's hide, and realize that the varying shades on each are so placed as to contribute to the general design and pattern, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain how this organized coöperation of parts, this harmonious distribution of pigment cells, has come about on merely mechanical principles.

"The mechanism whereby existence entrenches itself is manifest, or at least has been to a large extent discovered. Natural selection is a vera causa, so far as it goes; but if so much beauty is necessary for insects, what about the beauty of a landscape or of clouds? What utilitarian object do those observe? Beauty in general is not taken into account by science. Very well, that may be all right but it exists nevertheless. It is not my function to discuss it.

"No; but it is my function to remind you and myself that our studies do not exhaust the universe, and that if we dogmatize in a negative direction, and say that we can reduce everything to physics and chemis-

try, we gibbet ourselves as ludicrously narrow pedants, and are falling far short of the richness and fulness of our human birthright.

"But if we have learned from science that evolution is real, we have learned a great deal. I must not venture to philosophize, but certainly from the point of view of science evolution is a great reality. Surely evolution is not an illusion; surely the universe progresses in time. Time and space and matter are abstractions, but are none the less real; they are data given by experience, and time is the keystone of evolution. 'Thy centuries follow each other, perfecting a small wildflower.' . . .

"Either we are immortal beings or we are not. We may not know our destiny, but we must have a destiny of some sort. Those who make denials are just as likely to be wrong as those who make assertions; in fact, denials are assertions thrown into negative form. Scientific men are looked up to as authorities and should be careful not to mislead. Science may not be able to reveal human destiny, but it certainly should not obscure it. . . .

"We cannot really and seriously suppose that truth began to arrive on this planet a few centuries ago. The prescientific insight of genius — of poets and prophets and saints — was of supreme value, and the access of those inspired seers to the heart of the universe was profound. But the camp followers, the Scribes and Pharisees, by whatever name they may be called, had no such insight, only a vicious or foolish obstinacy; and the prophets of a new era were stoned.

"Now at last we of the new era have been victorious, we inherit the fruits of the age-long conflict and the stones are in our hands. Let us not fall into the old mistake of thinking that ours is the only way of exploring the multifarious depths of the universe and that all others are worthless and mistaken. The universe is a larger thing than we have any conception of, and no one method of search will exhaust its treasures.

"Men and brethren, we are trustees of the truth of the physical universe as scientifically explored. Let us be faithful to our trust.

"Genuine religion has its roots deep down in the heart of humanity and in the reality of things. It is not surprising that by our methods we fail to grasp it; the actions of the Deity make no appeal to any special sense, only a universal appeal, and our methods are, as we know, incompetent to detect complete uniformity. There is a principle of relativity here, and unless we encounter flaw or jar or change, nothing in us responds. We are deaf and blind therefore to the imminent grandeur around us unless we have insight enough to appreciate the whole, and to recognize in the woven fabric of existence flowing steadily from the loom in an infinite progress toward perfection, the ever-growing garment of a transcendent God."

But the continual advance in the domain of physical science is daily opening new vistas over new fields of discovery. Nature from time to time yields her secrets. But nature has no secrets with respect to the destiny of the human soul. Nothing has thus far been revealed by scientific research, which justifies the assumption, that an answer will be found to the inquiry, where are the dead. From remote antiquity we hear the positive declaration, there are no dead. The postulate of survival after death was taught for centuries in Egypt, in what is known as the doctrine of metempsychosis, which was introduced in Greece by Pythagoras, who declared that his soul inhabited the body of Euphorbus during the Trojan War, whose actions he claimed to have remembered. This belief assumes that the soul, at death, passes into other beings, not necessarily human, until after the lapse of centuries it is again reincarnated in the body of man. Modern philosophy,

which is not satisfied to walk by faith, but seeks tangible evidence, has rejected the doctrine of the soul's migration through the bodies of animals.

The search for evidence has yielded to the scientist no tangible results, but speculative philosophy, while assuming that the soul is immortal, continues to press the inquiry, shall we carry with us into some other state of existence our conscious identity? In our day the speculative philosopher, Maurice Maeterlinck, while fascinated with the grand idea of immortality, loves to indulge in speculation as to our destiny in its new environment in another world. He assumes that there is no good reason to justify the belief, that in the other life, we should not advance, rather than retain the emotions and desires which we indulge in here during our mundane existence. In his recent book, "Our Eternity," he rejects the theory of annihilation. In this connection he observes: "If death carries us to nothingness, did birth then, draw us out of that same nothingness? Why should the second be more impossible than the first?" He assumes, therefore, that there are two eternities, that before birth, as well as that after death. There are three mysteries which the mind of man, unaided by divine revelation has never been able to solve. We know not whence we came, nor for what reason we are here, nor whither we go. If the soul of the individual has existed from all eternity, it is, in this life, unconscious of any prior existence, through which it may have passed, notwithstanding the testimony of Pythagoras who claimed that he remembered his conduct on the plains of Troy where his soul inhabited the body of Euphorbus, who fought with the hosts of Agamemnon.

New wonders also are being constantly revealed in the physical world. The philosophers and sages of antiquity never dreamed that scientific investigation would result in discoveries which when atmospheric conditions are favorable, would enable one to practically listen to the ticking of a clock across the ocean 3,850 miles away. Wireless telegraphy was the latest wonder of the twentieth century. On the 21st day of November, 1913, for the first time in scientific annals by means of radio telgraphy, an expert operator in the naval observatory at the Arlington radio station at Washington, D. C., was able to compare the ticking of a clock with the ticking of another clock, in the national observatory at the Eiffel Tower station in Paris, France. The radio signals or aerograms were dispatched from America to Europe in the fraction of a second.

The object of this latest scientific achievement was to determine the difference in longitude on the earth's surface between the two places, and measure the velocity of projection of radio signals through space. The telegram and the cablegram made possible only by the intervention of wires and cables, have been superseded by the aerogram which darts through space with the velocity of light, surpassing the velocity of sound, and has rendered wires and cables no longer necessary.

Hertzian waves have been discovered. "With them," says Camille Flammarion, the distinguished French scientist, "disappears the complicated apparatus of wires, poles and cables. It was soon perceived that these marvelous waves, which are propagated in every direction, which traverse the thickest walls and surround us invisibly with a subtle reservoir of untranslated thoughts, can be easily held captive. The receiving apparatus is simplified to such an extent that to-day ingenious young fellows construct at very small expense delightful detectors, with which they receive surreptitiously the radio-telegraphic messages of the Eiffel Tower.

"This has even become an amusement in which many Parisians take part. One hears with curiosity the tick-

tacs, short or long, which are sounded in the little receiving apparatus and feels a strange emotion in thinking that at the same moment — or almost within a few hundredths of a second — this same ticking is heard in Washington, 62,000 kilometres (3,850 miles) from Paris; in the solitude of the seas by ships which voyage between the Old and the New Continent; and at immense distances in Europe and Africa. It is like a mysterious voice which whispers the same word across space and establishes a tacit accord between all those who hear it, unknown to each other."

In this connection it will be interesting to note the advance which has been made in the science of anatomy and physiology since the age of Pericles. Prior to the time of Aristotle, who was born nearly a century after Pericles, the human body was a locked body. With regard to the functions of the vital organs little was known. Scholars and philosophers knew nothing of the functions of the heart, with respect to its action in pumping the blood. It was obvious that the blood did not remain stagnant in the body, but the learned knew comparatively nothing more about it. Aristotle believed that the blood was generated by the food in the liver, and was thence carried to the heart, and from that organ was sent through the veins. As to the arteries, he supposed they only carried air. Galen, in the second century of our era, discovered that the arteries carried the blood, as well as vital air or spirit. But it was not till nearly the middle of the seventeenth century that William Harvey (1578-1657) discovered the manner in which the blood circulated in the body.

These observations are interesting, in view of the wonderful discoveries of the present century. Human ingenuity has invented an instrument whereby it is possible to look through opaque substances, and through the human body as if it were glass, and observe its internal mechanism in perfect harmonious action. X-ray

photography was the first means discovered to enable the scientist to look through living flesh. Radiography enabled the surgeon to photograph the vital organs; but to do this subjected the patient to exposure for such a length of time as to operate disastrously on the living tissues. An apparatus was discovered called a reinforcing screen, which greatly reduced the time required. Finally M. Dessauer invented a method, securing the desired results, without the reinforcing screen, by means of a Ruhmkorff coil, which enables the operator to photograph the internal organs of the body in a fraction of a second. "These photographs can be thrown upon a screen," says one of our distinguished scientists,[1] "and the time is at hand when we shall see upon a screen the entire internal mechanism of a human body in full action. Then physiology will be taught by sight, and not by books, and physicians themselves will learn things about these bodies of ours, of which, perhaps, they have never learned."

[1] Mr. Garrett P. Serviss, in the *New York American*, February, 1914.

THE END

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